THE
PEOPLE OF THE
Appellee,
Present:
QUISUMBING,
J.,
Chairperson,
- versus
- CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA,
and
VELASCO,
JR., JJ.
FERDINAND
PASCUAL y BAUTISTA,
Appellant.
Promulgated:
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated
Pascual was charged with Frustrated Murder
and Murder in two Informations dated
Criminal Case
No. T-2515
That
on or about the 15th day of April, 2000, in the evening, at Brgy. Flores, Municipality of Umingan,
Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
kill, armed with a firearm, with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one ADELAIDA
PERLAOAN on the back of his (sic) body, the accused having thus performed all
the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Murder as a
consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the accused, that is, due to the timely and able
medical assistance rendered to the offended party which prevented his (sic)
death, to the damage and prejudice of said ADELAIDA PERLAOAN.[3]
Criminal Case No.
T-2516
That on or about the 15th day of April, 2000, in the evening, at Brgy. Flores, Municipality of Umingan, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, armed with a firearm, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot thrice MANUEL PERLAOAN on his face which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said MANUEL PERLAOAN.[4]
Pascual pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.
Joint trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented as
witnesses Adelaida Perlaoan
(Adelaida), Noel “Boy” Perlaoan
and SPO1 Jeremias Fernandez (SPO1 Fernandez).
According to Adelaida,
at about
A few seconds later, Adelaida stood up and saw Pascual
walking away carrying a gun about two (2) feet long. She was then approximately seven (7) meters
away from Pascual, whom she recognized because of the
light coming from the jeepney’s headlights and a
street post. She cried out to her son,
shouting that her husband was shot by Pascual. Her son came out of their house, embraced her
and noticed that she was also hit because she had blood at her back. She lost consciousness but regained her
bearings soon enough. She was thereafter
taken to the
Noel “Boy” Perlaoan
testified that he was already in bed at about
SPO1 Fernandez testified that he was
on duty on
The policemen immediately proceeded
to Pascual’s house but was told by the latter’s wife
that Pascual left their house just after dinner and
might visit his brother in Brgy. Lapaz,
Umingan, Pangasinan. Having
received this information, they went to Brgy. Lapaz but failed to find Pascual. The policemen decided to put up a checkpoint in
Balungao but still failed to locate Pascual. They returned to Pascual’s
house only to be told by the latter’s brother that a tricycle arrived at dawn
to fetch Pascual’s wife.[11]
They
later received a report that Pascual was residing
somewhere in
The defense presented Pascual as sole witness.
According to Pascual, on
The trial court rendered judgment
finding Pascual guilty of Attempted Murder in
Criminal Case No. T-2515 and Murder in Criminal Case No. T-2516. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer:
1. Under Crim. Case No. T-2515, and applying the pertinent provisions of Act 4103, the penalty of from six (6) years of prision correctional maximum as MINIMUM, to ten (10) years of prision mayor medium as MAXIMUM; and,
2. Under
Crim. Case No. T-2516, the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Moreover,
and as stipulated, the accused is hereby ordered to pay to private complainant Adelaida Perlaoan the amount of P5,000.00
as civil liability in Crim. Case No. T-2515, and to
the heirs of the late Manuel Perlaoan, the amount of P200,000.00
as civil liability in Crim. Case No. T-2516.
Costs
are likewise for his account.
SO
ORDERED.[15]
The case was elevated on appeal to
this Court. However, pursuant to our
ruling in People v. Mateo,[16]
the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals, which rendered the
assailed decision affirming with modification the judgment of the trial court
thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the
foregoing disquisitions, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51, in
Criminal Case Nos. T-2515 and T-2516 finding appellant Ferdinand B. Pascual guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
Attempted Murder and Murder, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. In Criminal Case
No T-2515, however, appellant’s sentence is MODIFIED. His sentence is
reduced to Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum.
The
civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED
to read: Appellant is ordered to pay the
heirs of Manuel Perlaoan the amount of P25,000.00
as exemplary damages. The award of civil indemnity in the amount of P200,000.00
is reduced to P50,000.00. We affirm in all other respects.
SO
ORDERED.[17]
In his Brief,[18] Pascual stakes his appeal on the assertion that his
identity as the offender has not been established by sufficient evidence. He contends that Adelaida
herself admitted that she did not see Pascual
actually fire shots at her and her husband.
The Court of Appeals and the trial
court accorded full faith and credence to the testimony of Adelaida
who described with reasonable certainty the fact of the killing, as well as
identified Pascual as the assailant. It is doctrinal that the trial court's
evaluation of the credibility of a witness and his testimony is accorded the
highest respect because of the latter’s untrammeled opportunity to observe
directly the demeanor of a witness and thus, to determine whether he is telling
the truth.[19]
In this case, Adelaida
gave a straightforward, unequivocal and spontaneous testimony that she saw Pascual holding a long shotgun walking away rather
hurriedly a few seconds after she heard the gunshots that killed her husband
and wounded her. The following excerpts
from her testimony inspire belief:
PROS. BINCE:
x x x x
Q When you took cover behind the jeep,
what else happened?
