SECOND DIVISION
|
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE
BANK , Petitioner, - versus - HON. AMALIK P. ESPINOSA, JR.,
Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Respondents. |
G.R. No. 162922 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated: January
31, 2007 |
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The present petition for Certiorari stems
from one of several complaints of private respondent, Tala
Realty Services Corporation, which sought to evict petitioner, Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, from the premises
of its branch offices in nine different locations for non-payment of rent. The properties subject of the complaints were
covered by separate but similarly-worded contracts of lease between
petitioner as lessee and private respondent as lessor.
In a complaint for ejectment, docketed as Civil Case No. 51-95 in the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) P21,100 from April 1994 up to the time it vacated the
premises.
This Court’s P21,100 corresponding to the period
from April 1994 up to the time it vacated the premises. To this Court’s Resolution of
Pending resolution of petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration of the July 24, 2002 Resolution, the Court En Banc rendered
a decision on November 22, 2002 in G.R.
No. 137533, similarly entitled “Tala Realty Services
Corp. v. Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank.” In this En Banc case which involved
petitioner’s eviction from its branch site in Malolos,
Bulacan and which was based on the same grounds as
those in G.R. No. 132051, this Court adjudged herein petitioner not to be
liable for unpaid rentals, both parties having “participated in the deceptive
creation of a trust to circumvent the real estate investment limit” under the
General Banking Act.[1] As both parties were in pari delicto, this Court gave no affirmative
relief to one against the other. It,
however, noted that as the 20-year lease contract (which had already expired in
August 2001) had not been renewed or extended, “Tala
ha[d] the right to eject the Bank from the subject Bulacan
property on the ground of expiration of contract.”[2]
Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the July 24, 2002 Resolution in G.R. No. 132051 was subsequently
granted by this Court’s Third Division,
by September 3, 2003 Resolution which applied the Court En Banc’s pronouncement
in G.R. No. 137533 that “Tala should not be allowed to collect rent from the Bank”
during the period in question.
On September 26, 2003, this Court’s June
25, 2001 Decision, as well as its July 24, 2002 and September 3, 2003
Resolutions, in G.R. No. 132051 were recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgment as having become final and executory.
Subsequently, private respondent
filed with the trial court, the MTC in P21,100 computed from
April 1994 up to the time petitioner vacates the premises, and to pay
costs.
At the appointed time for the hearing
of the Motion for Execution on
Hence, the present petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court ascribing lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion to public respondent.
The issue then is whether public respondent
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
in ordering the execution of this Court’s
A court, tribunal or administrative
agency acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to
determine the case.[3]
Where the respondent is clothed with the power to determine the case, it
nevertheless acts in excess of jurisdiction when it oversteps its authority as
determined by law.[4]
Grave abuse of discretion exists if the public respondent
acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise
of his judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[5]
Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must have been patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[6]
Unquestionably, public respondent has
the power to rule on respondent’s Motion for Execution following Section 1 of
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. – Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Public respondent overstepped his
authority, however, when he ordered the execution of this Court’s Decision of
On its face, the Entry of Judgment[7] in
G.R. No. 132051 showed that two Resolutions subsequent to the June 25, 2001
Decision were also certified as having become final and executory.
Clearly apparent from the chronology of dispositions is the fact that the June
25, 2001 Decision was later modified by the
Additionally, petitioner specifically
pointed out in its written opposition to the motion that the “pronouncement of
the . . . Resolution of September 3, 2003 that ‘respondent bank is not liable
for unpaid rents’ and ‘Tala should not be allowed to
collect rent from the bank’ was diametrically inconsistent with the directive
in the Decision dated June 25, 2001, for the . . . Bank to pay Tala the monthly rental of P21,100.00 from April
1994 until the Bank vacates the premises . . .”[8]
Not being the final resolution of
petitioner’s duly perfected appeal, this Court’s June 25, 2001 Decision was not
a judgment that private respondent was entitled to execute as a matter of right,
hence, it could not have provided the basis for the grant of the motion for and
issuance of the writ of execution.[9]
Parenthetically, this Court notes
that even the writ of execution fell short of the requirement under paragraph
(e), Section 8 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that it should “specifically
state the amount of the interest, costs, damages, rents, or profits due as of the date of the issuance of the writ,
aside from the principal obligation under the judgment.” (Emphasis
supplied) Its directive to the sheriff
concerned merely reiterated the dispositive portion
of this Court’s June 25, 2001 Decision without specifying the amount due as of April
6, 2004, the date the writ was issued, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to cause the execution of the aforesaid judgment that is, to oust Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank Filipino on [sic] the subject premises and to restore possession thereof to Tala Realty Services Corporation; to levy the goods and chattels of the defendant, except those which are exempt from execution; and to make the sale thereof in accordance with the procedure outlined by Rule 39, 1997 Revised Rules of Court, in case of failure to pay the accrued monthly rentals from April 1994 up to the time it vacates the premises, and in such cases made and provided, together with all lawful fees for the service of the Writ.[10] (Emphasis supplied)
The failure to indicate the amount of
rentals due is of course attributable to private respondent which is charged
under Rule 39, Section 8(e)[11] with
the duty of specifying the same in its motion for execution.
