Petitioner,
Present:
Respondent.
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CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This
is a petition for review[1]
of the Decision[2]
dated
The Facts
On
In
her counter-affidavit[8]
dated
The
Deputy Ombudsman docketed the complaint for falsification of public document as
OMB-1-99-1970. In a Resolution[9]
dated
Subsequently,
the complaint was re-docketed as OMB-CPL-1-00-0006 for falsification and
dishonesty. In a Fact-Finding and
Investigation Report[11]
dated
On
the other hand, the Deputy Ombudsman docketed the complaint for dishonesty as
OMB-ADM-1-99-0821. In a Decision[12]
dated
After a careful perusal of the records on bar, this Office adopts the result of the NFA Fact-Finding Investigation regarding the absence of the personal or official pass-out slips as required by the NFA per Office Memorandum 79 No. 19 (par. 2, Item 2) dated 27 February 1978 which states that:
“xxx the official errand shall be covered by a Pass-out Slip. The Pass-out Slip shall be accomplished in duplicate, the Original to be retained by the Directorate/Office for attachment to the time card for payroll processing, if the official business would not enable the employee to punch in or out his time card on the specified hours. The duplicate shall be surrendered to the ground security guard. The form shall bear the initial[s] of the immediate supervisor and the signature of the Division Chief concerned xxx.
13. Also, under Item 4 of said Memorandum, it mandates that all employees are required to report to their respective posts in the morning before they go out on their official errands. Should it be necessary that the employee go directly to the place of errands from his residence, the Pass-out slip may be accomplished later (Annex “A-7”).”
The NFA Fact-Finding Team found out that: “no pass-out slips for the month[s] of June and July 1995 could be located at the NFA-Lingayen, Pangasinan Provincial Office nor at the NFA Regional Office. Only the pass-out slips for the months of August, September, October, November and December 1995 were found intact. Examination, however, of said pass-outs on file and original copies of DTR submitted to the Regional Office totally negates the claim of Mrs. Apolinario that the tardiness and absences which were not truthfully recorded in her DTRs could have been covered by pass-out slips, Travel Authority or Trip Permits. This finding was substantiated by a certification issued by Manager Roberto S. Musngi of NFA-Western Pangasinan re: Non-existence of Pass-out Slips in the name of Ligaya Apolinario during the above stated months (Exh.”J”) (Annex “A-7”).
Respondent failed to
produce her pass-out slips, travel authority or trip permits for the months of
June and July 1995 before the NFA Fact Finding Team or before this office to
buttress her contention that she was on official business when her tardiness
and absences were recorded in the General Daily Attendance Record. Hence, the allegation that she falsified her
entries for the aforesaid period in her Daily Time Record remains uncontroverted.[13]
Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner claimed that the issues and subject matter of
OMB-ADM-1-99-0821 were already dismissed by the Ombudsman in the
The
Ombudsman denied the motion. The
Ombudsman explained that the prohibition against double jeopardy finds
application only in criminal cases. If
ever the prohibition against double jeopardy applied in administrative cases,
it would still not apply in this case because OMB-1-99-1970 was not dismissed
on the merits but because the investigation report was not yet approved by the
NFA Regional Office. On OMB-CPL-1-00-0006,
the Ombudsman explained that the case was closed “on the wrong premise” that
the CSC suspended petitioner for six months on the same incident subject of the
case. The Ombudsman later learned that
the complainants in the CSC case were Ramon and Nimfa
Cuaresma and
that the complaint involved different issues and allegations.
Petitioner
filed a petition for review[14]
in the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In
its
It is settled that the
elements of res judicata
are: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it
must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) there must
be between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of
action. The ultimate test in
ascertaining the identity of causes of action is said to be to look into
whether or not [sic] the same evidence fully supports and establishes both the
present cause of action and the former cause of action. In the present petition, the third element is
lacking. The petitioner was separately
charged for different offenses before the Deputy [sic] Office of the [Deputy]
Ombudsman for
Petitioner further contends that the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman are allegedly not supported by substantial evidence.
We disagree.
Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The quantum of proof required in proceedings before administrative agencies is “substantial evidence” not overwhelming or preponderance.
In the present
petition, Ligaya M. Apolinario
did not challenge the validity or authenticity of the General Daily Attendance
Record reflecting her attendance. Though
she offered an explanation for the incongruity between the General Daily
Attendance Record and her Daily Time Record, the fact-finding team of the
National Food Authority, after an exhaustive investigation, found that
“pass-outs on file and original copies of DTR submitted to the Regional Office totally
negates the claim of Mrs. Apolinario (emphasis
ours) that the tardiness and absences which were not truthfully recorded in
her DTRs could have been covered by pass-out slips,
Travel Authority or Trip Permits.” In
short, there is clear evidence Apolinario was indeed
dishonest in filling out her daily time record.
The factual findings of the investigation conducted by the Investigating
Team have not been challenged. Nor were
these controverted by petitioner who has been unable
to present evidence to prove otherwise.
