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RODELIA S. FUNGO,
Petitioner, -versus- Respondents. |
G.R. No. 152531 Present: pUNO, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Challenged
in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, are the Decision[1]
dated
Rodelia S. Fungo, petitioner, alleged
in her petition that on
In January 1996, petitioner’s
husband, Nicolas Fungo, an elementary school teacher in the same school, was dismissed
from the service because of his low performance rating. According to petitioner, her husband’s
services were terminated because of his statement during a faculty meeting that
the
Petitioner then wrote respondent Fr.
Bustamante questioning the performance rating given to her husband. She attached to her letter documents containing
the summary of efficiency ratings of all the teachers. She retrieved these documents from the filing
cabinet.
On
On
Petitioner
further alleged in her petition that in the morning of
On
Respondents,
in their answer, denied the allegations in the complaint, contending that petitioner
voluntarily submitted her resignation letter on
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby entered in favor of complainant and
against respondents, ordering the latter, jointly and severally, as follows:
1.
To pay the sum of P316,187.00 as backwages of complainant from P58,292.60 which
was paid to her in advance;
2.
To pay another sum of P21,806.00 as mandatory 13th
month pay of the complainant for two years, 1996 and 1997; and
3.
To immediately reinstate complainant to her former or equivalent
position under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to her dismissal
or separation, or, at the option of the employer, to reinstate her name in the
payroll, also under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to her
dismissal or separation. Provided;
however, that should reinstatement be no longer feasible due to any intervening
event, respondents are further ordered to pay the separation pay of complainant
equivalent to her one (1) month salary per year of service, a fraction of six
(6) months considered as one (1) year without qualification or deduction in
addition to her backwages. All other
issues or claims are hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On appeal, the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), in its Decision dated
Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but the NLRC denied the same in its Resolution[5] dated
Petitioner seasonably filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, contending that the NLRC committed grave abuse
of discretion in ruling that she resigned voluntarily. On
follows:
A painstaking examination of the records leads this Court to conclude that petitioner cannot that easily be intimidated into tendering her resignation for a simple reason that she was facing a financial trauma out of the dismissal of her husband. If she was of honest heart and belief that she has every right to hold and maintain her position and employment as secretary, she could have fought off the imposing threats she alleges to have been given by Fr. Remirez and simply turned down the latter’s offer. In fact, she would even have a better standing in court if she was terminated by her employers rather than executing a resignation letter and later on claim that such was only resorted to because of undue intimidation of her superior. Indubitably, it is the petitioner’s word now against the word of Fr. Remirez that she was pressured into resigning by the latter.
Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration. However, it was denied by the appellate
court in its Resolution dated
Hence,
this petition.
The
primordial issue for our resolution is whether the petitioner was constructively
dismissed from the service.
The
petition is impressed with merit.
It
is a well-established rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought
before it from the Court of Appeals via
Rule 45 of the same Rules is limited to reviewing errors of law.[6] This Court is not a trier of facts. In the
exercise of its power of review, the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals
are conclusive and binding. Thus, it is
not the function of this Court to analyze and weigh the evidence all over
again.[7]
In
the instant case, however, we have to determine the appellate court’s findings
of facts since they contradict those of the Labor Arbiter.
After a careful scrutiny of the
records, we agree with the Labor Arbiter that petitioner was constructively
dismissed from employment.
Respondents argue that petitioner’s
act of retrieving the document from the files inside the rector’s office was
improper and constituted a willful breach of the trust reposed upon her by Fr.
Bustamante. Such breach of trust is a
just cause for terminating her services.
To be a valid ground for dismissal,
loss of trust and confidence must be based on a willful breach of trust and
founded on clearly established facts. A
breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without
justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly,
thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently.
It must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer’s
arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion. Otherwise, the employee would eternally remain
at the mercy of the employer.[8] Loss of confidence must not be
indiscriminately used as a shield by the employer against a claim that the
dismissal of an employee was arbitrary.
And, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act
complained of must be work-related and shows that the employee concerned is
unfit to continue working for the employer.[9]
In Nokom
v. National Labor Relations Commission,[10] we
set the guidelines for the application of loss of confidence as a just cause
for dismissing an employee from the service, thus:
a.
loss of confidence should not be
simulated;
b. it should not
be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified;
c. it may not be arbitrarily asserted in the
face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; and
d. it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought
to justify earlier action taken in bad faith.
In the instant case, Fr. Bustamante
entrusted to petitioner various documents in his office. She could take any document from the filing
cabinet inside his office. While she retrieved
documents pertaining to the efficiency ratings of all teachers in the school
for the year 1990-1991, such act did not constitute a breach of trust and
confidence since she did not show those documents to any other person except to
Fr. Bustamante himself. Significantly, he
did not dispute the fact that petitioner had access to the records.
When
petitioner asked Fr. Bustamante why her husband’s performance rating was low, Fr.
Remirez summoned her to his office and urged her to tender her resignation
within 30 minutes. He threatened her
that if she would not resign, her separation pay would be forfeited. These circumstances glaringly show that
respondents wanted to terminate her employment, but they made it appear that
she voluntarily resigned.
Resignation
is the voluntary act of employees who are compelled by personal reasons to disassociate
themselves from their employment. It
must be done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the
act of abandonment.[11] It would have been illogical therefore for
the petitioner to resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal.
Resignation is
inconsistent with the filing of the complaint.[12]
An
examination of the records of this case convinced us that petitioner was indeed
made to resign against her will with threat that she will not be given her
separation pay should she fail to do so.
Clearly, her consent was vitiated.
Indeed, it is very unlikely that petitioner, who worked in the school
for almost fifteen (15) years, would simply resign voluntarily. Her receipt of the benefits could be
considered as an act of self preservation, taking into consideration the
financial predicament she and her family were then facing.
Thus,
we rule that petitioner was constructively dismissed from her employment. There
is constructive dismissal if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or
disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that
it would foreclose any choice by him except to forego her continued employment.[13] It exists where there is cessation of work
because “continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely,
as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay.”[14] Respondent Fr. Bustamante claimed that he
had lost trust and confidence in petitioner.
Under this circumstance, coupled with Fr. Remirez’s
threat that she would not be given her separation pay, petitioner was compelled
to resign.
Petitioner’s
intention to leave the school, as well as her act of relinquishment, is not
present in the instant case. On the
contrary, she vigorously pursued her complaint against respondents. It is a clear
manifestation that she had no intention of relinquishing her employment. That Fr. Remirez convinced her to resign or
else she will not receive her separation pay obviously shows that respondents
wanted to get rid of her under the guise of voluntary resignation.
Under
Article 279 of the Labor Code, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Considering, however, that the nature of
petitioner’s work requires constant interaction with Fr. Bustamante, their
working relationship has been strained.
Thus, the payment of separation pay and other benefits in lieu of reinstatement
is in order. A more equitable disposition would be an award of separation pay
equivalent to at least one month pay, or one month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher, with a fraction of at least six (6) months being
considered as one (1) whole year.[15]
In
fine, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that petitioner
voluntarily resigned from employment.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 59424 are REVERSED. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter is hereby REINSTATED
with MODIFICATION in the sense that respondents are ordered to pay petitioner
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of
service rendered, plus full backwages and other privileges and benefits, or their
monetary equivalent, computed from her dismissal until the finality of this
Decision. From these amounts shall be
deducted the separation pay she
already received in advance.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice Chairperson |
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RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
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CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
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Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner (retired, now Commissioner of the COMELEC) and concurred in by Associate Justice Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador; rollo, pp. 42-49.
[2] Annex “C” of the Petition; id., p. 51.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Go v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 158922,
[7]
[8] Fujitsu Computer Corporation of
the
[9]
[10] G.R. No. 140043,
[11] EMCO Plywood Corporation v. Abelgas, G.R. No. 148532,
[12]
[13] Philippines Employ Services and
Resources, Inc. v. Paramio, G.R. No. 144786,
[14]
[15] Hodieng
Concrete Products v. Emilia, G.R. No. 149180,