Republic of the
THIRD DIVISION
LIGAYA
V. SANTOS, A.M.
No. RTJ-05-1946
EDNA
CORTEZ, [Formerly
OCA IPI No. 05-2181-RTJ] GIRLIE CASTILLO and
CHRISTOPHER
CASTILLO, Present:
Complainants,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,
SR., and
JUDGE ROLANDO G. HOW, CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Regional
Trial Court, Branch
257,
Respondent. January
26, 2007
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Before us is an administrative complaint[1]
dated
The facts of the case as found by the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) are as follows:
Complainant
Ligaya V. Santos is the Chairwoman of Barangay 659-A, Arroceros,
On
Upon
receipt of the Supreme Court Resolution, the trial court directed the
resumption of the proceedings on the subject criminal cases. However, Prosecutor Orda
filed a motion to inhibit Presiding Judge Raul E. de Leon for partiality in the
issuance of the previous order granting the withdrawal of the Information. Judge de Leon inhibited himself, and the
cases were re-raffled and eventually assigned to respondent judge before whose
court complainants filed their petition for bail.
On
On P100,000.00 to kill Prosecutor Orda.
Respondent Judge held
that he would resolve the petition for bail on the basis of the evidence
presented by the prosecution. When
complainants manifested that they would present one witness to identify the
documents on record, respondent branded the request as 'misplaced.' He even rejected outright the request of the
defense counsel to make a tender of proof and instead declared the petition
deemed submitted for resolution, subject to the filing of memorandum by the
parties within five (5) days.
On
In his Comment,[3]
respondent professes impartiality in handling the subject criminal cases. He asserts that he had explained to the
parties that, for purposes of bail hearing, only the prosecution is required to
present evidence since it is not yet a trial of the main case and the court is
only preliminarily tasked to determine if the evidence of guilt is strong.
Respondent argues that, even granting
the accused may be allowed to present their evidence but the Judge did not
allow it, the disallowance cannot be considered partiality or misconduct. He claims that he believed in good faith that
he would fairly and correctly resolve the petition for bail by evaluating it
based solely on the evidence of the prosecution; and that allowing both parties to present their evidence would
mean resolving the merits of the case itself.
He contends that if ever he committed any error, it was an error of
judgment committed in good faith for which complainants have remedies under the
Rules.
Respondent further contends that it is inaccurate
and unfair to claim that his Order denying bail was without supporting
evaluation of the evidence and only made a one-sentence conclusion that the
evidence of guilt is strong. He stresses
that the questioned Order contains a summary of the testimonies of the
witnesses of the prosecution and it is only after the summary that he made a
conclusion that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. He explains that he did not elaborate each
and every point in support of the conclusion since they are already contained
in the summary. He avers that he
intentionally made the conclusion terse because an outright conclusion of
everything might be considered a prejudgment of the case.
In the Agenda Report dated
EVALUATION:
x x
x
x
Respondent Judge insists that, for
purposes of bail hearing, only the prosecution is required to present evidence
since it is not yet a trial of the main case and the court is only
preliminarily tasked to determine if the evidence of guilt is strong. He claims that in decreeing such position he
merely exercised his discretion, bail being discretionary in the subject cases, and that if ever he erred in his ruling it is merely
an error of judgment.
The
Constitution guarantees to every person under legal custody the right to bail,
except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong. The
rules likewise mandate that before ruling on an application for bail, a hearing
should first be conducted to determine the existence of a
strong evidence against the accused.
A
hearing for bail is summary in nature or otherwise in the discretion of the
court. Summary
hearing means
such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt
as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is
merely to determine the weight of the evidence for purposes of bail. The course of the inquiry may be left to the
discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as
has reference to substantial matters avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the
examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a reasonable
minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not
essential to the purpose of the hearing.
It is true that the weight of the
evidence adduced is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. However, such discretion may be exercised
only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused
for the purpose of determining whether or not he should be granted provisional
liberty. At the hearing, the court
should assure that the prosecution is afforded the opportunity to adduce evidence
relevant to the factual issue, with the applicant having the right of
cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. Both the prosecution and the defense must be
given reasonable opportunity to prove, in the case of the prosecution, that
evidence of guilt of the applicant is strong; and, in the case of the defense,
that such evidence of guilt is not strong.
The accused has the right to cross-examine the witnesses presented by
the prosecution and to introduce his evidence in rebuttal to establish his
right to bail.
In
fine, the hearing is for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise sound
discretion as to whether or not under the Constitution and laws in force the
accused is entitled to provisional release on bail. At the hearing, the petitioner can rightfully
cross examine the witnesses presented by the prosecution and introduce his own
evidence in rebuttal.
