THIRD DIVISION
|
FELIPE REGIS, JR., Petitioner, - versus - THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and AGAPITO GARCIA, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 153914
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: July 31,
2007 |
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D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
This
is a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals, dated
The Facts
The
present petition stems from two separate ejectment cases involving the same
parties, albeit at different times, in two different branches of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
The
first, Civil Case No. II-236, entitled “Felipe
Regis and Genoviva Garcia v. Agapito Garcia,” was a complaint for forcible
entry, filed with the MTCC, Branch II,
[T]he Court, finds that the defendant [Garcia] is a possessor and owner in fee simple of a residential lot along the former shorelines of Cabili Avenue, Iligan City. That [the] defendant [Garcia] possessed a parcel of land of about 200 square meters since 1947 (sic). x x x Sometime in 1973, the government[,] upon seeing the area to have been developed and reclaimed from the sea, it surveyed the area and opened it for disposition and alienation under the Miscellaneous Sales System. Defendant [Garcia] filed his Miscellaneous Sales Application for the entire 200 sq. meters he reclaimed [which] was eventually awarded to him. That sometime in the year 1970[,] a certain Delvo had filed an adverse claim over the same property in issue but, the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the defendant [Garcia] herein over said parcel wherein the claim of herein plaintiff [Regis] is part.
x x x x
Further, defendant’s [Garcia] possession of this land in issue started before 1950 while the plaintiff enter[ed] the scene later, having purchased the rights of the defendant’s [Garcia] father over the portion, defendant’s [Garcia] father [had] occupied and claimed [as his] own.
Finally, the Court, opined that the
issue here could be settled by determining the true boundaries of each lot
claimed by party-litigants. But, even if this Court would do so yet, the action
of this Court, would [be] an effort in futility[,] the matter of ownership on
the entire portion of land claimed by defendant [Garcia] having been passed
over (sic) by the Regional Trial Court and lately was awarded by the government
to defendant [Garcia] under Miscellaneous Sales Application.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Court hereby opine[s] that plaintiff [Regis] had failed to prove any cause of
action against defendant [Garcia], hence, the Court hereby order[s] the
Dismissal of the case for [having] no cause of action.
SO ORDERED.
No
appeal was taken from this decision.
The
second case, entitled “Agapito Garcia v.
Felipe Regis, Junior and the Members of His Family,” docketed as Civil Case
No. 1-429 in the MTCC, Branch 01, Iligan City, was for ejectment, filed by
Agapito Garcia (Garcia), respondent herein.
In its Decision[4] dated
Garcia
appealed the
On
the findings of the lower court, it would appear that the herein
plaintiff-appellant [Garcia] took possession, ahead of anybody else, including
the defendant-appellee [Regis] of the 200 square meters, wherein the disputed
area of 40 square meters is merely a portion.
Even granting arguendo that the appellee [Regis] was in possession of the
property before the alleged forcible entry was filed in 1989, the appellant [Garcia]
was already there long before the intrusion of the 40 square meters which is a
portion of the whole 200 square meters, earlier applied for by the appellant [Garcia].
x x x x
In the case at bar, and in addition
to the findings of the lower court in Civil Case No. II-236, appellant [Garcia]
took possession of the property in 1946 (Exhibit “A”) and introduced improvements
thereon. To strengthen his hold on the property he filed a Sales Application
(Exhibit “D”) in 1973 and declared it for taxation purposes (Exhibit “C”) in
1973.
On the other hand, the documentary
evidence shown by the appellee [Regis], i.e., Declaration of Real Property
(Exhibits “3-B” and “3-C”) were secured only very recently or in October 1993
and June 1986[,] respectively. The two (2) tax receipts were issued only on
Evidently the appellant [Garcia] has
indeed occupied the property way ahead of the parents of the appellee [Regis]
and much earlier than the appellee [Regis] himself.
In sum, the Court believes that plaintiff-appellant [Garcia] is the rightful possessor of the lot in dispute and that defendant-appellee [Regis] being an intruder and deforciant should be ordered to restore the lot to the plaintiff-appellant [Garcia].
Aggrieved,
Regis filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals (CA) docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
57003, praying for the reinstatement in
toto of the MTCC Decision dated
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 3 in Civil Case No. 4607, reversing the judgment
in Civil Case No 1-236 (sic) rendered by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 1, Iligan City, and ordering the petitioner [Regis] to remove the
structures and to vacate the property in dispute is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
A
motion for reconsideration was filed by Regis but the same was denied by the CA
in a Resolution[7] dated
The Issues to be Resolved
On
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NO
JURISDICTION IN DECIDING CA-G.R. SP NO. 57003, AN APPEALED FORCIBLE ENTRY CASE
(ILIGAN CITY MTCC 1-429) AS AN ACCION
PUBLICIANA, AND SAID COURT ALSO
VIOLATED PETITIONER’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (Pages 6-11) TO
(a) Due Process (Pages 8 to 9) and,
(b) To a day in Court (Pages 10-11)
II
[THE CA ERRED] IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT GARCIA WAS IN “PRIOR POSSESSION” OF THE 40 SQUARE METER LOT IN QUESTION SINCE HIS FATHER, DEMETRIO GARCIA OCCUPIED IT IN 1946 AND PETITIONER FELIPE REGIS JR. AND HIS PARENTS TOOK POSSESSION ONLY IN 1962 (Pages 11 to 19)[9]
The Ruling of the Court
The
petition is devoid of merit.
