THIRD
DIVISION
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EDGAR LEDONIO,
Petitioner, - versus- CAPITOL
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 149040 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA,
JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court praying that (1) the Decision,[2]
dated 20 March 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 43604, affirming
in toto
the Decision,[3] dated 6
August 1993, of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 91, in Civil Case No. Q-90-5247, be set aside; and (2) the
Complaint[4] in
Civil Case No. Q-90-5247 be dismissed.
Herein respondent Capitol
Development Corporation instituted Civil Case No. Q-90-5247
by filing a Complaint for the collection of a sum of money against herein
petitioner Edgar Ledonio.
In its Complaint, respondent
alleged that petitioner obtained from a Ms. Patrocinio
S. Picache two loans, with the aggregate principal
amount of P60,000.00, and covered by promissory
notes duly signed by petitioner. In the
first promissory note,[5]
dated P30,000.00, in monthly installments of P3,000.00, with
the first monthly installment due on P30,000.00, with 36% interest per
annum, on P10,000.00, exclusive of
costs of suit.
On
KNOW
ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, PAT S. PICACHE of legal age and with postal
address at 373 Quezon Avenue, Quezon
City for and in consideration of SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00)
Philippine Currency, to me paid by [herein respondent] CAPITOL DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines with principal office at 373 Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City receipt whereof is hereby
acknowledged have sold, transferred, assigned and conveyed and (sic) by me
these presents do hereby sell, assign, transfer and convey unto the said
[respondent] CAPITOL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a certain debt due me from
[herein petitioner] EDGAR A. LEDONIO in the principal sum of SIXTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P60,000.00) Philippine Currency, under two (2) Promissory Notes
dated November 9, 1988 and November 10, 1988, respectively, photocopies of
which are attached to as annexes A & B to form integral parts hereof with
full power to sue for, collect and discharge, or sell and assign the same.
That I hereby declare that the principal sum of SIXTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00) with interest
thereon at THIRTY SIX (36%) PER CENT per annum is justly due and owing to me as
aforesaid.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 1st
day of April, 1989 at
(SGD)PAT
S. PICACHE
The foregoing document was signed by two witnesses and
duly acknowledged by Ms. Picache before a Notary
Public also on
Since
petitioner did not pay any of the loans covered by the promissory notes when
they became due, respondent -- through its Vice President Nina P. King and its
counsel King, Capuchino, Banico
& Associates -- sent petitioner several demand letters.[8] Despite receiving the said demand letters,
petitioner still failed and refused to settle his indebtedness, thus, prompting
respondent to file the Complaint with the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-5247.
In his
Answer filed with the RTC, petitioner sought the dismissal of the Complaint
averring that respondent had no cause of action against him. He denied obtaining any loan from Ms. Picache and questioned the genuineness and due execution of
the promissory notes, for they were the result of intimidation and fraud;
hence, void. He asserted that there had
been no transaction or privity of contract between
him, on one hand, and Ms. Picache and respondent, on
the other. The assignment by Ms. Picache of the promissory notes to respondent was a mere
ploy and simulation to effect the unjust enforcement of the invalid promissory
notes and to insulate Ms. Picache from any direct
counterclaims, and he never consented or agreed to the said assignment.
Petitioner
then presented his own narration of events leading to the filing of Civil Case
No. Q-90-5247.
According to him, on
Having
failed to obtain compensation from MRMC, petitioner decided to vacate and pull
out his machines from the leased property but he can only do so, unhampered and
uninterrupted by MRMC security personnel, if he signed, as he did, blank
promissory note forms. Petitioner
alleged that when he signed the promissory note forms, the allotted spaces for
the principal amount of the loans, interest rates, and names of the promisee/s were in blank; and that Ms. Picache
took advantage of petitioner’s signatures on the blank promissory note forms by
filling up the blanks.
