EN BANC
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ROMEO G. ROXAS and Petitioners, -
versus - ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE
ZUZUARREGUI, PACITA JAVIER, ELIZABETH R. GONZALES, JOSEFINA R. DAZA, ELIAS
REYES, NATIVIDAD REYES, TERESITA REYES, JOSE REYES and ANTONIO REYES, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - x ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE
ZUZUARREGUI, PACITA JAVIER, ELIZABETH R. GONZALES, JOSEFINA R. DAZA, ELIAS
REYES, NATIVIDAD REYES, TERESITA REYES, JOSE REYES and ANTONIO REYES, Petitioners, -versus- THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, JOSE B. H.
PEDROSA, ROMEO G. ROXAS and Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 152072 G.R. No.
152104 Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,* CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CARPIO
MORALES, AZCUNA,
TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO,
JR. and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: July 12, 2007 |
x- - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- x
PER CURIAM:
Self-approbation, pride and
self-esteem should not erode and dim the luster and dignity of this Court. Against overweening bluster and
superciliousness, nay, lordly claim, this Court must stand steadfast, unmoved
and uncompromising in upholding what is right and proper. In such posture, the mandate of affording
every man the equal protection of the law cannot dwindle. Strict adherence to ethical conduct and
righteousness without veering away from responsibility will foster an
impregnable respect, deference and even reverence to this Court’s decisions and
pronouncements.
In a Resolution[1]
dated 26 September 2006, the Court En Banc ordered Atty. Romeo G. Roxas to explain in writing why he should not be held in
contempt of court and subjected to disciplinary action when he, in a letter[2]
dated 13 September 2006 addressed to Associate Justice Minita
V. Chico-Nazario with copies thereof furnished the
Chief Justice and all the other Associate Justices, intimated that Justice Nazario decided G.R. No. 152072 and No.
152104 on considerations other than the pure merits of the case, and called the
Supreme Court a “dispenser of injustice.”
The letter of Atty. Roxas reads in part:
As
an officer of the court, I am shocked beyond my senses to realize that such
a wrongful and unjust decision has been rendered with you no less as the ponente. This terrible decision will go down in the annals
of jurisprudence as an egregious example of how the Supreme Court, supposedly
the last vanguard and bulwark of justice is itself made, wittingly or
unwittingly, as a party to the wrongdoing by giving official and judicial
sanction and conformity to the unjust claims of the Zuzuarreguis. We
cannot fathom how such a decision could have been arrived at except through
considerations other than the pure merits of the case. Every law student reading through the case
can see clearly how a brother lawyer in the profession had been so
short-changed by, ironically, the most sacred and highest institution in the
administration and dispensation of justice.
x x x x
This is an unjust and unfair
decision, to say the least. x x x We cry out in disbelief that such an
impossible decision could spring forth from the Supreme Court, the ultimate
administrator and last bulwark of justice.
As it stands, instead of being
an administrator of justice, the Supreme Court is ironically a dispenser of
injustice.
Under the circumstances, we hope you
will forgive us in expressing our sentiment in this manner as we are utterly
frustrated and dismayed by the elementary injustice being foisted upon us by
the Supreme Court, no less. Given the
facts of the case, we will never
understand what moved the Honorable Justice to decide as she did and what
forces and influences caused her to reason out her decision in such an unfair
and unjust manner as to compromise the reputation, integrity and dignity itself
of the Supreme Court, as a venerable institution of justice.
As lawyers, we are officers of the
Court so that, while we are being underservedly
pained by the seething injustice of the decision, we will submit to the
authority of Highest Court of the Land, even as our reverence for it has
been irreversibly eroded, thanks to your Honor’s Judgment.
x x x x
As
for Your Honor, sleep well if you still can. In the end, those we address as Honorable
Justice in this earthly life will [be] judged by the Supreme Dispenser of
Justice – where only the merits of Your Honor’s life will be relevant and
material and where technicalities can shield no one from his or her
wrongdoings.
Good day to you, Madame Justice!
