THIRD
DIVISION
|
ACEBEDO OPTICAL AND
MIGUEL ACEBEDO III, Petitioners, - versus - NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND MELENCIA
ASEGURADO, Respondents. |
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G. R. No. 150171 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The Case
For Review on Certiorari,[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, is the Decision,[2] dated
This case stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for
reinstatement and payment of full backwages and other benefits. Said grievance
was filed by herein private respondent against herein petitioners on
The facts of the case as synthesized
from the records are as follows:
On
1.
Receives (sic) product from supplier
and sort them out;
2.
Record incoming and outgoing
deliveries to stock ledger and stock card;
3.
Received (sic) requisition from
branch retail outlets;
4.
Select products from storage and
place them inside the box, label the boxes and prepare the corresponding
delivery receipts;
5.
Make physical count at regular
intervals and reconciles physical count with book records;
6. Other
assignments as and when required by supervisor from time to time.[4]
Initially, the private respondent’s
employment status was probationary. Six
months later, or on
But before her employment status was
made permanent, private respondent was given a Memorandum[5] by
petitioner Miguel Acebedo III, Operations Manager of petitioner
corporation, reading as follows:
TO : MELENCIA BUTIL
FROM : THE OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT
SUBJECT : WRITTEN WARNING on . . . . . . .
DATE :
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
As per report of the Personnel
Department on the Absences and Tardiness for the month of August, you were
found to have 1 hr. & 34 mins. late (sic).
Be informed that habitual
absences/tardiness is a grave violation of company policy.
This serves as your written warning.
[Signed]
MIGUEL
R. ACEBEDO III
Operations Manager
The memorandum was to apprise her of her accumulated
tardiness of one hour and a half for the month of August 1991; likewise, it
served as a warning to her that habitual tardiness/absenteeism is considered
a violation of company policy.
On
TO : MELENCIA BUTIL
FROM : THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT
SUBJECT : AS STATED
DATE :
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Be reminded that habitual tardiness is considered a grave
violation of Company Policy and is subject to strict disciplinary action.
This will serve as your first written warning.
[Signed]
THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT
On
TO : MELENCIA ASEGURADO
FROM : THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT
SUBJECT : TARDINESS, Suspension notice on
DATE :
- - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - -
The report on tardiness for the period January to March
1994, showed that you incurred lates (sic) twenty six (26) times (11, 7, 8) the
said numbers exceeded the maximum limit of four times each month.
It is one of the fundamental duties of any employee to
follow rules and regulations of the company, and (sic) one of the most basic is
the observance of official time. Your 201 file kept two (2) written warnings on
tardiness.
This time, you are given a three (3) days suspension
without pay effective May 10, 11 & 12, 1994.
Please be advised to manage your time very well to avoid
future offenses.
[Signed]
LUTZ
PENAFLORIDA
Acting
Head – Personnel
On
TO : MELENCIA ASEGURADO
FROM : THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT
SUBJECT : TARDINESS, Suspension notice of
DATE :
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The
report on tardiness for the period of [unreadable]
to December 1994, (sic) showed that you incurred lates (sic) twenty-one (21)
times (3, 9, 9), the said number exceeded the maximum limit of four times each
month.
Despite
of (sic) previous notices and suspension, you still failed to meet the
company’s policy on attendance. Since the company is implementing [unreadable] Disciplinary Measures for
this kind of infraction, you are hereby given seven (7) days suspension which
will [unreadable] effective on March
6, 9, 14, 16, 21, 23 & 27, 1995.
Please
adhere to the policy [unreadable]
failure to improve on this aspect will result in severe penalties.
For
your guidance.
[Signed]
LUTZ
PENAFLORIDA
Personnel Manager
On
TO : MELENCIA B. ASEGURADO
FROM : THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT
SUBJECT : STATEMENT OF CHARGE
DATE :
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Be
informed that the indefinite leave of absence which you have filed last May 22,
1995 is not approved, this nature of leave is not being considered in our
prescribed policy. Be reminded also that you have accumulated a total of
fourteen (14) days absence for this month alone.
Although,
(sic) we understood (sic) your reason (no babysitter), we are also concerned
about the smooth flow of work in your section. Since you went on leave, some
GSD staff took turn (sic) in doing your function. Due to this situation, I am
worried that this would led (sic) to confusion, error and delay because there’s
nobody who is completely in charged (sic) in monitoring their activities.
I
am giving you up to the end of the month to sort out your personal problem.
