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ZENAIDA ANGELES, Petitioner, |
G.R.
No. 160213 |
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- versus - |
Present: Quisumbing, J., Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio Morales, Tinga, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. |
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LORDY FERNANDEZ, Respondent. |
Promulgated: |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner
Zenaida Angeles seeks to annul the Decision[1]
dated
The facts culled from the records are
as follows:
Respondent Lordy
Fernandez worked as secretary and “all-around worker” from July 1992 to May
1998 in Bon Chic, a tailoring and dress shop which was located in
On
In her position paper before the
Labor Arbiter, Fernandez alleged that in May 1998, Angeles dismissed her
without cause and in violation of due process.
Fernandez claimed that during the entire period of her employment, she
had not committed any offense to merit her dismissal. In addition, she averred she was neither
notified of any reason nor administratively investigated prior to her
dismissal. Fernandez also alleged that
at the time she was dismissed, she was receiving a monthly salary of P6,000.[6]
Angeles, in her position paper,
stated that she hired Fernandez sometime in 1992 upon the recommendation of
Fernandez’s uncle. She denied that she
illegally dismissed Fernandez and claimed that Fernandez abandoned her job in
May 1998 despite being treated like a member of the family; given free board
and lodging, and salary higher than the minimum wage. Angeles alleged also that she discovered that
Bon Chic’s money and records were missing after Fernandez left her
job. As a consequence of Fernandez’s
departure, Angeles said she had to close Bon Chic in 1998.[7]
On
The dispositive
portion of the Labor Arbiter’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all premises duly considered, having found complainant [herein respondent] to have been illegally dismissed, the respondent [herein petitioner] is hereby ordered to pay to the complainant the following:
a)
her backwages at the rate of P6,000
a month from P127,434.93);
b)
her separation pay in the amount equivalent to one-half
month salary for every year of services, currently computed at Twenty Seven
Thousand Pesos (P27,000.00).
All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO
ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner
appealed.
The NLRC, in a resolution dated
Upon
elevation of the case, the Court of Appeals reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s
decision. The appellate court ruled that
the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in considering, on appeal, the
belated affidavits stating new allegations of petitioner without giving
respondent the right to rebut the same.
It held that these affidavits were self-serving. The appellate court also held that petitioner
failed to establish clear evidence of respondent’s intention to abandon her
employment. Neither did petitioner
inform respondent of the charge of abandonment, nor did she give respondent the
opportunity to explain her side.
The Court of Appeals disposed of the
case, to wit:
WHEREFORE,
finding the instant petition impressed with merit, the same is GIVEN DUE
COURSE. The assailed Resolutions
dated
SO
ORDERED.[10]
After
her motion for reconsideration was denied, Angeles filed this petition raising
the following issues:
A. WHETHER O[R] NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CONSIDERED [PETITIONER’S] EVIDENCE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS NOT GUILTY OF ABANDONMENT.[11]
Stated
simply, the issues for our resolution are:
(1) Did the NLRC err in accepting petitioner’s new evidence/affidavits
in her appeal before the NLRC? And (2)
Did respondent Fernandez abandon her job?
Petitioner argues that the Court of
Appeals erred in overturning the NLRC’s resolution
for the reason that the affidavits presented for the first time before the NLRC
were self-serving and were not subjected to comment below by petitioner (now
herein respondent). Petitioner adds that the presentation of evidence for the
first time on appeal is allowed in labor proceedings, and due process in labor
proceedings requires merely an opportunity to be heard. Respondent was given
that opportunity as she was allowed to file an answer to the memorandum of
appeal and submit counter-affidavits.
Respondent counters that petitioner’s
submission of affidavits on appeal was a mere afterthought and was not even
explained. Respondent claims that the
NLRC deprived her of due process when it considered these affidavits without
giving her the opportunity to contest or rebut them.
We note that respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration of the first NLRC resolution where she had
ventilated her side. This, in our view,
was an occasion for her to be heard. In
labor cases, such an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of amounts to due process.[12]
In
Tanjuan v. Philippine Postal Savings Bank,
Inc., we held that:
It is well-settled that the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on appeal, because technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases. This rule applies equally to both the employee and the employer. In the interest of due process, the Labor Code directs labor officials to use all reasonable means to ascertain the facts speedily and objectively, with little regard to technicalities or formalities. However, delay in the submission of evidence should be clearly explained and should adequately prove the employer’s allegation of the cause for termination.[13] (Emphasis supplied.)
In this
case, however, petitioner did not explain her belated submission of the
affidavits of Anita Claveria,[14]
Rolando C. Villanueva,[15] Bartolome Angeles[16]
and Merline Jumawan.[17] In our view, her plea that the affidavits be
admitted in the interest of truth, justice and fair play[18]
lacks merit.
Now, did respondent Fernandez abandon
her job?
Petitioner contends that respondent
abandoned her job when she voluntarily left.
She insists that respondent ignored her earnest efforts for respondent
to return to work. She says that
respondent was so indispensable to her business so much so that when respondent
left, she had to close shop. Moreover, petitioner
stresses, respondent filed the complaint 20 months after she left and only upon
Mr. Bucad’s instigation and the prospect of a
monetary award. Petitioner, relying on
our ruling in Arc-Men Food Industries, Inc. v. NLRC,[19]
claims that such belated filing implied abandonment.
Respondent, for her part, insists that
she did not abandon her job, and she had in fact religiously pursued her case
up to this Court. She also claims that
petitioner never notified her to return to work, nor warned her that her
failure to return would be considered abandonment. She further states that the filing of her
complaint was well within the prescriptive period.
