SECOND DIVISION
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NORSK HYDRO (PHILS.), INC. and HANS
T. NEVERDAL, |
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G.R. No. 162871 |
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Petitioners, |
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Present: |
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- versus - |
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Quisumbing, J., Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio Morales, Tinga, and VELASCO,
JR., JJ. |
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BENJAMIN S. ROSALES, JR., Respondent. |
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Promulgated: January
31, 2007 |
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DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Court of Appeals’
Decision[1]
dated
The facts, culled from the records,
are as follows:
On
Sometime in July
1997, Rosales informed the president of Norsk Hydro,
Hans Neverdal, of a seven-hectare land in Barangay Luz Banzon, Jasaan, Misamis Oriental offered
by a real estate broker, Virgie Azcuna-Capulong. After inspection, Neverdal
found the land suitable and instructed Rosales to check on it. After consultation with the broker, Rosales
informed Neverdal that certain portions of the land were
priced at P1,200 per square meter while the rest at P400 per
square meter. Neverdal
agreed to the purchase and instructed Rosales to close the deal. Accordingly, Deeds of Conditional Sale were
executed by Virgie Azcuna-Capulong and Ismael Laya, who were the
designated attorneys-in-fact of the landowners, in favor of the buyer, Norsk Hydro. The
ownership was subsequently transferred to Norsk
Hydro.
On P100 for every
square meter sold. Abecia
said he told on the group because he was not paid his share of the overprice. He attached a copy of the complaint for estafa that he filed against the other real estate brokers.
Consequently, on
On
For their part, petitioners Norsk Hydro and Neverdal
maintained that Rosales was dismissed for a just cause, having connived with
the real estate brokers to overprice the properties and profited from it to the
gross disadvantage of the company. They
contended that Rosales was given time to explain. They had set a hearing, yet Rosales failed to answer
the charges against him.
The Labor
Arbiter dismissed the complaint. It held
that the company was justified in terminating Rosales’s employment on the
ground of loss of trust and confidence. The
Labor Arbiter found Abecia’s sworn statement
sufficient basis for the company to lose its trust and confidence on Rosales. Moreover, the Labor Arbiter found nothing
irregular in the manner Rosales was dismissed.
Rosales appealed to the NLRC, which
affirmed[4]
the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The
NLRC ruled that the issue of whether there was overpricing is secondary only to
the issue of whether Rosales breached the trust and confidence reposed upon him
by his employer.
The NLRC held that the requirements of
notice and hearing have been sufficiently met when: (1) the show-cause memorandum
was served upon Rosales requiring him to submit an explanation within 72 hours;
and (2) notice was sent to him regarding an administrative hearing on
Undaunted, Rosales filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals ascribing grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the NLRC because (1) there was no legal basis for his dismissal;
and (2) his right to due process was violated.
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari
notwithstanding the lack of a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC.
The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the NLRC and declared that Rosales was illegally dismissed. The decretal portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
SO ORDERED.[5]
The Court of Appeals held that Norsk
Hydro failed to prove with substantial evidence that Rosales participated in the
alleged overpricing nor had it shown the extent of his participation. According to the Court of Appeals, the
company should not have relied on the affidavit of Abecia,
who was not a representative of any of the owners and that, without being
cross-examined, his affidavit was hearsay.
It ruled that Norsk Hydro did not observe due
process because it did not furnish Rosales or his counsel with the documents
for him to prepare intelligent answers to the charges against him.
The Court of Appeals denied the
company’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal raising one issue:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS seriously erred
and ruled contrary to law and jurisprudence when it acted as a trier of facts
and declared: (i) the dismissal of respondent Rosales illegal and without just
cause; (ii) directed petitioner
norsk hydro to pay Rosales full backwages plus accrued allowances and benefits;
and (iii) in lieu of
reinstatement, ordered petitioner to grant separation pay in favor of
respondent.[6]
Simply
put, the issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred when it declared the
termination of Rosales’s employment illegal.
Petitioners
argue that the Court of Appeals erred in ignoring the findings of facts of the
NLRC and the Labor Arbiter; that review by the Court of Appeals is limited only
in whether the NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion; that the Court of Appeals erred in taking cognizance
of the petition for certiorari despite respondent’s failure to file a motion
for reconsideration of the NLRC decision.
Indeed, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court is limited to questions of law, and the Court is not a trier of facts. This rule, however, is not without exceptions. This Court may review the factual findings of
the trial and the lower appellate courts when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the NLRC or of the Labor Arbiter.[7] Such is the situation in this case. We must caution, however, that the factual
findings of labor officials, who possess the expertise in matters within their
jurisdiction, have conclusive effect on this Court provided substantial
evidence supports such factual findings.[8]
Law and jurisprudence have long
recognized the right of employers to dismiss employees by reason of loss of
trust and confidence,[9]
especially in cases of employees occupying positions of responsibility, on the
premise that an employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence.[10]
It should also be stressed that proof
beyond reasonable doubt is not needed to justify the loss of trust and
confidence on the responsible officer. It
is sufficient that there be some basis for the same, or that the employer has
reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct,
and his participation therein renders him unworthy of trust and confidence
demanded of his position.[11] Article 282(c) of the Labor Code states,
however, that the loss of trust and confidence must be based on willful breach
of the trust reposed in the employee by his employer. Ordinary breach will not suffice; it must be
willful. Such breach is willful if it is
done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as
distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or
inadvertently.[12] More specifically the loss of trust must be
founded on clearly established facts.
In the
present case, Neverdal, as president of the company,
issued a show-cause memorandum and a notice of preventive suspension to
Rosales. Despite its directive to
Rosales to explain, within 72 hours, the charges against him, he did not do so.
On the scheduled hearing, he did not
present any evidence, constraining the company to evaluate the case based on
the documents available, the affidavit of Abecia who
appears to have no reason to implicate Rosales except for the fact that Rosales
and the other brokers reneged on their agreement on his share of the overprice. Likewise, it appears that Abecia’s
affidavit was a declaration against himself, lending it substantial credibility. Further, it appears that Rosales’s right to
notice and hearing was not violated. The
records clearly show that the company set an administrative hearing to give
Rosales an opportunity to explain his side and to call for witnesses and present
his evidence.
In sum,
we are in agreement with the findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter that
there was sufficient evidence to justify the termination of Rosales’s
employment for a just cause, namely, for loss of trust and confidence by the
company on its managerial officer.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
SO
ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 49-59. Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, with Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes (now Presiding Justice) and Lucas P. Bersamin concurring.
[2]
[3] CA rollo, pp. 17-37.
[4] Supra note 3.
[5] Rollo, p. 58.
[6]
[7] R & E Transport, Inc. v. Latag, G.R. No. 155214, February 13, 2004, 422 SCRA 698, 704.
[8] Philippine
Military Veterans Security and Investigation Agency v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 139159, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 177, 183.
[9] Etcuban, Jr. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 148410, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 516, 528-529.
[10]
[11] P.J. Lhuillier, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 158758, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 784, 798.
[12] Philippine National Construction
Corporation v. Matias, G.R. No. 156283,