THIRD
DIVISION
|
FRANCISCO MAGESTRADO,
Petitioner, - versus
- PEOPLE OF THE Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 148072 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: |
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the (1) Resolution[1]
dated 5 March 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 entitled, “Francisco Magestrado v. Hon. Estrella T.
Estrada, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch
83 of Quezon City, People of the Philippines and Elena M. Librojo,” which
dismissed petitioner Francisco Magestrado’s Petition for Certiorari for being the wrong remedy; and (2) Resolution[2]
dated 3 May 2001 of the same Court denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Private
respondent Elena M. Librojo filed a
criminal complaint[3]
for perjury against petitioner with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City, which was docketed as I.S. No. 98-3900.
After the filing of petitioner’s
counter-affidavit and the appended pleadings, the Office of the City Prosecutor
recommended the filing of an information for perjury against petitioner. Thus, Assistant City Prosecutor Josephine Z.
Fernandez filed an information for perjury against petitioner with the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of
That
on or about the 27th day of December, 1997, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and knowingly make an untruthful statement under oath upon a
material matter before a competent officer authorized to receive and administer
oath and which the law so require, to wit:
the said accused subscribe and swore to an Affidavit of Loss before
Notary Public Erlinda B. Espejo of P 758,134.42 and as
a consequence of which said title to the
property was surrendered by him to the said complainant by virtue of said loan,
thus, making untruthful and deliberate assertions of falsehoods, to the damage
and prejudice of the said Elena M. Librojo.[4]
The
case was raffled to the MeTC of Quezon City, Branch 43, where it was docketed
as Criminal Case No. 90721 entitled, “People
of the
On
On
Acting on the “Motion for Suspension of Proceedings”
filed by the [herein petitioner Magestrado], thru counsel, and the “Comment and
Opposition thereto, the Court after an evaluation of the same, finds the
aforesaid motion without merit, hence, is hereby DENIED, it appearing that the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil actions is not determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Hence, the trial of this case shall proceed as
previously scheduled on July 19 and
On
Aggrieved,
petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari[9]
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with a prayer for Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 83, docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-99-39358, on the ground that MeTC Judge Billy J. Apalit committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his
motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 90721.
On
Scrutinizing the complaints and answers in the civil
cases abovementioned, in relation to the criminal action for PERJURY, this
Court opines and so holds that there is no prejudicial question involved as to
warrant the suspension of the criminal action to await the outcome of the civil
cases. The civil cases are principally
for determination whether or not a loan was obtained by petitioner and whether
or not he executed the deed of real estate mortgage involving the property
covered by TCT No. N-173163, whereas the criminal case is for perjury which
imputes upon petitioner the wrongful execution of an affidavit of loss to
support his petition for issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No.
173163. Whether or not he committed perjury is the issue in the criminal case
which may be resolved independently of the civil cases. Note that the affidavit
of loss was executed in support of the petition for issuance of a new owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163 which petition was raffled to Branch 99 of
the RTC.
x x x.[10]
Again,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[11]
but this was denied by RTC- Branch 83 in an Order[12]
dated
Dissatisfied,
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari[13] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63293. Petitioner alleged that RTC Judge Estrella T.
Estrada committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying the Petition for Certiorari
in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358, and in effect sustaining the denial by MeTC-Branch
43 of petitioner’s motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721,
as well as his subsequent motion for reconsideration thereof.
On
Is this instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 the correct and appropriate remedy?
We rule
negatively.
The
resolution or dismissal in special civil actions, as in the instant petition,
may be appealed x x x under Section 10, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and not by petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the same rules.
Thus, the said rule provides:
Section 10.
Time for filing memoranda on special cases. In certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus cases, the parties shall file in lieu
of briefs, their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of thirty
(30) days from receipt of the notice issued by the clerk that all the evidence,
oral and documentary, is already attached to the record x x x.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises,
the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is hereby DISMISSED.[15]
The Court of
Appeals denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration[16]
in a Resolution[17]
dated
Hence, petitioner comes before us via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Orders of
Judge Estrella T. Estrada dated March 14, 2000 denying petitioner’s Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, and her subsequent Order dated December 21, 2000, denying the
Motion for Reconsideration thereafter filed can only be reviewed by the Court
of Appeals thru appeal under Section 10, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
2. Whether or not Judge Estrella T.
Estrada of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Quezon City, had committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of her jurisdiction in
denying the Petition for Certiorari
and petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration on the ground of a
prejudicial question pursuant to the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the prevailing
jurisprudence.
