FIRST DIVISION
|
PROCOPIO
TAPUROC, HEIRS OF ANTONIA EBE (Deceased) represented by her children namely: HEIRS OF CELEDONIA PUTONG, namely:
FORTUNATO ESCUDERO, TERESITA TABALDINA, CONCORDIO E. NEBRIA, PEDRO ESCUDERO
and LUISA PEDRERA; HEIRS OF EUFEMIO
PUTONG, namely: RICARDO PUTONG and PORFERIA PUTONG; HEIRS OF GREGORIO PUTONG, namely: ROSALIO PUTONG, PERSEVERANDA
LOPEZ, BERNARDO PUTONG and ROSALINDA OMAGAC; HEIRS OF MARIANO PUTONG, namely: SERAPIA DALHOG, TEODORA AYENG,
MARCIANO PUTONG, RESTITUTA LIQUIT, SERAPIA LUAY, FAUSTINO PUTONG and SOFRONIA
PATROLLA, ALL REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN- FACT, AUREA P. MERCIDOR,
Petitioners, - versus - CARMELITA
LOQUELLANO VDA. DE MENDE and the HEIRS OF EVANS MENDE, namely: ERIC MITCHEL,
ERIC LYNDON, ERIC FERDINAND, JOSE ERIC ERVIN and JENNIFER MILDRED, ALL
SURNAMED MENDE and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF TAGBILARAN, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 152007
Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: January
22, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O
N
GARCIA, J.:
Under
consideration is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
to nullify and set aside the following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 64548, to wit:
1. Decision[1] dated September 21, 2001, affirming an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City, Branch 47, in an action for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale, Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (8585) T-4767 and all Subsequent Documents and Damages, thereat commenced by the herein petitioners against the respondents; and
2.
Resolution[2]
dated
The petition embodies an alternative
prayer for this Court to remand the case to the trial court for the presentation
of an expert witness.
The
facts:
On
In
their Answer,[4] the respondent
Mendes, as defendants, denied the material allegations of the Complaint and
averred that the late Evans Mende, husband of respondent Carmelita Loquellano
Vda. de Mende and father of the herein co-respondents, bought the subject
parcel of land from its previous owners on December 12, 1967 as evidenced by a
Deed of Sale duly notarized by Atty. Rodolfo Yap. They further assert that they
had been in open, continuous, and peaceful possession of the land in question from the time of said sale, and had been religiously
paying the realty taxes due thereon. By way of affirmative defense, the
respondents assert that petitioners’ cause of action, if any, had already prescribed in view of the unreasonable
delay in filing the suit in court, let alone the fact that their (respondents’)
title has become indefeasible.
On
June 7, 1999, after due proceedings, the trial court came out with its decision[5] finding
that the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs (now petitioners) was insufficient
to establish their claim that the questioned Deed of Sale was a forgery. The
court explained that despite the opportunity given them, the plaintiffs failed
to present a handwriting expert to determine whether the said Deed of Sale was
indeed a forged instrument, adding that laches had already set in because of plaintiffs’
inaction and neglect in questioning the supposed forged character of the
document after the lapse of more than twenty-nine (29) years from the time of
its execution. Accordingly, the trial court
rendered judgment dismissing the Complaint, thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit. No compensation for damages, moral, exemplary and litigation expenses is awarded for failure of plaintiffs (sic) to prove by preponderance of evidence the existence of malice or bad faith in filing the instant case.
SO ORDERED.
From the adverse decision of the trial court,
the petitioners went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R.
CV No. 64548, faulting the court of origin in ruling that they failed to
present convincing evidence to prove the fact of forgery in the execution of
the assailed Deed of Sale. They likewise
faulted the lower court in denying their motion to have the original copy of
the Deed of Sale in dispute and their own Special Power of Attorney containing
the genuine signatures of their predecessors-in-interest, be examined by a
handwriting expert.
As
stated at the outset hereof, the appellate court, in its Decision[6] of
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED THE APPEAL OF THE PETITIONERS DESPITE SUFFICIENCY OF SUPPORTING EVIDENCE TO WARRANT A FAVORABLE JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONERS,
and
presenting for our resolution the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE
DEED OF
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS CONTRADICTED ITSELF AND ARRIVED AT A CONCLUSION CONTRARY TO THE RECORDS, LAW AND THE APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE.
The recourse must fail.
As it is, the petitioners call for a review of the facts of the case. This
is evident from the pleadings they filed with this Court. In their main petition[8]
and Memorandum,[9] the
petitioners emphatically state:
The issue in the case at bar boils down to whether or not the signatures of the petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest and Procopio Tapuroc (the only surviving vendor to the alleged deed of sale) were forged; and if they were, is the declaration of nullity of the said deed of sale dated December 13, 1967 is proper (sic).
