FIRST DIVISION
|
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, Petitioner, - versus - DIAMOND SEAFOODS CORPORATION, ROMEO V.
JACINTO, FRANCISCO YU & SHEOLIN YU,
Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 142420 Present: PUNO,
C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AZCUNA,
and GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated: January
29, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside
in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision[1]
dated May 30, 1997 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.45054, as reiterated in its Resolution[2] of March 15, 2000, affirming an earlier Order of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55, which dismissed, on ground
of prescription, the complaint for a sum
of money with prayer for a writ of attachment thereat commenced by the petitioner
against the herein respondents.
The decision under review recites the factual backdrop
as follows:
On
August 19, 1981, defendant corporation [now respondent Diamond Seafoods
Corporation], represented by Romeo V. Jacinto, and Francisco C. Yu, together
with Sheolin M. Yu, as sureties, executed a continuing Surety Agreement in
favor of the plaintiff [now petitioner] banking corporation, binding
themselves, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff all credit
accommodations, including Trust Receipts and other credit facilities as may
from time to time be incurred by the said defendant, together with their
interests, charges and other miscellaneous costs. On P78,595.99 in favor of the plaintiff,
obliging itself to hold in trust certain merchandise consisting of two cases of
machinery for PBCom’s account. The Trust
Receipt provided, among other things, that the defendant corporation shall sell
the said merchandise and turn over the proceeds thereof to PBCom on or before P85,147.00 in favor of PBCom, with the
undertaking that it will hold in trust certain merchandise consisting of one
(1) lot of electrical fixtures for PBCom’s account under the same obligation of
selling much (sic) merchandise and to turn over the proceeds thereof to PBCom
on or before May 15, 1983, if sold, or to return the goods to the plaintiff on
or before the said date if unsold (See Annexes “B” and “C”, Complaint). Defendants defaulted to comply with any of
the conditions of the aforesaid trust receipts such that as of June 15, 1983
the obligation stood at P327,844.03, minus corresponding marginal
deposits which were deducted from the respective accounts. Despite demands made upon the defendant, no
payment whatsoever was made on the account prompting the plaintiff to file a
complaint against the defendants with the City Fiscal’s Office of Manila for
Violation of P.D. 115 which was dismissed on
The
defendant Romeo V. Jacinto filed an Answer with special and affirmative
defenses, among them being that the action has already prescribed, and prayed
for a hearing thereon. Such motion, and
the Motion for Judgment on the Pleading, were heard on
In an Order[3] of
From
the allegations of the complaint itself, it is rather clear that this action
has long prescribed. The Trust Receipts involved here were dated
Prescinding
from that fact, however, even if we grant that the filing of the complaint with
the City Fiscal’s Office of Manila arrested the running of the prescriptive
period, this case was nevertheless filed beyond the ten year period provided by
law.
While
the other defendants did not raise the defense of prescription in their Answer,
this Court may nevertheless dismiss this case on such ground as it appears very
clearly from the very allegations of the complaint and the documents attached
thereto that prescription has already set in (See Ferrer vs. Ericta, et al., L-41767, Aug. 23, 1978).
The
action having prescribed, no judgment on the pleading in favor of the plaintiff
may be favorably made as the action has got to be dismissed.
Therefrom, petitioner went on appeal
to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 45054. As
stated at the outset hereof, the appellate court, in the herein assailed Decision[4] of
xxx.
We find that appellant [now petitioner] incorrectly invoked Article 1155 of the New Civil Code.
Indeed, anent the issue of prescription, what is clearly applicable is Act No. 3326. Section 2 of said Act, which runs counter to Article 1155 of the Civil Code invoked by appellant, provides that
prescription is interrupted only when judicial proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed. It goes to show that the running of the prescriptive period shall be
halted on the date the case is filed in court, and not on any
date prior thereto.