A After around three seconds[,] I stood up and I felt nervous, sir.
Q When you stood up what did you notice, if any?
A I saw the person walking, sir.
Q Who was that person you noticed walking?
A Ferdinand Pascual alyas “Utak”, sir.
Q This Ferdinand Pascual @ Utak whom you noticed walking, is this the same Ferdinand Pascual, [who was the] accused in this case?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where was Ferdinand Pascual when you noticed him walking?
A Going north, sir.
Q What did you notice from “Utak” when you noticed him proceeding north?
ATTY.
STA. MARIA:
It presupposes that he was holding something?
WITNESS:
A I saw him carrying a gun in his hand, sir.
Q Did you notice what kind of gun was being held by the accused?
A About two feet long, sir.
Q And where was the accused when you first noticed him carrying a gun when you noticed him?
A He was only seven meters away from me when I noticed him, sir.
COURT:
Q Was he walking away from you when you noticed him?
A He was walking away, sir.
PROS. BINCE:
Q What did you do, if you did anything, when you saw him walking away?
A I shouted, sir.
Q What were the words you shouted?
A I cried out “Boy, Boy, your father was shot by “Utak.”
Q Who was this Boy you are shouting?
A My son who was inside the house and maybe still asleep, sir.
Q Do you know how far was the accused when you started shouting?
A He was about 5-7 meters away.[20]
Adelaida further stated:
PROS. BINCE:
Q The last time you testified in court that after the shooting the accused walked towards the north. When you noticed the accused walking towards the north direction, what was his appearance?
A He was then in a long jacket (witness pointing up to the middle of her legs) and he was then walking towards north with a gun on his hand.
Q Will you please describe that gun holding [sic] by Utak when he was walking towards the north direction?
A The gun was about 2 feet long, sir.
Q Did you notice the color of that gun?
A No, sir.
Q How did Utak carry that gun?
A He was holding it with his hand dangly [sic], sir.
COURT:
Q His forearm was down?
A Yes, sir.
PROS. BINCE:
Q The incident happened during night
time, to be exact at
A I recognized [him] because the lights of the jeep were then on and besides there was a street light in front of our house, sir.
Q Where was the headlight of your vehicle facing when you allegedly saw the accused walking north?
A Towards north, sir.
COURT:
Q Your jeep was still moving when according to you the headlights were on when you saw the accused walking?
A No more, sir.
Q It was station[a]ry yet the headlight[s] were on. Is that what you are saying?
A Yes, sir.
PROS. BINCE:
Q That electric post which you claimed to have light, how far was that from your vehicle?
A It was only two (2) meters away, sir.
COURT:
Q Two meters away from whom? From you or from the accused?
A From the vehicle, sir.
Q Behind, in front or on the sides?
A On the sides, sir.
Q Right of the jeep?
A Yes, sir.[21]
We, therefore, cannot subscribe to Pascual’s argument that he was not positively identified as
the assailant because Adelaida did not actually see
him pull the trigger.
In People v. Raquiño,[22]
the accused-appellant contended that he could not have been
positively identified by the victim’s son because the latter admitted not
having seen the actual shooting incident but only the fleeing of three armed
individuals. The Court disagreed with
his contention explaining that positive identification pertains essentially to
proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the
very act of commission of the crime.
There are instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen
the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively
identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime, as for instance
when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim
immediately before and right after the commission of the crime.
In this case, Adelaida
was unwavering in her testimony that she saw Pascual
at the crime scene and that she could not have been mistaken in identifying Pascual as the assailant because the latter is very
familiar to her. She convincingly recounted that she was able to recognize Pascual although he was walking away from her because she
is familiar with his distinct gait, describing it as that of a drunken man.[23] We are, thus, convinced that with the help of
the jeepney’s headlights and the light from the
street lamp in front of the house of the Perlaoans, Adelaida was able to clearly catch sight of and recognize Pascual, her neighbor of many years, as the assailant.
It is also important to emphasize
that Adelaida immediately called out to her son that
her husband was shot by Pascual and afterward
narrated the incident to the police again identifying Pascual
as the assailant. These circumstances,
as the trial court correctly reckoned, are part of the res
gestae, having been made by Adelaida
immediately subsequent to the shooting.[24]
We agree with the Court of Appeals
that there is no evidence in this case which tends to discredit Adelaida’s testimony.
Pascual failed to establish or even ascribe to
her any motive that would move Adelaida to falsely
incriminate him. The fact that Manuel Perlaoan charged Pascual with
frustrated homicide in 1995 and caused the latter’s incarceration does not
necessarily indicate ill-motive on the part of Adelaida.
