THIRD DIVISION
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MAURICIO
MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Petitioners, - versus - Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 150157 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: January 25, 2007 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 which affirmed in toto the decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
The
factual antecedents are as follows:
The
vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with
plate number CVD-478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio
Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep with plate number PER-290,
owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza.
At
around
Respondent
suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for treatment to the
By
reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before
the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan,
charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries, docketed as Crim. Case No. 684-M-89.
Subsequently on
In
the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:
1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue
and be sued as well as the venue and the identities of the vehicles involved;
2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are
duly licensed;
3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;
4. The extent of
the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan and the existence of the
medical certificate;
5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the
private jeep being ahead of the bus;
6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved
and straight, although there was a ditch on the right side where the jeep fell
into.[3]
When
the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSNs)[4] of the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be
received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these witnesses are not
available to testify in the civil case.
Francisco
Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent
Calaunan, left for abroad sometime in November, 1989 and has not returned since
then. Rogelio Ramos took the stand and
said that his brother, Fernando Ramos, left for
The
trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos,
Bulacan, the court where Criminal Case No. 684-M-89
was tried, to bring the TSNs of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan,[5] Marcelo Mendoza[6] and Fernando Ramos[7] in said case, together
with other documentary evidence marked therein.
Instead of the Branch Clerk of Court, it was Enrique Santos Guevara,
Court Interpreter, who appeared before the court and identified the TSNs of the
three afore-named witnesses and other pertinent documents he had brought.[8] Counsel for respondent wanted to mark other
TSNs and documents from the said criminal case to be adopted in the instant
case, but since the same were not brought to the trial court, counsel for
petitioners compromised that said TSNs and documents could be offered by
counsel for respondent as rebuttal evidence.
For
the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus
conductor Oscar Buan testified. The TSN[9] of the testimony of Donato Ganiban, investigator of
the PRBLI, in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was marked and allowed to be adopted
in the civil case on the ground that he was already dead.
Respondent
further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence, the TSNs[10] of the testimonies of Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in
Criminal Case No. 684-M-89.
The
disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the
collision?
Respondent
insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be
liable while the latter is resolute in saying it was the former who caused the smash
up.
The
versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:
The parties differed only on the manner the collision
between the two (2) vehicles took place.
According to the plaintiff and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the
speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when
the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking
the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left
side. At the time the Philippine Rabbit
Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was
still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. Fernando Ramos corroborated the testimony of
the plaintiff and Marcelo Mendoza. He
said that he was on another jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the
jeep of plaintiff when the incident took place.
He said, the jeep of the plaintiff overtook them and the said jeep of
the plaintiff was followed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus which was running very
fast. The bus also overtook the jeep in
which he was riding. After that, he
heard a loud sound. He saw the jeep of
the plaintiff swerved to the right on a grassy portion of the road. The Philippine Rabbit Bus stopped and they
overtook the Philippine Rabbit Bus so that it could not moved (sic), meaning
they stopped in front of the Philippine Rabbit Bus. He testified that the jeep of plaintiff
swerved to the right because it was bumped by the Philippine Rabbit bus from
behind.
Both Mauricio Manliclic and his
driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the Philippine
Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep in question.
However, they explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to
go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left
because it was to overtake another jeep in front of it. Such was their testimony before the RTC in Malolos in the criminal case and before this Court in the
instant case. [Thus, which of the two
versions of the manner how the collision took place was correct, would be
determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the operation of
their respective vehicles.][11]
Petitioner
PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee, specifically
petitioner Manliclic.
On
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendants ordering the said defendants to pay plaintiff
jointly and solidarily the amount of P40,838.00
as actual damages for the towing as well as the repair and the materials used
for the repair of the jeep in question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and
another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P15,000.00 as
attorney’s fees, including appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the defendants are also to pay
costs.[12]
Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals.[13]
In a decision dated
Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review
assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals.
They assign as errors the following:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF THE TSN’s AND OTHER DOCUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S RELIANCE ON THE VERSION OF THE RESPONDENT ON HOW
THE ACCIDENT SUPPOSEDLY OCCURRED.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S UNFAIR DISREGARD OF HEREIN PETITIONER PRBL’s DEFENSE OF EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE IN THE
SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEE.
With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the
pendency of this appeal with this Court, we granted the Motion for the
Substitution of Respondent filed by his wife, Mrs. Precila Zarate Vda. De
Calaunan, and children, Virgilio Calaunan, Carmelita Honeycomb, Evelyn
Calaunan, Marko Calaunan and Liwayway Calaunan.[15]
In their Reply to respondent’s
Comment, petitioners informed this Court of a Decision[16]
of the Court of Appeals acquitting petitioner Manliclic
of the charge[17]
of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Physical Injuries attaching thereto a photocopy thereof.