Clearly, the foregoing statement calls for a determination of
the truth or falsehood of an alleged fact, a matter not for this Court to
resolve. Well-settled is the rule that factual
questions may not be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court is explicit. It reads:
SECTION 1. Filing
of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on
certiorari. The petition shall raise
only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis
supplied)
Evident it is from the above that the
function of the Court in petitions for review on certiorari is limited to
reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts. And,
as a matter of sound practice and procedure, the Court defers and accords
finality to the factual findings of trial courts, more so when, as here, such
findings are undisturbed by the appellate court. This factual determination,
as a matter of long and sound appellate practice, deserves great weight and
shall not be disturbed on appeal, save only for the most compelling reasons,[10]
such as when that determination is clearly without evidentiary support or when grave
abuse of discretion has been committed.[11]
This is as it should be since the Court, in petitions for review of CA
decisions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, usually limits its inquiry only
to questions of law. Stated otherwise, it is not the function of the Court to
analyze and weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of the
factual holdings of lower courts.[12]
The Court refrains from further scrutiny of factual findings of
trial courts, more so when those findings are affirmed by the CA, as here. To do otherwise would defeat the very essence
of Rule 45 and would convert the Court into a trier of facts, which it is not
meant to be.[13]
What
is more, it appears undisputed that the assailed Deed of Sale is a public
document, having been duly notarized by a certain Atty. Rodolfo Yap who,
unfortunately, had already passed away. Being a notarial instrument, the deed
in question is a public document and as such enjoys the presumption of
regularity in its execution. To
overthrow that presumption, sufficient, clear and convincing evidence is
required, otherwise the document should be upheld.[14]
Petitioners
maintain, however, that by merely examining the signatures in the questioned
Deed of Sale and the genuine signatures of their predecessors-in-interest in their
Special Power of Attorney, the glaring dissimilarities between the two sets of
signatures are immediately evident to support their claim of forgery.
We
are not convinced.
As
a rule, forgery
cannot be presumed. It must
be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. Mere allegation of forgery is not evidence and
the burden of proof lies on the party alleging it.[15] Here, the petitioners failed to discharge their
burden.
As it were, the petitioners merely
alleged that they filed two motions before the trial court to have the original
copy of the documents in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tagbilaran City
be examined by handwriting experts but their motions were ignored by the trial
court. They then harp on the excuse that
they could not be expected to prove forgery if the trial court denied them the
opportunity to do so.
We
are not persuaded.
The
trial court correctly
ruled that the parties themselves dictate the course and
flow of the presentation of evidence, as well as the witnesses for each side.
Considering that the case before it is civil,
not criminal, the lower court certainly
cannot, on its own, issue an order requiring a handwriting expert to appear before
it and compare the documents presented by the parties. It behooves upon the parties themselves to
call forth their own set of witnesses and present their own evidence to bolster
their respective claims. If the
petitioners failed to present an expert witness, only themselves ought to be
blamed. For, as the trial court itself pointed out in its decision:
x x
x. Plaintiffs, despite the
opportunity given them by this Court, failed to present a handwriting expert to
determine whether there was indeed forgery in the execution of the subject Deed
of
Moreover,
the technical procedure utilized by handwriting experts, while usually helpful
in the examination of forged documents, is not mandatory or indispensable to
the examination or comparison of handwritings.[16]
In Jimenez v.
Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations of the United Presbyterian
Church in the USA,[17] the Court identified and explained the factors
involved in the examination and comparison of handwritings:
xxx
[T]he authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon
its general characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine
signature. Dissimilarities as regards
spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops,
shades, etc., that may be found between the questioned signatures and the
genuine one are not decisive on the question of the former’s authenticity. The result of examinations of questioned
handwriting, even with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific
instruments, is, at best, inconclusive.
There are other factors that must be taken into consideration. The position of the writer, the condition of
the surface on which the paper where the questioned signature is written is
placed, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or
paper used, play an important role on the general appearance of the
signature. Unless, therefore, there is,
in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of direct or
circumstantial competent evidence on the character of the questioned
handwriting, much weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or
dissimilarities, between that questioned handwriting and an authentic one.
And to determine forgery, the Court
in Cesar v. Sandiganbayan[18]
(quoting Osborn, The Problem of Proof)
wrote:
The process of identification, therefore, must include the determination of the extent, kind, and significance of this resemblance as well as of the variation. It then becomes necessary to determine whether the variation is due to the operation of a different personality, or is only the expected and inevitable variation found in the genuine writing of the same writer. It is also necessary to decide whether the resemblance is the result of a more or less skillful imitation, or is the habitual and characteristic resemblance which naturally appears in a genuine handwriting. When these two questions are correctly answered the whole problem of identification is solved.
In the present case, all that the petitioners had to offer by way of evidence on
the issue of forgery was their bare denial that their predecessors-in-interest
signed the subject Deed of Sale. Such
denial will not suffice to overcome the presumption of regularity of notarized
documents, to overthrow which, the countervailing evidence must be clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant.[19]
Moreover,
and as aptly pointed out by the lower court in its decision of
However, even if it were true that the signature of Antonia Ebe is forged, it cannot brush aside the fact that all the heirs of Antonia Ebe, namely: Celedonia Putong, Eufemio Putong, Gregorio Putong and Mariano Putong all signed in the Deed of Absolute Sale. As earlier discussed their signatures cannot be said to have been forged as evidence presented to prove the same is found to be insufficient. Henceforth, all the rightful heirs who could question the subject sale are themselves signatories of the supposed questionable transaction.