We note that petitioner reiterates the allegations she
added in her memorandum of appeal before the NLRC which are based on the
belatedly submitted affidavits. In our
view, even if duly considered, these affidavits cannot prove that respondent
abandoned her job. In their affidavits,
Anita Claveria, Rolando C. Villanueva, Bartolome Angeles and Merline Jumawan did not state that respondent abandoned her
job. The same holds true of the unsworn statements of Bhonnie Roaquin,[20]
Melba Pacher[21]
and Jimmy Garce.[22] The
alleged clandestine, nighttime visits of a certain Bong to respondent’s room are
not pertinent to the issue of abandonment.
Whether respondent has been induced to complain because she has a child
to support is likewise of no pertinence.
That respondent already secured another job soon after she eloped with
Bong was alleged but not proven. Moreover,
petitioner’s claim that she made earnest efforts to convince respondent to
return contradicts her allegation in her position paper that she failed to
locate respondent.[23] On the contrary, respondent’s prayer for
reinstatement in her position paper manifested her intention to return. It must be stressed also, as a reminder to
petitioner, that a claim of illegal dismissal coupled with non-payment of monetary
benefits is a valid cause of action by an employee.
To
constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (1) the failure to report for
work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention
to sever the employee-employer relationship.
Of the two, the second element is the more determinative factor and
should be manifested by some overt acts.[24]
In our view, petitioner failed to show any overt
act showing respondent’s clear intention to sever her employment with Bon
Chic. Hence, we agree with the Labor
Arbiter and Court of Appeals that petitioner failed to prove that respondent
abandoned her job. Not even her
belatedly submitted affidavits prove respondent’s alleged abandonment. In her memorandum of appeal, petitioner surmised
that her expression of disappointment and objection to respondent’s alleged
relationship with Bong had motivated respondent to abandon her job.[25] But even if true, this fact does not
constitute substantial evidence to prove abandonment.
In
addition, petitioner’s reliance on Arc-Men Food Industries, Inc. v. NLRC,
is misplaced. There the Court ruled that
the Labor Arbiter and NLRC erred in relying on the often quoted observation
that the filing of a complaint for dismissal is inconsistent with the employer’s
defense of abandonment by the employee of his work. In that case the employer proved with
substantial evidence that the employee was not dismissed. There, it was found that the employee refused
to return to work after the period of the employer’s temporary shutdown. Although the employee filed the complaint
immediately after the alleged dismissal, the Court held therein that the Labor
Arbiter and NLRC cannot simply ignore the evidence presented by the employer,
on the pretext that the employee would not have filed the complaint for illegal
dismissal if he had not been dismissed indeed.[26]
Worth
stressing, we find sufficient reason to agree with the appellate court that petitioner
failed in this case to prove that respondent abandoned her job. While respondent filed the complaint 20
months after her dismissal, such filing was well within the four-year
prescriptive period allowed to institute an action for illegal dismissal.[27] This
Court had previously considered a non-issue[28]
the lapse of several months,[29]
e.g. eight months,[30]
nine months,[31]
and two years and five months[32]
before filing a complaint for illegal dismissal.
Aside
from failing to prove abandonment, we also agree that petitioner failed to
serve respondent the required written notices (1) containing the charge of
abandonment to afford respondent the opportunity to be heard and defend
herself, and (2) stating petitioner’s decision to terminate respondent with
clear reasons therefor.[33]
In
sum, we find that the appellate court did not err in concluding that respondent
did not abandon her work but was illegally dismissed by petitioner. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges. She is also entitled to her
full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time her compensation
was withheld from her up to the time of her actual reinstatement. Respondent’s reinstatement, however, is no
longer feasible. Due to “unsuccessful management,” Bon Chic ceased
operations in September 1998 or four months after respondent’s dismissal in May
1998.[34] Petitioner offered no proof, however, that
such closure was due to “serious business losses or financial reverses.” Thus, we affirm the Labor Arbiter’s award of
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, with the modification that respondent
is entitled to (1) full backwages, allowances and
other benefits computed from May 1998, when respondent was dismissed, until Bon
Chic’s closure in September 1998, a period of four (4) months; as well as
(2) separation pay equivalent to one-half month pay for every year of service,
reckoned from July 1992, when respondent was hired, until September 1998, when Bon
Chic closed, or a period of six (6) years.[35]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. Petitioner is ORDERED to pay
respondent full backwages, allowances and other
benefits for four months, plus separation pay equivalent to one-half month pay
for each of respondent’s six-year employment.
The Labor Arbiter is hereby ORDERED to compute and execute the
said award.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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|
REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 44-53. Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, with Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia (now a member of this Court), and Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Sunrise Manning Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 146703, November 18, 2004, 443 SCRA 35, 43.
[13] G.R. No. 155278,
[14] Rollo, p. 165.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] G.R. No. 113721,
[20] Rollo, p. 169.
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24] Unicorn Safety Glass, Inc. v. Basarte, G.R. No. 154689, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA
287, 297; R. Transport Corporation v. Ejandra, G.R.
No. 148508,
[25] Rollo,
p. 150.
[26] Supra
note 19, at 372-374.
[27] City Trucking, Inc./John Edles v. Antonio Balajadia, G.R. No. 160769, August 9, 2006; Texon Manufacturing v. Millena, G.R. No. 141380, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 377, 382.
[28] See City Trucking, Inc./ John Edles v. Antonio Balajadia, id.
[29] Hagonoy
Rural Bank, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 122075,
[30] Nazal
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 122368,
[31] Kingsize
Manufacturing Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 110452-54,
[32] Reno Foods, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 116462,
[33] New Ever Marketing, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140555, July 14, 2005, 463 SCRA 284, 295.
[34] Rollo, p. 223.
[35] See Casol v. Purefoods Corporation, G.R. No. 166550, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 559, 561; J.A.T. General Services v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 148340, January 26, 2004, 421 SCRA 78, 90; Labor Code, Article 283.