The
decision referred to in the letter is the Court’s decision[3] in these consolidated cases
where Attys. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor were
ordered to return, among others, to Antonio de Zuzuarregui,
Jr., et al. the amount of P17,073,224.84.
Roxas and Pastor filed their
Motion for Reconsideration[4] on
On
On
The
following day, they filed a Motion for Leave to File Motion to Set the Case for
Oral Argument, together with the Motion to Set the Case for Oral Argument (on
the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplement thereto).[9] In a Manifestation dated
On
On
On
This is an unjust and unfair decision, to say the least. x x x We cry out in disbelief that
such an impossible decision could spring forth from the Supreme Court, the
ultimate administrator and last bulwark of justice. As it stands, instead of being an administrative
of justice, the Supreme Court will ironically be a dispenser of injustice.
Under the circumstances, we cannot avoid to
suspect the bias and partiality of the ponente
of the case who we surmise must have been moved by considerations, other than
noble.
In this regard, Mr. Chief Justice, we implore Your Honor,
as steward of the Highest Court of the land, to take appropriate steps to
forthwith correct this anomalous decision by first, referring the case to the
Supreme Court En Banc, and then, after allowing us the opportunity to be
heard orally En Banc and after judiciously considering our “Urgent and
Compelling Motion for Reconsideration”, thereafter reversing the decision of
this Honorable Court’s First Division.
Finally, in order to cleanse the Supreme Court of the blot
caused by this case, we most ardently implore upon Your Honor to immediately
direct the conduct of an investigation of how such an impossible decision was
rendered at all and to sanction the perpetrators thereon.
As the Chief Justice, we have faith in you, Sir, to rectify
a grievous wrong inflicted upon a member of the Bar and to restore the good
image and reputation of the Court by causing the High Court to reverse such an inconceivable
decision that is unfair, unjust and illegal, being an [impairment] of the
obligation of contracts and against the principle of estoppel.
Said
letter was indorsed to the Clerk of Court of the First Division for its
inclusion in the agenda.[14]
On 12 July 2006, the Court resolved to
(a) Note Without Action (1) the motion of petitioners Roxas
and Pastor for leave to file supplemental motion for reconsideration of the
decision dated January 31, 2006; (2) the aforesaid supplemental motion for
reconsideration; and (3) respondents Zuzuarreguis’
motion for leave of court to file comment/opposition to motion for
reconsideration, said motion for reconsideration having been denied with
finality in the resolution of 27 March 2006; (b) Deny for lack of merit said
petitioners’ (1) motion for leave to file motion to set case for oral argument;
and (2) motion to set the case for oral argument [on the motion for
reconsideration and the supplement thereto]; (c) Note petitioners’
manifestation regarding the correction of typographical error in the affidavit
of service of their motion for leave to file motion to set case for oral
argument and said motion to set case for oral arguments; (d) Deny the urgent
and compelling second motion for reconsideration of petitioners Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor of the decision dated 31
January 2006 [with motion to refer the case to the Court En Banc], considering
that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Sec. 2,
Rule 52, in relation to Sec. 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended; (e) Deny said petitioners’ motion to refer the cases to the Court
En Banc, the latter not being an appellate court to which decisions or
resolutions of the Divisions may be appealed, pursuant to SC Circular 2-89 dated
7 February 1989, as amended by the resolution of 18 November 1993; and (f) Note
the First Indorsement dated 9 June 2006 of the Hon.
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban
referring for inclusion in the agenda the thereto attached letter [with
enclosures] of Atty. Romeo G. Roxas, relative to
these cases.[15]
On
On
On
On
In
a resolution dated 26 September 2006, this Court ordered Atty. Roxas to explain in writing why he should not be held in
contempt of court and subjected to disciplinary action on account of the letter
he sent to Justice Nazario with copies thereof
furnished the
Chief Justice and all the other Associate Justices.
