FIRST DIVISION
|
LINGKOD MANGGAGAWA SA
RUBBERWORLD, ADIDAS-ANGLO, its officers and members as represented by SONIA
ESPERANZA, Petitioners, - versus - RUBBERWORLD (PHILS.) INC.
and ANTONIO YANG, LAYA MANANGHAYA SALGADO & CO., CPA’s (In its capacity
as liquidator of Rubberworld (Phils., Inc.), Respondents. |
G.R. No. 153882
Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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D E C I S I O
N
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed
and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is the Decision[1] dated January 18, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 53356, as reiterated in its Resolution[2] of June 5, 2002, denying the
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The assailed CA decision annulled and set aside an earlier decision of the Labor Arbiter, as well as the resolution/order and writ of execution issued by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in a labor dispute between the petitioners and the respondents over which a
suspension order had
been issued by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Petitioner Lingkod Manggagawa sa Rubberworld, Adidas-Anglo is a legitimate labor union whose
members were employees of the principal respondent, Rubberworld Philippines, Inc.(Rubberworld, for short), a
domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of footwear, bags and garments.
The
facts:
On
On
On
September 9, 1994, herein
petitioner union, the Lingkod Manggagawa Sa Rubberworld, Adidas-Anglo (Lingkod, for brevity), represented
by its President, Sonia Esperanza, filed a complaint against Rubberworld and
its Vice Chairperson, Mr. Antonio Yang, for unfair labor practice (ULP),
illegal shutdown, and non-payment of salaries and separation pay. In its complaint, docketed as NLRC-NCR-Case No. 00-09-06637 (hereinafter
referred to as ULP Case, for brevity), petitioner union alleged that it had
filed a petition for certification election during the freedom period, which petition was granted by the DOLE Regional
Director. In the same
complaint, petitioner union claimed that the strike staged by Bisig Pagkakaisa-NAFLU was company-instigated/supported. The said complaint was referred to Labor Arbiter
Ernesto Dinopol for appropriate action.
On
Accordingly, with the creation of the
Management Committee, all actions for claims against Rubberworld Philippines,
Inc. pending before any court, tribunal, office, board, body, Commission
or sheriff are hereby deemed SUSPENDED.
Consequently, all pending incidents for preliminary
injunctions, writ of attachments, foreclosures and the like are hereby rendered
moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
Notwithstanding
the SEC's aforementioned
suspension order and despite Rubberworld's submission on
x x x [I]t is crystal clear that the SEC Order
notwithstanding, Labor Arbiters and the National Labor Relations Commission should not abdicate the jurisdiction which Article 217 of the Labor
Code has conferred upon them subject to the condition that awards, if any,
should be presented to the Management Committee for processing and payment,
and disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby
rendered:
1)
denying
respondents motion to suspend proceedings;
2)
declaring
respondent Rubberworld Phils., Inc. to have committed unfair labor practice;
3)
declaring
the temporary shutdown to have been officially ended as of
4)
ordering
respondent Rubberworld Phils., Inc. to reinstate complainant-Union's members
who indicate their intention to be so reinstated within one month from the
receipt of this decision by complainants' counsel;
5)
ordering
respondent Rubberworld Phils., Inc. to pay the members of the complainant-Union
their backwages computed from
For purposes of quantifying the backwages and separation
pay, and identifying the recipients thereof, Mr. Ricardo Atienza of the
Research and Information Unit of this Commission is hereby directed to proceed
to the office of the respondent Rubberworld whose responsible officers are
ordered to allow Mr. Atienza or his representative access to such records as
may be necessary and render a report thereon within 30 days from his receipt of
this Decision.
For purposes of any appeal, the appeal bond is
tentatively set at P500,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
On
P500,000.00 as tentatively fixed by the Labor Arbiter. Meanwhile, on P27,506,255.70). Despite Rubberworld’s vigorous opposition, the First Division of the NLRC, in its Order[6] of
Accordingly, respondents-appellants are
hereby directed to upgrade or complete their Appeal Bond in the amount
equivalent to Twenty Seven Million Five Hundred Six Thousand Two Hundred
Fifty-Five Pesos and 70/100 (P27,506,255.70) pursuant to the award as computed
by Ricardo O. Atienza within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.