Failure to go back to work on
For
your guidance.
[Signed]
LUTZ
PENAFLORIDA
Personnel
– Head
On
TO : MS. MELENCIA ASEGURADO – PACKAGING
CLERK
FROM : THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT
SUBJECT : SUSPENSION, Notice of
DATE :
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Based
on the Tardiness Report, you have accumulated a total of 17 lates for
the quarter (April – June).
As
per company policy, Head Office employees are limited only to four (4) lates
per month or a total of twelve (12) per quarter.
The
said policy is being implemented to control excessive lateness and to prevent
time being wasted for non-performance.
Despite
of (sic) previous warnings and/or suspension given, (March 1995) you
still failed to meet the company policy on Tardiness.
You
are hereby given a (sic) 13 days suspension which will take effect on Sept.
6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26 & 27, 1995.
Be
advised to observe the said policy accordingly. Future offense will be treated
with more severe penalty.
For
your guidance.
[Signed]
LUTZ
PENAFLORIDA
Head – Personnel
On
On
Six days later, or on
TO : MELY ASEGURADO
FROM : THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT
SUBJECT : NOTICE OF TERMINATION
DATE :
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Despite
several warnings both verbal and written accompanied with suspension, you were
found to be abusive in your lates and absences as shown by the result of 1996
Attendance Report for the quarter Jan-Mar. – 12, April-June – 21, July-Sept. –
43, Oct.-Nov. – 17. Only four (4) lates per month or twelve (12) per quarter is
allowed. Regarding absences and leaves, you already exhausted the company
provision of 8 days sick leave plus 7.5 vacation leave and had accumulated a
total of [unreadable] days absences without pay as of
This
kind of performance is below company standard. Chronic absenteeism combined
with abusive tardiness is considered as gross and habitual negligence that
constitutes a valid ground for dismissal. Be reminded that you were suspended
for 13 days (September ’95) for similar infraction and were advised to improve
your performance otherwise (sic) facing the maximum penalty is inevitable.
The
management has the prerogative to [unreadable]
also discipline [unreadable] its employees who are not capable of
following their fundamental duty to obey basic rules and regulations of the
company in order to protect its interest. Several [unreadable]
both verbal and written accompanied with suspension were issued to you but you
failed to live up to a higher standard of responsibility.
Please
be informed that your services shall be terminated on
For
your guidance.
[Signed]
LUTZ
PENAFLORIDA
Personnel
Head
From the aforequoted memorandum,
private respondent’s dismissal from service was brought on by her supposed
exhaustion of the allowable sick and vacation leaves per month constituting “gross
and habitual neglect of your duty.”[14] Notice of the termination of her employment
was received by private respondent “under protest” and six days after the fact,
or only on
The foregoing state of affairs prompted private
respondent to file a case for illegal dismissal with the NLRC the very next
day.
In a Decision
dated
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the dismissal of
complainant unlawful and unjustified and ordering the respondents jointly and
severally to reinstate said complainant to her former or equivalent position
without loss of seniority rights with full backwages which as of the date of
this Decision has ballooned to the amount of P79,716.00 plus other
benefits such as 13th month pay in the amount of P6,643.00
and service incentive leave pay in the amount of P2,628.00.
Respondents are also ordered to pay complainant’s counsel ten (10%)
percent of the total award recovered as attorney’s fees pursuant to law.[15]
On appeal, in a Resolution
dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit. The appealed decision dated
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[17]
which public respondent NLRC denied in its Resolution
dated
Undaunted, herein petitioners went to the Court of
Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the National Labor
Relations Commission for ordering the payment of backwages, damages and
attorney’s fees to an employee who had been dismissed for just cause.
On
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED due course and is
hereby DISMISSED.[18]
In essence, the Court of Appeals held that herein
petitioners failed to marshal the obligatory quantum of evidence needed to
substantiate a finding of legitimacy or validity in the termination of
employment of private respondent, the reason for which was supposedly her repeated
defiance of company policy. According to
the appellate court, petitioners’ failure to adduce in evidence a copy of the
contravened company policy was fatal to their cause. Absent proof of evidence of such document
embodying the flouted rule, the appellate court, along with the labor arbiter
and the NLRC, was unable to make a categorical finding on the issue of whether
or not the private respondent’s accumulated absences and/or tardiness were,
indeed, in violation of petitioner company’s rules and regulations. Further, as
to the allegation of chronic absenteeism and/or tardiness for the period of
1991 to 1995, the appellate court likewise held that the non-presentation of
the Daily Time Records (DTRs) for said period was a grave error. It held that the numerous memoranda issued to
private respondent were mere self-serving evidence and made the following
observations –
Petitioners’ stance is even incongruent with the evidence on record. Thus, the Private Respondent was employed, (sic) on a probationary basis or status x x x [she] incurred tardiness in the accumulated time of one (1) hour and thirty (30) minutes for the month of August, 1991, and yet, the Private Respondent was promoted and made a permanent employee on March 1, 1992.