On
On
With all due respect to this Honorable Court, and beyond my
personal grievances, I submit that the ruling in the subject consolidated cases
may not have met the standards or adhered to the basic characteristics of fair
and just decision, such as objectivity, neutrality and conformity to the laws
and the constitution. x x x
x x x x
Aside from
the fact that the aforesaid ruling appears to be seriously flawed, it also
casts grave aspersions on my personal and professional integrity and honor as a
lawyer, officer of the court and advocate of justice.
x x x x
These
implications, Your Honors, which I find hard to accept, have caused me severe
anxiety, distress and depredation and have impelled me to exercise my right to
express a legitimate grievance or articulate a bona fide and fair criticism of this Honorable Court’s ruling.
While
certain statements, averments and/or declarations in my
Quite
notably, despite my aggrieved sentiments and exasperated state, I chose to
ventilate my criticisms of the assailed ruling in a very discreet and private
manner. Accordingly, instead of
resorting to public criticism through media exposure, I chose to write a
personal letter confined to the hallowed halls of the highest tribunal of the
land and within the bounds of decency and propriety. This was done in good faith with no intention
whatsoever to offend any member, much less tarnish the image of this Honorable
Court.
Nonetheless,
it is with humble heart and a repentant soul that I express my sincerest
apologies not only to the individual members of this Honorable Court but also
to the Supreme Court as a revered institution and ultimate dispenser of
justice.
As earlier
explained, I was merely exercising my right to express a legitimate grievance
or articulate a bona fide and fair
criticism of this Honorable Court’s ruling.
If the nature of my criticism/comment or the manner in which it was
carried out was perceived to have transgressed the permissible parameters of
free speech and expression, I am willing to submit myself to the sound and
judicious discretion of this Honorable Court. x x x
After reviewing the records of these cases, We firmly stand by our decision which Atty. Roxas described to be unjust, unfair and impossible, and
arrived at through
considerations other than the pure merits of the case. Atty. Roxas’s
insistence that said decision did not meet the
standards or adhered to the basic characteristics of fair and just decision,
such as objectivity, neutrality and conformity to the laws and the Constitution,
is simply without basis. The fact that
the decision was not in his favor does not mean that the same was contrary to
our laws and was not rendered in a fair and impartial manner.
In one case,[22]
we had this to say when a lawyer challenged the integrity not only of the Court
of Appeals but also of this Court by claiming that the courts knowingly
rendered an unjust judgment:
We
note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming
that his personal knowledge of the law and his concept of justice are superior
to that of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot
but tend to erode the people's faith in the integrity of the courts of justice
and in the administration of justice. He repeatedly invoked his supposed quest
for law and justice as justification for his contemptuous statements without
realizing that, in seeking both abstract elusive terms, he is merely pursuing
his own personal concept of law and justice. He seems not to comprehend that
what to him may be lawful or just may not be so in the minds of others. He
could not accept that what to him may appear to be right or correct may be
wrong or erroneous from the viewpoint of another. x x x.
It is to be noted that prior
to his letter dated 13 September 2006, Atty. Roxas wrote
then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban
asking for an immediate investigation of “how such an impossible decision was
rendered at all and to sanction the perpetrators thereon.” It is to be stressed that then Chief Justice Panganiban was a member of the Division who concurred in the
ponencia written by Justice Nazario. The former
and the other three members[23]
of the Division did not find anything illegal, unjust or unfair about the
decision; otherwise, they would have registered their dissents. There was none. The decision was arrived at after a thorough
deliberation of the members of the Court.
Atty. Roxas
faulted the Supreme Court when “(o)
It is settled that the Court is not duty-bound to render
signed Decisions all the time. It has
ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or minute Resolutions, provided a
legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.[24] In the case before us, after going over the
motion for reconsideration filed by Roxas and Pastor,
we did not find any substantial argument that would merit the modification of
our decision and that would require an extended resolution since the basic
issues had already been passed upon.
In his letter subject of this contempt proceeding, Atty. Roxas accused Justice Nazario of deciding
the case through “considerations other than the pure merits of the case.” He averred that “we will never understand what moved
the Honorable Justice to decide as she did and what forces and influences caused
her to reason out her decision in such an unfair and unjust manner as to
compromise the reputation, integrity and dignity itself of the Supreme Court,
as a venerable institution of justice.”
