Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
PRESIDENTIAL
AD HOC FACT- G.R. NO. 135687
FINDING
COMMITTEE ON BEHEST
LOANS,
represented by: PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION
ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG),
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
and
NACHURA,
JJ.
HON.
OMBUDSMAN ANIANO
DESIERTO,
WENCESLAO PASCUAL,
GAUDENCIO
VIDUYA, JULIA M.
MACUJA,
PLACIDO MAPA, JR., JOSE
TEVES,
ALEJANDRO MELCHOR, RECIO
M.
GARCIA, DBP BOARD OF DIRECTORS
LORENZA
N. SALCEDO, JOSEPHINE S.
GARCIA,
STOCKHOLDERS OF P.R.
GARCIA
& SONS DEVELOPMENT and
INVESTMENT
CORPORATION,
Respondents.
(Re: OMB-0-96-2643)
x
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
PRESIDENTIAL
AD HOC FACT-FINDING
COMMITTEE
ON BEHEST LOANS,
represented
by: PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION
ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG),
Petitioner,
-
versus -
PLACIDO
MAPA – Board of Director/
Chairman DBP,
RECIO
GARCIA – Member,
JOSE
TENGCO, JR. – Member,
RAFAEL
SISON – Chairman,
JOSE
R. TENGCO – Member,
ALICE
L. REYES – Member,
CESAR
SALAMEA – Chairman,
DON
PERRY – Vice Chairman,
ROLANDO
M. SOZA – Member,
RICARDO
SILVERIO, SR.,
RICARDO
SILVERIO, JR.
RICARDO
S. TANGCO, Stockholders/
Directors
of Golden River Mining Corp.,
Respondents.
(Re: OMB-0-96-2644)
x
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
PRESIDENTIAL
AD HOC FACT-FINDING
COMMITTEE
ON BEHEST LOANS,
represented
by: PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION
ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG),
Petitioner,
- versus -
PANFILO
O. DOMINGO – Former PNB President,
CONRADO
S. REYES – Former NIDC General
Manager,
CONRADO
T. CALALANG,
ANTONIO
M. GONZALES,
NORBERTO
L. VILLARAMA,
SENEN
B. DE LA COSTA,
ANTONIO
O. MENDOZA, JR.,
IGNACIO
C. BERTUMEN,
Stockholders/Officers
of Filipino Carbon and
Mining
Corporation,
Respondents.
(Re: OMB-0-96-2645) Promulgated:
x-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking
to annul and set aside the Order[1] of the
Ombudsman dated
The
factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On
On March
6, 1996 and June 28, 1996, Orlando S. Salvador (Salvador), in his capacity as
PCGG consultant, executed three separate Sworn Statements stating that among
the loan accounts referred by the Assets Privatization Trust to the Committee
for investigation, report and recommendation are those of the following corporations:
P.R. Garcia and Sons Development and Investment Corporation (PRGS), Golden
River Mining Corporation (Golden River), and
Filipinas Carbon and Mining Corporation (Filcarbon).
With
respect to the loan account of PRGS, Salvador alleged that the said corporation
obtained from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) an initial loan
guarantee of P26,726,774.72 and a straight industrial loan amounting to P29,226,774.72
on October 26, 1967 for the purpose of redeeming mortgaged properties, rehabilitating
buildings and equipment and defraying its operational expenses.
Anent
the loan account of Golden River, Salvador claimed that the corporation
obtained loan accommodations from DBP beginning from 1975 until 1982 and that
as of October 31, 1986, it had a total
obligation of P43,193,000.00; that out of its five loan accounts, only
the first two loans of Golden River obtained in 1975 and 1977 were sufficiently
collateralized, leaving three other loans without any sufficient collateral, to
wit: refinancing loan obtained in 1980 for the amount of P14,724,430.00;
refinancing loan obtained on March 13, 1982 for the amount of P5,551,000.00;
and refinancing loan obtained on December 1, 1982 for the amount of P7,118,656.52.
As to
the loan account of Filcarbon, Salvador averred that
the said corporation applied with the National Investment Development
Corporation (NIDC) a loan guarantee of P27.4 Million on January 17, 1977; that
the loan application was favorably recommended by the President of the
Philippine National Bank (PNB); that the application was subsequently approved
by PNB's Board of Directors on August 17, 1977.
Salvador alleged that, based on the evidence
submitted to the Committee, these three
corporations did not have sufficient collaterals for the loans they obtained,
except with respect to the loans obtained by Golden River in 1975 and 1977.
