Republic of the
Supreme Court
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CLARITA J. SAMALA, Complainant, |
ADM.
CASE NO. 5439 |
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Present: |
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PUNO,
C.J., |
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QUISUMBING, |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, |
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, |
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CARPIO, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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- versus - |
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CARPIO MORALES, |
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CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, |
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TINGA, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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GARCIA,
and VELASCO, JR., JJ. |
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ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
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_______________________ |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.
Before us is a complaint[1] dated
May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J. Samala (complainant)
against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia (respondent) for
Disbarment on the following grounds: (a) serving on two separate occasions as
counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading the court by
submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in
exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of being
immoral by siring illegitimate children.
After
respondent filed his Comment, the Court, in its Resolution of
The investigation was conducted
by Commissioner Demaree
Jesus B. Raval.
After a series of hearings, the parties filed their
respective memoranda[3] and the
case was deemed submitted for resolution.
Commissioner
Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes prepared the Report and
Recommendation[4] dated
In a
minute Resolution[5] passed
on
We
adopt the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue on
immorality and as to the recommended penalty.
On serving as counsel for
contending parties.
Records
show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 272, Marikina City, entitled “Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez” for
nonpayment of rentals, herein respondent, while being the counsel for defendant
Valdez, also acted as counsel for the tenants Lagmay,
Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga[6] by filing an Explanation and Compliance
before the RTC.[7]
In
Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch
75, Marikina City, entitled “Editha
S. Valdez and Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamante
and her husband” for ejectment, respondent
represented Valdez against Bustamante – one of the
tenants in the property subject of the controversy. Defendants appealed to the RTC, Branch 272,
But
in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, entitled “Editha
S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and Register of Deeds of Marikina
City,” respondent, as counsel for Valdez, filed a
Complaint for Rescission of Contract with Damages and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 275500 against Alba, respondent's former client in Civil Case No.
98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK.
Records
further reveal that at the hearing of November 14, 2003, respondent admitted
that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, he was the lawyer for Lagmay
(one of the tenants) but not for Bustamante and Bayuga[10] albeit
he filed the Explanation and Compliance for and in behalf of the tenants.[11] Respondent also admitted that he represented
Valdez in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against Bustamante and her husband but denied being the counsel for
Alba although the case is entitled “Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband,” because
Valdez told him to include Alba as the two were the owners of the property[12] and it
was only Valdez who signed the complaint for ejectment.[13] But, while claiming that respondent did not
represent Alba, respondent, however, avers that he already severed his
representation for Alba when the latter charged respondent with estafa.[14] Thus, the filing of Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK against Alba.
Rule
15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
A
lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel
for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former
client.[15] He may not also undertake to discharge
conflicting duties any more than he may represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule is founded on the principles
of public policy and good taste.[16] It springs from the relation of attorney and
client which is one of trust and confidence.
Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence,
but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then
can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is
of paramount importance in the administration of justice.[17]
One
of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of that duty.[18]
The
stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on
principles of public policy and good taste.
It springs from the attorney’s duty to represent his client with
undivided fidelity and to maintain inviolate the client’s confidence as well as
from the injunction forbidding the examination of an attorney as to any of the
privileged communications of his client.[19]
An
attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented
him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated.[20] The bare attorney-client relationship with a
client precludes an attorney from accepting professional employment from the
client’s adversary either in the same case[21] or in a
different but related action.[22] A lawyer is forbidden from representing a
subsequent client against a former client when the subject matter of the
present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter
of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client.[23]
We
held in Nombrado v. Hernandez[24] that the termination of the
relation of attorney and client provides no justification for a lawyer to
represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The reason for the rule is that the client’s
confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the expiration of the
professional employment.[25] Consequently, a lawyer should not, even after
the severance of the relation with his client, do anything which will
injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he previously
represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the client’s confidences
acquired in the previous relation.[26]
In
this case, respondent’s averment that his relationship with Alba has long been
severed by the act of the latter of not turning over the proceeds collected in
Civil Case No. 98-6804, in connivance with the complainant, is
unavailing. Termination of the
attorney-client relationship precludes an attorney from representing a new
client whose interest is adverse to his former client. Alba may not be his original client but the
fact that he filed a case entitled “
In Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr.,[27] citing
the case of Quiambao v. Bamba,[28] we held
that:
The proscription against
representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the
opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated
action. It is of no moment that the
lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has
to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the
confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as
the two actions are wholly unrelated. It
is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of
the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them would affect the
performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.[29]
Respondent is bound to comply with
Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that “a lawyer
shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the
attorney-client relation is terminated.”
The reason for the prohibition is found
in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence of
the highest degree. A lawyer becomes
familiar with all the facts connected with his client’s case. He learns from his client the weak points of
the action as well as the strong ones.
Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care.[30]
From the foregoing, it is evident that
respondent’s representation of
Respondent is reminded to be more
cautious in accepting professional employments, to refrain from all appearances
and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of
interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication
befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and
loyalty in all transactions with his clients.[32]
On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary
evidence.
