Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE
(represented by the Philippine
Orthopedic Center) and VICTOR
S. CLAVEL, Present:
Petitioners,
QUISUMBING,
J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO,
JR., JJ.
SPOUSES JOSE and AMELIA Promulgated:
LURIZ,
Respondents. January
26, 2007
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
An appeal is a statutory right that
must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
law. Having satisfactorily shown that
they have complied with the rules on appeal, petitioners are entitled to the proper
and just disposition of their cause.
The Case
This Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the annulment of the
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby
DENIED. The Decision dated
The Facts
The instant case arose from an ejectment
Complaint filed by respondents at the Quezon City Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 37, against Petitioner Victor S. Clavel, as occupant of Lot Nos.
8 and 10, Block 260, located at
In his Answer, Clavel averred that
the lots in question were owned and possessed by the Philippine Orthopedic
Center (POC), a government medical facility, which had built four (4) cottages
on said lots and had been in possession of the said lots since 1953. He alleged
that the POC had authorized its administrative officers, including Clavel, to
use the cottages as their residences. He
also averred that respondents could not rely upon TCT No. 1297 as the basis of
their claim because its original copy had allegedly been burned during the fire
in the office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City in 1998. He said that said title was deemed
non-existent unless reconstituted.
Moreover, he stressed that the deeds of sale relied upon by the
respondents were not registered and hence, were of questionable character until
duly proven. He then prayed that the case be dismissed.
On
From the foregoing, this Court finds that
[respondents’] claim has been duly established by satisfactory evidence, and
therefore hereby renders judgment in favor of the [respondents] and against the
[petitioner] Victor S. Clavel, ordering him and all persons claiming rights
under him, or whoever is found in possession of subject properties;
a) to
immediately vacate Lots 8 and 10 of Block 260 located at
b) to
pay [respondents] the sum of P10,000.00 per month as reasonable compensation
for the use and occupancy of subject parcels of land to be computed from
February 14, 1997 and every month thereafter until subject properties shall
have been finally vacated;
c) to
pay respondents the sum of P20,000 for and attorney’s fees; and
d) to
pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Thereafter, on
On
On
On
October 30, 1997, Deputy Sheriff Efren P. Luna, accompanied by policemen, took
possession of the disputed lots, ejected all POC personnel from these lots, and
padlocked the cottages on them.
On
On
On November 21, 1997, petitioner
Republic filed its Motion for Intervention with the trial court, alleging
ownership of the disputed lots by virtue of Proclamation Nos. 438 (series of
1953) and 732 (series of 1961) praying that it be allowed to adopt Clavel’s
petition as its petition-in-intervention, and for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondents from disposing, alienating, or
encumbering the properties in question.
On
The Ruling of the Court of
Appeals
Affirming
the
Moreover, the CA observed that
petitioners erred when they failed to oppose respondents’ motion for
execution. Agreeing with the RTC, it
sanctioned petitioners for not attending the hearing for the Motion for
Execution although they were notified a day before the hearing. Also, it observed that the writ of execution
could not be stayed because petitioners failed to post the required supersedeas
bond.
The Issues
Petitioners
submit the following issues for our consideration:
I
Whether or not the
issuance by the [MeTC]
(1)
Order dated
(2)
Writ of Execution dated
(3)
Order dated
(4)
Order dated
(5)
Order dated
were erroneous and
improper and in grave abuse of the [MeTC] Judge’s discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and
II
Whether or not the
Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it rendered the Decision dated
In
gist, the petition revolves on the following issues: (1) the timeliness of the payment
of the docket fees; and (2) the propriety of the issuance of the Writ of
Execution.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has merit.
Timeliness of the Payment of Docket Fees
Appeal is an essential part of our
judicial process. As such, courts should
proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal,[5] particularly
if the appeal is meritorious. However, the
right to appeal is merely a statutory right.
For this reason, it should be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the law.[6]
In an appeal from a judgment or final
order of a municipal trial court to the regional trial court, Rule 40 of the
Rules of Court provides:
Sec.
2. When to appeal.—An appeal may be
taken within fifteen (15) days after notice to the appellant of the judgment or
final order appealed from. x x x
x
x x x
Sec. 3.
How to appeal.—The appeal is taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
court that rendered the judgment or final order appealed from. x x x
x
x x x
Sec.
5. Appellate
court docket and other lawful fees.—Within the period for taking an appeal,
the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment
or final order appealed from the full amount of the appellate court docket and
other lawful fees. Proof of payment
thereof shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original
record or the record on appeal, as the case may be.
Accordingly, in order to perfect an
appeal, the following must be complied with: first, a notice of appeal must be filed
within 15 days from the notice of final judgment or final order appealed from; second,
such notice of appeal must be filed with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order, and served upon the adverse party; third, within
the same period, payment of the full amount of appellate court docket and other
legal fees to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final
order.
Notably, full payment of the
appellate docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory, even jurisdictional.
Otherwise, the appeal is deemed not perfected and the decision sought to be
appealed from becomes final and executory.[7]
In the instant case, petitioners do
not deny that they paid the appellate docket fees on
We find that petitioners seasonably
paid the appellate docket fees.
It is a hornbook doctrine that when a
party is represented by counsel, notice to the client and to any other lawyer,
not the counsel of record, is not a notice in law.[10] The only exception, as provided in Section 2
of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is when service upon the parties
themselves is ordered by the court. Indisputably,
in their Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying their Notice of Appeal,
petitioners submitted a photocopy of the notice of decision which the trial
court served on their counsel. The said
copy had an
Relying
on the date when the counsel of petitioners received the notice of judgment,
the period to commence appeal should be reckoned on
Liberal Construction of the Rule on Nonpayment of Docket Fees
Even assuming
that petitioners belatedly filed the appellate docket fees, the circumstances
of the case would have warranted a liberal construction of the rule on
nonpayment of docket fees.