After consideration of
the procedural and substantive issues raised by petitioner, we find the instant
petition to be without merit.
The procedural issue herein basically hinges on the proper
remedy which petitioner should have availed himself of before the Court of
Appeals: an ordinary appeal or a petition for certiorari.
Petitioner claims that he correctly questioned RTC-Branch 83’s Order of
dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari
in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358 through a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Private
respondent and public respondent People of the
We agree with respondents. We hold that the appellate court did not err
in dismissing petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari,
pursuant to Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court (and not under Rule
44, Section 10, invoked by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated
The correct procedural recourse for
petitioner was appeal, not only because RTC-Branch 83 did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358 but also because RTC-Branch 83’s Order of
dismissal was a final order from which petitioners should have appealed in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court.
An order or a judgment is deemed
final when it finally disposes of a pending action, so that nothing more can be
done with it in the trial court. In other words, the order or judgment
ends the litigation in the lower court. Au contraire, an interlocutory
order does not dispose of the case completely, but leaves something to be done
as regards the merits of the latter.[18] RTC-Branch 83’s Order dated
Under Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
declared by the Revised Rules of Court to be appealable. The manner of appealing an RTC judgment or
final order is also provided in Rule 41 as follows:
Section
2. Modes of appeal. —
(a)
Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by
the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be
taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment
or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse
party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special
proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or
these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be
filed and served in like manner.
Certiorari generally lies only when there is no appeal nor
any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy available to petitioners. Here, appeal was available. It was adequate to deal with any question
whether of fact or of law, whether of error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion or error of judgment which the trial court might have
committed. But petitioners instead filed
a special civil action for certiorari.
We have time and again
reminded members of the bench and bar that a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court lies only when “there is no appeal
nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”[19]
Certiorari cannot be allowed when
a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that
remedy,[20]
certiorari not being a substitute for lost appeal.[21]
As certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal, we have repeatedly emphasized
that the perfection of appeals in the manner and within the period permitted by
law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and that the failure to perfect
an appeal renders the decision of the trial court final and executory. This rule is founded upon the principle that
the right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere statutory
privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law. Neither can
petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of technicality must yield to the
broader interest of substantial justice. While every litigant must be given the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from
constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal within the
reglementary period is not a mere technicality. It raises a jurisdictional problem as it
deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal.[22]
The remedies of appeal
and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.[23]
A party cannot substitute the special
civil action of certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court for the remedy of appeal. The existence and availability of the right
of appeal are antithetical to the availability of the special civil action for certiorari.[24]
As this Court held in Fajardo v. Bautista[25]:
Generally,
an order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final order, and hence a
proper subject of appeal, not certiorari.
The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or successive. Accordingly,
although the special civil action of certiorari is not proper when an ordinary
appeal is available, it may be granted where it is shown that the appeal would
be inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from
the injurious effects of the order complained of, or where appeal is inadequate
and ineffectual. Nevertheless,
certiorari cannot be a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal,
where such loss is occasioned by the petitioner’s own neglect or error in the
choice of remedies.
On
For this procedural
lapse, the Court of Appeals correctly denied outright the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner before it.
Moreover, there are even
more cogent reasons for denying the instant Petition on the merits.
In the Petition at bar, petitioner raises
several substantive issues. Petitioner harps on the need for the suspension of
the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721 for perjury pending before
MeTC-Branch 43 based on a prejudicial question still to be resolved in Civil
Case No. Q-98-34308 (for cancellation of mortgage) and Civil Case No.
Q-98-34349 (for collection of a sum of money) which are pending before other
trial courts.