[A]fter her one (1)
hour and thirty – four (34) minute tardiness in September 1991, nothing on
record reveals that she had been tardy for the year 1992. The “Memorandum”
reminding the Private Respondent about her tardiness did not establish that
Private Respondent again incurred any tardiness. It is noted that Private Respondent was not
tardy in the year 1993. Although she was
tardy during the period from January to March 1994, however, she was ordered
suspended on
Based on the “Memorandum” of the Petitioners, the Private Respondent was tardy for seventeen (17) times for the quarter from April to June, 1995. However, the “Memorandum” of the Petitioners did not indicate the dates and precise times when the Private Respondent was tardy. Without the “Daily Time Records” of the Respondent during the period envisaged in the Memoranda of the Petitioners, it cannot be ascertained whether Private Respondent’s tardiness was habitual and incorrigible.[19]
Anent the finding by the NLRC that herein
petitioners’ appeal was filed out of time, the Court of Appeals clarified that
Sec. 224 of the Labor Code requires that both party and counsel must be served
their respective copies of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. In the instant case, herein petitioners
received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s decision only on
In fine, the Court of Appeals ruled that the appeal,
having been filed with the NLRC within the reglementary period, dismissal of
the employee was too severe a penalty and, thus, unwarranted. Such conclusion was based on the finding that
“even on the assumption that Private Respondent incurred tardiness and/or
absences in the course of her employment, she had been duly penalized therefor.”[20]
Hence, petitioners, through the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, as amended, seek recourse to this Court and raise the
following issues:[21]
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED PALPABLE
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT DECLARED RESPONDENT TO HAVE BEEN ILLEGALLY
DISMISSED DESPITE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT SHE INCURRED EXCESSIVE
TARDINESS AND ABSENTEEISM IN VIOLATION OF THE COMPANY’S RULES AND REGULATIONS
WHICH WARRANTED HER TERMINATION FROM WORK; [and]
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED PALPABLE
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT ORDERED RESPONDENT REINSTATED TO HER FORMER
POSITION OR TO REINSTATE HER TO HER FOREMER OR EQUIVALENT POSITION WITH FULL
BACKWAGES PLUS OTHER BENEFITS[,] SUCH AS 13TH MONTH PAY AND SERVICE
INCENTIVE LEAVE PAY.
At the
outset, it is pertinent to note that the first issue raised by petitioners
inquires into the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. They are fundamentally assailing the appellate
court’s finding that whatever evidence is on record, it is insufficient to
establish that company policies were contravened by private respondent. In
effect, petitioners would have us sift through the data on record and pass upon
whether or not there is sufficient basis to hold private respondent accountable
for continually disobeying the “established” company policy respecting
tardiness and absenteeism allegedly amounting to gross and habitual negligence. This clearly involves a factual inquiry, the
determination of which is the statutory function of the NLRC.[22]
Elementary
is the principle that this Court is not a trier of facts; only errors of law
are generally reviewed in petitions for review on certiorari criticizing decisions of the Court of Appeals. Questions
of fact are not entertained.[23] And
in labor cases, this doctrine applies with greater force.[24]
Factual questions are for labor tribunals to resolve.
Judicial
Review of labor cases does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of
the evidence upon which its labor officials’ findings rest.[25] As such, the findings of facts and
conclusion of the NLRC are generally accorded not only great weight and respect
but even clothed with finality and deemed binding on this Court as long as they
are supported by substantial evidence.[26] This Court finds no basis for deviating from said
doctrine without any clear showing that the findings of the Labor Arbiter, as
affirmed by the NLRC, are bereft of substantiation. Particularly when passed upon and upheld by
the Court of Appeals, they are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court
and will not normally be disturbed.[27]
Nevertheless,
we have reviewed the records of the case at bar and find no reversible error
committed by the Court of Appeals concerning the merits of the present petition.
Bearing
in mind the facts of the case, petitioners assert that private respondent’s
numerous tardiness and/or absenteeism is tantamount to gross habitual neglect
of duty amounting to gross negligence; thus, a valid ground for dismissal of an
employee.