The
Committee submitted its report to President Ramos who instructed then PCGG
Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo,
sitting as the Committee's ex-officio Chairman, to file the necessary charges
against the DBP Chairman and members of the Board of Directors, the former PNB
President and former NIDC General Manager, together with the respective
stockholders/officers of the three corporations.
Subsequently, the Sworn Statements of Salvador
were used by the Committee as its bases in filing separate complaints with the
Office of the Ombudsman against herein private respondents for alleged
violation of the provisions of Sections 3 (e)[3]
and (g)[4] of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
The
complaint against respondents Lorenzo N. Salcedo and
Josephine S. Garcia, stockholders of PRGS; and Wenceslao
Pascual, Gaudencio Viduya, Julia D. Macuja, Placido L. Mapa, Jr., Jose Teves, Alejandro Melchor, Recio Garcia, Rafael Sison, Cesar
Zalamea, Don M. Perry and Rolando Soza,
then officers and members of the Board of Directors of DBP, is docketed as
OMB-0-96-2643.
The
complaint against Ricardo Silverio, Sr., Ricardo Silverio, Jr., and Ricardo S. Tangco,
stockholders of Golden River; and Placido Mapa, Jose de Ocampo, Recio Garcia, Jose Tengco, Jr.,
Rafael Sison, Jose de Ocampo,
Jose R. Tengco, Alice L. Reyes, Cesar Zalamea, Don Perry and
Rolando M. Soza, then officers and members of
the Board of Directors of DBP, is docketed as OMB-0-96-2644.
The
complaint against Panfilo O. Domingo, then PNB
President; Conrado S. Reyes, then NIDC General
Manager; and Conrado Calalang,
Antonio M. Gonzales, Norberto L. Villarama, Sene B. dela Costa, Antonio O.
Mendoza, Jr. and Ignacio C. Bertumen, officers and
stockholders of Filcarbon, is docketed as
OMB-0-96-2645.
Subsequently,
the three aforementioned cases were consolidated by the Office of the
Ombudsman.
In his
assailed Order of
Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Ombudsman denied it in its Order dated
Hence,
herein petition.
Petitioner
contends that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing, motu
proprio, the three complaints without first
requiring respondents to submit their counter-affidavits and petitioner to file
its reply thereto. Such dismissal, petitioner avers, is premature. Petitioner
further argues that even granting that the Ombudsman feels that petitioner's
evidence is insufficient, the Ombudsman should have first required petitioner
to clarify said evidence or to adduce additional evidence, in accordance with
due process.
Petitioner
also asserts that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground that it was filed out of time as evidence shows
that the said motion was timely filed.
Petitioner
contends that the consolidation of the three complaints and the subsequent
issuance of a single Order dismissing them is erroneous. Petitioner argues that
the three complaints cannot be lumped together and a single order issued for
their resolution as these complaints involve different sets of facts and are
based on different loan transactions.
Petitioner
further avers that the pieces of evidence submitted as part of the complaints
were not considered by the Ombudsman when it issued the assailed Orders; that
the findings of the Committee that the subject loans are behest loans prevail;
and, that the right of the State to recover behest loans as ill-gotten wealth
is not barred by prescription.
In his
Comment, the Ombudsman, citing the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission as authority, contends that the provisions of Section 15, Article XI
of the Constitution, which provides for the imprescriptibility
of the right of the State to recover ill-gotten wealth, applies only to civil
actions and not to criminal cases. The Ombudsman further avers that prior to
its amendment, Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 provided that the period for the
prescription or extinguishment of a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act was ten years. Subsequently, the said provision was amended in
1982 increasing the prescriptive period to fifteen years. Applying the
Constitution and the law to the present case, the Ombudsman argues that, except
with respect to the two loan transactions entered into by Golden River in
1982, all the other alleged criminal
acts of herein private respondents in connection with the loan transactions
they entered into in the years 1967 until 1980 had already prescribed in 1995.
Hence, private respondents can no longer be prosecuted with respect to
these transactions.
The
Ombudsman also avers that under Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No.
7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), the Ombudsman is
authorized to dismiss, motu proprio, a complaint even without requiring the
respondents to file their counter-affidavits and even without conducting a
preliminary investigation.
As to
the loan accounts of Golden River obtained on March 13, 1982 and December 1,
1982, the Ombusman
contends that based on pieces of evidence presented by the complainant,
the said loans had more than sufficient collateral.