To raise even more
suspicions of fraud and spuriousness of the promissory notes and their
subsequent assignment to respondent, petitioner called attention to the fact
that Ms. Picache is an incorporator and member of the
Board of Directors of both MRMC and respondent.[11]
After
the pre-trial conference and the trial proper, the RTC rendered a Decision[12]
on
[Herein petitioner]’s disclaimer of the promissory
note[s] does not inspire belief. He is a
holder of a degree in Bachelor of Science in Chemical Engineering and has been
a manufacturer of garments since 1979.
As a matter of fact, [petitioner]’s testimony that he was made to sign
blank sheets of paper is contrary to his admission in paragraphs 12 and 13 of
his Answer that as a condition to his removal of his machines [from] the leased
premises, he was made to sign blank promissory note forms with respect to the
amount, interest and promisee. It thus appears incredulous that a
businessman like [petitioner] would simply sign blank sheets of paper or blank
promissory notes just [to] be able to vacate the leased premises.
Moreover, the credibility of [petitioner]’s testimony
leaves much to be desired. He
contradicted his earlier testimony that he only met Patrocinio
Picache once, which took place in the office of
Mission Realty and Management Corporation, by stating that he saw Patrocinio Picache a second time
when she went to his house. Likewise,
his claim that the electric power in the leased premises was cut off only two
months after he occupied the same is belied by his own evidence. The contract of lease submitted by
[petitioner] is dated
The RTC
also sustained the validity and enforceability of the Assignment of Credit
executed by Ms. Picache in favor of respondent, even
in the absence of petitioner’s consent to the said assignment, based on the
following reasoning –
The promissory notes (Exhs. “A” and
“B”) were assigned by Ms. Patrocinio Picache to [herein respondent] by virtue of a notarized
Assignment of Credit dated April 1, 1989 for a consideration of P60,000.00
(Exh. “C”).
The fact that the assignment of credit does not bear the conformity of
[herein petitioner] is of no moment. In
C & C Commercial Corporation vs. Philippine National Bank, 175 SCRA 1, 11,
the Supreme Court held thus:
“x x x
Article 1624 of the Civil Code provides that ‘an assignment of credits and
other incorporeal rights shall be perfected in accordance with the provisions
of Article 1475’ which in turn states that ‘the contract of sale is perfected
at the moment there is a meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the
object of the contract and upon the price.’
The meeting of the minds contemplated here is that between the assignor
of the credit and his assignee, there being no necessity for the consent of the
debtor, contrary to petitioner’s claim.
It is sufficient that the assignment be brought to his knowledge in
order to be binding upon him. This may
be inferred from Article 1626 of the Civil Code which declares that ‘the debtor
who, before having knowledge of the assignment, pays his creditor shall be
released from the obligation.’”
[Petitioner] does not deny having been notified of the
assignment of credit by Patrocinio Picache to the [respondent]. Thus, [respondent] sent several demand letters
to the [petitioner] in connection with the loan[s] (Exhs.
“D”, “E”, “F” and “G”). [Petitioner] acknowledged receipt of
[respondent]’s letter of demand dated
Given its aforequoted findings, the RTC proceeded to a determination
of petitioner’s liabilities to respondent, taking into account the provisions
of the promissory notes, thus –
x x x
Consequently, [herein respondent] is entitled to recover from [herein petitioner]
the principal amount of P30,000.00 for the
promissory note dated
In Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 167
SCRA 815, it was held that penalty interests are in the nature of liquidated
damages and may be equitably reduced by the courts if they are iniquitous or
unconscionable, pursuant to Articles 1229 and 2227 of the Civil Code. Considering that the promissory note dated
November 10, 1988 already provided for interest at 36% per annum on the
principal obligation, as well as for the capitalization of the unpaid interest,
the penalty charge of 20% of the total outstanding balance of the obligation
thus appears to be excessive and unconscionable. The interest charges are enough punishment
for [petitioner]’s failure to comply with his obligation under the promissory
note dated
With respect to the attorney’s fees,
the court is likewise empowered to reduce the same if they are unreasonable or
unconscionable, notwithstanding the express contract therefor.
