THIRD DIVISION
SEVEN STAR TEXTILE G.R. No. 166846
COMPANY,
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
MARCOS DY and
GUILLERMO
CAHILLO,
Respondents. Promulgated:
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on
certiorari of the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision[1] in
CA-G.R. SP No. 66402, which annulled and set aside the resolutions of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), as well as the Resolution[2]
dated
As found by the CA, the present
petition stemmed from the following backdrop:
[Respondents] Marcos Dy and
Guillermo Cahillo were former employees of [petitioner] Seven Star Textile Company (SSTC, for brevity). Dy started his employment with SSTC on
On
The
complaint alleged that Dy and Cahillo were dismissed from employment on P17,400.00 as separation pay; and that he refused the offer of
SSTC as he was still interested to work with the company because of the
difficulty of looking for another job.
For his part, Cahillo alleged that he complained to Mrs. Ong that he had
not been paid for the overtime work that he had rendered since he started
working and requested for the payment thereof; that he subsequently refused to
render overtime work because of the non-payment of his previous overtime work;
that he reported for work on May 19, 1998, but he was not able to find his time
card; that he asked for his time card from Rolly Tan, Assistant Production
Manager, and the latter told him that his time card was in the office of Mrs.
Ong and that he could get it after he had delivered some goods; that when he
returned to the company at 6:15 p.m. on said day, he called Mrs. Ong, who told
him of his dismissal from work effective the following day because of his
refusal to render overtime work; and that Mrs. Ong told him to come back on May 25, 1998 to get his 13th
month pay and when he did, he was asked to sign a resignation letter to be
entitled to separation pay in the amount of P11,000.00, but he refused
to do so. Both Dy and Cahillo claimed that they were dismissed without cause
and without prior notice.
SSTC
denied that Dy and Cahillo were dismissed from work, claiming that the two did
not report for work after they were reprimanded for refusing to render overtime
work; that Cahillo had committed several infractions of company rules and
regulations; that Dy held a supervisory position involving trust and
confidence, so that a high degree of loyalty and respect was expected of him;
and that Dy committed numerous absences and tardiness, acts of insubordination
and willful disobedience of orders of his superiors, which warrant the loss of
trust and confidence reposed on him; and that being a managerial employee, Dy
is not entitled to his claims for monetary benefits.
Lin
Ang Pang claimed that he is a mere stockholder of SSTC and was thus erroneously
impleaded in the complaint.[3]
On
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered dismissing the
present case for lack of merit. Respondents are however ordered to pay Cahillo
the amount of P2,004.16 representing his unpaid 13th month
pay (proportionate) for 1998.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The Labor Arbiter declared that contrary
to respondents Marcos Dy and Guillermo Cahillo’s claim, they were not dismissed
from employment; they abandoned their work.
Since respondents had voluntarily terminated their employment, petitioner
Seven Star Textile Co. was no longer mandated to comply with the requirement to
send notices to respondents. The Labor
Arbiter explained:
x x x [T]he requirement of the law that respondents
should have sent notice to complainants to report for work in order to
establish abandonment is not applicable in this case. Respondents did not
terminate the services of complainants on the ground of abandonment. They
merely interposed abandonment as a matter of defense and not as a valid ground
for complainants’ termination. In other words, respondents raised abandonment
of work to negate complainants’ contention that they were terminated from
employment and not as a valid ground for termination since respondents strongly
deny said termination. There being no employment termination obtaining in this
case, the charge of illegal dismissal must fall for lack of factual and legal
basis.[6]
On appeal,[7]
the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. It declared, among others, that
no termination paper existed; thus, there was no dismissal to speak of. Respondents’
unjustified refusal to render overtime work amounted to voluntary resignation. The NLRC also pointed out that respondents’
infraction of company policies had eroded the trust and confidence which their
employer had reposed upon them. This, coupled with their recent unjustified
refusal to render overtime work, would justify their dismissal. The NLRC also ruled
that respondent Dy was a Finishing Supervisor - a managerial employee who,
under the Labor Code of the
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of P2,970.00
and the proportionate amount of his 13th month pay in the sum of P2,004.16
or a total aggregate of P4,974.16.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Respondents’ motion for
reconsideration of the NLRC Decision was denied for lack of merit.[9]
Thereafter, respondents assailed the
NLRC ruling via a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 66402.
