THIRD DIVISION
LADISLAO
SALMA and MARILOU SALMA,
Petitioners, - versus - THE HON. PRIMO C. MIRO, DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), BRGY. CAPT.
ROLANDO MARTINEZ, and BARANGAY TANODS namely;
CRISENTE ZERNA, BALTAZAR CUMCOM, MONTAÑO TORRES, ELDIN MIRAFLOR, NOEL TORRES,
FRANCISCO CASTRO, BENITO BAROT, RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ, KASAMA BUENAVENTURA,
WILLIAM DAYAO, RICO PIÑERO, JOSEPHINE CORNELIO and GINA SALMA, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 168362 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: January
25, 2007 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside,
for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion, the Review on Joint
Resolution[1]
dated 15 October 2004 and the Order[2]
dated
The factual
and procedural antecedents of this instant petition are as follows:
On
The aforesaid property was commonly owned by the Salmas although in the possession of Gina and her late husband. After her husband’s demise, Ladislao was very adamant in regaining the possession of the entire property insisting that Gina had no more right to remain therein.
At
the time Gina brought to the attention of
Upon hearing the
complaint,
In
the early morning of the following day,
Gina
related that at around
While
Ladislao was absorbed by his temper at the front of
her house, Gina lost no time in reporting to
Sensing the urgency of the situation, Martinez agreed to go with Gina to her house, and so he convened his Barangay Tanods, namely: Crisente Zerna, Baltazar Concom, Montaño Torres, Eldin Miraflor, Noel Torres, Francisco Castro, Benito Barot, and Rafael Rodgriguez, then proceeded to the location where the alleged harassment took place to verify the report and mediate between the disputing parties.[6]
Upon their
arrival at the vicinity, the gate adjoining the fence surrounding the entire
lot was already tied with a wire but Ladislao was
nowhere to be found. Wanting to promptly
settle the matter,
To ease the growing tension, Martinez politely greeted Ladislao, “mayong buntag Lad” (good morning Lad), and in a diplomatic manner asked, “di-a mi arong pag klaro aning report sa imong bayaw nga si Gina nga imo kunong gi-alaran ang alagi-an nila ug sa iyang mga kustomer diin naapektuhan iyang negosyo, ug imo pa kuno gihulga ang iyang trabahante, ug unya imo gyud syang gisulong karon lang, unsa man ni katinu-od?” (we are here to verify the truth on Gina’s complaint that you allegedly fenced her house which blocked her and her customer’s passage and, on one instance, mauled her laborer which affected her business, and then again harassed her at her residence this morning). Instead of justifying his actions, Ladislao explicitly admitted the allegations and even retorted, “ngano man diay sulongon nako si Gina? Wala moy labot kay walay makabo-ot sa akong gustong buhaton! Wala moy labot Noy, kay ako ning property,” (What if I will harass Gina? What if I will fence my property? This is mine and I will certainly do whatever pleases me and its none of your business anymore). These arrogant utterances were allegedly made by Ladislao while pointing his finger at the the Barangay Captain and pushing him away.[7]
The
contemptuous behavior displayed by Ladislao prompted
In the process of effecting his arrest, Ladislao and
his wife Marilou Salma, who
tried to help him evade the barangay authorities,
suffered slight physical injuries as evidenced by medical reports.[9] Spouses Ladislao
and Marilou Salma later
cried they were victims of “manhandling” and “police brutality” alleging that
the force employed by
Consequently, Ladislao
was charged with the crimes of Direct Assault, Resistance to a Person in
Authority or his Agents, and Coercion docketed as I.S. No. 03-152 entitled, “Chief
of Police v. Ladislao Salma.”[11]
On the
other hand, spouses Ladislao and Marilou
Salma filed six counter charges against Martinez and
the Barangay Tanods namely Crisente Zerna, Baltazar Concom, Montaño Torres, Eldin Miraflor, Noel Torres, Francisco Castro, Benito Barot, and Rafael Rodriguez, before the City Prosecution
Office of Tanjay City and docketed as follows: I.S.
No. 03-156, For: Slight Physical Injuries, “Marilou
Salma v. Crisente Zerna,” I.S. No. 03-157, For: Grave Threats, “Ladislao Salma v. Crisente Zerna and Baltazar Concom,” I.S. No.