In the
instant case, respondent cut short the hearing after the prosecution presented
its evidence and dispensed altogether with the defense's turn to adduce
evidence in rebuttal. Said
denial of the request to present evidence shows deficiency in prudence,
discretion and judgment on the part of respondent Judge. The deficiency is magnified by respondent's
outright denial of complainants' request to make a tender of proof, which is
allowed under the Rules. It is not
accurate to contend that hearing the prosecution overcome its burden of proof
would suffice. Dictates of fair play
should have at least reminded respondent to inquire first the nature of the
evidence proposed to be presented, determine whether or not they will be
essential for the purpose of ascertaining entitlement to bail, before
discarding any evidence outright. This
is in keeping with procedural due process, given established rules and
jurisprudence on bail.
It is a
pressing responsibility of judges to endeavor at all times to avoid such
actions as would impress upon litigants the disregard of due process. On this, respondent had been remiss.
True, as a matter of public policy,
a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such
error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause injustice. This does not mean, however, that a judge
need not observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of his
official functions. In every case, a
judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of
criticism.
The
records, however, fail to establish bad faith, corruption, dishonesty or fraud
on the part of respondent, thereby meriting for him a tempered penalty. In fact, a finding of good faith is
consistent with the fact that respondent still granted both parties opportunity
to submit their respective memorandum after he disallowed the defense to
present evidence.
Finally, the rest
of the charges against respondent lack merit. Specifically, the charge of bias and
partiality was not substantiated.
Moreover, that the decision was based on a one-sentence conclusion that
the evidence of guilt is strong is inaccurate.
The conclusion to that effect was actually preceded by a thorough
summary of the evidence. The fact that
there was no categorical discussion on how the conclusion was reached does not
make it less a reasonable conclusion.
Obviously, respondent accorded the evidence probative weight, which he
deemed to be adequate for his inference.
At any rate, the inadequacy of expression of the questioned Order is
outweighed by its substantial compliance with the requirements for an Order
granting or denying bail.
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for consideration
of the Honorable Court are our recommendations that:
1. The
instant complaint be RE-DOCKETED
as a regular administrative case;
1. For
deficiency in prudence, which borders on disregard of due process, respondent
be REPRIMANDED
with Stern Warning that subsequent infractions shall be dealt with more
severely;
The rest of the charges
against respondent be DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
We adopt the findings of facts and recommendation of the OCA.
On
On
At issue is whether or not the acts
committed by respondent judge constitute gross ignorance of the law, manifest
partiality and serious misconduct.
On gross ignorance of the
law.
No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is
strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.[7]
Stressing our ruling in Basco
v. Rapatalo,[8] we held that when the
grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that
the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains
with the judge. This discretion, by the very nature of
things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the
court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the
evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or
produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial
discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the
petitioner having the right of cross examination and to introduce his own
evidence in rebuttal.[9]
The discretion of the trial court is
not absolute nor beyond control. It must
be sound, and exercised within reasonable bounds.[10] Judicial discretion, by its very nature,
involves the exercise of the judge's individual opinion and the law has wisely
provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while allowing
the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views,
prevent them from getting out of control.[11] An uncontrolled or uncontrollable discretion
on the part of a judge is a misnomer. It
is a fallacy. Lord Mansfield, speaking
of the discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail, said: “but
discretion when applied to a court of justice, means
sound discretion guided by law. It must
not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful; but legal and regular.”[12]
Jurisprudence is replete with
decisions on the right of petitioner in bail proceedings to introduce his own
evidence in rebuttal.[13] Respondent failed to observe and consider for
his proper determination and evaluation the weight of evidence presented by the
prosecution. This, to our mind, is a
clear denial of complainants’ right to due process and equal protection of the
law as embodied in our Constitution.[14]
Records show that during the hearing
of the application for bail, complainants' counsel insisted on presenting their
evidence to disprove the allegations of the prosecution. However, respondent argued that the
prosecution has to establish evidence against the accused because if he will go
to the defense evidence, there will be no way of stopping it, it will go
through and through, as if, he is already hearing the main case.[15]
This line of argument by respondent is
misplaced considering that what the complainants were asking is for their
evidence, which is already a part of the record, to be presented and admitted
as tender of proof.
The reasons given by respondent that
for purposes of bail hearing, only the prosecution is required to present
evidence since it is not yet a trial of the main case; that the court is only
preliminarily tasked to determine if the evidence of guilt is strong; and that to allow complainants to present their evidence would mean
resolving the merits of the case itself, are not plausible.
