Republic of the
Supreme Court
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MANUEL O. ORIENTE, |
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G.R. No. 155094 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., |
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- versus - |
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(Chairperson), |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CALLEJO, SR., and |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. |
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PEOPLE OF THE |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
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January 30, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
For review before the Court are the Decision[1]
dated February 14, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the
Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103 (RTC), dated
November 15, 1999, in Criminal Case No. 96-65313, finding Manuel Oriente (petitioner) guilty of the crime of Homicide; and
the CA Resolution[2]
dated September 9, 2002 which denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
An Information dated
That on or about the 16th day of
March 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused conspiring, confederating with three other persons whose true names and
whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another,
with intent to kill, qualified by evident premeditation and treachery, taking
advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one
ROMULO CARIÑO Y VALLO by then and there hitting him with a lead pipe on the
different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Upon
arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The evidence presented by the parties, as summarized by the CA,
are as follows:
The
prosecution’s version of the case is as follows:
On
Peeping
through potted plants (about 3 feet high) perched on top of a neighbor’s fence
(about 2 feet high), and at a distance of more or less eight (8) meters, he saw
Romulo Cariño, [petitioner]
Manuel Oriente, the latter’s daughter Marilou Lopez and the latter’s husband, Paul Lopez and one
Rogelio Gascon arguing along the alley beside the
concrete fence in front of Manuel Oriente’s house
where there was a lighted fluorescent light.
He heard Paul Lopez telling Romulo Cariño, “Ikaw Cariño,
and liit-liit mo, and yabang
mo!” Then Arnel
Tanael saw Marilou coming
out from their house with a lead pipe and handed it over to Paul. Paul then hit Romulo
with a lead pipe at his right arm.
Accused-appellant got the lead pipe from Paul and hit Romulo on his left eyebrow.
Romulo reeled and fell down. Upon seeing Romulo
fall down, Arnel got confused, hence, he went back
inside the house and switched off the light and turned the television off. He went outside again and saw Romulo moaning. At
this point, Paul Lopez was already poking a gun at Romulo,
then pulled the trigger twice but the gun did not
fire. Arnel
then shouted, “Putang ina ninyo, bakit niyo ginagawa
iyan sa bayaw
ko, bakit ninyo ginaganito siya, ano ba
ang kasalanan niya sa inyo.” Oriente and his
company did not say anything. Arnel carried Romulo and brought
the latter inside the house. He called
up Mario at the Panabuilt Transport office to get a
cab. When the cab arrived, Romulo Cariño was brought by Arnel to the
Dr.
Roberto Garcia, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the post-mortem
examination on the victim’s cadaver declared that the cause of death of Romulo Cariño was traumatic head
injury. He opined that even with
immediate and adequate medical attendance, the victim would not have survived
due to the extensive nature of hemorrhage suffered by Romulo.
In
an attempt to exculpate [the petitioner], the defense gave the following
version:
On
the night of the commission of the crime, [petitioner] Manuel Oriente was fetched by Tanod
members in their area to attend a wake.
It was already the Tanods’ off-duty. While he was on his way out of the house, he
saw spouses Paul and Malou and his granddaughter
inside the car going out of the garage.
The three went to visit Malou’s in-laws.
At the gate of his house, while having
a conversation with the Tanod members who fetched
him, they heard two gunshots coming from downhill. They noticed that the person who fired the
shots was walking towards them. They waited
for him to pass by. This person was Romulo Cariño. When the latter reached a store, which is a
fence away from Oriente’s house, the latter asked Romulo what was his problem. Suddenly, Cariño
extended his arms and poked [his] gun to Oriente and
his companions. Romulo
told them not to get near him or he will shoot and kill all of them. Surprised by the victim’s response and for
fear of being shot, [petitioner] Oriente stepped back
towards his yard and was able to take hold of a piece of wood and hit Romulo. [Petitioner]
Oriente mentioned that he does not know if he hit Cariño’s hands, eyebrow and other parts of his body with
that single blow but he saw Romulo Cariño lose his balance, fall and hit his head on the
ground. The victim was still holding the
gun. After five seconds, Romulo Cariño stood up and ran (pasuray-suray) towards the direction of his house. Fearing that Cariño
will shoot them if they would go after him, [petitioner] Oriente
told the Tanods that they will just attend to him the
following day. [Petitioner] Oriente further testified that he had no intention of
killing Cariño and that his purpose was only to
disarm him.[4]
The RTC rendered a Decision dated
ACCORDINGLY, the court renders judgment
finding the accused MANUEL ORIENTE Y ORILLO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
Principal of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined and penalized by the Revised
Penal Code with two (2) mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong and sufficient provocation and so he is hereby sentenced to
suffer a jail term of Six (6) Months of Arresto
Mayor as minimum and Four Years and One (1) Day of Prision
Correctional as maximum.