03-158, For: Slander by Deed, “Ladislao Salma v. Brgy. Capt. Rolando Martinez and Crisente Zerna et al.,” I.S. No. 03-159, For: Grave Coercion, “Ladislao Salma
v. Brgy. Capt. Rolando Martinez and Crisente Zerna et al.,” I.S. No. 03-160,
For: Arbitrary Detention, “Ladislao Salma v. Brgy. Capt. Rolando Martinez
and Crisente Zerna et al.”, and
I.S. No. 03-161, For: Unlawful Arrest, “Ladislao Salma v. Brgy. Capt. Rolando Martinez and Crisente
Zerna, et al.”[12]
On
“ACCORDINGLY, and for reasons
already cited, I.S. Nos. 03-156, 03-157,
03-158, 03-159, 03-160, 03-161 and 03-162 are hereby ordered dismiss (sic).”[14]
However,
the criminal complaint against Ladislao was ordered
filed, it having been established that
respondent Ladislao committed the acts as charged and
is probably guilty thereof.[15] The dispositive
portion of the Joint Resolution reads:
“ACCORDINGLY, let two separate informations for the offense defined in Article 148 and Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code against Ladislao Maglucot Salma be filed before the proper court.”[16]
Aggrieved, the spouses Salma elevated the matter to the Office of the Regional
State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, through an Appeal and/or Petition
for Review[17]
they filed on
Since the respondents in the criminal complaints instituted by the spouses Salma are public officials, who allegedly committed the offenses charged while in performance of their official duties, the Regional State Prosecutor indorsed the resolution of I.S. Case Nos. 03-156, 03-157, 03-158, 03-159, 03-160, and 03-161 for the proper cognizance by the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas).
On the other hand, since Ladislao was a private individual, the jurisdiction for the review of the Resolution approving the filing of Criminal Informations against him for the crimes of Direct Assault, Resistance to a Person in Authority or his Agents and Coercion was retained by the Regional State Prosecutor.
In a Resolution[18]
dated
Wherefore, the City Prosecutor of Tanjay is directed to move for the withdrawal of the informations filed in court and to inform this Office of the action taken hereon within ten
(10) days from receipt hereof.[19]
For its part, the Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas) resolved the appeal brought
before its jurisdiction by approving the dismissal of the complaints filed by
the spouses Salma against respondent barangay officials.[20] The decretal
portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE,
foregoing premises considered, the Joint Resolution dated
Similarly ill-fated was the spouses Salma’s Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing
resolution which was denied by the Ombudsman in an Order dated
Unyielding, the spouses Salma filed this instant Petition for Certiorari[23]
advancing the argument that Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas,
Primo C. Miro, committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the dismissal of cases
filed against respondent barangay officials.
For our resolution then is the
following issue:
WHETHER
OR NOT DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS, PRIMO C. MIRO COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN APPROVING THE
DISMISSAL OF CASES FILED AGAINST
We rule in the negative.
In the eight-paged
Petition[24]
filed by petitioner spouses, which was reproduced in toto
in their Memorandum,[25]
they generally averred that grave abuse of discretion attended the approval of
the dismissal of their complaints against the barangay
officials, but miserably failed to substantiate the allegation. Petitioner spouses availed themselves of an
extraordinary remedy allowed under the Rules by filing this Special Civil
Action for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court but the
allegations advanced by the petitioner spouses were empty of any material
argument to prove their recantation that the Deputy Ombudsman gravely abused his
discretion.
Even if the instant petition is
essentially bare in substance, this Court will nonetheless comb the records and
address the issue scantily laid by the spouses Salma
and apply the pertinent legal and jurisprudential principles to resolve this
case.
In order to avail of the Special Civil
Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court,
petitioner in such cases must clearly show that public respondent acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in
jurisdiction.[26]
By grave
abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[27]
In sum, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be capricous, arbitrary or whimsical exercise of power.
Applying the above-laid parameters in
the case at bar, we must look into the Resolution dated 15 October 2004 and the
Order dated 29 March 2005 issued by the Ombudsman and determine whether there
is a substantial evidence to support its conclusions in order to take it out
from the ambit of grave abuse of discretion as defined above.
In the
disputed Resolution, the Ombudsman found that there is no probable cause to
engender a well-founded belief that the crimes charged against the barangay officials were indeed committed and that they were
probably guilty thereof.
It
particularly cited that the acts of Ladislao in
pointing his finger at
Significantly, the rule on presumption
of regularity in the performance of official function aptly applies in this
case. Under the Rules of Evidence, it is
presumed that official duty has been regularly performed, unless contradicted.[28] Consequently, if in the act of effecting
lawful arrest upon Ladislao, the latter was ridiculed
or even injured, the same was not intentional but merely an incidental
consequence considering that he offered initial resistance against the
arresting barangay compelling the latter to use
reasonable force. The same is true with
the other acts committed by the barangay officials by
reason or on the occasion of effecting the lawful
arrest. The said acts were but the
necessary and incidental repercussions of the performance of the official
duties by the respondents.