The
Ombudsman asserts that his findings of fact and his application of pertinent
laws as well as rules of evidence deserve great weight and respect and even
accorded full faith and credit in the absence of any showing of any error or
grave abuse of discretion.
Respondents
Panfilo O. Domingo, Jose R. Tengco,
Jr., Alicia Ll. Reyes, Cesar Zalamea, Placido L. Mapa, Jr., Conrado T. Calalang, Norberto Villarama and Ricardo C. Silverio
filed their respective Comments. While the present petition is pending in this
Court, respondents Conrado Reyes and Jose Teves died.[5] In
a Resolution[6] issued
by this Court dated February 22, 2006, respondents Wenceslao
Pascual, Senen dela Costa, Lorenzo Salcedo and
Antonio Mendoza were dropped as respondents for an earlier resolution of the
case after all efforts of petitioner to ascertain their correct and present
addresses proved to be in vain.
With
respect to the other respondents who failed to file their respective comments,
the Court dispenses with the comments in
order that the present petition may be resolved.
The
Court shall first deal with the issue of prescription as this was the main basis of the Ombudsman in dismissing
petitioner's complaints.
Section
15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.
In Presidential Ad Hoc Committee v. Hon. Desierto[7], the Court held that the imprescriptibility of the right of the State to recover ill-gotten wealth applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases. In other words, the prosecution of offenses arising from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth contemplated in the above-mentioned provision of the Constitution may be barred by prescription.[8]
Under
Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Blg. 195, which took effect on
As to
whether or not the subject complaints filed against herein respondents had
already prescribed, the Court's disquisition on an identical issue in Salvador
v. Desierto[9] is
instructive, to wit:
The applicable laws on prescription of criminal offenses defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code are found in Articles 90 and 91 of the same Code. For those penalized by special laws, Act No. 3326, as amended, applies. Here, since R.A. 3019, the law alleged to have been violated, is a special law, the applicable law in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides:
Sec.
2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same not be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall
be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.”
The above provisions are clear and need no interpretation. In Presidential Ad Hoc Committee vs. Hon. Desierto*, we held:
x x x it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the
aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the
questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials
concerned connived or conspired with the “beneficiaries of the loans.” Thus, we
agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with
which respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and
not from the day of such commission.
The
assertion by the Ombudsman that the phrase ‘if the same not be known’ in
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 does not mean ‘lack of knowledge’ but that the crime
‘is not reasonably knowable’ is unacceptable, as it provides an interpretation
that defeats or negates the intent of the law, which is written in a clear and
unambiguous language and thus provides no room for interpretation but only
application.”
We reiterated the above ruling in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto** thus:
In
cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February
1986 Edsa Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the aggrieved party could not have
known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions were made (PCGG vs. Desierto,
G.R. No. 140232, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 767; Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, Note
14; Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding
Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto, supra, Note
16). Moreover, no person would have dared to question the legality of those
transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the
date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive
investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.
As
to when the period of prescription was interrupted, the second paragraph of
Section 2, Act No. 3326, as amended, provides that prescription is
interrupted ‘when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.[10]
The
complaints filed against respondents did not specify the exact dates when the
alleged offenses were discovered. However, it is not disputed that it was the
Committee that discovered the same. As such, the discovery could not have been
made earlier than
As to
petitioner's claim that it is error on the part of the Ombudsman to deny petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the same was filed out of time:
The Ombudsman
is presumed to have regularly performed its official duty in the determination
of whether
or not the said Motion was really filed beyond the reglementary
period as provided under the pertinent rules of the Office of the Ombudsman.
However, this presumption is disputable. In the present case, petitioner
contends that the subject Motion was sent by registered mail on July 29, 1998, which was the
last day allowed for filing of the same. As proof of such mailing, petitioner
presented a Certification[11] issued by the
Central Post Office in Manila stating therein that Registered Letter No. 74220
was sent by the PCGG on July 29, 1998, addressed to
the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila, and that said
letter was duly delivered to and received on August 5, 1998 by an authorized
representative of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman failed to
controvert petitioner's submission in any of the pleadings filed in the
present petition. A simple referral to the date that appears on
the front page of the Motion for Reconsideration, indicating the date when the
Office of the Ombudsman received the Motion, would have easily disputed the
allegation of petitioners. In the
absence thereof, the Court finds that the presumption of regularity of
the Ombudsman's performance of his official duties must yield to the evidence
presented by petitioner. As such, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order of the Ombudsman dated July 6, 1998 should be considered as timely
filed.