For
clarity, we shall first discuss the allegations of petitioner in his complaint in Civil Case No. Q-98-34308
(for cancellation of mortgage) and that of
private respondent in her complaint in Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 (for collection
of a sum of money).
Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 is a complaint for Cancellation of
Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages filed on P100,000.00 to
facilitate the filing of cases against private respondent; to deliver to
petitioner the certificate of title of the land; and/or to cancel the
certificate of title in possession of private respondent. However, Mr. Gazmin, Jr., did nothing upon
receipt of the amount of P100,000.00 from petitioner. In fact, petitioner was even charged with perjury
before the Office of the City Prosecutor, all because of Mr. Gazmin, Jr.’s
wrongdoing. Petitioner further alleged
that he discovered the existence of a spurious Real Estate Mortgage which he
allegedly signed in favor of private respondent. Petitioner categorically denied signing the mortgage
document and it was private respondent who falsified the same in order to
justify her unlawful withholding of TCT No.
N-173163 from petitioner. Thus, petitioner prayed for:
1. The cancellation of
Real Estate Mortgage dated
2. As well as to order [herein private respondent]
to DELIVER the Owner’s Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
N-173163 to [herein petitioner];
3. Condemning [private respondent] to pay [petitioner]
the sums of
a) P100,000.00 as MORAL DAMAGES;
b) P50,000.00 as EXEMPLARY DAMAGES;
c) P50,000.00 as Attorney’s fees and
d) Cost of suit.
4. A general relief is
likewise prayed for (sic) just and equitable under the premises.
Civil Case No. Q-98-34349,[26]
on the other
hand, is a complaint for a sum of money with a motion for
issuance of a writ of attachment filed by private respondent
against petitioner on P758,134.42 with a promise to pay on or
before
A.
That
upon filing of this Complaint as well as the Affidavit of attachment and a
preliminary hearing thereon, as well as bond filed, a writ of preliminary
attachment is (sic) by the Honorable Court ordering the Sheriff to levy [herein
petitioner] property sufficient to answer [herein private respondent’s] claim
in this action;
B.
That
after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered in [private respondent’s]
favor as against [petitioner], ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of
P758,134.42 plus interest thereon at 5% per month from September 1997 up
to the date of actual payment; actual damages in the sums of P70,000.00
each under paragraphs 11 and 12 of the complaint; P200,000.00 as moral
damages; P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; twenty (20%) of the principal
claim as attorney’s fees plus P2,500.00 per appearance honorarium; and P60,000.00
as litigation expense before this Honorable Court.
[Petitioner] prays for such further
relief in law, justice and equity.
As to whether it is proper to suspend
Criminal Case No. 90721 for perjury pending final outcome of Civil Case No.
Q-98-34349 and Civil Case No. Q-98-34308, we take into consideration Sections 6
and 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, which read:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.
– A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a
prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor
or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal
action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be
filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements
of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are:
(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
The rationale behind the principle of
suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions.[27]
A prejudial
question is defined as that which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and
the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged
in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence
of the accused.[28]
For a prejudicial question in a civil
case to suspend criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in
the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.
Thus, for a civil action to be
considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the
suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil
case, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves
facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3)
jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another
tribunal.[29]
If the resolution of the issue in the
civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in
the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity “that the
civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case,” therefore,
the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.[30] Neither is there a prejudicial
question if the civil and the criminal action can, according
to law, proceed independently of each other.[31]
However, the court in which an action is
pending may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and upon proper application
for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide by the outcome
of another case pending in another court, especially where the parties and the
issues are the same, for there is power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of cases on its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself,
for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of parties to the second
action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first
action are settled, the second action should be stayed.[32]
The power to stay proceedings is incidental
to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the cases on
its dockets, considering its time and effort, those of counsel and the
litigants. But if proceedings must be stayed, it must be done in order to
avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting
judgments, confusion between litigants and courts. It bears stressing
that whether or not the trial court would suspend the proceedings in the
criminal case before it is submitted to its sound discretion.[33]
Indeed, a judicial order issued pursuant to
the court’s discretionary authority is not subject to reversal on review unless
it constitutes an abuse of discretion. As
the United States Supreme Court aptly declared in Landis v. North American Co., “the burden of making out the justice
and wisdom from the departure from the beaten truck lay heavily on the
petitioner, less an unwilling litigant is compelled to wait upon the outcome of
a controversy to which he is a stranger. It is, thus, stated that only in
rare circumstances will a litigant in one case is compelled to stand aside,
while a litigant in another, settling the rule of law that will define the
rights of both is, after all, the parties before the court are entitled to a
just, speedy and plain determination of their case undetermined by the pendency
of the proceedings in another case. After all, procedure was created not
to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice.”[34]
As stated, the determination of whether the
proceedings may be suspended on the basis of a prejudicial question rests on whether
the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the civil cases are so related
with the issues raised in the criminal case such that the resolution of the
issues in the civil cases would also determine the judgment in the criminal
case.
