THIRD
DIVISION
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SPS. GUILLERMO MALISON and AMELITA
MALISON,
Petitioners, - versus
- HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. MELCHOR
MARANAN, JR. and VIRGINIA MARANAN, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 147776 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This
is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the revised
Rules of Court assailing (1) the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated 25 January 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58767 dismissing
herein petitioners’ petition and affirming the decision[2]
dated 31 March 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 215, in Civil Case No. Q-99-39527; and (2) Resolution[3] of
the Court of Appeals dated
The
antecedent facts show that a complaint[5]
for ejectment was filed by the private respondents
Spouses Melchor Maranan,
Jr. and Virginia Maranan against the petitioners, Spouses
Guillermo and Amelita Malison, docketed as Civil Case
No. 19167 before the MeTC. In their Complaint, private respondents
alleged that they are the owners/lessors of the
subject property located at 166 Scout Chuatoco, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 155183 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City,
which they acquired from its former owner Belen Eser-Pascual,
through her attorney-in fact, Luz Eser-Tabing, in a
Deed of Sale executed in August 1991.
Petitioners are staying on the premises through the tolerance of the
private respondents. As early as July
1996, verbal demands were made on the petitioners to vacate the premises but
the same were ignored which led private respondents to the institution of the
complaint before the MeTC.
Petitioners,
though, presented a totally different version of events as to how private
respondents acquired title to the subject property. Petitioners claim that petitioner Amelita Eser-Malison (Amelita), married to Guillermo Malison (Guillermo), was the
eldest child of deceased spouses Ignacio Eser and Fe Villacorta. Amelita has been living on the subject property since 1950
with her sisters Luz Eser-Tabing (Luz), Rosie Eser-Tolentino (Rose), Belen Eser-Pascual
(Belen) and brother Efren Eser
(now also deceased). The subject
property was registered under TCT No. 142311 in the name of Belen only for the
purpose of applying for a loan with the Government Service Insurance System
with the understanding that Belen would hold in trust the subject property for
all of her siblings. The safekeeping of
TCT No. 142311 was entrusted to Luz and her son Arnel
Tabing (Arnel). When Belen returned to the
On
P400,000.00
to be divided into four equal parts, one part of which was to be remitted to
Belen.[7] In 1996, private respondents, who claim to
have bought the property in 1991, surfaced after five years, trying to evict
petitioners from their ancestral home.
Petitioners
assail the Deed of Sale in favor of the private respondents asserting that any
purported sale of the subject property was spurious and in excess of the
authority of Luz, Belen’s attorney-in-fact, who was directed to sell the
subject property for the specific amount of P400,000.00 and to particular
individuals, namely, petitioner Spouses Malison. A careful perusal of Luz’s Power of Attorney
should have put private respondents in inquiry on the scope of her authority to
sell the subject property. Another
matter raised by petitioners is that the issue of ownership is prejudicial and
intrinsic to the resolution of this case for ejectment
and, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the MeTC; that
the retention of the possession of the subject property by petitioners for five
years after the purported Deed of Sale in favor of private respondents raised
the presumption that there was something amiss in the sale transaction; that private
respondents have no contract of lease; that neither were rentals paid to them
since 1991, contrary to their allegation that they wrote petitioners demanding
rentals. Belen had executed another
Special Power of Attorney dated
The
MeTC rendered a decision on the ejectment
case on
In
sustaining the private respondents’ position, the MeTC[9]
explained that since the private respondents are the registered owners of the
subject property by virtue of the Deed of Sale dated 12 August 1991 executed in
their favor by Belen, thru her attorney-in-fact Luz, for the sale price of P1,690,000.00,[10]
they have the right as owners to occupy, enjoy and dispose of the subject
property. Similarly, they also have the
right of action against the holder/possessor of the subject property in order
to recover it. Since there is no lease
contract between the parties and there being no stealth, force, and strategy
applied by petitioners in entering the subject property, petitioners’ occupancy
thereof is obviously by tolerance of the private respondents; and inasmuch as
petitioners are in possession of the subject property by mere tolerance of the
real owners, their possession initially was lawful but became illegal when the
tolerance was withdrawn upon demand to vacate the subject property by the
owners. Possession by tolerance is
necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, failing which, a
summary proceeding for ejectment is the proper
remedy. Private respondents’ letter
dated
Hence,
the dispositive portion of the MeTC
Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [herein private respondents] and against [herein petitioners] as follows:
1. Ordering [petitioners], and all persons claiming right over the said property to vacate the property with an area of 200 square meters and covered by TCT 155183 of the Register of Deeds of Wuezon City (sic), located at No. 166 Scout Chuatoco Street, and to surrender peaceful possession thereof to the [private respondents];
2. Ordering the [petitioners] to pay P2,500
as reasonable compensation for the use and enjoyment of the premises from the
filing of the complaint.