As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, Pascual’s
conviction and subsequent imprisonment were enough vindication for the Perlaoans.
Pascual’s defense of denial and alibi,
supported by nothing but his say-so, is futile in the light of Adelaida’s positive identification of him as the
assailant. Denial and alibi are
inherently weak defenses which should be buttressed by other convincing
evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.[25]
Both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals rejected Pascual’s allegation that after he
was released from prison on
The Court is unmoved by the accused’s intransigent stance that on the night of the incident in question he was harmlessly distant from the crime site, as he was allegedly in his wife’s house at Lucena City with their two children and her relatives Rodolfo and Virginia Colambo. None of them was presented on the witness stand to corroborate his alibi, however,
He repeatedly told the Court that from the date he walked free from incarceration on May 14, 1995 he proceeded straight home to Lucena City, and there he stayed until the local police took him into custody pursuant to the then pending arrest warrants issued by this Court, one of which had to do with Criminal Case No. T-1820 for “frustrated homicide.”
The
Court takes official cognizance of said case, wherein the same Ferdinand Pascual alias “Utak” has likewise
stood trial before it for a stabbing incident that transpired on
We also note that as SPO1 Fernandez testified, Pascual’s wife and brother told him that Pascual left their house just after dinner on
It should be stressed that it was
only in December 2000, or about eight (8) months from the time the crime was committed
on April 15, 2000, that policemen received a report that Pascual
was arrested somewhere in Quezon Province.[28] Pascual must have
known from his wife and brother that the police were looking for him on account
of the killing of Manuel Perlaoan. Despite this, he did not communicate to the
authorities whatever information he had which might shed light on the case,
choosing instead to hole up in
Given the circumstances surrounding
the attack on the Perlaoans, we agree with the trial
court and the appellate court that treachery attended the attack. Treachery is present when the offender
commits any crime against persons employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution
without risk to the offender arising from any defense which the offended party
might make.[30]
In this case, the trial court
correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery that attended
the killing of Manuel Perlaoan and the wounding of Adelaida. Two
conditions must concur for treachery to exist:
(1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself, and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular
means, method or form of attack employed by him.[31]
Adelaida vividly recalled that that night,
she and her husband were just about to get off from their passenger jeepney when two gunshots suddenly reverberated in the
air. They had absolutely no inkling of
the attack. They had no opportunity to
anticipate the imminence thereof the attack nor were they in any position to
defend themselves or repel the aggression because they were unarmed. Manuel Perlaoan was
fatally shot in the head which instantly caused his death. The execution of the attack, without the
slightest provocation from the victims who were unarmed, made it impossible for
the latter to defend themselves or to retaliate.[32]
As regards the qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation, we find that the prosecution failed to
adduce evidence to prove the elements thereof, including: (1) the time when the accused determined to
commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he clung to his
determination to commit the crime; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between
the decision to commit the crime and the execution thereof to allow the accused
to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[33]
We do not agree with the contention
of the Office of the Solicitor General in its Brief dated
At any rate, the doctrinal rule is
that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not life threatening, the
accused not having performed all the acts of execution that would have brought
about death, the crime committed is only attempted murder.[36] In this case, the wound inflicted on Adelaida was not the kind which could have caused her death
as, in fact, she was confined at the
The Court of Appeals correctly
assessed the penalty to be imposed upon Pascual for
Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. T-2515.
Attempted Murder is punishable with the penalty two degrees lower than
that prescribed for the consummated felony under Article 51 of the Revised
Penal Code. Accordingly, the imposable penalty is prision
mayor. Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall
be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum of the penalty to be imposed should be within the range of prision correccional, and
the maximum of the penalty to be imposed should be within the range of prision mayor in its medium period. Hence,
for the crime of Attempted Murder, Pascual should be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Two (2) years, Four (4)
months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
As regards the issue of damages, the
award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto
in favor of Manuel Perlaoan’s heirs is
proper. This award is mandatory and
requires no proof other than the victim’s death.[37] We also award to Manuel Perlaoan’s
heirs exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in accordance with
Art. 2230 of the Civil Code. Further,
based on the agreement of the parties in the Order[38]
of the trial court dated P5,000.00
shall suffice to answer for indemnification in the event of a judgment of
conviction in Criminal Case No. T-2515.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
In Criminal Case No. T-2515,
Ferdinand B. Pascual is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from Two (2) years, Four (4)
months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One
(1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum. He is likewise ordered to pay
private complainant Adelaida Perlaoan
the amount of P5,000.00 as damages.
In Criminal Case No. T-2516, Ferdinand
B. Pascual is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA and is adjudged to indemnify the heirs of the deceased,
Manuel Perlaoan, the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
as civil indemnity ex delicto and Twenty Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]Rollo, pp. 3-23; Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam and Arturo G. Tayag.