On the first assigned
error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan,[18] Marcelo Mendoza[19] and Fernando Ramos[20] should not be admitted in
evidence for failure of respondent to comply with the requisites of Section 47,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
For Section 47, Rule 130[21]
to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead
or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former
case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or
those representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same
subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action;
(d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue
involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to
cross-examine the witness in the former case.[22]
Admittedly, respondent
failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules for
a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule. Petitioner
PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had
no opportunity to cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively
against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLI’s employee. The
cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare
that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted
against their employees.[23]
Notwithstanding
the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the
testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner
PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility.
It is elementary that an
objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered
in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the
right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence
because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the
law. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti
that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of
failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as
sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted.[24] Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to
establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like
any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it deserves.[25]
In the case at bar,
petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs
containing the testimonies of respondent Calaunan,
Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when the same were
offered in evidence in the trial court. In
fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted by both petitioners.[26] Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in
evidence the TSN containing the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiff’s witnesses in the
criminal case should not be admitted in the instant case, why then did it offer
the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given
in the criminal case? It appears that
petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. It cannot argue that the TSNs
of the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal case
should not be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the
testimony of the witness for the accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan,
Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of
the testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.
We
do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLI’s argument that
it will be denied due process when the TSNs of the
testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando
Ramos in the criminal case are to be admitted in the civil case. It is too late for petitioner PRBLI to raise
denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSNs. For failure to object at the proper time, it
waived its right to object that the TSNs did not
comply with Section 47.
In
Mangio v. Court of Appeals,[27] this Court, through
Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno,[28] admitted in evidence a
TSN of the testimony of a witness in another case despite therein petitioner’s
assertion that he would be denied due process.
In admitting the TSN, the Court ruled that the raising of denial of due
process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground
for objecting to the admissibility of the TSN was belatedly done. In so doing, therein petitioner waived his
right to object based on said ground.
Petitioners
contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been admitted
in the instant civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to
“testimony or deposition.” We find such
contention to be untenable. Though said
section speaks only of testimony and deposition, it does not mean that documents
from a former case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said documents can be admitted they being
part of the testimonies of witnesses that have been admitted. Accordingly, they shall be given the same
weight as that to which the testimony may be entitled.[29]
On the second assigned
error, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner Manliclic
as to how the accident occurred is more credible than respondent’s
version. They anchor their contention on
the fact that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by
the Court of Appeals of the charge of Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
To be resolved by the
Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclic’s
acquittal in the civil case.
From the complaint, it
can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from, or based
on, quasi-delict.[30] Petitioner Manliclic
was sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence in causing the collision,
while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a
good father in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly
petitioner Manliclic. The allegations read:
“4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M.
plaintiff was on board the above-described motor vehicle travelling
at a moderate speed along the North Luzon Expressway heading South towards
Manila together with MARCELO MENDOZA, who was then driving the same;
“5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon
Express Way, the above-described motor vehicle was suddenly bumped from behind
by a Philippine Rabbit Bus with Body No. 353 and with plate No. CVD 478 then
being driven by one Mauricio Manliclic of
“6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the
above-described motor vehicle was forced off the North Luzon Express Way
towards the rightside where it fell on its driver’s
side on a ditch, and that as a consequence, the above-described motor vehicle
which maybe valued at EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000) was rendered a total
wreck as shown by pictures to be presented during the pre-trial and trial of
this case;
“7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff
sustained bodily injuries which compounded plaintiff’s frail physical condition
and required his hospitalization from July 12, 1988 up to and until July 22,
1988, copy of the medical certificate is hereto attached as Annex “A” and made
an integral part hereof;
“8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total
wreckage of the above-described motor vehicle as well as bodily (sic) sustained
by plaintiff, was solely due to the reckless imprudence of the defendant driver
Mauricio Manliclic who drove his Philippine Rabbit
Bus No. 353 at a fast speed without due regard or observance of existing
traffic rules and regulations;
“9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation
failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of (sic) family in the
selection and supervision of its drivers; x x x”[31]
Can Manliclic
still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent notwithstanding
the declaration of the Court of Appeals that there was an absence of negligence
on his part?
In exonerating petitioner
Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of Appeals
said:
To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant was negligent “when the bus
he was driving bumped the jeep from behind”; that “the proximate cause of the
accident was his having driven the bus at a great speed while closely following
the jeep”; x x x
We do not agree.