On
the civil aspect, the accused Manuel Oriente y Orillo is ordered to pay the lawful heirs of the victim Romulo Carino y Orillo the sum of P41,500.00 as
actual damages and P50,000.00 as indemnification damages.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[5]
However, on
On the latter
date, the RTC promulgated its second Decision dated
ACCORDINGLY, the court renders judgment finding the
accused MANUEL ORIENTE y Orillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as Principal
of the crime of HOMICIDE as
defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code with two (2) mitigating
circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong and sufficient
provocation and so, applying Article 64, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code
and also the Indeterminate Sentence Law, [the] accused is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate jail term of Four
(4) Years, Two (2) Months and One (1) Day of Prision Correccional as minimum and Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day
of Prision Mayor as maximum.
On the civil aspect, the accused Manuel Oriente y Orillo is ordered to
pay the lawful heirs of the victim Romulo Cariño y Vallo the sum of P41,500.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as indemnification
damages.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[7]
(Emphasis supplied)
The RTC found
that the testimonies of the defense witnesses, including the petitioner, are incredible;
that the victim suffered extensive head injuries; that the defense failed to
show any imminent threat or danger to the life of the accused; that the accused
has in his favor the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code; that there was
sufficient provocation on the part of the victim since the incident was
preceded by an intense argument, and, therefore, the provocation qualifies as
another mitigating circumstance in favor of the petitioner; that treachery is
not present since there was an altercation immediately preceding the incident;
that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of evident premeditation;
that there is no clear showing that the accused took advantage of superior
strength; and, finally, that the prosecution duly proved actual damages amounting
to P38,500.00 for the funeral services and P3,000.00 for the
cemetery lot and religious services, while the other expenses were not
supported by evidence.
The petitioner appealed to the CA. On
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision
dated 4 November 1999 rendered by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is an indeterminate prison
term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Romulo
Cariño y Vallo in the
amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED.[8]
(Emphasis supplied)
The
CA held that there is no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the RTC
convicting the petitioner; that, at most, the inconsistencies of prosecution
witness Arnel Tanael refer
to minor details only, which tend to strengthen, rather than weaken, his
credibility, and, moreover, prove that his testimony was unrehearsed; that, all
in all, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are highly credible; that
the evaluation of the testimonies of the eyewitnesses by the RTC should be
accorded great weight and respect; that the testimony of Tanael
on the injuries inflicted on the victim is supported by the findings of the NBI
medico-legal officer as stated in the post mortem report; that the detailed
testimony of a witness in homicide cases acquires greater weight and credibility
if it corresponds with the autopsy report; that the mere fact that the judge
who penned the decision was not the same judge who heard the testimonies of the
witnesses does not ipso facto render the decision erroneous, more so
when the judgment appears to be fully supported by the evidence on record; that
the alleged act of the victim poking the gun at the petitioner and his
companions does not constitute unlawful aggression, an essential requirement
for self-defense, since the mere aiming of the gun and threat to kill merely
constitute a threat or intimidating attitude which does not amount to an actual
and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof; and that the accused did not
resist but went peacefully with the police authorities when the latter invited
the petitioner to the station does not amount to voluntary surrender.
Finding that the RTC erred in finding that two
mitigating circumstances were present, namely, lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong and sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended
party immediately preceding the act, the CA modified the penalty imposed by the
RTC. According to the CA, the extensive
nature of the injuries as stated in the post-mortem findings negates the
contention of the petitioner that he had no intention of killing the victim
because his purpose was only to disarm him; and the provocation, if any, done
by the victim was not immediate to the act of petitioner’s beating the victim,
since a certain Paul Lopez had already previously assaulted the victim, and,
moreover, there was a sufficient interval of time between the provocation of
the offended party and the commission of the crime by the petitioner.
