SECOND DIVISION
|
CAPITOL WIRELESS, INC. Petitioner, - versus - CARLOS
ANTONIO BALAGOT,
Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 169016 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and VELASCO, Jr., JJ. Promulgated: |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner Capitol Wireless, Inc.
(Capwire) hired respondent, Carlos Antonio Balagot (Balagot), as collector on
At around
As Capwire HRD director recommended
the immediate termination of the services of Balagot on the ground of grave
misconduct and willful breach of trust and confidence,[1] the
HRD sent on
A
report was received this morning from HRD for grave misconduct on your
part. It was found out that you are
employed with Contractual Concepts, Inc. as a motorized messenger serving their
client, China Banking Corp. In view of
this, explain within twenty four (24) hours why no disciplinary action should
be taken against you for this matter.[2]
In an undated handwritten letter-reply,
Balagot admitted the charge against him.[3]
An administrative hearing was thus conducted
on May 18, 2000 during which Capwire presented 1) a certification of Balagot’s
employment with CCI, signed by its president and general manager, stating that
Balagot had been assigned to China Bank since December 8, 1992;[4] 2)
a cash voucher in favor of Balagot issued by CCI reflecting a loan amounting to
P2,000;[5] and 3)
Balagot’s payslip from CCI for the period
Balagot admitted that simultaneously
with his employment as a collector for Capwire, he had been performing
messengerial duties to China Bank on a “part time basis.”[7]
On
Balagot thereafter filed on
By Decision of
After careful deliberation, We are of the opinion that as far as the complainant’s working in another company while being an employee of the respondent is not a just cause for dismissal under the Labor Code, especially that there is no positive showing that the complainant uses the company time of one employer in his service with another or that the two employers are in competing businesses. Indeed, an employee or worker has to resort to
the proper use of
all his time and skills in order to survive in our country at its economic
crisis. Even in
The
respondents exclaimed that it is hard to believe that the complainant’s
employment with Contractual Concepts, Inc. does not interfere with his work
with them. However, a scrutiny of the
record does not show that the respondents has [sic] established a prima
facie case against the complainant for using their company time in working with
another. The respondents may indeed
find it “hard to believe” that the complainant has not been cheating them of
company time, but unless they can show us the evidence, We cannot affirm that
belief.[11] (Underscoring supplied)
The Labor Arbiter thus ordered Capwire
and Marquez to jointly and severally[12]
reinstate Balagot without loss of seniority rights and other privileges;[13]
and to pay Balagot full backwages and 10% of the monetary award as attorney’s
fees, and should Balagot opt for separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, to give
him separation pay equivalent to one-half month pay for every year of service,
a fraction of six months being considered one whole year.[14]
On Capwire’s appeal, the NLRC
reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision, holding as follows:
There is no denying that taking on double job [sic] per se is not illegal as extra income would go a long way for an ordinary worker like herein complainant. The only limitation is where one job overlaps with the other in terms of time and/or poses a clear case of conflict of interest as to the nature of business of complainant’s two employers.
In
the case at bar, the conflict of interest scenario is out of the question since
respondent Capitol Wireless (Capwire) business is very different from
Contractual Concepts Incorporated. The
problem, however, is as to time and performance of duty. With respondent CAPWIRE complainant works
as a collector from 8:00 A.M. to
5:00 P.M. On the other hand, his job
at Contractual Concept is as a messenger assigned at China Bank. As a messenger,
we do not believe that he’ll be performing his task after
The NLRC accordingly dismissed Balagot’s
complaint.
On Balagot’s
Petition for Certiorari, the Court of Appeals, by Decision[16] of
May 31, 2005, holding that Capwire failed to prove that Balagot was dismissed for
just cause, reversed the decision of the NLRC and reinstated that of the Labor
Arbiter. The Court of Appeals absolved
Capwire president Marquez of solidary liability with Capwire, however.[17]
Its Motion for Partial Reconsideration[18]
having been denied,[19] Capwire
filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, raising the issue of
“whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed manifest error in
holding that respondent was illegally dismissed, thus, totally disregarding the
evidence on record, in violation of the Labor Code as amended, and the revised
rules of evidence.”[20]
In his Comment, [21] Balagot reiterates his argument that his job at CCI did not
interfere with his job at Capwire, maintaining that he performed his tasks for
CCI only after office hours. To bolster his
argument, he asserts that his performance at Capwire was always satisfactory
and never went below average.[22]
The petition is impressed with merit.