In its Decision[10]
dated
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of
the National Labor Relations Commission dated November 23, 2000, which affirmed
the decision of Labor Arbiter Eduardo J. Carpio dismissing petitioners’
complaint for illegal dismissal, as well as the Resolution dated May 31, 2001
denying the motion for reconsideration thereof, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Private respondent Seven Star Textile Company is
DIRECTED to REINSTATE petitioners Marcos Dy and Guillermo Cahillo to their
former positions, without loss of seniority rights and privileges, and to pay
their full backwages and other benefits, such as service incentive leave pay
for three (3) years and 13th month pay, from the dates of their
dismissal up to the date of their actual reinstatement.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In finding the petition meritorious, the
appellate court noted that respondents
reported for work on
Petitioner filed its motion for
reconsideration which the CA denied for
lack of merit.[12]
In the present recourse, petitioner
raises the following arguments:
I. RESPONDENTS DY AND CAHILLO ARE NOT ENTITLED TO
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS BECAUSE ABANDONMENT WAS USED MERELY AS A DEFENSE AND NOT
AS A GROUND FOR TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT.[13]
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT FOUND THAT PETITIONER DISMISSED THE RESPONDENTS CONTRARY TO THE
FINDINGS OF BOTH THE LABOR ARBITER AND THE NLRC THAT THERE WAS NO DISMISSAL.[14]
Petitioner claims that it did not
dismiss respondents Dy and Cahillo from employment. After having been reprimanded for their refusal
to render overtime work, respondents never reported back to work. Since the
fact of termination had not been established, petitioner asserts that the
employer’s burden to comply with substantive and procedural due process did not
even arise.
Petitioner further avers that the CA
abused its discretion when it substituted its own findings for that of the
Labor Arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC. It points out that both the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC found that respondents were not terminated from employment,
and that this finding is not only entitled to great respect but also given the
stamp of finality. Petitioner argues that in the absence of a clear showing
that the findings are arbitrary and bereft of any rational basis, it is not for
this Court to examine their truth or falsehood. Since the CA did not declare
that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC acted arbitrarily in rendering their
respective decision and resolutions, such findings should not be disturbed.
Petitioner contends that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are triers of facts on
specific matters within their field of expertise. They are in a better position to assess and
evaluate the credibility of the contending parties’ claims and evidence.
Petitioner cites Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company v. Montemayor,[15]
and posits that as far as judicial review of labor cases is concerned, this Court is only limited to issues of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
For their part, respondents Dy and
Cahillo maintain that the appellate court did not err when it found that they
were illegally dismissed for non-observance of due process and absence of valid
cause.
The petition is bereft of merit.
To counter respondents’ claim that
they were dismissed from employment, petitioner interposed a bifurcated defense
in its Position Paper: (a) that respondents abandoned their work on account of
their unjustified refusal to render overtime services as ordered by petitioner;
and (b) that respondents were dismissed from employment on the ground of
serious misconduct or willful disobedience of the lawful orders of petitioner
as employer, and loss of confidence with respondent Dy. The pertinent portion of petitioner’s
arguments follows:
7. In this case, the herein respondent merely required
complainants to render overtime work sometime in April 1998 to meet the demands
of their clients for their product but they refused and deliberately walked out
from the company premises.
8. Complainants’ refusal to render overtime work for
no reason at all is a willful act of disobedience and insubordination to the
lawful orders of their employer or its representative. Likewise, they knew that
the respondents are trying to meet the demands of their clients for their
products, they wittingly and deliberately walked out from the company’s
premises when they noticed that no other employees could make the deliveries to
the clients. Under the Labor Code, the employer may terminate an employment on
the grounds of serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of
the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection [with] his
work. Deliberate disregard or willful disobedience of the employer’s lawful
orders belongs to this category. This is
in accordance with Article 282, paragraphs (b) and (e) of the Labor Code of the
x x x x
9. Hence, there could not had been any dismissal in
the instant case simply because the herein complainants were never terminated
from their employment but they did not report for work after they were
reprimanded for refusal to render overtime work. Abandonment is itself a form
of voluntary resignation as the initiative to terminate the employer-employee
relation emanates from the employee. This is manifested in this case.