He then ended by mocking her when he said “sleep well if you still can”
and that her “earthly life will [be] judged by the Supreme Dispenser of Justice where only the merits of Your Honor’s life
will be relevant and material and where technicalities can shield no one from
his or her wrongdoings.”
As to the Court, supposedly the last
vanguard and bulwark of justice, he likewise accuses it of making itself,
wittingly or unwittingly, a party to the wrongdoing by giving official and
judicial sanction and conformity to the unjust claims of the adverse party. He added:
“This is an unjust and unfair decision, to say the least. x x x We cry out in
disbelief that such an impossible decision could spring forth from the Supreme
Court, the ultimate administrator and last bulwark of justice. As it
stands, instead of being an administrator of justice, the Supreme Court is
ironically a dispenser of injustice.”
In his letter of explanation, Atty. Roxas extended apologies to Justice Nazario,
to the other members of the High Court and to the High Court itself as a
revered institution and ultimate dispenser of justice. He said he was merely exercising his right to
express a legitimate grievance or articulate a bona fide and fair
criticism of the Honorable Court’s ruling.
He explained that his criticism of the assailed ruling was done in good
faith with no intention whatsoever to offend any member, much less tarnish the
image of the Court. Instead of resorting
to public criticism through media exposure, he chose to ventilate his criticism
in a very discreet and private manner by writing a personal letter confined to
the hallowed halls of the Court and within bounds of decency and propriety.
We find the explanations
of Atty. Roxas unsatisfactory. The accusation against Justice Nazario is clearly without basis. The attack on the person of Justice Nazario has caused her pain and embarrassment. His letter is full of contemptuous remarks
tending to degrade the dignity of the Court and erode public confidence that
should be accorded it.
To prevent liability from
attaching on account of his letter, he invokes his rights to free speech and
privacy of communication. The invocation
of these rights will not, however, free him from liability. As already stated, his letter contained
defamatory statements that impaired public confidence in the integrity of
the judiciary. The making of
contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free
speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right.
Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as
free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the
independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefor
and confidence therein.[25] Free expression must not be used as a vehicle
to satisfy one’s irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even
destroy this Court and its magistrates.[26]
This Court does not curtail the right
of a lawyer, or any person for that matter, to be critical of courts and judges
as long as they are made in properly respectful terms and through legitimate
channels. This Court in In re: Almacen[27]
said:
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that is it articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because then the court’s actuation are thrown open to public consumption. x x x
x x x x
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizen whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. x x x
x x x x
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen.
x x x x
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
In
the case at bar, we find the statements made by Atty. Roxas
to have been made mala fides and exceeded
the boundaries of decency and propriety.
By his unfair and unfounded accusation against Justice Nazario, and his mocking of the Court for allegedly being
part of a wrongdoing and being a dispenser of injustice, he abused his liberty
of speech.
In
In re: Wenceslao Laureta,[28]
cited in United BF Homeowners v. Sandoval-Gutierrez,[29] we
ruled:
To allow litigants to go
beyond the Court’s resolution and claim that the members acted “with
deliberate bad faith” and rendered an “unjust resolution” in disregard or
violation of the duty of their high office to act upon their own independent
consideration and judgment of the matter at hand would be to destroy the
authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and
resolutions and to disregard utterly the presumption of regular performance of
official duty. To allow such collateral
attack would destroy the separation of powers and undermine the role of the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable
disputes.
x x x x
In resume, we
find that respondent Ilustre has transcended the
permissible bounds of fair comment and criticism to the detriment of the
orderly administration of justice in her letters addressed to the individual
Justices quoted in the show-cause Resolution of this court en banc,
particularly the under lined portions thereof; in the language of the charges
she filed before the Tanodbayan quoted and
underscored in the same Resolution; in her statements, conduct, acts and
charges against the Supreme Court and/or the official actions of the justices
concerned and her ascription of improper motives to them; and in her
unjustified outburst that she can no longer expect justice from this
Court. The fact that
said letters are not technically considered pleadings, nor the fact that they
were submitted after the main petition had been finally resolved does not
detract from the gravity of the contempt committed. The constitutional right of freedom of speech
or right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against
the Court.