In the exercise of its impartial
jurisdiction, the Court allows a liberal construction of the rules on the
manner and periods for perfecting appeals in order to serve the demands of
substantial justice. Specifically, on
the payment of docket fees, the Court in Buenaflor
v. CA qualifies that:
The established rule is that the payment
in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory.
Nevertheless, this rule must be qualified, to wit: First, the failure to pay appellate court
docket fee within the reglementary period allows only discretionary dismissal,
not automatic dismissal, of the appeal; Second, such power should be used in
the exercise of the Court’s sound discretion “in accordance with the tenets of
justice and fair play and with great deal of circumspection considering all
attendant circumstances.[11]
In Mactan Cebu International
Airport Authority v. Mangubat,[12]
the payment of the docket fees was delayed by six days but the Court excused
the late payment because the party showed willingness to abide by the Rules by
immediately paying the docket fees.
Also, we ruled in Yambao v. Court of Appeals that “the appellate
court may extend the time for the payment of the docket fees if appellant is
able to show that there is a justifiable reason for x x x failure to pay the
correct amount of docket fees within the prescribed period, like fraud,
accident, mistake, excusable negligence, or a similar supervening casualty,
without fault on the part of the appellant.”[13]
In the same manner, the Court in Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals affirmed
the reinstatement of an appeal previously dismissed for failure to pay the
docket fees. It held that the appeal was
dismissed not because the appellant lacked interest in the case, but because of
lack of proper notice. Thus, it
considered the reinstatement of the appeal as just and proper because the “interest
of substantial justice far outweighs whatever negligence”[14] was
committed.
Although the CA found that the docket
fees were belatedly paid, it should have taken cognizance of the persuasive
reasons attendant in this case that merit a relaxation of the rules. Notably, the Notice of Appeal was immediately
prepared and filed before the expiration of the period to file said notice. It would seem thus, that the alleged three-day
delay in the payment of appellate fees was not a result of petitioners’ inexcusable
lethargy to pursue the case.
More importantly, petitioners should
not be denied of their right to the proper and just disposition of their cause. The gravamen of the complaint at the MeTC is the
rightful possession of the disputed land.
Petitioner POC had been in peaceful possession of said land by virtue of
a law long before the claims of ownership of respondents. On the other hand, relying on a certificate
of ownership and deeds of sale, respondents suddenly alleged that they merely
tolerated the occupation of petitioners on the disputed land.[15]
An ejectment case, based on the
allegation of possession by tolerance, falls under the category of unlawful
detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the
person’s withholding from another of the possession of real property to which
the latter is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the former’s
right to hold possession under a contract, either expressed or implied.[16] Where the plaintiff allows the defendant to use
his/her property by tolerance without any contract, the defendant is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that s/he will vacate on demand,
failing which, an action for unlawful detainer will lie.[17]
The assailed MeTC Decision gave
credence to the certificate of title of respondents. However, considering that petitioners had
prior possession of the land, it is important to squarely rule on whether such
prior possession was merely by virtue of an implied agreement, and whether such
tolerance had already ceased. A reading of the MeTC Decision, on the
contrary, reveals that no such findings were made. Hence, it appears that a thorough review of
the case is merited.
Propriety
of the Issuance of the Writ of Execution
Petitioners assail the issuance of
the Writ of Execution on the ground that it was hastily issued without
affording them the right to oppose respondents’ motion for execution.[18] They aver that contrary to the prescribed
rule, the execution of the MeTC judgment was ordered even before the period to
file an appeal had lapsed.
We agree. It should be noted that the
appellate court relied on Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure in
affirming the trial court’s issuance of the writ of execution. However, the applicable rule in cases of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer is Rule 70, which states, thus:
Sec. 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same.—If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. x x x
The
foregoing rule provides that a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs shall be
immediately executory. It can be stayed
by the defendant only by perfecting an appeal, filing a supersedeas bond, and
making a periodic deposit of the rental or the reasonable compensation for the
use and occupancy of the property during the pendency of the appeal. These requisites are mandatory and concurrent.[19] Thus, if not complied with, execution will
issue as a matter of right.
In
this case, the appellate court held that petitioners’ failure to perfect the
appeal and to file a supersedeas bond warranted the immediate execution of the
MeTC judgment. However, a review of the
records reveals that even before petitioners had the opportunity to perfect
their appeal and file a supersedeas bond, the writ of execution had already
been issued. Petitioners received the MeTC
Decision on
Public policy dictates that ejectment
cases must be resolved with the least possible delay, and judgments rendered in
favor of plaintiff be immediately executed.[20] However, the rules of procedure prescribe
trial courts to strike a balance between the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ right
to relief.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the July 10, 2003 Decision of
the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Municipal Trial Court
is directed to give due course to the appeal in Civil Case No. 37-17388 and approve
the amount of supersedeas bond as required in Section 19 of Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court. Likewise, the Writ of
Execution issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court on
No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F
I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam, with Associate Justices Portia
Alino-Hormachuelos and Edgardo P. Cruz concurring, rollo, pp. 84-92.
[5] Salazar v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142920,
February 6, 2002, 376 SCRA 459, 471,
citing Labad v. University of Southern Philippines, et al., G.R.
No. 139665, August 9, 2001, 362 SCRA 510.
[10] De
Leon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138884, June 6, 2002, 383 SCRA 216, 228;
Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999, 321 SCRA
584, 598; Rural Bank of Alaminos Employees Union v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 100342-44, October 29, 1999, 317 SCRA 669, 682-683.