The
swerving of Calaunan’s jeep when it tried to overtake
the vehicle in front of it was beyond the control of accused-appellant.
x x x x
Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant
cannot be held liable for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property
with Physical Injuries as defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.[32]
From the foregoing
declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the
ground that he is not the author of the act complained of which is based on
Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
In spite of said ruling,
petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the
mishap. The afore-quoted section applies
only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action
arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability referred to
in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict
only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused.[33]
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the
Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict
or crime – a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a
crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may
produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an
action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.[34] It is now settled that acquittal of the accused,
even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction
of the civil liability based on quasi delict.[35]
In other words, if an
accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil
liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence
only. However, if an accused is
acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission
complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door
to civil liability based on the crime or ex
delicto. In
this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil
liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be
instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.
As
regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana,
same will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of
reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or omission
complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or
negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code.[36] An acquittal or conviction in the criminal
case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case[37]
based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
Petitioners ask us to give credence to their
version of how the collision occurred and to disregard that of respondent’s. Petitioners insist that while the PRBLI bus
was in the process of overtaking respondent’s jeep, the latter, without
warning, suddenly swerved to the left (fast) lane in order to overtake another
jeep ahead of it, thus causing the collision.
As a general
rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for
review. The factual findings of the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive
on the Supreme Court.[38]
Not being a trier of facts, this Court will not allow
a review thereof unless:
(1) the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and
conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond
the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings
of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[39]
After
going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the exceptions that
would warrant our departure from the general rule. We fully agree in the finding of the trial
court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that it was petitioner Manliclic who was negligent in driving the PRBLI bus which
was the cause of the collision. In
giving credence to the version of the respondent, the trial court has this say:
x x x Thus,
which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was
correct, would be determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in
the operation of their respective vehicle.
In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of
Mauricio Manliclic (Exh.
15) given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading
no mention was made by him about the fact that the driver of the jeep was
overtaking another jeep when the collision took place. The allegation that another jeep was being
overtaken by the jeep of Calaunan was testified to by
him only in Crim. Case No. 684-M-89 before the
Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan
and before this Court. Evidently, it was
a product of an afterthought on the part of Mauricio Manliclic
so that he could explain why he should not be held responsible for the
incident. His attempt to veer away from
the truth was also apparent when it would be considered that in his statement
given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading
(Exh. 15), he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus
bumped the jeep of Calaunan while the Philippine Rabbit
Bus was behind the said jeep. In his
testimony before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos,
Bulacan as well as in this Court, he alleged that the
Philippine Rabbit Bus was already on the left side of the jeep when the
collision took place. For this
inconsistency between his statement and testimony, his explanation regarding
the manner of how the collision between the jeep and the bus took place should
be taken with caution. It might be true
that in the statement of Oscar Buan given to the Philippine
Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading, it was mentioned by
the former that the jeep of plaintiff was in the act of overtaking another jeep
when the collision between the latter jeep and the Philippine Rabbit Bus took
place. But the fact, however, that his
statement was given on
x x x x
If one would believe the testimony of the defendant,
Mauricio Manliclic, and his conductor, Oscar Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat
parallel to the jeep when the collision took place, the point of collision on
the jeep should have been somewhat on the left side thereof rather than on its
rear. Furthermore, the jeep should have
fallen on the road itself rather than having been forced off the road. Useless, likewise to emphasize that the
Philippine Rabbit was running very fast as testified to by Ramos which was not controverted by the defendants.[40]
Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclic’s
negligence that caused the smash up, there arises the juris tantum presumption
that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the
diligence of a good father of a family.[41] Under Article 2180[42]
of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence
on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article
2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against
the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such
employee. Therefore, it is incumbent
upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.[43]
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had
shown that it exercised the required diligence in the selection and supervision
of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. In the matter of selection, it showed the
screening process that petitioner Manliclic underwent
before he became a regular driver. As to
the exercise of due diligence in the supervision of its employees, it argues
that presence of ready investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient proof that it exercised the
required due diligence in the supervision of its employees.
In the selection of prospective
employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience and service records. In the
supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for
the breach thereof. To fend off
vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was incumbent on
them.[44]
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[45]
it was explained that:
Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption.
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that “the formulation of various company policies on safety without showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and safety were followed.” x x x.