We find the instant petition to be without merit.
The
Labor Code, specifically Article 277(b), guarantees the right of an employee to
security of tenure. It provides that –
ART. 277. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS. – x x x
(b) Subject
to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to
be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and
without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code,
the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be
terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for
termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in
accordance with company rules and regulations x x x.
From
the foregoing, it is quite clear that the dismissal of private respondent may
be upheld only if shown to have been made for a just or authorized cause and
attended with due process.
Corollary
to the preceding legal policy is the equally basic principle of labor law, that,
it is the employer who has the burden of proving that the dismissal is for just
cause, and failure to do so would necessarily
mean that the dismissal was unjustified; and, therefore, illegal.
In the
present petition, the labor arbiter evaluated the evidence presented by herein
parties and concluded that private respondent Asegurado was not afforded the
due process guaranteed by law and jurisprudence. Moreover, the alluded
incidences of absenteeism and tardiness which constituted the charge of
habitual neglect of duty amounting to gross negligence were past infractions
that have already been penalized.
On
appeal, the NLRC affirmed the finding of illegal dismissal.
In
agreement with the assailed decisions, the Court of Appeals, heedful of the
legal principle that it is the employer which has the onus probandi to prove that private respondent’s dismissal was based on valid ground, ruled
that the Commission committed no grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the
finding by the labor arbiter that the evidence on record was insufficient to
sustain the legality of private respondent Asegurado’s dismissal from service;
therefore, the appellate court dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners.
As
earlier stated, we find no basis for deviating from the oft-espoused legal
tenet that findings of facts and conclusion of the labor arbiter are generally
accorded not only great weight and respect but even clothed with finality and
deemed binding on this Court as long as they are supported by substantial
evidence, without any clear showing that such findings of fact, as affirmed by
the NLRC, are bereft of substantiation. More
so, when passed upon and upheld by the Court of Appeals, they are binding and
conclusive upon us and will not normally be disturbed;[28]
accordingly, the finding that the alleged absences and incidences of tardiness
of private respondent are but past infractions for which petitioners had
already imposed several sanctions and for which private respondent had been
duly penalized. And being past infractions, they cannot be taken collectively
as a justification for the dismissal from service of the employee.[29]
But
even assuming for the sake of argument that the past infractions could still
validly be the subject of future punishment, still there is no basis for
petitioners’ claim that private respondent’s supposed habitual absenteeism and
tardiness is a form of gross and habitual neglect of duty. Under Article 282(b)
of the Labor Code, gross and habitual neglect of duty by the employee of his
duties is a just cause for the termination of the latter’s employment. To warrant removal from service, however, the
negligence should not merely be gross but also habitual.[30] In this case, assuming the absences and
tardiness of private respondent Asegurado to be habitual, can they also be
categorized as gross?
Gross
negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise even slight care
or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.[31] Though there may have been times when private
respondent’s absences were undertaken without the necessary approved leave
applications, nevertheless, she would send word for when these would occur.
Moreover, quite telling is the fact that nowhere in the memoranda sent to
private respondent was there any mention of a complaint relating to the quality
of her work. As the
present case does not show the presence of one of the two requisites to make
the finding of negligence a just cause for dismissal. At the most, private respondent should have
been further suspended from service for taking for granted that her leave would
be approved by the personnel department of petitioner corporation.
The penalty of dismissal is too harsh,
considering that private respondent had been with the company for five years
and, apparently, the management had no complaint as regards the former’s
quality of work.
Herein,
to our mind, petitioners have not sufficiently shown that private respondent
had willfully disobeyed the company rules and regulations respecting absences
and tardiness. The cause for the
termination of private respondent’s employment was not simply habitual
tardiness and/or absenteeism. Petitioners
have alleged time and again that the basis upon which the dismissal of private
respondent was anchored was breach or violation of company policy. It was their
contention that private respondent’s habitual tardiness and/or absences were in
violation of petitioner company’s rules and regulations. Ironically, though
petitioners referred to their company policies, they never presented a copy of these
in evidence except in their Motion for Reconsideration – too late in the day.
Being the basis of the charge against private respondent, it is without doubt
the best evidence available to substantiate the allegations. The purpose of the
rule requiring the production of the best evidence is the prevention of fraud,
because if a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it, and
seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place (or none at all save for
mere allegation), the presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is
withheld for fraudulent purposes which its production would expose and defeat.[32]
By
failing to prove the existence of the company rules in due time, i.e., non-presentation of an authenticated
copy, unarguably the best evidence, casts skepticism on the factual basis of the
charge of violation thereof; arguably, therefore, it cannot be said that the
assailed conduct can be considered gross neglect of duty.