Nonetheless, a perusal of the
assailed Order dated August 31, 1998 of the Ombudsman shows that there are grounds other
than late filing upon which the Ombudsman denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, to wit:
x x x x
All the foregoing notwithstanding, and bearing in mind the peculiar circumstances of this case, particularly the fact that the subject loans are now alleged as ill-gotten wealth and behest loans, the same remains to be bare allegations with no new evidence tendered to thwart the Order in question.
The complaints herein are plain and simple. There is no allegation even that the questioned loans were granted “at the behest” of respondent officials in these cases x x x.
x x x x[12]
It, thus, appears that the Ombudsman's basis for dismissing
the complaints was not merely the prescription of the complaints, but also the
lack of any allegation therein that the questioned loans are behest loans.
However, while there was no specific or particular mention
that the questioned loan accounts were “behest loans,” the complaints contain
allegations consistent with the criteria laid down by Memorandum Order No. 61
issued by President Ramos on
The said Memorandum provides for the following as a frame
of reference in determining whether a loan, which is under scrutiny, is behest:
(a) It is under-collateralized;
(b) The borrower corporation is undercapitalized;
(c)
Direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials, like the presence
of marginal notes;
(d)
Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as
cronies;
(e)
Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended;
(f)
Use of corporate layering;
(g)
Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought; and
(h) Extraordinary speed with
which the loan release was made.[13]
(Emphasis supplied).
In Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Hon. Desierto,[14]
the Ombudsman adopted the position that to qualify as a behest loan, two or more of the criteria
enumerated in Memorandum Order No. 61 must be present.
It is therefore erroneous for the Ombudsman to conclude in
the present case that the complaints against PRGS and Filcarbon
were bereft of any allegations that their questioned loans are behest,
considering that said complaints explicitly alleged the presence of two of the
criteria: that the subject loans are “under-collateralized” and that the
borrower corporations are “undercapitalized.”
Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7 of the
Office of the Ombudsman, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman, provides:
SEC. 2. Evaluation. - Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend whether it may be:
a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;
b) referred to respondent for comment;
c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case;
d) forwarded to the appropriate officer or official for fact-finding investigation;
e) referred for administrative adjudication; or
f) subjected to a preliminary investigation.
While under this Rule, the Ombudsman may dismiss a
complaint outright for want of palpable merit, but a sense of justice and
fairness demands that the Ombudsman must set forth in a Resolution the reasons
for such dismissal.
It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a
litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the
factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.[15]
This Court has held that the constitutional and statutory mandate that no
decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
it is based applies as well to dispositions by quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies.[16]
In fact, Section 18 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of
1989, makes the Rules of Court applicable, in a suppletory
manner, to its own rules of procedure. One of the requirements provided under
Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court is that a judgment or final order
determining the merits of the case should state the facts and the law on which
it is based.
A careful reading of the questioned Orders of the Ombudsman
shows that there is no express finding that the complaints filed by petitioner
were manifestly without merit. There is no explanation or discussion,
whatsoever, as to how it reached its conclusion that the disputed loans are not
behest insofar as PRGS and Filcarbon are concerned.
Thus, for a proper disposition of the complaints against
PRGS and Filcarbon, the Court finds it necessary to
refer them back to the Ombudsman for proper evaluation based on their merits.
As to
Discussing these two loans, we find that in 1980, Golden River Corporation was granted a refinance in the amount of P14,724,430 pesos. Such grant in 1982 for P5,551,000.00 is less than 50% of the said P14,724,430 pesos, hence, this cannot be said to be granted with insufficient collateral, taking the same as reference point alone without the previous collaterals and assets which were admittedly sufficient as admitted by complainant in paragraph b, p. 2 of the Sworn Statement of Orlando L. Salvador (p. 10, Records, OMB-0-96-2644)
x x x
Likewise, the loans for P7,118,656.52 on December 1, 1982 is not more than 50% of the additional assets alone which is the money equivalent of the two refinanced loans of P14,724,430.00 and P5,551,000.00 the total of which is P20,275,430.00 pesos. Considering that the refinancing ratio has a maximum of 70% of the total assets/collaterals, even the last two loans which were within the prescriptive period are not without sufficient collaterals.