Failure of the respondents-appellants to comply with this
directive will give this Commission no choice but to dismiss their appeal for
non-perfection thereof.
Its motion for reconsideration of the
same Order having been denied
by the NLRC in its Resolution[7] of March 29, 1996, Rubberworld directly went to this Court on a Petition for Certiorari,[8] interposing the sole issue of
whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in requiring the corporation to post the upgraded appeal bond of P27,506,255.70 based on
the computation of Mr. Atienza.
Meanwhile,
on account of
Rubberworld’s failure to
upgrade or complete its appeal bond as indicated in the NLRC’s January 22, 1996 Order, the Commission, in a decision[9] dated June 28, 1996, did dismiss Rubberworld’s appeal. Owing to
this development, Rubberworld filed with the Court a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari,[10] therein
incorporating its
challenge to the said dismissal order of the NLRC,
contending that the labor tribunal acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction.
On
Finding that the continuance in business [of Rubberworld] would neither be feasible/profitable nor work
to the best of interest of the stockholders, parties-litigants, creditors, or
the general public, xxx Rubberworld Philippines, Inc. is hereby DISSOLVED under Section 6(d) of P.D. 902-A. Accordingly, the suspension Order is LIFTED.
The
Laya Mananghaya Salgado &
Co., CPA’s is hereby appointed as liquidator to effect
the dissolution of the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
On
On
Consistent
with its ruling in St.
Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC,[15] the Court, in its Resolution
of
For its part, the CA, in its Resolution[16] of
Eventually, in the herein assailed Decision[17] dated January 18, 2002, the CA granted Rubberworld’s petition in CA–G.R. SP. No. 53356 on the finding that the Labor Arbiter had indeed committed grave abuse of discretion when it
proceeded with the ULP case despite the SEC’s suspension
order of December 28,
1994, and accordingly declared
the proceedings before it, including the subsequent orders by the NLRC dismissing Rubberworld’s appeal and
the writ of execution,
null and void.
With their motion for
reconsideration having
been denied in the CA in its Resolution[18] of
1) Whether the CA had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction or an excess in the exercise thereof when it gave due
course to the petition filed by Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. and annulled and set
aside the decisions rendered by the labor arbiter a quo and the NLRC, when the
said decisions had become final and executory warranting the outright dismissal
of the aforesaid petition;
2) Whether the CA had committed grave abuse of discretion and reversible
error when it applied Section 5(d) and Section 6 (c) of P.D. No. 902-A,
as amended, to the case at bar;
3) Whether the CA had committed reversible error when it adopted and
applied the rulings in the cases of Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc., or Julie Yap Ong v. NLRC, Marilyn F. Arellano, et. al.[19] and Rubberworld
(Phils.), Inc. and Julie Y. Ong v. NLRC, Aquino Magsalin, et. al.[20] to the case at bar.
We DENY.
It
is the petitioners’ submission that the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the affirmatory decision of the NLRC and the latter’s
dismissal of Rubberworld’s appeal, as
well the writ of
execution subsequently
issued, can no longer be annulled and set aside, the same having all become
final and executory. Additionally,
petitioners argue that no appeal from the decision of the Labor
Arbiter was ever
perfected due to Rubberworld's
failure to upgrade or post additional bond as ordered by the NLRC. Hence, they submit that the CA acted in grave abuse of discretion in
even giving due course to Rubberworld’s
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 53356, let alone rendering a decision thereon annulling and setting aside the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC’s dismissal of Rubberworld’s appeal and the writ of execution issued following the dismissal of
said appeal.
The Court disagrees.
While posting an appeal bond is indeed a requirement for the perfection of
an appeal from the
decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC, Rubberworld’s failure to
upgrade its appeal bond cannot bar, in this particular instance, the review by the CA of the lower court proceedings.