3. To pay attorney’s fees in the amount of
P10,000.00; and
4. Ordering the [petitioners] to pay the cost of suit.[13]
Petitioners
appealed to the RTC where the case was docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-99-39527. The RTC rendered a decision
dated
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, and finding no reversible error in the Decision dated
From
the RTC, petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision
dated
The RTC and the Court of Appeals agreed with the MeTC that the jurisdictional requirements have been
sufficiently complied with by the private respondents and the evidence on hand
show their entitlement to the relief sought in their complaint for ejectment.
Hence,
this petition moored on the following issues:
1) Is the purchase of subject property by respondents Sps. Maranan from a person other than the registered owner of a residential house and lot valid?
2) Is ejectment the proper remedy of Sps. Maranan assuming arguendo validity of title?[15]
The
first issue brings to the fore the validity of the purchase of the property
made by the private respondents. The
second issue seeks to determine whether or not ejectment
is the proper remedy for the private respondents.
At
the threshold, there is a need to stress that pursuant to Section 1, Rule 45 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for review before this
Court should only raise questions of law.
Factual matters cannot be raised before this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari. This Court, at this stage is limited to
reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts. We are restrained from conducting further
scrutiny of the findings of fact made by trial courts. Otherwise, we would convert this Court into a
trier of facts.[16] In the absence of a showing that the case
falls under one of the exceptions,[17]
factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court.
And they carry even more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the
factual findings of the trial court.
After a perusal of the records, this Court can only conclude that the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals, affirming those of the RTC, are amply
supported by evidence and are, resultantly, conclusive on this Court.[18] As
such, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the
evidence already considered in the proceedings below.[19] Where factual matters are involved, it is
well-settled that a question of fact is to be determined by the evidence to
support the particular contention. As
found by the Court of Appeals, the evidence adduced on this score are in
private respondents’ favor. Whether such
conclusion of the Court of Appeals was supported by the evidence presented
before it, is also factual in nature.
Therefore,
the following facts are deemed settled:
(1) the subject property was
registered in the name of Belen; (2)
Belen, through her attorney-in-fact, Luz, sold the subject property to
private respondents by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated 12 August 1991; (3) petitioners remained in possession of the
subject property by mere tolerance of the private respondents; and (4) after five years, private respondents already
gave petitioners notice to vacate the subject property, which petitioners
refused to heed.
It
bears to emphasize that this is an EJECTMENT case and the foregoing are facts
relevant to the determination of which of the parties have a better right to
POSSESSION of the subject property.
A complaint for ejectment
may be instituted in accordance with Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of
Court:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. – Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.