I
At
the outset, we reiterate that the special civil action for certiorari cannot be availed of even if it is based upon lack of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion when the remedy of appeal is available.[10] Certiorari is proper only if there is no
appeal, or when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.[11] Regis
cannot invoke the extraordinary writ of certiorari
as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.
Regis
filed the present petition for certiorari
on
Before
finally concluding this matter, the records of this case clearly show the
compliance by respondent [Garcia] with the requisites, as aforementioned, in
commencing the ejectment proceedings before the court a quo. In this regard, We take note of the MTCC’s observations to
be quite significant:
“(W)hether or not defendant’s (sic) [Regis]
have the right to occupy the said area, this issue is irrelevant to ejectment
cases considering that this is now a question of who has a better right of
possession, hence a proper case of accion
publiciana. To the mind of the court, plaintiff’s [Garcia] remedy in the
instant case is to file an action for the recovery of ownership or accion reinvidicatoria [which also
includes the recovery of possession][.]
Granting ex argumenti that the previously quoted comment made by the court a quo is correct, there is no reason for this Court to dismiss the present case based on the alleged error of the respondent [Garcia] in not filing an accion publiciana. To do so would only result in a senseless re-litigation of the same matter and the issues that is now before Us. As an appellate court, We can rule on the same issues based on the same set of evidence had it been an accion publiciana the respondent [Garcia] commenced before the proper RTC, and the results would have been no different.[12]
A
cursory reading of the CA Decision would reveal that it did not decide the
forcible entry case as accion publiciana.
The CA only commented on the observation of the RTC that it would have been better
if Garcia filed an accion publiciana instead
of a complaint for forcible entry. This
is a legitimate comment of the appellate court on the discussion in the RTC
decision.
A
complaint for forcible entry may be brought within a year from unlawful
dispossession before a municipal trial court in a summary proceeding.[13]
This summary action is for the recovery of physical possession only. Title or
ownership over the property is not in issue.
However, when the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the same, then the issue of ownership shall be resolved in order to decide the
issue of possession.[14] The judgment rendered shall be conclusive
with respect to possession only, shall not bind the title or affect the
ownership of the property, and shall not bar an action between the same parties
respecting title to the land or building.[15]
In
an action for forcible entry, whether or not the person occupying the property
has the right to occupy the same is not important. What is essential is that the
party filing the case be able to prove that his peaceful physical possession of
the property was arbitrarily intruded by another. The rationale for this remedy
is that a person who is in peaceful possession of property must not be ejected
therefrom by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. A person who
believes that he has a right of possession over a certain property that is in
the hands of another must not take the law into his own hands. He cannot just
barge in and take the property that is actually occupied by another.
A year after the unlawful dispossession
of property, the aggrieved party may file an accion publiciana. The better right to possession, as distinguished
from the right to physical possession, is litigated in this plenary action[16] as
an ordinary civil proceeding in the RTC.
Recovery
of ownership, which includes the right to possession over real property, can be
commenced through an accion reivindicatoria.
The action is filed in the RTC.
On
the issue of whether or not an action for forcible entry can be treated as accion publiciana, we rule in the
negative. Forcible entry is distinct from accion
publiciana. First, forcible entry should be filed within one year from the
unlawful dispossession of the real property, while accion publiciana is filed a year after the unlawful dispossession
of the real property. Second, forcible entry is concerned with the issue of the
right to the physical possession of the real property; in accion publiciana, what is subject of litigation is the better
right to possession over the real property. Third, an action for forcible entry
is filed in the municipal trial court and is a summary action, while accion publiciana is a plenary action in
the RTC.[17]
In
the instant case, the CA acted within its jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
judgment. To repeat, the CA did not treat the forcible entry case as an accion publiciana. What was litigated before the appellate court was the very same case for
forcible entry initiated at the MTCC. Not
being a new case, petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of due process
or denied his day in court. Furthermore,
Regis, after appealing his case to the CA and having taken part in the
proceedings therein, is estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of such
tribunal after receiving an unfavorable judgment.
II
The
issue of who had prior possession over the disputed property that is located at
Del Mar St.,
The
Court takes judicial notice of the Decision of MTCC, Branch II,
WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the
conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O
N
Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis, with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Eliezer R. De Los Santos, concurring; rollo, pp. 25-34.
[2] Rollo, p. 56.
[3] Penned by Judge Ayonan M. Aguam; id. at 208-209.
[4] Penned by Judge Albert B. Abragan;
id. at 210- 214.
[5] Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon, entitled “Agapito Garcia v. Felipe Regis Junior and the Members of His Family,” id. at 215-219.
[6] Rollo, pp. 25-34.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004, 436 SCRA 123, 127.
[11] RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Section 1.
[12] Rollo, p. 33.
[13] Bishop
of
[14] RULES OF COURT, Rule 70, Section 16.
[15] RULES OF COURT, Rule 70, Section 18.
[16]
[17] Bishop
of
[18] Hko
Ah Pao v. Ting, G.R. No. 153476,
[19] Ariem v. Hon. de los Angeles, etc., et al., 151 Phil. 440, 445 (1973).