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HEIRS OF SALVADOR HERMOSILLA, namely:
ADELAIDA H. DOLLETON, RUBEN HERMOSILLA, LOLITA H. DE LA VEGA, ERLINDA H.
INOVIO, CELIA H. VIVIT, ZENAIDA H. ACHOY, PRECILLA H. LIMPIAHOY, and EDGARDO
HERMOSILLA, Petitioners, -versus- Spouses JAIME REMOQUILLO and LUZ REMOQUILLO, Respondents. |
G.R. No.
167320
Present: QUISUMBING, Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO
MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Heirs of Salvador Hermosilla, namely: Adelaida H. Dolleton, Ruben Hermosilla, Lolita H. de la Vega, Erlinda H. Inovio,[1] Celia[2] H. Vivit, Zenaida H. Achoy, Precilla[3] H. Limpiahoy, and Edgardo Hermosilla, assail the Court of Appeals’ Decision[4] dated September 29, 2004 which reversed the trial court’s decision in their favor and accordingly dismissed their complaint.
Subject of the controversy is a
65-square meter portion of a lot located in Poblacion,
San Pedro, Laguna.
On
Apolinario Hermosilla
(Apolinario), who was occupying a lot in San Pedro Tunasan Homesite until his death
in 1964, caused the subdivision of the lot into two, Lot 12 with an area of 341
square meters, and Lot 19 with an area of 341 square meters of which the 65
square meters subject of this controversy form part.
On
On
On
After Apolinario
died, his daughter Angela Hermosilla filed a protest
before the Land Authority, which became the National Housing Authority (NHA),[5] contending that as an heir of the
deceased, she is also entitled to Lots 12 and 19. By Resolution of
The NHA later awarded on March 16,
1986 Lot 19 to Jaime for which he and his wife were issued a title, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-156296, on
On May 25, 1992, petitioners filed an
action for Annulment of Title on the ground of fraud with damages against Jaime
and his spouse, together with the Register of Deeds, before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Biñan, Laguna, alleging that by virtue
of the Kasunduan
executed in 1972, Jaime had conveyed to his uncle Salvador the questioned property–part
of Lot 19 covered by TCT No. T-156296 which was issued in 1987.
By Decision[7] of
On the alleged failure of
consideration of the Kasunduan, the trial court held that the same did
not render the contract void, but merely allowed an action for specific
performance. The dispositive
portion of the trial court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring plaintiffs as co-owners of the 65 square meters of the 341 square meters covered by TCT T-156296, registered in the name of defendants. The Court hereby directs the Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch, to cancel said Transfer Certificate of Title, and in lieu thereof, to issue another [to] plaintiffs [as] co-owners of the above portion.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[8] (Underscoring supplied)
The Court of Appeals, reversing the decision
of the trial court, held that the Kasunduan
was void because at the time of its execution in 1972, the Republic of the
Philippines was still the owner of Lot 19, hence, no right thereover
was transmitted by Jaime who was awarded the Lot in 1986, and consequently no
right was transmitted by Salvador through succession to petitioners. And it found no evidence of fraud in Jaime’s act
of having
At all events, the appellate court
held that the action had prescribed, it having been filed in 1992, more than four
years from the issuance to Jaime and his wife of the Transfer Certificate of
Title.
Hence, the present petition for
review on certiorari.
Petitioners argue that the application
of the law on prescription would perpetrate fraud and spawn injustice, they
citing Cometa v. Court of Appeals;[9]
and that at any rate, prescription does not lie against a co-owner. Cometa involves a different factual milieu
concerning the right of redemption, however.
And petitioners’ contention that prescription does not lie against a
co-owner fails because only the title covering the questioned property, which
petitioners claim to solely own, is being assailed.
While this Court finds that the
action is, contrary to the appellate court’s ruling, not barred by the statute
of limitations, it is still dismissible as discussed below.
Albeit captioned as one for Annulment
of Title, the Complaint ultimately seeks the reconveyance
of the property.
From the allegations of the
Complaint, petitioners seek the reconveyance of the
property based on implied trust. The prescriptive
period for the reconveyance of fraudulently
registered real property is 10 years,
reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title,[10] if
the plaintiff is not in possession, but imprescriptible if he is in
possession of the property.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years. The ten-year prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover the title and possession of the property does not run against him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.[11] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is undisputed that petitioners’
houses occupy the questioned property and that respondents have not been in
possession thereof.[12] Since there was no actual need to reconvey
the property as petitioners remained in possession thereof, the action took the
nature of a suit for quieting of title, it having been filed to enforce an
alleged implied trust after Jaime refused to segregate title over
As priorly
stated, however, when the Kasunduan was
executed in 1972 by Jaime in favor of
Claiming exception to the rule,
petitioners posit that at the time the Kasunduan was
executed by Jaime in 1972, his application which was filed in 1963 for the
award to him of Lot 19 was still pending, hence, the Kasunduan transferred to Salvador Jaime’s vested right to purchase the same,
in support of which they cite a law on estoppel, Art.