10. Complainants’ bad faith is quite evident in the
institution of the instant complaint for illegal dismissal when they knew that
respondent SEVEN STAR did not terminate them. This Honorable Office should not
give any credence to the complainants’ baseless allegation of illegal
dismissal. The complainants not only had been guilty of insubordination and
willful disobedience but also maliciously imputing their refusal to work as a
fault on the part of the respondents, hoping to collect separation pay and
other monetary claims.
11. Willful disobedience of the employer’s lawful
orders, as a just cause for the dismissal of an employee, envisages the
concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employee’s assailed conduct
must have been willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a
“wrongful and perverse attitude”; (2) the order violated must have been
reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which
have been engaged to discharge. (San
Miguel Corporation vs.Ubaldo, 218
SCRA 293). These requisites are present in this case.
12. The service record of complainant CAHILLO would
reveal the following infractions: (1) abandoning the company’s delivery truck
before reaching the assigned destination; (2) drinking liquors inside the
dormitory, grave threat, intimidating his other co-employees by means of a
deadly weapon and inflicting physical injuries to a woman co-employee. Proofs
of these incidents are hereto attached as Annexes “3” to “5” and made an
integral part hereof.
13. With respect to the complainant DY, he held a
supervisory position as he was tasked to execute policies and/or standards
regarding personnel management of the respondent SEVEN STAR, and that his
position entails trust and confidence of the respondents. As such, a high
degree of loyalty and respect to his employer is highly expected of him. As
reflected in his service records which are hereto attached as Annexes “6” to
“18,” complainant DY’s neglect of his employment as shown by his commission of
numerous absences, and late in coming to work, repeated acts of insubordination
and willful disobedience of the orders of his superior warrant the lost of the
trust and confidence that his employer had reposed on him. This is pursuant to
Article 282, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code of the
x x x x
14. In the case of Micro
Systems vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 157 SCRA 410, the Supreme
Court held that:
No employer may rationally be expected to continue in
employment a person whose lack of morals, respect and loyalty to his employer,
regard for his employer’s rules and appreciation of the dignity and
responsibility of his office, has so plainly and completely been bared.
15.
The Supreme Court, in the case of San
Miguel Corporation vs. Ubaldo, 218 SCRA 293, has this to say:
The employer cannot be compelled to continue the
employment of a person who was found guilty of maliciously committing acts
which are detrimental to his interests. It will be highly prejudicial to the
interests of the employer to impose on him the charges that warranted his
dismissal from employment. Indeed, it will demoralize the rank and file if the
undeserving, if not undesirable, remain in the service. It may encourage him to
do even worse and will render a mockery of the rules of discipline that
employees are required to observe.
16. Since it was established that the complainants
were dismissed for a just and valid cause, they are not entitled to receive
separation pay. (Samson Alcantara,
Philippine Labor and Social Legislation, Annotated, Volume I, Revised (1992)
Edition, page 632.) This is pursuant to Rule 1, Book VI, Section 7 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code of the
Rule
I, Book VI, Section 7. Termination of employment by employer. – The just causes for terminating the services of an
employee shall be those provided in Article 282 of the Code. The separation
from work of an employee for a just cause does not entitle him to the
termination pay provided in this Code, xxx” (underscoring supplied)[16]
Thus,
as correctly held by the CA, petitioner admitted in its Position Paper that
respondents had been “dismissed” from employment:
It should be noted that in its position paper, SSTC
argued that Dy and Cahillo were not dismissed from work and that the latter’s
refusal to render overtime work is a willful act of disobedience and
insubordination to the lawful orders of their employer, which constitutes a
valid ground for termination of employment; and that since Dy and Cahillo were
dismissed for a just and valid cause, they are not entitled to separation pay.
