THIRD DIVISION
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PEOPLE OF
THE Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - JUDY SALIDAGA y
QUINTANO, Accused-Appellant. |
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G.R. No. 172323 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: January 29, 2007 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For review is the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01332 which affirmed in toto the Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 166, finding
accused-appellant Judy Salidaga y Quintano guilty of the crime of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay his victim, AAA,[3]
the amounts of P50,000.00, as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00,
as moral damages. He was also ordered to
pay the costs of suit.
The
factual antecedents are as follows:
An
Information dated
On or about
Upon
arraignment on
The
prosecution presented, as its lone witness, the victim herself. In her testimony, she stated that at the time
of the incident, she was alone and asleep at their house located in Bolante,
The
prosecution likewise presented the Sworn Statement of AAA[7]
and the Initial Medico-Legal Report issued by the crime laboratory of the
Philippine National Police.[8] The report was signed by a certain P/Sr. Insp.
Daileg who conducted the physical examination on AAA. It bears the following information:
FINDINGS:
Hymen: Carunculae myrtiformis
CONCLUSION:
Subject is non-virgin state physically (sic)[9]
The
defense presented appellant as its sole witness. He testified that on
Appellant
also stated that during the time when the supposed rape took place, he was
installing the flooring of the house belonging to “Lando” and “Ate Aling” in Bolante,
The
defense did not present any documentary evidence.
On
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Judy
Salidaga y Quintano Guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime
of Rape, as charged in the Information, and there being neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and pay AAA P50,000.00, as civil indemnity and P50,000.00,
as moral damages, plus the costs of suit.[10]
In
adjudging appellant guilty, the trial court declared that –
(a)fter
a thorough examination and full evaluation of the evidence on record, the Court
finds that the following relevant facts have been adequately established:
1. On
2. Accused went on top of AAA, poked a
knife at her neck, removed her shorts and inserted his penis inside her vagina.
3. AAA was gripped with fear. She could not fight and resist the sexual
assault because of the knife poked at her neck and she was afraid accused would
kill her.
4. Accused immediately left and
disappeared after satisfying his bestial lust.
The
crime of rape is committed by a man who has carnal knowledge of a woman through
force, threat or intimidation and is punishable by Reclusion Perpetua (Articles
266-A and 266-B, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, known as the
Anti-Rape Law of 1997).
Considering
the established relevant facts and the law applicable, the Court is convinced
that the accused committed the crime of Rape as charged in the Information.
Accused’s
defense of denial and alibi cannot outweigh or overcome the positive and
unequivocal narration of AAA on how she was ravished by the accused. The record is bereft of any proof that AAA is
actuated by ill-motive in charging accused of a very serious crime. Accused’s asseveration that he and AAA were
live-in partners from June to November, 2002, even if true, cannot weaken the
clear, candid and categorical statement of AAA that accused sexually abused her
on December 16, 2002.[11]
A
Notice of Appeal[12] was
seasonably filed by appellant and the trial court ordered the transmittal of
the entire records of the case to this Court.
Subsequently, we ordered the referral of the case to the Court of
Appeals conformably with our decision in the case of People v. Mateo.[13]
On
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the
decision appealed from must be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the accused-appellant.[14]
Appellant
is again before us asserting his innocence and impugning the finding of the
Court of Appeals on the sole ground that –
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[15]
We
find merit in the petition.
In
determining the guilt or innocence of the accused in rape cases, the courts are
guided by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be
made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even
more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of
things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony
of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[16]
The
Court of Appeals, in sustaining the trial court, declared that the appellant’s
defense of denial and alibi cannot outweigh AAA’s positive and unequivocal
narration as to how the rape was perpetrated by appellant. In the process, the Court of Appeals
reiterated the familiar rule that “alibi, like denial, is an intrinsically weak
defense which must be supported by strong evidence of lack of culpability.”[17]
It
must be emphasized that in this case, the prosecution presented only one
witness who was none other than the offended party herself. We retrace the lone testimony of AAA as
follows:
DIRECT EXAM.
BY FISCAL PAZ:
q AAA,
do you recall where were you on
a Yes,
sir.
q Where
were you?
a In
the house.
q Where
were your house located then?
a Bolante,
q What
were you doing in your house on said date and time?
a I
was sleeping.
q At
the time, did you have companions in the house?
a None.
q
While you were sleeping on said date and time in your house, do you
recall if there was something that happened?
a
Yes.
q What
was that?
a He
went on top me and poked a knife at my neck, sir.
q You
said “he,” who was that person you are referring to?
a Judy.
q If
he is inside the court room, please went (sic) down and tap his shoulder.
a I
cannot do it.
q Will
you point to him?
COURT:
Witness
pointing to a person who when asked gave his name as Judy Salidaga.