Her explanations for the incongruity between the General Daily
Attendance Record and her Daily Time Record are not sufficient to overcome the
charge of Dishonesty considering the two apparent facts that it was she who
filled the Daily Time Record, and that she did not correctly indicate therein
her absences and tardiness, which are reflected in the General Daily Attendance
Record. She claims that she went on
official business trips during the dates
she was tardy and absent as reflected in the General Daily Attendance
Record but she failed to produce any pass-out slip, Travel Authority or Trip
Permit which she must secure pursuant to internal office regulations. The Investigating Team was unable to find
copies of the pass-out slips, Travel Authority or Trip Permit for the dates she
claims she went on official business trips which she should have given to the
proper officer concerned and kept on file in the Regional Offices following
Office Memorandum 79 No. 19 dated
Hence,
this petition. Petitioner now reiterates her claim that the Ombudsman should
have dismissed OMB-ADM-1-99-0821 considering that the Ombudsman had previously
dismissed the “same” complaint.
Petitioner also insists that the findings of the Ombudsman were not
supported by substantial evidence.
In
her Memorandum,[16]
respondent explained that she filed two complaints against petitioner: (1) an
administrative complaint for dishonesty and (2) a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of public document. Respondent added that, although based on the
same facts and evidence, the dismissal
of the criminal case did not automatically lead to the dismissal of the
administrative case. Besides, the Deputy
Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case not on the merits but on the ground the
NFA Regional Office had not yet approved the Investigation Report. As the
Ombudsman explained, OMB-CPL-1-00-0006 was closed “on the wrong premise” that
the CSC’s decision referred to
the same complaint for falsification of public documents.
The Issues
Petitioner
raised the following issues:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the decision of the Ombudsman considering that the “same” complaint
had been previously dismissed; and
2. Whether
the Court of Appeals erred in affirming that the findings of
the Ombudsman were supported by substantial evidence.
The Ruling of the Court
The
petition has no merit.
Petitioner
contends that the dismissal of OMB-1-99-1970 and the termination of
OMB-CPL-1-00-0006 are valid grounds to dismiss OMB-ADM-1-99-0821. Petitioner argues that the “same” complaint,
having been dismissed by the Ombudsman, is now res
judicata and thus, bars the Ombudsman from
hearing the complaint for dishonesty.
The
Court notes that, for falsifying petitioner’s
DTR, respondent filed two complaints against petitioner. The first was a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of public document and the second
was an administrative complaint for dishonesty.
The Ombudsman docketed the criminal case as OMB-1-99-1970 for
falsification of public document, which was later re-docketed as
OMB-CPL-1-00-0006 for falsification and dishonesty, and the administrative case
as OMB-ADM-1-99-0821 for dishonesty.
In Tecson
v. Sandiganbayan, we ruled that:
[I]t is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or employee is under a three-fold responsibility for violation of a duty or for a wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such violation or wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the public officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party. If the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may be punished criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension, removal from office, or other administrative sanctions. This administrative liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil liabilities.[17] (Italics in the original.)
Thus,
the dismissal of the criminal complaint did not necessarily foreclose the
continuation of the administrative action or carry with it relief from
administrative liability.[18] The Office of the Ombudsman did not err when
it proceeded with the determination of petitioner’s
administrative liability despite the dismissal of the criminal complaint.
The
Court of Appeals correctly ruled that res judicata did not set in because there is no identity of
causes of action. Moreover, the decision
of the Ombudsman cannot be considered a valid and final judgment. On the criminal complaint, the Ombudsman only
had the power to investigate and file the appropriate case before the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner’s claim that her constitutional protection against double
jeopardy was violated has no merit.
Double
jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent
court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5)
when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.[19] None of these applies to the present
case. The Ombudsman only conducted a
preliminary investigation in OMB-1-99-1970 and OMB-CPL-1-00-0006. Hence, double jeopardy will not lie.
Finally,
the Court notes that the Ombudsman and the appellate court found substantial
evidence to prove petitioner’s administrative liability. The Court affirms this finding following the
rule that factual findings of administrative bodies, when supported by
substantial evidence, are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal.[20]
WHEREFORE,
we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM
the
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice
Josefina Guevara-Salonga with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and
Eloy R.
[3] Rollo, pp. 45-48.
[4] CA
rollo, p. 43.
[5]
[6] Petitioner was being investigated for the following charges:
1. Falsification of official documents;
2. Intriguing against honor of employees;
3. Immoral conduct;
4. Neglect of duty;
5. Soliciting or accepting directly or indirectly any gift, favor, loan or anything of monetary value in the course of her official duties or in connection with NFA’s business transactions which may be affected by the functions of her office; and
6. Contracting loans of money or other property from persons with whom the NFA has business relations or other private parties.
[7] Rollo, pp. 56-76.
[8]
[9]
[10] The 10 April 2000 Resolution states: “WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is hereby recommended DISMISSED and the same be redocketed as CPL.” Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Jesus F. Guerrero approved the Resolution.
[11] Rollo, pp. 80-81.
[12]
[13]
[14] Under Rule 43 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.
[15] Rollo, pp. 42-44.
[16]
[17] 376 Phil. 191, 198-199 (1999).
[18] Office of the Court Administrator
v. Enriquez, A.M. No. P-89-290,
[19] Dela Rosa v. CA, 323 Phil. 596 (1996).
[20] Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521,