A perusal of the allegations in the
complaints show that Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 pending before RTC-Branch 77,
and Civil Case No. Q-98-34349, pending before RTC-Branch 84, are principally
for the determination of whether a loan was obtained by petitioner from private
respondent and whether petitioner executed a real estate mortgage involving the
property covered by TCT No. N-173163. On
the other hand, Criminal Case No. 90721 before MeTC-Branch 43, involves the
determination of whether petitioner committed perjury in executing an affidavit
of loss to support his request for issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of
TCT No. N-173163.
It is evident that the civil cases and the
criminal case can proceed independently of each other. Regardless of the outcome of the two civil
cases, it will not establish the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the
criminal case for perjury. The purchase
by petitioner of the land or his execution of a real estate mortgage will have
no bearing whatsoever on whether petitioner knowingly and fraudulently executed
a false affidavit of loss of TCT No. N-173163.
MeTC-Branch 43,
therefore, did not err in ruling that the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 for cancellation of
mortgage before the RTC-Branch 77; and Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 for collection
of a sum of money before RTC-Branch 84, do not pose a
prejudicial question in the
determination of whether petitioner is guilty of perjury in Criminal Case No.
90721. RTC-Branch 83, likewise, did not
err in ruling that MeTC-Branch 43 did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner’s motion for suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No.
90721.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions
dated
SO
ORDERED
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA
Associate
Justice
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Elvi John S. Asuncion concurring; rollo, pp. 27-29.
[2]
[3] The date of filing of the criminal complaint does not appear from the Records.
[4] CA
rollo, p. 21.
[5] Id.
at 58-61.
[6] Penned by Judge Billy M. Apalit.
[7] Id.
at 67-70.
[8]
[9] Id.
at 72-81.
[10] Penned
by Judge Estrella T. Estrada. Id. at 18.
[11] Id.
at 67-70.
[12] Id.
at 20.
[13] Id.
at 2-16.
[14] Id.
at 91-93.
[15] Id.
at 92.
[16] Id.
at 94-96.
[17] Id.
at 104-105.
[18] Diesel Construction Company, Inc. v.
Jollibee Corp., 380 Phil 813, 824 (2000).
[19] De
la Paz v. Panis, 315 Phil. 238, 248 (1995).
[20] Felizardo v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 112050,
[21] David
v. Cordova, G.R. No. 152992, 28 July 2005, 464 SCRA 385, 395.
[22] Delgado
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137881,
[23] Land Bank of the
[24]
[25] G.R. Nos. 102193-97,
[26] This case was subsequently dismissed on
[27] Te
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126746,
[28] Donato v. Luna, G.R. No. L-53642, 15
April 1988, 160 SCRA 441, 445; Quiambao
v. Osorio, G.R. No. L-48157, 16 March 1988, 158 SCRA 674, 677-678; Ras v. Rasul, G.R. Nos. L-50441-42, 18
September 1980, 100 SCRA 125, 127.
[29] Prado v. People, 218 Phil 573, 577 (1984).
[30] Sabandal v. Tongco, 419 Phil. 13, 18 (2001).
[31] Rojas v People, 156 Phil. 224, 229 (1974).
[32] Quiambao
v. Osorio, supra note 28 at 679.
[33] Security
Bank Corporation v. Victorio, G.R. No. 156994,
[34]