1434 of the Civil Code, which provides that “[w]hen a person who is not the
owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it and later, the seller or
grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the
buyer or grantee.”[15]
Petitioners’ reliance on Article 1434
of the Civil Code does not lie. The
principles of estoppel apply insofar as they are not
in conflict with the provisions of the Civil Code, the Code of Commerce, the
Rules of Court and special laws.[16]
Land Authority Administrative Order
No. 4 (1967), “Rules and Regulations
governing Disposition of the Laguna Settlement Project in San Pedro, Laguna,”
proscribes the conveyance of the privilege or preference to purchase a land
from the San Pedro Tunasan project before it is
awarded to a tenant or bona fide occupant,
thus:
SEC. 6. Privilege of Preference to Purchase Intransferable; Waiver or Forfeiture Thereof. – From the date of acquisition of the estate by the Government and before issuance of the Order of Award, no tenant or bona fide occupant in whose favor the land may be sold shall transfer or encumber the privilege or preference to purchase the land, and any transfer or encumbrance made in violation hereof shall be null and void: Provided, however, That such privilege or preference may be waived or forfeited only in favor of the Land Authority . . .[17] (Italics in the original, emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners’ insistence on any right
to the property under the Kasunduan thus fails.
[T]he transfer
“became one in violation of law (the rules of the PHHC being promulgated in
pursuance of law have the force of law) and therefore void ab
initio.”
Hence, appellant acquired no right over the lot from a contract void ab initio, no
rights are created. Estoppel,
as postulated by petitioner, will not apply for it cannot be predicated on an
illegal act. It is generally considered
that as between the parties to a
contract, validity cannot be given to it by estoppel
if it is prohibited by law or is against public policy.[18] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners go on to postulate that
if the Kasunduan is void, it follows that the
1962 Deed of Assignment executed by Apolinario in
favor of Jaime is likewise void to thus deprive the latter of any legal basis
for his occupation and acquisition of Lot 19.
Petitioners’ position fails. Petitioners lose sight of the fact that, as
reflected above, Jaime acquired
In another vein, since the property was
previously a public land, petitioners have no personality to impute fraud or
misrepresentation against the State or violation of the law.[19] If the title was in fact fraudulently
obtained, it is the State which should file the suit to recover the property through
the Office of the Solicitor General. The
title originated from a grant by the government, hence, its cancellation is a
matter between the grantor and the grantee.[20]
At all events, for an action for reconveyance based on fraud to prosper, the plaintiff must
prove by clear and convincing evidence not only his title to the property but
also the fact of fraud. Fraud is never presumed. Intentional acts to deceive and deprive
another of his right, or in some manner injure him must be specifically alleged
and proved by the plaintiff by clear and convincing evidence.[21] Petitioners failed to discharge this burden,
however.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is, in light of the foregoing ratiocination, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Erlinda H. Inovio died on
[2] Identified as “Cecilia,” Transcript of
Stenographic Notes (TSN),
[3] Signed as “Priscila” in the Answer to Written Interrogatories, records, p. 60, and in the verification and certification portion of the petition, rollo, p. 29.
[4] Penned by Justice Aurora Santiago-Lagman with the concurrence of Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador.
[5] Historically, the function of
administering the acquisition and disposition of landed estates were discharged
by the following government agencies: By
authority of Commonwealth Act No. 378, the President of the
[6] Rollo, pp. 33-34.
[7] Penned by Judge Hilario F. Corcuera.
[8] Rollo, p. 44.
[9] G.R. No. 141855,
[10] Alfredo
v. Borras, G.R. No. 144225,
[11]
[12] Specifically, these are the houses of Celia,
Precilla and Edgardo. See TSN,
[13] Arlegui
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126437,
[14] One cannot give what one does not have. Vide Cavite Development Bank v. Lim, G.R. No. 131679, February 1, 2000, 324 SCRA 346, 356, where it was held that in a contract of sale the principle of nemo dat quod non habet applies at the consummation stage. Under Article 1459 of the Civil Code, it is required that at the time of delivery the seller be the owner of the thing sold.
[15] Civil Code, art. 1434, as applied in a number of cases cited in Piscueña v. Heirs of Petra Unating, G.R. No. 132803, August 31, 1999, 313 SCRA 384, 386.
[16] Ibid., art. 1432, see also art.
1637 which provides that the provisions on the law on sales are subject to the
rules laid down by the Land Registration Law with regard to immovable property.
[17] 64 O.G. No. 27 6850 (July 1968).
[18] Ibay v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 67279,
[19] Vide
Domaoal v. Bea, No. L-30167,
[20] Vide
De Ocampo
v. Arlos, G.R. No. 135527,
[21] Vide
Barrera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123935, 14 December 2001, 372 SCRA
312, 316-317; Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc.,
G.R. No. 130876,