(Insular Bank of P10,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees appears to be enough.
Consequently, the fallo of the RTC Decision reads –
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the [herein respondent] and against [herein
petitioner] ordering the latter as follows:
1.
To pay
[respondent], on the promissory note dated November 9, 1988, the amount of P30,000.00
with interest thereon at the legal rate of 12% per annum from April 18, 1990
until fully paid and a penalty of 20% on the total amount;
2.
To pay
[respondent], on the promissory note dated November 10, 1988, the amount of P30,000.00
with interest thereon at 36% per annum compounded at the same rate until fully
paid;
3.
To pay
[respondent] the amount of P10,000.00, as and for attorney’s fees; and
4.
To pay the costs
of the suit.[13]
Aggrieved
by the RTC Decision, dated
Comes now petitioner to this Court, via a Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
raising the sole issue[16]
of whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
affirming in toto
the RTC Decision, dated
ART. 1300.
Subrogation of a third person in the rights of the creditor is either
legal or conventional. The former is not
presumed, except in cases expressly mentioned in this Code; the latter must be
clearly established in order that it may take effect.
ART. 1301.
Conventional subrogation of a third person requires the consent of the
original parties and the third person.
According to petitioner, the assignment of credit
constitutes conventional subrogation which requires the consent of the original
parties to the loan contract, namely, Ms. Picache
(the creditor) and petitioner (the debtor); and the third person, the
respondent (the assignee). Since
petitioner never gave his consent to the assignment of credit, then the
subrogation of respondent in the rights of Ms. Picache
as creditor by virtue of said assignment is without force and effect.
This
Court finds no merit in the present Petition.
Before
proceeding to a discussion of the points raised by petitioner, this Court deems
it appropriate to emphasize that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
and the RTC in this case shall no longer be disturbed. It is axiomatic that this Court
will not review, much less reverse, the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals, especially where, as in this case, such findings coincide with those
of the trial court, since this Court is not a trier
of facts.[17]
The
jurisdiction of this Court in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of
law, not of fact, unless it is shown, inter alia,
that: (a) the conclusion is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and
conjectures; (b) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd and impossible;
(c) there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) the judgment is based on a
misapplication of facts; (e) the findings of fact of the trial court and the
appellate court are contradicted by the evidence on record and (f) the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both parties.[18] None of these circumstances are present in
the case at bar. After a perusal of the
records, this Court can only conclude that the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals, affirming those of the RTC, are amply supported by evidence and are,
resultantly, conclusive on this Court.[19]
Therefore,
the following facts are already beyond cavil: (1) petitioner obtained two loans
totaling P60,000.00 from Ms. Picache, for
which he executed promissory notes, dated 9 November 1988 and 10 November 1988;
(2) he failed to pay any of the said loans; (3) Ms. Picache
executed on 1 April 1989 an Assignment of Credit covering petitioner’s loans in
favor of respondent for the consideration of P60,000.00; (4) petitioner
had knowledge of the assignment of credit; and (5) petitioner still failed to
pay his indebtedness despite repeated demands by respondent and its
counsel. Petitioner’s persistent
assertions that he never acquired any loan from Ms. Picache,
or that he signed the promissory notes in blank and under duress, deserve scant
consideration. They were already found
by both the Court of Appeals and the RTC to be implausible and inconsistent
with petitioner’s own evidence.
Now this
Court turns to the questions of law raised by petitioner, all of which hinges
on the contention that a conventional subrogation occurred when Ms. Picache assigned the debt, due her from the petitioner, to
the respondent; and without petitioner’s consent as debtor, the said
conventional subrogation should be deemed to be without force and effect.
This Court
cannot sustain petitioner’s contention and hereby declares that the transaction
between Ms. Picache and respondent was an assignment
of credit, not conventional subrogation, and does not require petitioner’s
consent as debtor for its validity and enforceability.