Given
the factual milieu obtaining in this case, it cannot be said that the decision of the Labor Arbiter,
or the decision/dismissal order and writ of execution
issued by the NLRC, could
ever attain final and executory status. The Labor Arbiter completely disregarded and violated Section 6(c) of Presidential Decree 902-A, as amended, which categorically mandates the suspension of all actions for claims
against a corporation placed under a management committee by the SEC. Thus, the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the order and writ subsequently issued by the NLRC are all null and void for having been undertaken or issued in violation of the SEC suspension Order dated
Acts
executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void,
except when the law itself authorizes their validity.[21] The Labor Arbiter's decision in this case is void ab initio, and therefore, non-existent.[22] A void judgment is in effect no judgment at all. No rights are divested by it nor obtained from it. Being
worthless in itself, all proceedings upon which the judgment is founded are equally worthless. It neither binds nor
bars anyone. All acts performed under it
and all claims flowing out of it are void.[23] In other
words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same
as it would be if there were no
judgment. It accordingly leaves the
party-litigants in the same position they were in before the
trial.[24]
In fact,
it is immaterial whether an appeal from the Labor Arbiter's
decision was perfected or not, since a judgment void ab initio is non-existent and cannot acquire finality.[25] The judgment is vulnerable to attack even when no
appeal has been taken. Hence, such judgment does not become final in the sense
of depriving a party of his right to question its validity.[26] Hence, no grave abuse of discretion attended the CA's
taking cognizance of the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 53356.
Besides,
the Labor Arbiter, by simultaneously ruling in his decision of
A bond
is only mandatory from an appeal of the decision itself on the merits of the laborers'
money claims to ensure payment thereof. Had the Labor Arbiter taken
heed of Rubberworld’s motion to suspend proceedings when that motion was filed, and ruled
upon it separately, no bond would have been required for a review of his resolution thereon. As it were, the Labor Arbiter chose
to continue to decide the main case, then to incorporate in his decision the denial of Rubberworld’s motion to suspend
proceedings, thereby effectively
requiring a bond on a question which would not have ordinarily required one.
We
shall now address the more
substantial issue in this case, namely, the applicability of the provisions of Section 5 (d) and Section 6 (c) of P.D. No. 902-A, as amended, reorganizing the SEC, vesting it with additional powers and
placing it under the Office of the President, which respectively read:
Section 5. In addition to the regulatory adjudicative
functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations,
partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly
granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:
xxx xxx xxx
d) Petitions of corporations, partnerships or
associations to be declared in the state of suspension of payments in cases
where the corporation, partnership or association possesses sufficient property
to cover all its debts but foresees the impossibility of meeting them when they
respectively fall due or in cases where the corporation, partnership or
association has no sufficient assets to cover its liabilities, but is under the
management of a rehabilitation receiver or management committee created pursuant
to this Decree.
Section 6. In order to
effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the
following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
c) To appoint one or more receivers of the property, real
or personal, which is the subject of the action pending before the Commission
in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in such other
cases whenever necessary in order to preserve the rights of the
parties-litigants and/or protect the interest of the investing public and creditors:
x x x Provided, finally, That upon appointment of a management committee, the rehabilitation
receiver, board or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions for claims
against corporations, partnerships, or associations under management or
receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be
suspended accordingly. [Emphasis
supplied]
As correctly ruled by the CA, the issue of applicability in labor cases of the aforequoted provisions of PD 902-A, as amended, had already been resolved by this Court in its earlier decisions in Rubberworld
(Phils.), Inc., or Julie Yap Ong v. NLRC, Marilyn
F. Arellano, et. al.[27] and Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. and Julie Y. Ong v. NLRC, Aquino, Magsalin, et. al,[28] supra.
In
the first Rubberworld
case, the Court upheld the applicability of PD 902-A to labor
cases pursuant to Section 5(d) and Section 6(c)
thereof, with
the following pronouncements:
It is plain
from
the
foregoing provisions of the law that “upon the appointment [by the SEC] of a
management committee or a rehabilitation receiver,” all actions for claims
against the corporation pending before any court, tribunal or board shall ipso jure be suspended. The justification for the automatic stay of all pending
actions for claims “is to enable the management committee or the rehabilitation
receiver to effectively exercise its/his powers free from any judicial or
extra-judicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the rescue of
the debtor company. To allow such other actions to continue would only add to
the burden of the management committee or rehabilitation receiver, whose time,
effort and resources would be wasted in defending claims against the
corporation instead of being directed toward its restructuring and
rehabilitation.”[29]
xxx xxx xxx
x x x The law is
clear: upon the creation of a management committee or the appointment of a
rehabilitation receiver, all claims for actions “shall be suspended
accordingly.” No exception in favor of labor claims is mentioned in the law.