Under
the above provision, there are two entirely distinct and different causes of
action for an ejectment case, to wit: (1) a case for forcible entry, which is an
action to recover possession of a property from the defendant whose occupation
thereof is illegal from the beginning, as he acquired possession by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer,
which is an action for recovery of possession from defendant whose possession
of the property was inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or
implied) with the plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his
possession despite the termination of his right thereunder.[20]
Private
respondents’ complaint contained the following essential allegations:
Plaintiffs
are the owners/lessors of a premises denominated as
166 Scout Chuatoco,
The
land covered by the aforestated title together with
all the improvements thereon was acquired by the plaintiffs through sale from
the former owner Belen Eser Pascual
through her atty-in-fact Luz Eser
Tabing sometime in August 1991. Copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale is made
part hereof and hereto attached as Annex “B.”
x x x x
As
early as July, 1996 verbal demands were made upon the defendants to vacate the
subject premises but to no avail because the defendants failed and refused to
heed the said demand.
On
After
a perusal of the aforequoted complaint, we find that
the MeTC had jurisdiction over the case inasmuch as
the complaint itself sufficiently alleged that possession was unlawfully
withheld from the private respondents who are the registered owners thereof,
and that the petitioners refused to vacate the subject premises despite demands
to vacate the same. The private
respondents’ cause of action springs from petitioners’ failure to vacate the
premises.[22] The complaint was filed on
A
simple allegation that defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from
plaintiff is sufficient. In an unlawful detainer case, the defendant’s possession was originally
lawful but ceased to be so by the expiration of his right to possess. Hence, the phrase “unlawful withholding” has been held to imply possession on the part
of defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a
contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a right and is being
withheld by defendant.[23]
We
emphasized this point in Ross Rica Sales Center,
Inc. v. Ong[24]:
In Javelosa v. Court of Appeals [333 Phil. 331 (1996)], it was held that the allegation in the complaint that there was unlawful withholding of possession is sufficient to make out a case for unlawful detainer. It is equally settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.
Hence, the phrase “unlawful withholding” has been held to imply possession on the part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant. In Rosanna B. Barba v. Court of Appeals [426 Phil. 598 (2002)], we held that a simple allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is sufficient.
Such
being the case, the remedy of ejectment was properly availed
of by the private respondents as based on the allegations in their complaint.
As a general rule, the main issue in
an ejectment suit is possession de facto, not possession de jure.
Verily, in ejectment cases, the
word “possession” means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal
possession, in the sense contemplated in civil law. The only issue in such cases is who is
entitled to the physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants.[25] It does not even matter if the party’s title
to property is questionable.[26]
Over and over again we have held
that in ejectment proceedings courts must resolve only
the issue of who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises.[27] The question of possession is primordial
while the issue of ownership is unessential.[28]
In Gayoso v. Twenty-Two Realty Development
Corporation,[29] we have
ruled:
It is basic that a court’s jurisdiction is provided by law. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, provides in part:
SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
x x x x
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the question of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. (Emphasis supplied.)
We explained the same matter at length
in Dizon v. Court of Appeals[30]:
Well-settled is the rule that in an ejectment suit, the only issue is possession de facto or physical or material possession and not possession de jure. So that, even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, as in this case, the court may pass upon such issue but only to determine the question of possession especially if the former is inseparably linked with the latter. It cannot dispose with finality the issue of ownership – such issue being inutile in an ejectment suit except to throw light on the question of possession. This is why the issue of ownership or title is generally immaterial and foreign to an ejectment suit.
Detainer, being a mere quieting process, questions raised on
real property are incidentally discussed.
In fact, any evidence of ownership is expressly banned by Sec. 4 of Rule
70 except to resolve the question of possession. Thus, all that the court may do, is to make
an initial determination of who is the owner of the property so that it can
resolve who is entitled to its possession absent other evidence to resolve the
latter. But such determination of
ownership is not clothed with finality.
Neither will it affect ownership of the property nor constitute a
binding and conclusive adjudication on the merits with respect to the issue of
ownership. x x
x.
Section
18, Rule 70 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court provides an instructive
guideline on the effect of any declaration of ownership made in an ejectment proceeding:
SEC. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving title or ownership. – The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building.