Thus, SSTC admitted that Dy and Cahillo were, in fact, dismissed from
employment, although it argued that their dismissal was for a just and valid
cause. However, no evidence was presented by SSTC to prove compliance with the
twin requirements of notice of hearing or that a notice to return to work was
served by them on Dy and Cahillo.[17]
The rule that factual findings of
administrative tribunal are accorded respect and even finality admits an
exception: that is, when it is clear that a palpable mistake was committed by
the quasi-judicial tribunal which needs rectification. The CA found that the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC committed an obvious mistake in declaring that
respondents failed to substantiate their claim of illegal dismissal. The Court agrees
with the CA’s pronouncement that in cases of illegal dismissal, it is incumbent
upon the employer to show by substantial evidence that the employees’ dismissal
was validly made, and failure to discharge that duty would mean that the
dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal. As the appellate court correctly held:
Settled is the rule that in termination cases, the
burden of proving that the dismissal of the employees was for a valid and
authorized cause rests on the employer. It is incumbent upon the employer to
show by substantial evidence that the termination of the employment of the
employees was validly made and failure to discharge that duty would mean that
the dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal. On the other hand,
abandonment as a just and valid ground for dismissal requires the deliberate,
unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. Mere absence or
failure to report for work, after notice to return, is not enough to amount to
such abandonment.
It should be noted that in its position paper, SSTC
argued that Dy and Cahillo were not dismissed from work and that the latter’s
refusal to render overtime work is a willful act of disobedience and
insubordination to the lawful orders of their employer, which constitutes a
valid ground for termination of employment; and that since Dy and Cahillo were
dismissed for a just and valid cause, they are not entitled to separation pay.
Thus, SSTC admitted that Dy and Cahillo were, in fact, dismissed from
employment, although it argued that their dismissal was for a just and valid
cause. However, no evidence was presented by SSTC to prove compliance with the
twin requirements of notice of hearing or that a notice to return to work was
served by them on Dy and Cahillo.[18]
Thus, the burden of proof to show
that respondents’ dismissal from employment was for a just cause falls on
petitioner as employer. Petitioner cannot discharge this burden by merely
alleging that it did not dismiss respondents; neither can it escape liability
by claiming that respondents abandoned their work. When there is no showing of
a clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law
considers it a case of illegal dismissal. Petitioner desperately tries a
convoluted, if not absurd, argument - that it only raised abandonment as a
defense and not as a ground for dismissing respondents, and as such, is not
bound to observe due process. However, whether abandonment is alleged as a
ground for dismissing an employee or a mere defense, the employer has the legal
duty to observe due process.
Abandonment is a matter of intention
and cannot lightly be inferred or legally presumed from certain equivocal acts.
For abandonment to exist, two requisites must concur: first, the employee must have failed to report for work or must
have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and second, there must have been a clear intention on the part of the
employee to sever the employer-employee relationship as manifested by some
overt acts. The second element is the
more determinative factor. Abandonment as a just ground for dismissal thus requires
clear, willful, deliberate, and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume
employment. Mere absence or failure to
report for work, even after notice to return, is not tantamount to abandonment.[19]
The Court further notes the
circumstances which strengthen the case for respondents. When respondents
reported back to work, they could no longer find their time cards. When they
inquired from petitioner, they were told that their employment had already been
terminated. Petitioner even offered to pay them separation pay. Moreover, their
refusal to accept the offer and the fact that they immediately filed an illegal
dismissal case against petitioner negates abandonment.[20]
From the foregoing, we hold that the
CA did not commit any error or grave abuse of discretion when it reversed and set
aside the resolutions of the NLRC in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-06-04698-98.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO
J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice
[2] Rollo, pp. 53-54.
[3] Id. at 27-29.
[4] CA rollo, pp. 7-10.
[5]
[6]
[7] The case was docketed as NLRC NCR CA No. 022754-2000.
[8] CA rollo,
p. 19.
[9]
[10] Rollo, pp. 27-40.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] G.R.
No. 88626,
[16]
Records, pp. 14-18.
[17] Rollo, p. 36.
[18]
[19] Standard Electric Manufacturing Corporation
v. Standard Electric Employees Union-NAFLU-KMU, G.R. No. 166111,
[20]
In the case of Philtranco Service
Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 351 Phil. 827,
835 (1998), we held that, “Time and again, we have held that the immediate
filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal by an employee, as in this case, is
inconsistent with abandonment.”