The trial court found that petitioner
PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection but not in the supervision of its employees. It expounded as follows:
From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very good procedure of recruiting its driver as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no evidence though that it is as good in the supervision of its personnel. There has been no iota of evidence introduced by it that there are rules promulgated by the bus company regarding the safe operation of its vehicle and in the way its driver should manage and operate the vehicles assigned to them. There is no showing that somebody in the bus company has been employed to oversee how its driver should behave while operating their vehicles without courting incidents similar to the herein case. In regard to supervision, it is not difficult to observe that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has been negligent as an employer and it should be made responsible for the acts of its employees, particularly the driver involved in this case.
We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the
occurrence of the accident is not enough to exempt petitioner PRBLI from
liability arising from the negligence of petitioner Manliclic. Same does not comply with the guidelines set
forth in the cases above-mentioned. The
presence of the investigators after the accident is not enough supervision. Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior
to any accident, should have been shown and established. This, petitioner failed to do. The lack of supervision can further be seen
by the fact that there is only one set of manual containing the rules and
regulations for all the drivers of PRBLI. [46] How then can all the drivers of petitioner
PRBLI know and be continually informed of the rules and regulations when only
one manual is being lent to all the drivers?
For failure to adduce
proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the damages caused by petitioner
Manliclic’s negligence.
We now go to the award of
damages. The trial court correctly awarded the amount of P40,838.00
as actual damages representing the amount paid by respondent for the towing and
repair of his jeep.[47] As regards the awards for moral and exemplary
damages, same, under the circumstances, must be modified. The P100,000.00 awarded by the trial
court as moral damages must be reduced to P50,000.00.[48] Exemplary damages are imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good.[49] The amount awarded by the trial court must, likewise,
be lowered to P50,000.00.[50] The award of P15,000.00 for attorney’s
fees and expenses of litigation is in order and authorized by law.[51]
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that (1) the award of moral damages shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and
(2) the award of exemplary damages shall be lowered to P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third
Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] CA rollo, pp. 191-193.
[2] Records, pp. 437-456.
[3] Pre-Trial Order; Records, p. 143.
[4] TSNs
were admitted per Order dated
[5] Exhs.
G-3 to G-10 (
[6] Exh. D-4
(
[7] Exh. E-4.
[8] Exhs. A to H, with submarkings.
[9] Exh. 19.
[10] Exhs. M to P.
[11] Rollo, pp. 45-47.
[12] Records, p. 456.
[13]
[14] CA rollo, p. 193.
[15] Rollo, pp. 59-62, 88.
[16] CA-G.R. CR No. 19749.
[17] Crim. Case No. 684-M-89.
[18] Exhs. G-3
to G-10 (
[19] Exh. D-4 (
[20] Exh. E-4.
[21] Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. - The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
[22] Samalio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140079,
[23] Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People, G.R. No. 147703,
[24] Tison v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121027,
[25] Top-Weld Manufacturing, Inc. v. ECED, S.A., G.R. No. 44944, 9 August 1985, 138 SCRA 118.
[26] Records, pp. 336-337.
[27] G.R. No. 139849,
[28] Now Chief Justice.
[29] People
v.
[30] Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provision of this Chapter.
[31] Records, pp. 1-3.
[32] Rollo, pp. 112-114.
[33] Elcano v. Hill, G.R. No. L-24803,
[34] Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74761, 6 November 1990, 191 SCRA 195, 203-204.
[35] Heirs of the Late Guaring, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 274, 279 (1997).
[36] McKee v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68102 and No. 68103, 16 July 1992, 211 SCRA 517, 536.
[37] Castillo
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48541,
[38] Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. John Bordman
Ltd. Of Iloilo, Inc., G.R. No. 159831,
[39] Sigaya
v. Mayuga, G.R. No. 143254,
[40] Rollo, pp. 47-50.
[41] Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104408, 21 June 1993, 223 SCRA 521, 539.
[42] Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
x
x x x
Employers shall
be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
x x x x
The
responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.
[43] Dulay v. Court of Appeals, 313 Phil. 8, 23 (1995).
[44] Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Sarangaya III, G.R. No.
147746,
[45] Supra note 41 at 540-541.
[46] TSN,
[47] Exhs. C to
C-4 and F. Records, pp. 232-236, 288.
Article 2219 (2), Civil Code.
[48] Kapalaran Bus Line v. Coronado, G.R. No. 85331,
[49] Article 2229, Civil Code.
[50] Tiu v. Arriesgado, G.R. No. 138060, 1 September
2004, 437 SCRA 426, 451; Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 120553, 17 June 1997, 273 SCRA 562, 574-575.
[51] Article 2208 (1), (2) and (5), Civil
Code.