PROSEC. PAZ;
After
the accused went on top of you and poked a knife at your neck, what happened
next?
a I was not conscious when it happened.
q Why
were you not conscious?
a I
was scared.
q Scared
of what?
a Because
of the knife poked at my neck and I am afraid he might kill me.
q What
did the accused do when he went on top of you?
a He
put his sex organ inside.
q Where
did he put his sex organ.
a Mine.
q In
your sex organ?
a Yes.
q What
did you do when he did that?
a None.
q Why
did you not do anything?
a Because
I was afraid.
q Why
were you afraid?
a Because
of the knife poked at my neck and he might kill me.
q About
how long was his sex organ inside yours?
a I
cannot recall.
q After
the accused inserted his penis inside your vagina, what happened next?
a He
stood up.
q Where
did he go?
a He
went out. (Emphasis supplied.)[18]
As
admitted by AAA, she immediately lost consciousness after appellant went on top
of her. Yet, in the next breath, she was
able to vividly recall the events that occurred while in a state of
unconsciousness. To our mind, this inconsistency in AAA’s testimony is simply
too glaring to be brushed aside for it goes into the integrity and viability of
the criminal complaint she initiated against appellant. If it were true, as she claimed in the
witness stand, that she immediately fainted, how could she then remember, in
detail, how appellant was able to rape
her. Her testimony on this material
point is simply unconvincing. As we
reiterated in the case of People v. Mole,[19] a woman raped in a state of unconsciousness would not be able to narrate her
defloration during that state, and her violation may be proved indirectly by
other evidence.
Unfortunately
for the prosecution, other than the vacillating testimony of AAA, the records
of this case are bereft of any other evidence sufficient to hold appellant
guilty of rape. The Initial Medico-Legal
Report it submitted before the trial court fails to persuade us into affirming
appellant’s conviction. As aptly pointed
out by the appellant, “the Medico-Legal Report (Exhibit A) only showed that the
private complainant was in a ‘non-virgin state physically’ which was expected
since she herself admitted that she was cohabiting with BBB in December 2002.”[20]
To
be sure, there have been instances when this Court convicted an accused of the
crime of rape committed while their victims were unconscious for as we held in
the case of People v. Palapal[21] –
(i)t
is but to be expected that if the sexual assault was committed against the
victim while the latter was in a state of unconsciousness, she would not be
able to testify on the actual act of sexual intercourse. It is precisely when the sexual intercourse
is performed when the victim is unconscious that the act constitutes the
statutory offense of rape especially when, as in the instant case, the loss of
consciousness was the result of appellant’s act of violence. x x x.[22]
In
the subsequent case of People v. San
Pedro,[23] our pronouncement was that –
x x x Of course, an unconscious woman will
not know who is raping her. If the
defense theory were to be adopted, then it would be impossible to convict any
person who rapes an unconscious woman, except only where a third person
witnesses the crime. Henceforth, the
clever rapist would simply knock his potential victim out of her senses before
actually raping her, to be later immunized from conviction for insufficient
identification.
In
a situation like this, the identity of the rapist is determined by the events
preceding or following the victim’s loss of consciousness. x x x.[24]
However,
there have also been instances when this Court did not hesitate to set aside
convictions in rape cases where, after weighing the evidence lodged by the
prosecution, we arrived at the inevitable conclusion that the accused must be
set free.
In
the case of People v. Tayag,[25] the trial court held the accused guilty
of forcible abduction with rape. With
the use of a bolo, he purportedly brought the nine-year old victim to his house
and tied her to the trunk of a nearby coconut tree. He pressed the bolo against her legs then
kissed and bit her lips. The accused
then proceeded to hit her on the stomach and she lost consciousness. When she regained her senses, she felt pain
all over her body but the accused once again hit her in the stomach and she
fainted. When she recovered her
consciousness, she realized that her panty had been taken off. Her private part likewise ached. Notwithstanding the testimonies of the victim
and the medical examiner, we still held that the accused could not be convicted
of forcible abduction with rape; instead, we found him guilty only of forcible
abduction –
(s)econd. Although the prosecution has proven that
Lazel was sexually abused, the evidence proferred is inadequate to prove she
was raped. Evidence of carnal knowledge
is necessary in rape. Lazel entertained
the belief that she was raped because when she regained consciousness, she felt
pain all over her body and her private part.
The trial court found that Lazel was sexually abused because of her
belief. It then equated sexual abuse with
rape x x x.
x x x x
Removal
of underwear, a reddening of hymen, an aching private part and blood on the
underwear do not prove carnal knowledge.
The removal of the victim’s underwear is at most a preparation to engage
in sexual intercourse. The reddening
hymen could have been caused by a male sex organ but that is just a
possibility. In the case at bar,
considering the age of the victim and the condition of her hymen, there should
be laceration if there was penetration by an adult male sex organ. The aching private part could well be part of
the over-all effect of her beating. The
blood on the panty discovered by Lazel after she woke up could have come from
the wound inflicted on her leg. It is
easy to speculate that Lazel was raped.