In other words, collaterals were sufficient in accordance with Sec. 78,
R.A. 337, as amended (General Banking Act) x x x[17]
This
Court has consistently held that the Ombudsman has discretion to determine
whether a criminal case, given its facts and circumstances, should be filed or
not. It is basically his call. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith should he
find it to be insufficient in form and substance or, should he find it
otherwise, to continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with the
investigation if, in his view, the complaint is in due and proper form and
substance. Quite relevant is the Court's ruling in Espinosa v. Office of the
Ombudsman[18]
and reiterated in the case of The
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Hon. Desierto,[19]
to wit:
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of the Ombudsman. To insulate the Office from outside pressure and improper influence, the Constitution as well as R.A. 6770 has endowed it with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. This court consistently refrains from interfering with the exercise of its powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who, ‘beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service.’[20]
As a rule, the Court shall not unduly
interfere in the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers, as provided in the Constitution,
without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.[21] The basis for this rule was provided in the
case of Ocampo IV v. Ombudsman[22] where the
Court held as follows:
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they would be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.[23]
While the Court has previously held that it may
interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman in case of clear abuse of discretion,[24] the Ombudsman
is not guilty of abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint against Golden
River insofar as the two 1982 loan transactions are concerned.
However,
the complaint against Golden River had not been completely disposed of by the
Ombudsman as it failed to discuss the refinancing loan obtained by the said
corporation in 1980 for the amount of P14,724,430.00. Hence, the
complaint against Golden River should also be referred back to the Ombudsman
for proper evaluation of its merits with respect to the aforementioned loan.
Petitioner contended that the
Ombudsman erred in dismissing the complaints without requiring respondents to
file their counter-affidavits and petitioner its reply, or to further require
petitioner to clarify its evidence or adduce additional evidence.
It is quite
clear under Section 2(a), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman, that it may dismiss a complaint outright for
want of palpable merit. At that point, the Ombudsman does not have to conduct a
preliminary investigation upon receipt of a complaint.[25] Should the
investigating officer find the complaint devoid of merit, then he may recommend
its outright dismissal.[26] The Ombudsman
has discretion to determine whether a preliminary investigation is proper.[27] It is only
when the Ombudsman opts not to dismiss
the complaint outright for lack of palpable merit would the
Ombudsman be expected to require the respondents to file their
counter-affidavit and petitioner, its reply.
Lastly,
the Court finds nothing erroneous in the Ombudsman's act of consolidating the three complaints and of
issuing a single order for their dismissal considering that, with the exception
of the complaint regarding the two 1982 loan accounts of Golden River which was
separately discussed by the Ombudsman on their merits, the dismissal of all the
other complaints was based on a common ground, which is prescription.
However,
in the remand of the complaints against respondents, orderly administration of
justice behooves the Ombudsman not to consolidate the three complaints, as the respective respondents therein would
inevitably raise different defenses which would require separate presentation
of evidence by the parties involved.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. Except with respect to the complaints relative to the loan
accounts of Golden River obtained on March 13, 1982, and December 1, 1982, the
assailed Orders of the Ombudsman dated July 6, 1998 and August 31, 1998 in
OMB-0-96-2643, OMB-0-96-2644 and OMB-0-96-2645 are SET ASIDE.
The
Office of the Ombudsman is directed to conduct with dispatch an evaluation on
the respective merits of the complaints against herein respondents pursuant to
the provisions of Section 2, Rule II of
its Rules of Procedure.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V.
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, p. 49.
[2]
[3] Section 3(e)-Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
[4] Section 3(g)-Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
[5] Rollo, pp. 1154 and 1164.
[6]
[7] 375 Phil. 697, 716 (1999).
[8]
[9] 464 Phil. 988 (2004).
* 375 Phil. 697 (1999).
** 415 Phil. 723, 729-730 (2001).
[10]
[11] Rollo, Vol. I, p. 402.
[12] Rollo, p. 61.
[13] Official Gazette, Vol. 88, No. 48,
[14] 402 Phil. 821, 829-831 (2001).
[15] Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88709, February 11, 1992, 206 SCRA 127, 132.
[16] Pilipinas Kao, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 423 Phil. 834, 849 (2001).
[17] Rollo, pp. 54-55.
[18] 397 Phil. 829 (2000).
[19] 418 Phil. 715 (2001).
[20] The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Hon. Desierto, supra note 19, at 721.
[21]
[22] G.R. Nos. 103446-47,
[23] Ocampo IV v. Ombudsman, supra note 22, at 730.
[24] Young v. Office of the Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 110736,
[25] Kara-an v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 119990,
[26]
[27]