An assignment of credit has been defined as an agreement by virtue of which
the owner of a credit (known as the assignor), by a legal cause - such as sale,
dation in payment or exchange or donation -
and without need of the debtor's consent, transfers that credit and its
accessory rights to another (known as the assignee), who acquires the power to
enforce it, to the same extent as the assignor could have enforced it against
the debtor.[20]
On the
other hand, subrogation, by definition, is the transfer of all the rights of
the creditor to a third person, who substitutes him in all his rights. It may
either be legal or conventional. Legal subrogation is that which takes place
without agreement but by operation of law because of certain acts. Conventional
subrogation is that which takes place by agreement of parties.[21]
Although it
may be said that the effect of the assignment of credit is to subrogate the
assignee in the rights of the original creditor, this Court still cannot
definitively rule that assignment of credit and conventional subrogation are
one and the same.
A noted authority
on civil law provided a discourse[22]
on the difference between these two transactions, to wit –
Conventional Subrogation and Assignment of Credits. –
In the Argentine Civil Code, there is essentially no difference between
conventional subrogation and assignment of credit. The subrogation is merely the effect of the
assignment. In fact it is expressly
provided (article 769) that conventional redemption shall be governed by the
provisions on assignment of credit.
Under our Code, however, conventional subrogation is not identical to assignment of credit. In the former, the debtor’s consent is necessary; in the latter, it is not required. Subrogation extinguishes an obligation and gives rise to a new one; assignment refers to the same right which passes from one person to another. The nullity of an old obligation may be cured by subrogation, such that the new obligation will be perfectly valid; but the nullity of an obligation is not remedied by the assignment of the creditor’s right to another. (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court
has consistently adhered to the foregoing distinction between an assignment of
credit and a conventional subrogation.[23] Such distinction is crucial because it would
determine the necessity of the debtor’s consent. In an assignment of credit, the consent of
the debtor is not necessary in order that the assignment may fully produce the
legal effects. What the law requires in
an assignment of credit is not the consent of the debtor, but merely notice to
him as the assignment takes effect only from the time he has knowledge
thereof. A creditor may, therefore,
validly assign his credit and its accessories without the debtor’s
consent. On the other hand, conventional
subrogation requires an agreement among the parties concerned – the original
creditor, the debtor, and the new creditor.
It is a new contractual relation based on the mutual agreement among all
the necessary parties.[24]
Article
1300 of the Civil Code provides that conventional subrogation must be clearly
established in order that it may take effect.
Since it is petitioner who claims that there is conventional subrogation
in this case, the burden of proof rests upon him to establish the same[25]
by a preponderance of evidence.[26]
In Licaros v. Gatmaitan,[27]
this Court ruled that there was conventional subrogation, not just an
assignment of credit; thus, consent of the debtor is required for the effectivity of the subrogation. This Court arrived at such a conclusion in
said case based on its following findings –
We agree with the finding of
the Court of Appeals that the Memorandum of Agreement dated
"Immediately discernible from above is the common feature of contracts involving conventional subrogation, namely, the approval of the debtor to the subrogation of a third person in place of the creditor. That Gatmaitan and Licaros had intended to treat their agreement as one of conventional subrogation is plainly borne by a stipulation in their Memorandum of Agreement, to wit:
"WHEREAS, the parties herein have come to an agreement on the nature, form and extent of their mutual prestations which they now record herein with the express conformity of the third parties concerned" (emphasis supplied),
which
third party is admittedly Anglo-Asean Bank.