Capwire’s evidence, consisting of,
among other things, its HRD director’s report that he saw Balagot at China Bank
at 3:35 p.m. of May 9, 2000; Balagot’s above-stated handwritten admission; the December
8, 1992 certification of employment signed by CCI’s president and general
manager; the cash voucher in favor of Balagot for a company loan from CCI; and
Balagot’s payslip from CCI for the period April 1-15, 2000, unmistakably indicate
that from December 8, 1992 to May 22, 2000, Balagot had been using Capwire time
to perform service for another company.
Balagot’s claim that he performed his
tasks for CCI only after his office hours with Capwire does not impress. As Capwire argues:
Under the Rules on Evidence, specifically Section 3, Rule 131, the presumptions: “that the ordinary course of business has been followed” and “that things happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life,” are disputable presumptions that can only be overcome by clear and preponderant evidence.
In
this connection, it is of general knowledge that the banking industry follows the ordinary working hours of
Now, since it is presumed, until contradicted that, “the ordinary course of business has been followed,” and “things happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life,” it logically follows that petitioner performed his duties with China Banking Corporation during office hours – that is from 8:00 am to 5:00 pm. This presumption can be overcome only by clear and preponderant evidence. However, the records of the case will clearly show that respondent failed to present any proof to contradict the same, hence, the presumption stands against him. Thus, it was a highly erroneous conclusion for the Court of Appeals to have found that there was no convincing evidence to prove that petitioner was using the company resources of petitioner in rendering messengerial services for China Banking Corporation x x x.
In
the same manner, this Honorable Court can also take judicial notice of the fact that banks, or any business establishment
for that matter, close its [sic] business transactions and operations at
5:00 in the afternoon because this fact is of public/common knowledge. Thus, it is respectfully submitted that there
is no need to produce evidence that indeed banks close its [sic] operations after
Besides,
respondent admitted in his petition, that his job with petitioner was to
be carried out from
x x x x
Moreover,
if respondent’s allegation is true that indeed he was only rendering services
to China Banking Corporation after
Furthermore, the minutes of the
administrative hearing conducted by Capwire on
Capwire having established, through
substantial evidence, a prima facie case of just cause to dismiss Balagot,
the burden of evidence shifted to Balagot.[26] Balagot
failed, however, to controvert the same.
This Court is thus constrained to uphold his dismissal.
Verily, jurisprudence recognizes as a
valid ground for dismissal of an employee unauthorized use of company time,
as Pepsi-Cola Distributors of the
Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC[27] holds:
[An
employee] cannot serve himself and [his employer] at the same time all at the
expense of the latter. It would be unfair to compensate private respondent
who does not devote his time and effort to his employer. The primary duty of the employee is to carry
out his employer’s policies. . . .[28] (Underscoring supplied),
and of company vehicle, as Soco
v. Mercantile Corporation of Davao[29]
holds:
. . . Petitioner avers that the damage inflicted on MERCO by his activities due to his misuse of the company vehicle during working hours did not hamper the smooth business operations of MERCO.
However,
what should not be overlooked is the prerogative of an employer company to prescribe
reasonable rules and regulations necessary or proper for the conduct of its
business and to provide certain disciplinary measures in order to implement
said rules and to assure that the same would be complied with. A rule prohibiting employees from using
company vehicles for private purpose without authority from management is, from
our viewpoint, a reasonable one. This
regulation cannot be faulted by petitioner because this is proper and necessary
even if only for an orderly conduct of MERCO’s business. From the evidence presented, petitioner twice
used the company vehicle in pursuing his own personal interests, on company
time and deviating from his authorized route, all without permission. x x x
Certainly, to condone petitioner’s own conduct will erode the discipline
that an employer should uniformly apply so that it can expect compliance to
the same rules and regulations by its other employees. Otherwise, the rules necessary and proper for
the operation of its business, would
be gradually rendered ineffectual, ignored, and eventually become meaningless.[30] (Underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and the
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] NLRC records, p. 27.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Rollo, p. 80.
[12]
[13] Ibid.
[14]
[15] Supra
note 1 at 228-230.
[16] Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Salvador Valdez, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo and Magdangal M. de Leon. CA rollo, pp. 143-153.
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] Supra note
11 at 17.
[21]
[22]
[23] Supra note
11 at 18-20.
[24]
[25] Supra note 1 at 36.
[26] Vide
Bautista v. Sarmiento,
G.R.No. L-45137, September 23, 1985, 138 SCRA 587, 593 (the burden of evidence
shifts from party to party depending upon the exigencies of the case in the
course of the trial.).
[27] 358 Phil. 773 (1997).
[28]
[29] G.R. Nos. L-53364-65,
[30]