Hence, herein petition for review raising
the following assignment of errors:
A.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF
HOMICIDE ALTHOUGH IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE LOWER COURT FOUND OUT THAT THERE WAS
NO INTENT ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER TO COMMIT SAID CRIME AND THERE WAS NO
PROVOCATION AT ALL ON HIS PART;
B.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT BELOW ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THAT THERE WAS AN UNLAWFUL
AGGRESSION ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM, AND THE MEANS EMPLOYED BY PETITIONER TO
PREVENT THE SAME WAS REASONABLE AND FALLS UNDER THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OR
SELF-DEFENSE;
C.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE LOWER COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE LONE ALLEGED EYE
WITNESS, WHEN SAID TESTIMONY HAS FULL OF INCONSISTENCIES; AND
D.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS HAS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT MODIFIED THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, INCREASING THE PENALTY THEREOF WITHOUT
ANY DISCUSSION OR EXPLANATION IN THE DECISION ITSELF WHY SAID MODIFICATION OF
PENALTY IS NECESSARY AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
The Court affirms
the conviction of the petitioner except as to damages and the penalty imposed.
The petitioner emphasizes that the victim, allegedly a
troublemaker in the vicinity, was drunk, fired his gun twice, and then
proceeded towards the petitioner and his companions. Petitioner argues that the victim’s act of
poking the gun at him constitutes unlawful aggression sufficient to warrant his
claim of self-defense.
The Court is not convinced.
When self-defense is invoked, the
burden of evidence shifts to the accused to show that the killing was legally
justified. Having owned the killing of
the victim, the accused should be able to prove to the satisfaction of the
Court the elements of self-defense in order to avail of this extenuating
circumstance. He must discharge this
burden by clear and convincing evidence.
When successful, an otherwise felonious deed would be excused, mainly
predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the accused.
Self-defense requires that there be
(1) an unlawful aggression by the person injured or killed by the offender, (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel that unlawful
aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. All these conditions
must concur.[9] There can be no self-defense, whether
complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression
against the person who resorted to self-defense.[10]
Unlawful aggression, a primordial
element of self-defense, would presuppose an actual, sudden and unexpected
attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person – not a mere
threatening or intimidating attitude – but most importantly, at the time the
defensive action was taken against the aggressor.[11] To invoke self-defense successfully, there
must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of
the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe
wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.[12]
The petitioner’s plea of self-defense contradicts
common knowledge and experience. No
better test has yet been found to measure the value of a witness’ testimony
than its conformity to the knowledge of mankind.[13]
The Court agrees with the findings of
the RTC which are supported by the evidence on record:
The testimonies of the defense witnesses,
including the accused, that Cariño threatened the
persons gathered in front of Oriente’s house with a
gun is quite difficult to believe in view of the admissions of the same defense
witnesses, including the accused, that Cariño was
able to get up from the ground after being hit and ran away with gun in
hand. A person who was already
threatening to kill with a gun and who was then hit with a piece of wood in a
serious manner, can be reasonably expected to make use
thereof. Here, the defense makes a
rather unusual claim that Cariño simply ran away and
did not use the gun he was holding while running.
The
testimony of Arnel Tanael
that Cariño did not run away but he got him at the
place where he fell in the alley beside Oriente’s
house appears more credible and reasonable than that of the defense.
Moreover,
considering the extensive injuries suffered by Cariño
– several contusions on the face and head fractures – it is doubtful that a
person in that condition, aggravated by what the defense claimed to be Cariño’s state of stupor (drunk and “pasuray-suray”),
could still run, much less hold a handgun while running.
In
his testimony, the accused stated that Cariño walked
towards him and his companions saying: “Don’t come near me. I will shoot all of you. I will kill all of you.” In the first place, why will Cariño utter such statements when there was no evidence by
the defense that the accused and/or any of his companions at that time –
Not that the RTC
is alone. The CA, too, aptly observed:
x x x We find the testimony of [defense] witnesses highly
incredible. Their version is that Cariño, after he was hit with the lead pipe, fell on the
ground still holding a gun. Thereafter,
he just stood up and ran away. It is
surprising, however, why these Tanod members
including accused-appellant did not wrestle for the gun when they had all the
opportunities to do so when Cariño fell down, if there
was indeed a threat to their life and limb.