Respondent, in effect, deprived the accused with their right to present
rebuttal evidence which to our mind is a clear violation of their right to due
process and equal protection of the law. As
aptly observed by the OCA, dictates
of fair play should have at least reminded respondent to inquire first of the
nature of the evidence proposed to be presented, determine whether or not it
will be essential for the purpose of ascertaining entitlement to bail, before
discarding any evidence outright. This
is in keeping with procedural due process, given established rules and
jurisprudence on bail.[16]
It is clear from the foregoing that
respondent is remiss in his responsibility to endeavor at all times to avoid
such actions as would impress upon litigants the disregard of due process.
It is settled that as a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability – civil, criminal or administrative – for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as along as he acts in good faith.[17] To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.[18]
However, although a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he renders, relative immunity is not a license to be negligent, abusive or arbitrary in the performance of his adjudicatory prerogatives.[19]
To constitute gross ignorance of
the law, it is not enough that the subject decision, order or actuation of the
judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty, or corruption.[20] Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt
motives or improper considerations, are sufficient defenses in which a judge
charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.[21]
However, good faith in
situations of fallible discretion inhered only within the parameters of
tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and the
applicable legal principles evident and basic as to be beyond possible margins
of error.[22]
In this
case, respondent's act of cutting short the hearing after the prosecution
presented its evidence, without affording the defense to adduce evidence in
rebuttal together with his outright denial of complainants’ request to offer
proof, is a clear disregard of the right of the accused to disprove that the
evidence of guilt is strong. It is of no
moment that respondent required complainants to submit
their memorandum. What is significant is
that complainants were deprived of their constitutional right to present
evidence during the hearing which the respondent may intelligently appreciate
and evaluate in the light of the circumstances then obtaining.
It must be stressed that occupying the exalted position of a judge entails a lot of responsibilities, foremost of which is proficiency in the law. Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the laws and maintain professional competence. He is mandated to be conversant with the law and to have more than a cursory acquaintance with the rules and authoritative doctrines. When the law is elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance thereof. Judges are expected to have more than just a modicum of acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules.
On
manifest partiality and serious misconduct.
Nothing in the records suggests that respondent was motivated by malice or corrupt motives to deny the application for bail. Complainants failed to substantiate their other allegations with competent proof besides their own bare allegations. Respondent did what he thought was right under the law and established principles. Hence, respondent could not be held liable for manifest partiality and serious misconduct. The Court cannot presume partiality based on the circumstances alleged in the complaint.
Moreover, for serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules.[23] The records are bereft of any evidence to this effect to warrant disciplinary action against respondent.
On denying bail
based on a one-sentence conclusion that the evidence of guilt is strong.
We agree with the OCA that although there was no categorical discussion on how the conclusion, that the evidence of guilt is strong, was reached, the same does not make it less a reasonable conclusion. The inadequacy of expression of the questioned Order is outweighed by its substantial compliance with the requirements for an Order granting or denying bail.
In sum, the act of respondent in denying the complainants the right to present evidence constitutes simple ignorance of the law; but in the absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations on the part of the respondent, the penalty of reprimand recommended by the OCA is just and reasonable.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds Judge Rolando G. How guilty of simple ignorance of the law and REPRIMANDS him with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Chairperson
|
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-29.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Sec. 7, Rule 114, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
[8] 336 Phil. 214 (1997).
[9] Paderenga v. Court of Appeals, 317 Phil. 862, 876 (1995).
[10] Supra note 8.
[11]
[12] Id., citing Francisco, Ricardo J., Criminal Procedure,
1993 ed., p. 226, citing Rex v. Wilkee, 4 Burr., 2527; 98 Reprint, 327, citing in note
26 (a), 6 C.J., p. 254.
[13]
[14] Section 13, Article III, 1987 Constitution.
Section
13. All persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
[15] Rollo, pp. 17-18.
[16]
[17] Hilado v. Reyes, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1910,
[18] Sacmar v. Reyes-Carpio, A.M. No.
RTJ-03-1766,
[19] Managuelod v. Paclibon,
Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-02-1726,
[20] Officers and Members
of the IBP, Baguio-Benguet Chapter v. Pamintuan, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1691, November 19, 2004, 443
SCRA 87, 110; Ong v. Rosete,
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1538,
[21] Balsamo v. Suan,
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1656,
[22] Dantes v. Caguioa, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1919,
[23] Francisco v. Cosico, A.M. No. CA-04-37,