Public respondent having overstepped
his authority in ordering the execution of this Court’s June 25, 2001 Decision,
passing on the issue of grave abuse of discretion has been rendered unnecessary. Suffice it to state that given the
circumstances surrounding the Motion for Execution of which public respondent was
sufficiently apprised and which he himself acknowledged in his order granting the
same,[12] public
respondent should have taken more time and circumspection before granting the
same.
On petitioner’s argument that it was
not heard on private respondent’s Motion for Execution: It has been opined that Section 1 of Rule 39
of the Rules of Court now requires that the motion for execution “must be with
notice to the adverse party, with a
hearing when the circumstances so require, to enable him to file any
objection thereto or bring to the attention of said court matters which may
have transpired during the pendency of the appeal and
which may have a bearing on the execution sought to enforce the judgment.”[13]
(Emphasis supplied) It can not be
gainsaid that the circumstances surrounding the Motion for Execution, which cast
doubt on the propriety of executing the June 25, 2001 Decision, called for petitioner
to give its side thereon.
Granting, however, that petitioner’s
counsel was “brusquely cut off” when he started to verbally argue against the Motion
for Execution during the hearing on February 26, 2004 and that public respondent
failed to consider its written opposition,[14] still,
petitioner was able to proffer its objections when it filed a motion to
reconsider[15] the order
granting the Motion for Execution. In
that motion to reconsider, petitioner reiterated the arguments it raised during
the hearing and in its written opposition to the Motion for Execution.[16] These circumstances were noted in public respondent’s
Petitioner’s prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order or a writ of injunction to perpetually
restrain the enforcement of public respondent’s order dated
In line with this Court’s
pronouncement in G.R. No. 132557 that while herein private respondent, Tala Realty Services Corporation, had no right to eject
petitioner based on non-payment of rent, it “has the right to do so on the
ground of expiration of the contract,” petitioner’s prayer for its restoration
to its former Iloilo branch site may not lie.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Public respondent, Judge Amalik
P. Espinosa, Jr., having exceeded his authority in ordering the execution of this
Court’s decision dated June 25, 2001 in G.R. No. 132051, his assailed orders
dated February 26, 2004 and March 29, 2004 as well as the writ of execution
dated April 6, 2004 are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Republic Act No. 337.
[2] Rollo, p. 74.
[3] Honrado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166333, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 280; Punzalan v. Dela Peña, G.R. No. 158543, July 21, 2004, 434 SCRA 601, 609; Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc. v. NLRC, 380 Phil. 660, 667 (2000); Association of Trade Unions v. Hon. Abella, 380 Phil. 6, 18 (2000).
[4] Honrado v. Court of Appeals, supra; Yu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154115, November 29, 2005, 476 SCRA 443; Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129368, August 25, 2003, 409 SCRA 455, 480.
[5] Bedruz
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 161640, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA 287; Villanueva
v. Ople, G.R. No. 165125, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 539, 540; Santos
v. COMELEC, 447 Phil. 760,
772 (2003).
[6] Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
[7] Rollo, pp. 80-81.
[8]
[9]
[10] Ibid.
[11] The last sentence of Rule 39, Sec. 8(e) reads:
For this purpose, the motion for execution shall specify the amounts of the foregoing reliefs sought by the movant.
[12] Order
dated
[13] F. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, 400 (6th rev. ed.).
[14] Rollo, pp. 10-11.
[15] Motion for Reconsideration dated
[16] Petitioner’s
written opposition to the motion for execution was received by the trial court
on
[17] Rollo, p. 33.
[18]