Finally, in the exercise of its
discretion, the Ombudsman affirmed the findings of the Graft and Investigation
Officer that, as correctly ruled by the City Prosecutor, there is no probable
cause in filing the criminal charges against the barangay
officials, and made a pronouncement that, while probable cause need not be an
actual certainty, it is regretted that, based on reasonable belief, the same
does not exist in the present cases.
Upon close scrunity
of the foregoing Resolution, we find nothing whimsical, arbitrary, or
capricious in the above findings. The
determination of the Deputy Ombudsman of the non-existence of a reasonable
ground to believe that the crime has been committed,
is supported by substantial evidence and therefore it cannot be gainsaid that
the same is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
The Ombudsman is empowered to
determine whether there exists a reasonable ground to believe that the crime
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and
thereafter file the corresponding informations before
the appropriate courts.[29] The authority granted to government
prosecutors, like the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsman in the instant case, to
file criminal charges does not preclude them from refusing to file the
information when they believe that there is no prima facie evidence to do
so.
In Salvador
v. Desierto,[30]
we ruled:
On the issue of whether respondent Ombudsman
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint against
respondents, let it be stressed that the Ombudsman has discretion to determine
whether a criminal case, given its facts and circumstances should be filed or
not. It is basically his call. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith should
he find it to be insufficient in form [and] substance or he may proceed with
the investigation if, in his view, the complaint is in due and proper form and
substance.
Thus, saved on well-recognized
exceptions,[31]
this Court has almost adopted quite aptly, a policy of non-interference in the
exercise of the Ombudsman’s constitutionally mandated powers.[32]
In Espinosa v. Office of the
Ombudsman,[33]
we held:
The
prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of
the Ombudsman. To insulate the Office from outside pressure and improper
influence, the Constitution as well as R.A. 6770 has endowed it with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory
powers virtually free from legislative, executive or judiciary
intervention. This Court consistently
refrains from interfering with the exercise of its powers, and respects the
initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who, “beholden to no one,
acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public
service.”
The non-interference rule that we rigorously observed is based, not only
upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory
powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon
practicality as well. Otherwise, the
functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions
assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of
the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way
that the courts will be extremely swamped
if they were compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part
of fiscals and prosecuting attorneys, each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.[34]
We have carefully examined the records, and we find no compelling reason
to deviate from the time-honored policy of non-interference. The Resolution of the Ombudsman was supported
by substantial evidence giving us no cogent reason to depart from his
findings. As significantly observed by
the Ombudsman:
The acts of complainant Ladislao Salma in laying a hand
on the respondent Barangay Captain could be taken as
an assault against a person in authority.
The apprehension of complainant Ladislao Salma was but the natural reaction of the respondent Barangay Tanods who personally
witnessed the pushing incident, especially that the
complainant fled when asked to go with them to the Tanjay
Police Station for proper booking and disposition.[35]
On
the other hand, the spouses Salma utterly failed to
single out a particular act indicating abuse of discretion other than the
fleeting allegation that respondent Ombudsman has committed such.
In sum, this Court has maintained a stature of non-interference from the
discretion of the Ombudsman provided there is no grave abuse of
discretion. Absent a clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion as in the case at bar, we are constrained to uphold
the findings of the Ombudsman.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Third
Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Issued by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II, Allan Francisco S. Garciano, with the “recommending approval” of the Director of the Evaluation and Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) Edgardo G. Canton and the approval of Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, Primo C. Miro. Rollo, pp. 10-22.
[2]
[3] Records, pp. 22-23.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] Rollo, pp. 10-22.
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] People v. Court of Appeals, 368 Phil. 169, 180 (1999).
[27]
[28] RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Sec. 3. Disputable Presumptions. – The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
x x x
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed.
[29] Esquivel v. Ombudsman, 437 Phil. 702, 711 (2002).
[30] Salvador v. Desierto, G.R. No. 135249,
16 January 2004, 420 SCRA 76, 82.
[31] (a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice; (c) When there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice; (d) When the acts of the officer is without or in excess of authority; (e) When the prosecution is under an invalid law; (f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; (j) Where there is no prima facie case against the accused and the motion to quash on that ground has been denied; and (k) Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners, Brocka v. Enrile, G.R. Nos. 69863-65, 10 December 1990, 192 SCRA 183, 188-189.
[32] Nava v. Commission on Audit, 419 Phil. 544, 553 (2001).
[33] 397 Phil. 829, 831(2000).
[34] Supra note 32 at 271.
[35] Rollo, p. 19.