And letting an armed man go would not be the normal reaction of persons
in charge of peace and order in the community, especially if the armed man had
previously threatened to shoot them. The
only logical conclusion is that Cariño was not a
threat to them and to their community, for as accused-appellant testified, “they will just deal with him the following day.”[15]
Noteworthy
is the testimony of NBI Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Roberto Garcia, on his
findings from his post-mortem examination of the cadaver of the victim that the
cause of death was traumatic head injury, viz:
1. abrasion, right forearm;
2. contused-abrasion, left temple;
3. lacerated wounds above the left eyebrow; over
the left eyebrow;
4. hematomas orbital, left. Scalp frontal region, left side;
5. fractures, skull
6. hemorrhages: extensive
7. visceral organs, congested.[16]
On cross-examination, Dr. Garcia
opined that even with immediate and adequate medical attendance, the victim
would not have survived considering the extensive nature of the hemorrhages
found.[17] As the RTC held:
[C]onsidering the
extensive injuries suffered by the victim – several contusions on the face and
head fractures – it is doubtful that a person in that condition, aggravated by
what the defense claimed to be Cariño’s state of
stupor (drunk and “pasuray-suray”), could still run,
much less hold a handgun while running.[18]
Thus, the defense failed to establish
the existence of the gun being pointed at petitioner to constitute unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim.
While petitioner avers that the
testimony of Arnel Tanael
is burdened with improbabilities and inconsistencies, after having owned the
crime, however, the burden of proof is reversed and, therefore, he cannot
simply protest that the evidence of the prosecution is weak. It then becomes incumbent upon petitioner to
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
evidence of the prosecution, for even if the latter were weak, it could not be
disbelieved after he had admitted the killing.
Hence, if the accused fails to discharge the burden of proof, his
conviction must ensue as a matter of consequence.[19]
The petitioner insists that the CA erred in modifying
the RTC’s decision by increasing the penalty imposed
upon him. It is settled that in a
criminal case, an appeal throws the whole case
open for review, and it becomes the duty
of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment
appealed from, whether they are made the subject of assignment of errors or
not,[20]
including the propriety of the imposable penalty.[21]
There is also no point in considering
petitioner’s argument that the RTC promulgated two decisions and, by doing so,
he was placed in double jeopardy.
Courts have the inherent power to
amend their decisions to make them conformable to law and justice. This prerogative, however, is not absolute.
The rules do not contemplate amendments that are substantial in nature.[22]
They merely cover formal changes or such
that will not affect the crux of the decision, like the correction of
typographical or clerical errors. Courts will violate due process if they make
substantial amendments in their decisions without affording the other party the
right to contest the new evidence presented in a motion for reconsideration.[23] The Court finds that the change in the
penalty by the RTC in the instant case did not involve the consideration of any
new evidence but a mere “correction” of the penalty imposed to conform with the Revised Penal Code and The Indeterminate Sentence
Law.
And as the Solicitor General
correctly noted, the trial court modified the penalty in its Decision dated
As to the
mitigating circumstances, the CA is correct in finding that the RTC erred in
appreciating in favor of the petitioner the mitigating circumstances of lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation on the part of the
victim, Romulo Cariño.
On the first
circumstance, the RTC held:
According to the accused, he did not intend
to kill Cariño.
In turn, Cariño did not die immediately from
his wounds as he still lived for around two (2) hours after his body was taken
to the hospital. This fact and the fact
that Cariño was hit by a hard, blunt object, convince
[sic] this court that the intent of the accused to kill Cariño
appears to be reasonably doubtful. . . .[25]
However, the CA correctly took into
consideration the post-mortem findings of the NBI medico-legal expert and his
testimony that even with immediate and adequate medical attendance, the victim
would not have survived due to the extensive nature of the hemorrhage suffered
by the victim. The brute force employed
by the petitioner contradicts the claim that he had no intention to kill the
victim. The mitigating circumstance of
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot
be appreciated where the acts employed by the accused were reasonably
sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim.[26]
On the second circumstance, the RTC
pointed to the fact that the incident was preceded by an intense argument
between the victim and the accused so as to qualify the situation as a
mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party which immediately preceded the act.[27]
Provocation is defined to be any
unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party, capable of exciting,
inciting, or irritating anyone. In order
to be mitigating, provocation must be sufficient and should immediately precede
the act. Provocation is sufficient if it
is adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which must accordingly be
proportionate in gravity. That the provocation must immediately precede the act
means that there should not be any interval of time between the provocation by
the offended party and the commission of the crime by the person provoked.[28]
The fact
that a heated or intense argument preceded the incident is not by itself the sufficient
provocation on the part of the offended party as contemplated by law. Moreover, petitioner failed to establish by
competent evidence that the victim had a gun and used it to threaten
petitioner.
