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AMKOR TECHNOLOGY PHILIPPINES, INC., ANTHONY
MICHAEL PETRUCCI and ROSEMARIE S. KATALBAS,
Petitioners, -versus- NORY A. JUANGCO,
Respondent. |
G.R. No. 166507 Present: pUNO, CJ., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, AZCUNA, and GARCIA,
JJ. Promulgated: |
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution
is the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by petitioners of our Decision
promulgated on
In our Decision of September 20, 2006, we affirmed with
modification the Decision dated October 20, 2004 of the Court of Appeals finding
that Nory A. Juangco, respondent,
was illegally dismissed from her position as Executive Director of Amkor Technology Philippines, Inc., petitioner. We upheld the appellate court’s ruling that respondent
is entitled to separation pay, backwages and other
privileges and benefits. However, we deleted
the awards for moral and exemplary damages for lack of basis.
Petitioners anchored their motion for partial reconsideration on our
recent Decision in Domondon v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al,[1] penned by
then Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, now Chief Justice.
A second hard look at this case is deemed in order.
While it is not the function of this Court to re-examine the
evidence submitted by the parties in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, we are constrained to
determine anew the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, considering that they are in
conflict with those of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC, relying on the affidavits of the
officers of petitioner-company, found that respondent was not coerced into
signing the notice of voluntary retirement.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals found that respondent was coerced to retire. When
the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals clash with those of the voluntary arbitrator or the
NLRC, we are compelled to go over the records of the case as well as the
submission of the parties.[2]
Records show that due to business losses, petitioner-company
saw the need to reduce its existing manpower complement. Several meetings were held among its
officers and department heads to discuss actions to be taken to implement the
same. Sometime in October, 2001, petitioner-company
convened its key officers and department heads, including respondent, to
finally decide whether to implement a voluntary retirement/voluntary separation
program or a retrenchment program.
During the meeting, respondent expressed her interest and volunteered to
personally participate in the downsizing program of the company’s personnel.
To formalize her decision to retire from the company, respondent
submitted an undated letter signifying her intention to avail of the Voluntary
Retirement Program of the company, effective
1. I shall receive a separation package equivalent to 1.25 months for every year of service of my current basic monthly salary. I shall also receive an additional one-time 2 months pay, inclusive of the 30 day notice provided for by law.
A week thereafter, or on November 22, 2001, pursuant to her proposition,
respondent received her voluntary retirement package in the amount of Three
Million Seven Hundred Four Thousand Five Hundred Seventeen Pesos and 98/100 (P3,704,517.98) inclusive of
an additional two (2) months pay.
Respondent signed a Receipt and Release Waiver and Quitclaim on the same
date.
The core of the controversy is whether or not respondent
voluntarily retired from her position as Executive Director in petitioner-company.
Respondent denied the due execution of her Release Quitclaim
and Waiver, alleging that she signed the same under duress and
intimidation. She claimed that she was
threatened that she will receive nothing if she will not sign it. With the prospect of receiving nothing, she consented
to sign the waiver.
Petitioners maintain that respondent’s resignation was
voluntary, perforce, there could be no illegal
dismissal.
There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is
compelled to give his consent by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an
imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or
property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants.[3] A re-examination of the records of the case
convinced us that respondent was not coerced or intimidated into signing her retirement
letter. The voluntariness
of her retirement is attested and confirmed by top ranking officials of petitioner-
company then present during the meeting in October
2001. She failed to present evidence to
contradict their statements.
Respondent is a well-educated woman holding a managerial
position. It is highly improbable that with her employment
stature and educational attainment, she could have been duped into signing a retirement
letter against her will. In signifying
her intention to retire, she even made a proposition as to the amount she believed
she was entitled to. Being a woman of
high educational attainment and qualifications, she is expected to know the
import of everything she executes.[4] Having been granted a retirement package
which is very much higher than the amount being received by an employee
terminated for an authorized cause under Article 283 or one who retires under
Article 287 of the Labor Code, we are not swayed by her argument that she was
intimidated or coerced in signing her retirement letter. Indeed, it is safe to conclude that such
retirement package was the reason why she opted to retire.
In Domondon,
where the factual setting is similar to the instant case, the Court held:
Assuming that private
respondents prepared the letter of resignation for petitioner to sign as
claimed, the Court is not convinced that petitioner was coerced and intimidated
into signing it. Petitioner is no
ordinary employee with limited education.
He has a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Economics from the
Similarly,
in Callanta v. National Labor Relations Commission,[5] we
ruled:
It is highly unlikely and incredible for a man of petitioner’s position and educational attainment to so easily succumb to private respondent company’s alleged pressures without even defending himself nor demanding a final audit report before signing any resignation letter. Assuming that pressure was indeed exerted against him, there was no urgency for petitioner to sign the resignation letter. He knew that nature of the letter that he was signing, for as argued by respondent company, petitioner being “a man of high educational attainment and qualification, x x x he is expected to know the import of everything that he executes, whether written or oral.”
Respondent received her retrenchment backwage
a week after she submitted her resignation paper. She had ample time to mull over what courses
of action to take if indeed she was illegally dismissed. Instead, she returned to the company to sign
the Receipt and Release Waiver and Quit Claim and to receive her retirement
package. Thereafter, she looked for
employment in other companies. She
filed her complaint for illegal dismissal only on
While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social
justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be expected that
every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its own rights which, as
such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair
play.[6]
WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration
and RECONSIDER our Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice Chairperson |
|
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
|
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
|
Chief Justice
[1] G.R. No. 154376,
[2] Mitsubishi
Motors Philippines Corporation v. Chrysler Philippines Labor Union, et al., G.R.
No. 148738, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 206.
[3] Article 1335, Civil Code
of the
[4] Callanta v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 105083,
[5]
[6] Sosito v. Aguinaldo
Development Corporation, No. L-48926,