Thus, we underscored in that case of Tecson v. Gutierrez,[31]
[B]efore us is only the initial determination of ownership
over the lot in dispute, for the purpose of settling the issue of possession,
although the issue of ownership is inseparably linked thereto. As such, the lower court’s adjudication of
ownership in the ejectment case is merely
provisional, and our affirmance of the trial courts’
decisions as well, would not bar or prejudice an action between the same
parties involving title to the property, if and when such action is brought
seasonably before the proper forum.
Based on the foregoing postulates, the finding that private
respondents, being holders of a title to the subject property, have a better
right to the possession thereof, must not be taken as a conclusive
determination of their ownership nor confirmation of private respondents’ title
to the said property. In an appropriate
proceeding before the appropriate court having jurisdiction, petitioners may
still have the sale of the subject property to private respondents annulled,
and the latter’s title cancelled if petitioners’ case is truly meritorious.
Additionally,
it must also be remembered that the subject property is registered under the
Torrens System in the names of the private respondents whose title to the
property is presumed legal and cannot be collaterally attacked, less so in an
action for unlawful detainer. Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No.
1529,[32] a
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled,
except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the
private respondents can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for
that purpose. The subject of ownership
over the property is beyond the power of the court a quo to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.[33]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is DENIED for lack of merit
and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando with Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring; rollo, p. 39.
[2] Penned by Presiding Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla, CA rollo, pp. 36-38.
[3] Rollo, p. 50.
[4] Penned by Judge Joselito Generoso, id. at 39-41.
[5] CA rollo, p. 54.
[6] POWER OF ATTORNEY
KNOW ALL MEN BY THIS PRESENT:
I, BELEN ESER PASCUAL, of legal age, married, at present staying at 16805 Cashell Road, Olney, Maryland 20832, U.S.A., do hereby constitute and appoint LUZ E. TABING; of legal age, married, at present staying at 591 Facundo Street, Pasay City, Manila, Philippines, to be the true and lawful attorney, for me and in my name, place, and stead, to do and perform the following acts and things to wit:
To execute Deed of Absolute Sale of a real estate property specifically described as:
Parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-21083 (142311) x x x.
To receive the
purchase price of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P400,000), net, the
Capital Gain tax and other incidental expenses resulting from this Deed of
Absolute Sale shall be shoulder by the Buyer;
To divide the above proceeds into four (4) equal parts;
To
remit one (1) part into my account here in the
[7] CA rollo, p. 42.
[8]
[9]
[10] Annex B.
[11] Annex C of the Complaint.
[12] Philippine National Bank v. Animas, 203 Phil. 101, 106 (1982).
[13] CA rollo, p. 41.
[14]
[15] Rollo, p. 112.
[16] Alvarez v. Court of Appeals, 455 Phil. 864, 875 (2003).
[17] The jurisdiction of this Court in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless it is shown, inter alia, that: (a) the conclusion is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (b) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd and impossible; (c) there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) the judgment is based on a misapplication of facts; (e) the findings of fact of the trial court and the appellate court are contradicted by the evidence on record; and (f) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. (China Banking Corporation v. Dyne-Sem Electronics Corporation, G.R. No. 149237, 11 July 2006, 494 SCRA 493, 499.)
[18] Security Bank and Trust Company
v. Gan, G.R. No. 150464,
[19] Alcaraz v. Tangga-an, 449 Phil. 63, 70 (2003).
[20]
[21] CA rollo, pp. 54-55.
[22]
[23] Barba v. Court of Appeals, 426 Phil. 598, 606 (2002).
[24] G.R. No. 132197,
[25] Lao
v. Lao, G.R. No. 149599,
[26] Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
146364,
[27]
[28] Fige v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107951,
[29] G.R. No. 147874,
[30] 332 Phil. 429, 432-433 (1996); National Onion Growers Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. v. Lo, G.R. No. 141493,
[31] G.R. No. 152978, 4 March 2005, 452
SCRA 781, 788, citing Sps. Anicete v. Balanon, 450 Phil. 615, 621 (2003); Co. v. Militar, G.R.
No. 149912, 29 January 2004, 421 SCRA 455, 459.
[32] SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
– A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
[33] Apostol v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125375,