Considering
that the prescriptive period in the case at bar is ten (10) years (Article
1144 of the Civil Code), and that the complaint below was filed on
Ineluctably,
We believe and so hold the trial court committed no reversible error in
dismissing the complaint for recovery
of a sum of money, on the ground of prescription. (Words in bracket supplied)
Its
motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision having been denied by
the CA in its Resolution[5] of
March 15, 2000, petitioner is now with this Court via the instant recourse on
its singular submission that the two (2) courts below erred “WHEN THEY [A] DISMISSED THE CIVIL COMPLAINT ON THE
GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION BASED ON ACT NO. 3326 INSTEAD OF ARTICLE 1155 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE; AND [B] COMPUTED THE
PERIOD OF PRESCRIPTION CONTRARY TO WELL-SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE.”
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner
invokes Article 1155 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 1155. The prescription of
actions in interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial
demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgement of
the debt by the debtor. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner
insists on the applicability of the aforequoted legal provision, particularly
the underscored portion thereof, relying heavily on alleged demands it made
upon the respondents, as stated in paragraph 8 of its complaint, to wit:
8.
Notwithstanding demands made by PBCom upon the
defendants, the latter failed and refused to pay their long overdue
obligations;[6]
While
the truth of the foregoing allegation is ordinarily hypothetically admitted in
the resolution of the issue of prescription in a motion to dismiss, the
petitioner itself prevented such hypothetical admission when it stated in paragraph
9 of the same complaint that:
9.
PBCom made several attempts to get in touch with the
defendants to demand payment or settle their obligations but same proved futile for reasons beyond PBCom’s control.[7] (Emphasis supplied.)
There could have
been no valid
and effective demand made
in this case considering that the demand letters were never received by the respondents. Petitioner reaffirmed such fact of non-receipt when it
expressly stated in its Appeal Brief[8] before the CA that the demand letters it sent
to the respondents on
However,
the plaintiff-appellant sent its demand letters on
There can be no other factual
conclusion in this case, therefore, than that there was no valid and effective
extra-judicial written demand, as required by Article 1155 of the Civil Code, supra, for the petitioner’s claimed
interruption of the running of the prescriptive period.
Petitioner alternatively claims that
the criminal complaint it lodged against the respondents before the City
Fiscal’s Office of Manila may be considered as an extra-judicial demand for
purposes of Article 1155. There is,
however, nothing on record which shows that the respondents were duly notified
of the filing of such complaint before said office. Just like in the case of
the aforementioned demand letters, the filing of the criminal complaint adverted
to did not have the effect of a valid demand for purposes of Article 1155.
Besides, petitioner itself admits
that said criminal complaint was dismissed by the Fiscal’s Office for failure
to prosecute. Hence, no criminal action
for alleged violation of the Trust Receipts Law was ever instituted in any
court of law against the respondents upon which the civil aspect thereof may be
said to have been deemed instituted.
From the records of the case before
the Court, therefore, there was nothing that interrupted the running of the
ten-year prescriptive period from the time petitioner’s cause of action accrued,
with the non-payment of the civil obligations arising from the maturity of the
subject trust receipts.
We disagree, however, with the ruling of the CA that
the provisions of Act No. 3326,[10] as
amended, instead of Article 1155, should apply. Act No. 3326, as amended, will apply only if what is in issue is the
prescription of a criminal action for violation of special laws, like the Trust
Receipts Law. The Act, which is a penal
statute, finds no application in computing the period when a civil suit for breach
of contract based on trust receipts, such as the instant case, prescribes. Petitioner is thus correct in citing Article
1155 as the pertinent law in this civil case.
The CA’s error notwithstanding,
the Court sustains
the result of its affirmance of the trial court’s
dismissal of the complaint in this case because the instant civil action
was indeed filed beyond the 10-year prescriptive period provided
under Article 1144[11]
of the Civil Code, which had not been
interrupted by any
action filed in court, or any written extrajudicial demand as explained above,
or any written acknowledgement of the debt by herein respondents as provided in
Article 1155.
WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is DENIED for lack
of merit.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
Chairperson
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate
Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate
Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Jainal D. Rasul (now ret.), with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Demetrio G. Demetria (both now ret.), concurring. Rollo, pp. 107-114.
[2]
[3]
[4] Supra note 1.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Id at 78.
[10] AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN.
[11] The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.