Atty. Roxas likewise cannot hide
under the mantle of the right to privacy.
It must be disclosed that prior to his letter addressed to Justice Nazario, Atty. Roxas first wrote
then Chief Justice Panganiban asking for an
investigation as to how the assailed decision was rendered and to sanction the
perpetrators. The accusations contained therein
are similar to those in his letter to Justice Nazario. The fact that his letters were merely
addressed to the Justices of this Court and were not disseminated to the media is
of no moment. Letters addressed to individual
Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial functions,
become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire
court.[30] As can be gathered from the records, the
letter to then Chief Justice Panganiban was merely
noted and no show-cause order was issued in the hope that Atty. Roxas would stop his assault on the Court. However, since Atty. Roxas
persisted in attacking the Court via his second letter, it behooved the
Court to order him to explain why he should not be
held in contempt of court and subjected to disciplinary action.
Under the circumstances, we find Atty. Romeo G. Roxas guilty of indirect contempt of court under Section 3,
Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Said section reads:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. –
After a charge in writing
has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon
within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or
counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for
indirect contempt:
x x x x
d. Any improper
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice; x x x.
x x x x
Section 7,
Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides the penalty
for indirect contempt as follows:
Sec. 7. Punishment for indirect
contempt. – If the respondent is
adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court
or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not
exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months or
both. x x x.
The disrespect caused to the Court by Atty. Roxas merits a fine of P30,000.00
with a warning that a repetition of a similar act will warrant a more severe
penalty.
With his contemptuous and
defamatory statements, Atty. Roxas likewise violated
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Canons 11.03 and
11.04. These provisions read:
CANON 11 -- A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT
DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT
BY OTHERS
x x x x
Rule 11.03. – A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive and
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04. – A lawyer shall not attribute to a
Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the
case.
It is the duty of a lawyer as an officer of the court to
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts and to promote confidence in the
fair administration of justice and in the Supreme Court as the last bulwark of
justice and democracy.[31] Respect for the courts guarantees the
stability of the judicial institution. Without
such guarantee, the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.[32] When confronted with actions and statements,
from lawyers and non-lawyers alike, that tend to promote distrust and undermine
public confidence in the judiciary, this Court will not hesitate to wield its
inherent power to cite any person in contempt.
In so doing, it preserves its honor and dignity and safeguards the
morals and ethics of the legal profession.[33]
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, Atty. Romeo G. Roxas is found GUILTY of indirect contempt of court. He is hereby FINED the amount of P30,000.00 to
be paid within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution and WARNED that a repetition of a similar
act will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Roxas’ personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
SO
ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBINGAssociate Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate Justice |
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On leave |
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ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZAssociate Justice |
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice |
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MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice
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ADOLFO S.
AZCUNA Associate Justice
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DANTE O.
TINGA Associate Justice |
MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
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CANCIO
C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
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PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
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ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
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REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
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* On leave.
[1] Rollo, of G.R. No. 152072, pp. 813-814.
[2]
[3] The antecedents are stated in the
decision promulgated on
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] Montecillo v. Gica, G.R. No. 30380,
[23] Associate Justices Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez and Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (now retired).
[24] In
Re: Wenceslao Laureta,
[25] In re: Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Case Hurled by Atty. Leonard de Vera, A.M. No. 01-12-03-SC, 29 July 2002, 385 SCRA 285, 291.
[26] Re:
Letter Dated
[27] G.R. No. 27654,
[28] Supra note 24 at 420-421.
[29] A.M. No.
CA-99-30,
[30] Mercado
v. Security Bank Corporation, G.R. No. 160445,
[31] In re: Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Case Hurled by Atty. Leonard de Vera, supra note 25 at 292.
[32] Mercado v. Security Bank Corporation, G.R. No. 160445, 16 February 2006, 482 SCRA 501, 519-519 citing Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724.
[33] In re: Wenceslao Laureta, supra note 24 at 403.