Since the law makes no distinction or exemptions, neither should this Court. Ubi lex non distinguit nec
nos distinguere debemos.
Allowing labor cases to proceed clearly defeats the purpose of the
automatic stay and severely encumbers the management
committee's time and resources. The said committee would need to defend against
these suits, to the detriment of its primary and urgent duty to work towards
rehabilitating the corporation and making it viable again. To rule otherwise
would open the floodgates to other similarly situated claimants and forestall
if not defeat the rescue efforts. Besides, even if the
NLRC awards the claims of private respondents, its ruling could not be enforced
as long as the petitioner is under the management committee.[30]
In Chua
v. National Labor Relations Commission, we ruled that labor claims cannot proceed independently of a bankruptcy
liquidation proceeding, since these claims “would spawn needless controversy,
delays, and confusion.”[31] With more reason, allowing labor claims to
continue in spite of a SEC suspension order in a rehabilitation case would
merely lead to such results.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 217 of the Labor Code should be construed not in
isolation but in harmony with PD 902-A, according to the basic rule in
statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored.[32] Indeed, it is axiomatic that each and every
statute must be construed in a way that would avoid conflict with existing
laws. True, the NLRC has the
power to hear and decide labor disputes, but such authority is deemed suspended
when PD 902-A is put into effect by the Securities and Exchange Commission. [Emphasis supplied]
The second Rubberworld case reiterates
the above pronouncements of the Court:
Presidential Decree No. 902-A is clear that
“all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships or associations
under management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or
body shall be suspended accordingly.” The law did not make any exception in
favor of labor claims.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus,
when NLRC proceeded to decide the case despite the SEC suspension order, the
NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction to hear and decide cases.
As a consequence, any resolution, decision or order that it rendered or issued
without jurisdiction is a nullity. [Emphasis supplied]
Petitioners argue, however, that the doctrines laid down in the two aforecited cases cannot
be made to apply to the instant controversy because the SEC
order therein only mandates that all pending cases
against Rubberworld
Philippines, Inc. should
be deemed suspended. Petitioners contend that the decision of the Labor Arbiter in the present case, as well the order of dismissal and writ of
execution issued by NLRC, have become final and executory by reason of Rubberworld’s failure to perfect its appeal by not upgrading or completing
the required cash or surety bond as ordained by the NLRC. Petitioners thus conclude that the doctrine of stare decisis cannot apply to the instant case.
Petitioners
are in error.
It is incontrovertible that the denial of Rubberworld’s motion to suspend proceedings in the
principal case was incorporated
in the decision
of the Labor Arbiter. Obviously, then, the Labor Arbiter’s decision of
In short, at the time the SEC issued its suspension Order
of
For being well-grounded in fact and law, the assailed CA decision and resolution
in CA-G.R. SP No. 53356 cannot be said to
have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion or issued in excess or want of jurisdiction. We find no reason to overturn such
rulings.
WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is DENIED and the assailed
decision and resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
Chairperson
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate
Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate
Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, with Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria (now ret.) and Teodoro P. Regino (now ret.), concurring; Rollo, pp. 98-106.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Rollo, pp. 319-357.
[14]
[15] G.R.
No. 130866,
[16] Rollo, pp. 390-391.
[17] Supra
note 1.
[18] Supra note 2.
[19]
G.R. No. 126773,
[20]
G.R. No. 128003,
[21] Article 5, The
Civil Code; Buyco v. Philippine National Bank, 112 Phil. 588.
[22] Barde v.
Posiquit, G.R. No. L-29445,
[23] Comia v. Nicolas,
G.R. No. L-26079, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA
492 citing Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, 685 and Gomez v. Concepcion, 47 Phil 717, 712.
[24] Metropolitan Waterworks
& Sewerage System v. Sison, G.R. No. L-40309,
[25] Supra note 18.
[26] David v.
Aquilizan, G.R. No. L-49360,
[27] Supra note 19.
[28] Supra note 20.
[29] Id. citing BF Homes,
Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76879, October 3, 1990, 190 SCRA 262, 269, per
Cruz, J.
[30]
[31] Ibid., p.
576.
[32] See
Ching v. Land Bank of the