It is
indeed true that administrative agencies, like the NLRC, are not bound by the
technical rules of procedure and evidence in the adjudication of cases.[33] However, this procedural liberty must not be
interpreted to mean an unfettered license to put forth assertions without at
least presenting tangible proof to back them up. Otherwise, such assertions
would just be allegations, and allegations are not evidence.[34] What is involved here transcends mere
procedural technicality and concerns the more paramount principles and
requirements of due process, which may not be sacrificed at the altar of
expediency. Upon this principle, the
failure to present a copy of the supposed Company Policy to prove the
allegation of their existence must be seen and taken for what they are –
inadmissible hearsay. Mere allegation or assertion, by any stretch of
reasoning, cannot be considered substantial evidence of their existence and of
the subsequent violation complained of.
From
the preceding discussion, the dearth of reliable evidence on record constitutes
serious doubt as to the factual basis of the charge of violation of company
policy filed against private respondent. This doubt shall be resolved in her favor in
line with the policy under the Labor Code to afford protection to labor and
construe doubts in favor of labor.[35] The consistent rule is that if doubts exist
between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of
justice must be titled in favor of the latter. The employer must affirmatively show
rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause.[36] Having failed to satisfy this burden of proof,
we find that petitioners dismissed private respondent without just cause. Consequently,
the termination of her employment was illegal.
To
finish, as a final nail to the coffin that is the petitioners’ recourse to this
Court, we find that private respondent was not accorded due process by
petitioners prior to being dismissed from service. Despite the fact that
private respondent was repeatedly warned through the numerous memoranda sent to
her for coming in late or not reporting at all to the office, she was never
asked to defend her position, much less voice an objection to the charges
leveled at her.
Law
and jurisprudence require an employer to furnish the employee two written
notices before termination of his employment may be ordered. The first notice
must inform him of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is
sought; the second, of the employer’s decision to dismiss the employee after he
has been given the opportunity to be heard and defend himself.[37] With regard to private respondent, prior to
the Notice of Termination, no occasion was given to her to explain her side on why
she should not be terminated. There is
no evidence that there was an exchange
of communication between petitioners and private respondent regarding the
latter’s supposed infractions. Lest it
be forgotten, every opportunity and assistance must be accorded to the employee
by the management to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense,
including legal representation.[38] No chance whatsoever was given to private
respondent in this case. She was simply
served her termination notice without being heard in her defense.
In
retrospection, if, indeed, private respondent was a delinquent and an errant
employee, why did petitioners put up with such behavior for no less than five
years?
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
SO
ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
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|
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ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
|
|
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 27-56.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo (now a retired Associate Justice of this Court) with Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Perlita Tria-Tirona, concurring; id. at 60-71.
[3]
[4] CA rollo, pp. 71-72.
[5] Rollo, p. 152.
[6]
[7]
[8] The Memorandum was signed by Lutz Peñaflorida, Acting Head, Personnel Department of petitioner Acebedo Optical; id. at 154.
[9] CA rollo, p. 84.
[10] Rollo, p. 155.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] CA rollo, 76.
[16]
[17]
[18] Rollo, p. 70.
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] CBL
Transit, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 128425,
[23] Alfaro v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil.
310, 317 (2001).
[24] San
Juan De Dios Educational Foundation Employees Union-Alliance of Filipino
Workers v.
[25] Alfaro v. Court of Appeals, supra note 23 at 318.
[26] Progressive Development Corp. v. NATIONAL Labor Relations Commission, 398 Phil. 433, 439-440 (2000).
[27] Shoppes Manila, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 464 Phil. 427, 438-439 (2004).
[28]
[29] Lopez
v. National Labor Relations Commission, 358 Phil. 141, 150 (1998).
[30] Union
Motor Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 159738,
[31] Philippine Aeolus Automotive United
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 387 Phil. 250, 263
(2000).
[32] IBM,
Phils., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
365 Phil. 137, 151 (1999).
[33] Jarcia Machine Shop and Auto Supply v. National Labor Relations Commission, 334 Phil. 84, 92 (1997).
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37] Rule XIV, Book V, Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code; National
Service Corporation v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. L-69870,
[38] Pono v. National Labor Relations Commission, 341 Phil. 615, 621-622
(1997).