Meanwhile, granting that Procopio Tapuroc’s signature found on Exh. C is indeed a forgery, he testified in open court that he discovered the sale and the fact of Mende’s possession of the subject land in 1967 yet – and did not do anything about it.
At
the other end of the spectrum, the respondents presented sufficient proof of
their claim of ownership over the property in dispute. The respondent Mendes maintain that they had
been in continuous, peaceful and open possession of the property since 1967,
the year of the alleged sale, or for more than thirty (30) years now. No less than the petitioners themselves acknowledged
this in their pleadings[20]
before this Court. And beginning the
year 1968, the respondents have been religiously paying the realty taxes due on
the same property. Likewise, when TCT
No. 3444 was lost, respondent Carmelita Loquellano Vda. de Mende filed a
petition for judicial reconstitution to secure a second owner’s copy of the lost
title. Said petition went through the proper procedure and thereafter Carmelita
was issued a second owner’s copy of TCT No. 3444 which was later changed to TCT
No. (8585) T-4767.
All
told, we find that the petitioners, who initiated in the court of origin the
basic complaint in this case, have not
sufficiently met the burden of proof to sustain their cause. Additionally, we agree
with the CA in ruling that laches had barred the petitioners:
xxx The records show that they [petitioners] did not institute any action against the order of the then Court of First Instance, 14th Judiciary District. Their inaction and failure to assert any right, if any, over the disputed lot, bars them from recovering the same as said failure clearly asserts to laches.
Not to be overlooked is the fact that the petitioners filed
their complaint of declaration of nullity only after twenty-nine (29) years
from the execution of the alleged forged deed of sale. In the meanwhile, title to the property had
already been in the name of respondent Mendes since 1967. The Mendes had been
in open, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject land, and had been
religiously paying the realty taxes due thereon. These are hard facts that ought not to be
disregarded. The Court, in a long line
of cases,[21] has
uniformly held in favor of the registered owner who had been in possession of a
disputed property for a considerable period of time. With the Mendes’ possession in this case
having been in the concept of an owner and the land itself registered in their names
for more than thirty (30) years now, their title thereto had become
indefeasible and their possession could no longer be disturbed. The petitioners’ failure to take the
necessary steps to assert their alleged right for at least twenty-nine (29)
years from date of registration of title is fatal to their cause of action on
the ground of laches.
As
a final note, we emphasize that a
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate
Justice Working
Chairperson |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate
Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by then Associate Justice (now ret.) Eugenio S. Labitoria with then Associate Justices (now ret.) Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and Perlita J. Tria Tirona, concurring; Rollo, pp. 117-123.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Supra note 1.
[7] Supra note 2.
[8] Page 9 of Petitioners’ Petition
for Review on Certiorari dated
[9] Page 7 of the Memorandum for the
Petitioners dated
[10] Republic
v. CA, G.R. No. 116372,
[11] Floro
v. Llenado, G.R. No. 75723, June 2, 1995, 244 SCRA 713, citing Remalante
v. Tibe, 158 SCRA 145 (1988); Benguet Exploration, Inc. v. CA, G.R.
No. 117434, February 9, 2001, 351 SCRA 445.
[12] PT
& T v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152057, September 29, 2003, 412 SCRA
263.
[13] American President Lines, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110853, July 31, 2000, 336 SCRA 582, citing Catapusan v. Court of Appeals, 264 SCRA 534, 539 (1996); First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 259, 309 (1996), citing South Sea Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA 744 (1995).
[14] Romualdez-Licaros
v. Licaros, 449 Phil. 824 (2003); Bernardo
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107791, May 12, 2000, 332 SCRA 1, citing Spouses Caoili v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 128325, September 14, 1999, 314 SCRA 345.
[15] Victor
Lingan v. Attys. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy Baliga, A.C. No. 5377, June 15,
2006, citing Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 107967, March 1, 1994, 230 SCRA 550; People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 153119, April 13, 2004, 427 SCRA 28; and Fernandez v. Fernandez, 416 Phil. 322
(2001).
[16] Heirs
of Severa P. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117609, December 29,
1998, 300 SCRA 565.
[17] G.R. No. 140472, June 10, 2002, 383 SCRA 326; citing Lorenzo v. Diaz, 53 OG, 4107, 4110-4111, July 15, 1957, cited in Punzalan v. Comelec, 289 SCRA 702, April 27, 1998, and in Francisco, Evidence, Vol. VII, Part I, 1997 ed., p. 674.
[18] G.R. Nos. L- 54719-50,
[19] Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations of the United Presbyterian Church in the USA, supra.
[20] Page 9 of the Memorandum for the
Petitioners dated
[21] Ladignon
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122973, July 18, 2000, 336 SCRA 42, citing Pasay City & Republic Real Estate
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 199 (1998), Carreon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112041, June 22, 1998, 291
SCRA 78, citing Trinidad v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 204 SCRA 524 (1991); Heirs
of Batiog Lacamen v. Heirs of Laman, G.R. No. L-27088,