Complainant alleges that in Civil Case
No. 00-7137 filed before MTC, Branch 75 for ejectment,
respondent submitted TCT No. 273020 as evidence of
Records reveal that respondent filed
Civil Case No. 00-7137 on
Upon examination of the
record, it was noted that Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK for rescission of
contract and cancellation of TCT No. 275500 was also filed on
Hence, respondent cannot feign
ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted was already cancelled in lieu
of a new title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of the latter's
ownership.
Respondent failed to comply with Canon
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer
shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any
artifice. It matters not that the trial
court was not misled by respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name
of
In Young v. Batuegas,[37] we held
that a lawyer must be a disciple of truth.
He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will “do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in court” and he shall “conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to his clients.”[38] He should bear in mind that as an officer of
the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and
the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct
conclusion.[39] The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to
expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them.
While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client’s rights and is
expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his client’s cause, his
conduct must never be at the expense of truth.
A lawyer is the servant of the law and
belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of
law and the dispensation of justice.[40] As such,
he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate.[41]
On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees.
Complainant alleges that respondent
filed the following cases: (a) Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK at the
RTC, Branch 272; (b) Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC, Branch 75; and (c) I.S.
Nos. 00-4439 and 01-036162 both entitled “
As culled from the records,
Respondent filed I.S. Nos. 00-4439[43] and
01-036162[44] both
entitled “
We find the charge to be without
sufficient basis. The act of respondent
of filing the aforecited cases to protect the
interest of his client, on one hand, and his own interest, on the other, cannot
be made the basis of an administrative charge unless it can
be clearly shown that the same was being done to abuse judicial processes to
commit injustice.
The filing of an administrative case
against respondent for protecting the interest of his client and his own right
would be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated to defend and
prosecute the right of his client.
On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate
children.
We find respondent liable for being
immoral by siring illegitimate children.
During the hearing, respondent admitted
that he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay who are all over 20 years of age,[48] while
his first wife was still alive. He also
admitted that he has eight children by his first wife, the youngest of whom is over
20 years of age, and after his wife died in 1997, he married Lagmay in 1998.[49]
Respondent further admitted that Lagmay was staying
in one of the apartments being claimed by complainant. However, he does not consider his affair with
Lagmay as a relationship[50] and does
not consider the latter as his second family.[51] He reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay because he has two houses, one in Muntinlupa and another in
In this case, the admissions
made by respondent are more than enough to hold him liable on the charge
of immorality. During the hearing,
respondent did not show any remorse. He
even justified his transgression by saying that he does not have any
relationship with Lagmay and despite the fact that he
sired three children by the latter, he does not
consider them as his second family. It
is noted that during the hearing, respondent boasts in telling the commissioner
that he has two houses - in Muntinlupa, where
his first wife lived, and in
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be
difficult to specify the degree of moral delinquency that may qualify an act as
immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been
defined as that “conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which
shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the
community.[54] Thus, in several cases, the Court did not
hesitate to discipline a lawyer for keeping a mistress in defiance of the mores
and sense of morality of the community.[55] That respondent
subsequently married Lagmay in 1998 after the death
of his wife and that this is his first infraction as regards immorality serve
to mitigate his liability.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent
Atty. Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of
misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) years, effective immediately upon receipt
of herein Resolution.
Let
copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their
information and guidance, and let it be entered in respondent’s personal
records.
SO ORDERED.
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate
Justice |
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ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES Associate Justice |
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ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
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DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
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CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-4.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Now Assistant Court Administrator.
[10] Rollo, pp. 397-398; 407-410.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] Frias v. Lozada,
A.C. No. 6656,
[16] Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 6th Edition, pp. 219, 225; citing cases.
[17] Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569, 579 (1949).
[18]
[19] Tiania v. Ocampo, A.C. No. 2285,
[20] Lorenzana Food Corporation v. Daria, Adm. Case No. 2736,
[21] Natan v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640, 648 (1952).
[22] Nombrado v. Hernandez, 135 Phil. 5, 9 (1968).
[23] Pormento, Sr. v. Pontevedra,
A.C. No. 5128,
[24] Nombrado v. Hernandez, supra.
[25] Natan v. Capule, supra at 648.
[26] Ibid. at 648.
[27] A.C. No. 6836,
[28] A.C. No. 6708,
[29]
[30] Maturan v.
Gonzales, 350 Phil.
882, 887 (1998);
[31] Rollo, pp. 423-427.
[32] Gamilla v. Mariño, Jr., 447 Phil. 419, 432 (2003).
[33] Rollo, pp. 30-32.
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37] 451 Phil. 155 (2003).
[38]
[39] Ibid. at 161.
[40] Ting-Dumali v. Torres, A.C. No. 5161,
[41] Ibid. at 117.
[42] Rollo, p. 485.
[43]
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47] Son of respondent and one of the tenants in the subject property.
[48] Rollo, pp. 514-515.
[49]
[50]
[51]
[52]
[53]
[54] Rau Sheng Mao v. Velasco, 459 Phil. 440, 445 (2003).
[55] Mendoza v. Mala,
A.C. No. 1129,