Had the
intention been merely to confer on appellant the status of a mere
"assignee" of appellee's credit, there is
simply no sense for them to have stipulated in their agreement that the same is
conditioned on the "express conformity" thereto of Anglo-Asean Bank. That they did so only accentuates their
intention to treat the agreement as one of conventional subrogation. And it is
basic in the interpretation of contracts that the intention of the parties must
be the one pursued (Rule 130, Section 12, Rules of Court).
x
x x x
Aside for the 'whereas clause" cited by the appellate court in its decision, we likewise note that on the signature page, right under the place reserved for the signatures of petitioner and respondent, there is, typewritten, the words "WITH OUR CONFORME." Under this notation, the words "ANGLO-ASEAN BANK AND TRUST" were written by hand. To our mind, this provision which contemplates the signed conformity of Anglo-Asean Bank, taken together with the aforementioned preambulatory clause leads to the conclusion that both parties intended that Anglo-Asean Bank should signify its agreement and conformity to the contractual arrangement between petitioner and respondent. The fact that Anglo-Asean Bank did not give such consent rendered the agreement inoperative considering that, as previously discussed, the consent of the debtor is needed in the subrogation of a third person to the rights of a creditor.
None of the foregoing circumstances
are attendant in the present case. The
Assignment of Credit, dated P60,000.00.
By virtue of the same document, Ms. Picache
gave respondent full power “to sue for, collect and discharge, or sell and
assign” the very same debt. The
Assignment of Credit was signed solely by Ms. Picache,
witnessed by two other persons. No
reference was made to securing the conforme of
petitioner to the transaction, nor any space provided for his signature on the
said document.
Perhaps more in point to the case at
bar is Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, [28]
in which this Court found that –
The
basis of the complaint is not a deed of subrogation but an assignment of credit
whereby the private respondent became the owner, not the subrogee
of the credit since the assignment was supported by HK $1.00 and other valuable
considerations.
x x x x
The
petitioner further contends that the consent of the debtor is essential to the
subrogation. Since there was no consent on his part, then he allegedly is not
bound.
Again, we find for the respondent. The questioned deed of assignment is neither one of subrogation nor a power of attorney as the petitioner alleges. The deed of assignment clearly states that the private respondent became an assignee and, therefore, he became the only party entitled to collect the indebtedness. As a result of the Deed of Assignment, the plaintiff acquired all rights of the assignor including the right to sue in his own name as the legal assignee. Moreover, in assignment, the debtor's consent is not essential for the validity of the assignment (Art. 1624 in relation to Art. 1475, Civil Code), his knowledge thereof affecting only the validity of the payment he might make (Article 1626, Civil Code).
Since
the Assignment of Credit, dated
It bears to emphasize that even if the consent of petitioner as debtor is unnecessary for the validity and enforceability of the assignment of credit, nonetheless, the petitioner must have knowledge, acquired either by formal notice or some other means, of the assignment so that he may pay the debt to the proper party, which shall now be the assignee. This much can be gathered from a reading of Article 1626 of the Civil Code providing that, “The debtor who, before having knowledge of the assignment, pays his creditor shall be released from the obligation.”
This Court, in Sison v. Yap Tico,[31] presented and adopted Manresa’s analysis of Article 1626 of the Civil Code (then Article 1527 of the old Civil Code) –
“We have said that article 1527 deals with the
individual phase or aspect which presupposes the existence of a relationship
with third parties, that is, with the person of the debtor. Let us see in what way.
“The above-mentioned article states that a debtor who,
before having knowledge of the assignment, should pay the creditor shall be
released from the obligation.
“In the first place, the necessity for the notice to
the debtor in order that the assignment may fully produce its legal effects may
be inferred from the above. It refers to
a notice and not to a petition for the consent which is not necessary. We say that the notice is not necessary in
order that the legal effects may be fully produced, because if it should be
omitted, such omission will not imply that the assignment will not exist
legally, but that its effects will be limited to the parties thereto; at least,
they will not reach the debtor.
“*
* * * * * * *
“Let us go to the legal effects produced by the
failure to give the notice. In the
beginning, we have said that the contract does not lose its efficacy with
respect to the parties who made it; but article 1527 determines specifically
one of the consequences arising from the failure to give notice, for it
evidently takes for granted that the debtor who, before having knowledge of the
assignment, should pay the creditor shall be released from the obligation. So that if the creditor assigned his credit,
acting in bad faith and taking advantage of the fact that the debtor does not
know anything about the assignment because the latter has not been notified,
and collects its amount, the debtor shall be free from the obligation, inasmuch
as it has been legally extinguished by a payment which fully redounds to his
benefit. The assignee can take advantage
of all civil and criminal actions against the assignor, but he can ask nothing
from the debtor, because the latter did not know of the assignment, nor was he
bound to know it; the assignor should blame himself for his failure to have the
notice made.