With respect to
the other aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and
grave abuse of superior strength, the Court likewise agrees with the findings
of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that none of these circumstances are present
for lack of evidence.
Thus, the CA is partly correct in modifying
the penalty imposed by the RTC. The RTC
imposed an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years, two (2) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional
as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum, while the CA adjusted the sentence upwards since no
mitigating circumstances attended the crime, and imposed an indeterminate
prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum. Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that any person found guilty of homicide shall
be punished by reclusion temporal, i.e., twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to twenty (20) years.
Applying Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term
of the sentence shall be within the range of the penalty next lower, which is prision mayor, i.e., anywhere between
six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years. The CA appropriately exercised its discretion
when it imposed six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as the minimum term.
However, the CA erred in imposing
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as the maximum
term of the indeterminate sentence. In
the computation of the maximum term, the law prescribes that the attending
circumstances should be considered.
There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in this case, the
penalty that should be imposed is the medium period of the penalty prescribed
by law,[29]
that is, reclusion temporal in its medium period, or, anywhere between
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months.
And last, the CA, without reason,
omitted a portion of the award of damages by the RTC in the civil aspect of the
case, namely, the amount of actual damages which comprised the expenses for the
cemetery lot and religious services. In
particular, the RTC held that the prosecution was able to prove actual damages
amounting to P41,500.00 based on supporting
evidence,[30]
in addition to the death indemnity of P50,000.00 as required by current
jurisprudence.[31] On the other hand, the dispositive
portion of the CA judgment merely ordered petitioner to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased victim in the amount of P50,000.00.
The Court restores the full amount of
actual damages originally awarded by the RTC.
Moral damages are not awarded for
lack of basis in fact and law.[32] No witnesses testified to prove the existence
of the factual
basis therefor.
Pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil
Code, in criminal offenses, exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime is committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances.
Considering that no aggravating circumstance is present in this case,
the lower courts are correct in not awarding exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The petitioner is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Homicide and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of an indeterminate
sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day,
as maximum. The petitioner is further
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 as death indemnity and P41,500.00 as actual
damages.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
|
ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona, with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Bernardo P. Abesamis, concurring.
[2]
Rollo,
p. 9.
[3] Records, Vol. I, p. 1.
[4] CA Rollo, pp. 207-208.
[5] Records, Vol. II, p. 394.
[6]
[7]
[8] Rollo, p. 20.
[9]
People v. Dagani, G.R.
No. 153875,
[10]
People v. Catbagan,
G.R. Nos. 149430-32,
[11] People v. Dagani, supra; People v. Dela Cruz, 400 Phil. 872, 878 (2000).
[12] People v. Dagani, supra note 9; People v. Escarlos, 457 Phil. 580, 596 (2003).
[13] People v. Venerable, 352 Phil. 623, 632 (1998).
[14] Rollo, p. 72.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
People v. Paulino, G.R. No. 148810,
[20] People v. Flores, Jr., 442 Phil. 561, 569 (2002).
[21] See Cadua v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 627, 648 (1999).
[22] Cansino v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 686, 692 (2003); Unidad v. Court of Appeals, 447 Phil. 96, 109 (2003).
[23] Cansino v. Court of Appeals, id. at 692.
[24] People v. Rondero, 378 Phil. 123, 143 (1999).
[25] Rollo, p. 72.
[26] People v. Isleta, 332 Phil. 410, 427-428 (1996). See People v. Francisco, 388 Phil. 94, 126 (2000); People v. Gonzales, Jr., 411 Phil. 893, 925 (2001).
[27] Revised Penal Code, Art. 13, par. 14.
[28] Navarro v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 21, 36 (1999).
[29] Revised Penal Code, Art. 64, par. 1.
[30]
Exhibits “L,” “M-1” and “M-2”;
Records, Vol. I, pp. 94, 109-110.
[31] See People v. Dagani, supra note 9.
[32]
See Civil Code,
Arts. 2217-2220, 2229-2235.