But in criminal cases, speculation and probabilities cannot take the
place of proof required to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. Suspicion, no matter how strong,
must not sway judgement.[26]
Similarly, in the case of People v. Daganta,[27]
the accused was charged with the rape of a minor. According to the prosecution, the accused
invited the supposed victim to his room and once inside, the accused started
kissing her on the cheek and then on her lips. He then sprayed an insect
repellant to her face as a result of which she lost consciousness. When she woke up, she found the accused
sitting outside his room. The lower
portion of her umbilicus was painful and when she urinated, she felt pain in
her private parts. The physical
examination of the alleged victim revealed that there was hymenal laceration at
All
in all, the prosecution’s evidence is hazy and contradictory sorely lacking as
it is in material details. Admittedly, a
conviction can be based on circumstantial evidence. In the present case, however, the chain of
circumstances does not show a coherent and consistent story that would give
rise to a certitude sufficient to convince this Court to impose on appellant
the very grave penalty of reclusion perpetua.
His own defense is admittedly weak.
But conviction is never founded
on the weakness of the defense. Rather,
it always rests on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence. (Emphasis supplied.)[28]
It
is inherent in the crime of rape that the conviction of an accused invariably
depends upon the credibility of the victim as she is oftentimes the sole witness
to the dastardly act. Thus, the rule is
that when a woman claims that she has been raped, she says in effect all that
is necessary to show that rape has been committed and that if her testimony
meets the crucible test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the
basis thereof.[29] However, the courts are not bound to treat
the testimony of the victim as gospel truth.
Judges are duty-bound to subject her testimony to the most rigid and careful
scrutiny lest vital details which could affect the outcome of the case be overlooked
or cast aside.
In highlighting the supposed weakness
of appellant’s defense of alibi, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
overlooked the basic question of whether the prosecution presented sufficient
evidence to support their guilty verdicts for settled is the rule that in every
criminal prosecution, the accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is
established by the prosecution. Thus, if
the prosecution fails, it fails utterly, even if the defense is weak, or
indeed, even if there is no defense at all.[30] The prosecution, at all times, bears the
burden of establishing an accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No matter how weak the defense may be, it is
not and cannot be the sole basis of conviction if, on the other hand, the
evidence for the prosecution is even weaker.[31]
The
principle has been dinned into the ears of the bench and the bar that in this
jurisdiction, accusation is not synonymous with guilt.[32] The proof against him must survive the test
of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.[33] If the evidence is susceptible of two
interpretations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, the accused must be acquitted.[34] The overriding consideration is not whether
the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a
reasonable doubt as to his guilt.[35] If there exists even one iota of doubt, this
Court is “under a long standing injunction to resolve the doubt in favor of
herein accused-petitioner.”[36] The accused may offer no more than a feeble
alibi but we are enjoined to proclaim him innocent in the light of insufficient
evidence proving his guilt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 16 November 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01332, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 166 in Criminal Case No. 124878-H, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
appellant is ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable
doubt. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is hereby directed to cause the immediate release of appellant,
unless the latter is being lawfully detained for another cause; and to inform
the Court of the date of his release, or the reasons for his continued
confinement, within ten days from notice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
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|
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ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Renato C. Dacudao with Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin and Celia C.
Librea-Leagogo, concurring; rollo,
pp. 3-13.
[2] Records, pp. 67-69.
[3] Under Republic Act No. 9262 also known as “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004” and its implementing rules, the real name of the victim and those of her immediate family members are withheld and fictitious initials are instead used to protect the victim’s privacy.
[4] Records, p. 1.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[14] Rollo,
p. 13.
[15] CA rollo, p. 26.
[16] People
v. Arsayo, G.R. No. 166546,
[17] Rollo,
p. 10.
[18] TSN,
[19] 462 Phil. 209, 221 (2003).
[20] Rollo,
p. 27.
[21] 200 Phil. 267 (1982).
[22]
[23] G.R. No. 94128,
[24]
[25] 385 Phil. 1150 (2000).
[26]
[27] 370 Phil. 751 (1999).
[28]
[29] People
v. Tismo, G.R. No. 44773,
[30] People
v. Tempongko, Jr., 228 Phil. 553, 561 (1986).
[31] People
v. Boneo, G.R. No. 74522,
[32] People
v. Batidor, 362 Phil. 673, 685-686 (1999).
[33] People
v. Mejia, 341 Phil. 118, 145 (1997).
[34] People
v. Manambit, 338 Phil. 57, 100 (1997).
[35] People
v. Vasquez, 345 Phil. 380, 400 (1997).
[36] Rollo,
p. 10.