“*
* * * * * * *
“Hence, there not having been any notice to the
debtor, the existence of his knowledge of the assignment should be proved by
him who is interested therein; and the debtor is not bound to prove his
ignorance.”
In
a more recent case, Aquintey v. Spouses Tibong,[32]
this Court stated: “The law does not require any formal notice to bind the
debtor to the assignee, all that the law requires is
knowledge of the assignment. Even if the debtor had not been notified, but came
to know of the assignment by whatever means, the debtor is bound by it.”
Since his
consent is immaterial, the only other matter which this Court must determine is
whether petitioner had knowledge of the Assignment of Credit, dated
Finally, assuming arguendo
that this Court considers petitioner a third person to the Assignment of
Credit, dated 1 April 1989, the fact that the said document was duly notarized
makes it legally enforceable even as to him.
According to Article 1625 of the Civil Code –
ART. 1625. An assignment of credit, right or action shall produce no effect as against third persons, unless it appears in a public instrument, or the instrument is recorded in the Registry of Property in case the assignment involves real property.
Notarization
converted the Assignment of Credit, dated 1 April 1989, a private document,
into a public document,[33]
thus, complying with the mandate of the afore-quoted provision and making it
enforceable even as against third persons.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED, and the Decision, dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 11-23.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Candido V. Rivera, concurring; id. at 41-53.
[3] Penned by then Judge Marina L. Buzon (now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals), id. at 37-40.
[4]
[5] Records, pp. 161-163.
[6]
[7]
[8] The letters were dated 18 May 1989, 5 June 1989, 13 June 1989, and 31 July 1989, all sent by registered mail, id. at 168-171.
[9]
[10] Ms. Picache is likewise an incorporator and member of the Board of Directors of respondent Capitol Development Corporation.
[11]
[12] Rollo, p. 38.
[13]
[14]
[15] Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Candido V. Rivera, concurring; id. at 64-65.
[16]
[17] Jammang
v. Takahashi Trading Co., Ltd., G.R. No. 149429, 9 October 2006, 504 SCRA
31, 42.
[18] China Banking Corporation v. Dyne-Sem Electronics Corporation, G.R. No. 149237, 11 July 2006, 494 SCRA 493, 499 .
[19] Security Bank and Trust Company
v. Gan, G.R. No. 150464,
[20] Far East Bank & Trust Company v. Diaz Realty, Inc., 416 Phil. 147, 161 (2001).
[21] Chemphil Export & Import Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 619, 642 (1995).
[22] Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, 1996 ed., p. 402.
[23] See South City Homes, Inc. v. BA Finance Corporation, 423 Phil. 84, 95 (2001); Far East Bank & Trust Company v. Diaz Realty, Inc., supra note 20; Licaros v. Gatmaitan, 414 Phil. 857, 866-867 (2001); Sesbreño v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89252, 24 May 1993, 222 SCRA 466, 478-479; Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84220, 25 March 1992, 207 SCRA 553, 558.
[24] Licaros v. Gatmaitan, id.
[25] Section 1, Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court reads, “Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.”
[26] According to Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court, “In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. x x x.” By “preponderance of evidence is meant simply evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it.” (Rivera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115625, 23 January 1998, 284 SCRA 673, 681.)
[27] Supra note 23 at 868-870.
[28] Supra note 22 at 558-559.
[29]
[30] National Investment and
Development Corporation v. De
[31] 37 Phil. 584, 587-588 (1918).
[32] G.R. No. 166704,
[33] Bernardo v. Atty. Ramos, 433 Phil. 8, 15 (2002).