Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
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SAMAHAN NG MASANG PILIPINO SA MAKATI, INC. (SMPMI), represented by
Chairman Robert L. Mora, Sr., |
G.R. No. 142255 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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- versus - |
Quisumbing, J.,
Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. |
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BASES
CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY |
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(BCDA),
represented by BCDA Chairman Rogelio Singson, and MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUIG, represented
by Mayor Ricardo D.
Papa, |
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Respondents. |
Promulgated: |
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January
26, 2007 |
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D
E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before
the Court is a novel Petition for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and Injunction,[1]
filed by petitioner Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati, Inc. (SMPMI),
to prohibit respondent Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) from
evicting its members from their houses in
The
facts are undisputed. The members of
SMPMI, allegedly comprising over 20,000 families, are residents of
It further
asserts that Section 8[4] of
RA 7227, which stipulates the area of
As
a background, on March
13, 1992, RA 7227 created the BCDA to “accelerate the sound and balanced
conversion into alternative productive uses of the Clark and Subic military
reservations and their extensions (John Hay Station, Wallace Air Station,
O’Donnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval Communications Station, and
Capas Relay Station),”[5]
and “to raise funds by the sale of portions of Metro Manila military camps.”[6] Pursuant to this Act, then President Ramos
issued Executive Order (EO) No. 40,[7]
series of 1992, specifying, among others, the portions of Metro Manila military
camps to be utilized to generate capital for the BCDA. Among these Metro Manila military camps is
In
its Comment,[8]
BCDA asserts ownership of
The Court takes
judicial notice of the fact that the hectarage embraced by TCT No. 192 (OCT No.
291) consists of Government property.
Three things persuade the Court:
(1) the decrees of Proclamations Nos. 192 and 435; (2) the
incontrovertible fact that OCT No. 291 has been duly cancelled; and (3) the
decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. CV No. 00293, affirming the
decision of Hon. Gregorio Pineda, Judge of the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch XXI, in LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 2484, Case No. R-1467 thereof,
entitled “In Re: Issuance of Owner’s
Duplicate of Certificate of Title No. 291,” as well as our own Resolution, in
G.R. No. 69834, entitled “Domingo Palomares, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court”.[9]
BCDA
maintains that pursuant to Sec. 7[10]
in relation to Sec. 8[11]
of RA 7227, the ownership of the Metro Manila military camp lots in question is
transferred to BCDA by the President and specifically earmarked for vital and
important government infrastructure projects.
In sum, it asserts that its takeover of
BCDA
further counters that SMPMI has no cause of action as it is not the real party
in interest; on the contrary, it should either be the USA or the individual
persons affected by the eviction.
Besides, it argues that SMPMI or its members have not shown ownership
over the lots they are occupying that are to be accorded protection pursuant to
Rule 58 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure on preliminary
injunction. Also, BCDA contends that in
as much as the ownership of
BCDA
then traced history which revealed the conveyance of then Fort William McKinley
property to the Philippine Government, specifically citing the July 4, 1946
Treaty of General Relations, the Preamble of the Military Bases Agreement, and
US Diplomatic Note No. 0634 where the USA acknowledged that said Fort was owned
by the Philippine Government.
Finally,
BCDA raises the issue that petitioner cannot assail the title of the subject
lots in
The Issues
In its
A
WHETHER OR NOT
PETITIONERS HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST RESPONDENTS
B
WHETHER OR NOT BCDA
HAS A LAWFUL RIGHT OVER THE PROPERTY
C
WHETHER OR NOT
PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF FORUM-SHOPPING
D
WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE IS A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE TITLES OVER THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION[13]
On the other hand,
petitioner raises in its November 27, 2000 Memorandum the following
issues for our consideration:
I
WHETHER OR NOT BCDA
(RA 7227) CAN JUST LEGALLY STAKE ITS CLAIM IN ANY PART OF
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE
BCDA AND
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE BCDA CAN EJECT THE MEMBERS OF THE PETITIONERS WITHOUT OFFERING THEM A SUITABLE ALTERNATIVE OF HOMESITE AS PROVIDED UNDER PD 1576 (LINA LAW)? [SIC]
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT MAY ISSUE A RESTRAINING ORDER TO BCDA/MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUIG PENDING THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONTROVERSY TO AVERT FUTURE VIOLENCE?[14] [SIC]
The Court’s Ruling
Relative
to the issuance of a TRO or injunction, the core issue to be resolved is who
between petitioner SMPMI and BCDA has the right of possession over the
particular parcels of land which are subject of this petition. In this regard, SMPMI insists that if the
ruling is in favor of respondent BCDA, then BCDA and respondent Municipality
of Taguig cannot extrajudicially eject its members; at the very least,
respondents must comply with RA 7279, commonly known as the “Lina Law,” which
provides a suitable alternative homesite before eviction is enforced.
We
rule in favor of BCDA.
The
instant action is essentially for prohibition, which is the issuance of a
restraining order or writ of injunction against BCDA and the
In
the absence of a clear legal right, the writ must not issue. Indeed, a restraining order or an injunction is a preservative remedy
aimed at protecting substantial rights and interests, and it is not designed to
protect contingent or future rights. The
possibility of irreparable damage without proof of adequate existing rights is
not a ground for injunction.[16]
A close
scrutiny of the records at hand shows that petitioner’s members have not shown
a clear right or a right in esse to retain possession of the parcels of
land they are occupying inside
First,
it is unequivocal that the Philippine Government, and now the BCDA, has title
and ownership over
Second,
respondent BCDA has convincingly shown that TCT No. 2288 in the name of the
Third, it is clear from the records that BCDA has been
granted a clear mandate by RA 7227, specifically by its Sections 7 and 8, and
re-enforced by EO No. 40, series of 1992, to take over and administer Fort
Bonifacio for its development and disposition to raise funds for BCDA projects,
among others, the conversion of Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions to alternative productive uses. The fact that TCT No. 61524, in the name of
the Republic of the
Fourth, it is basic that ownership or dominion includes the
right of possession. In traditional
Roman law, jus possidendi or the right to possess is fundamentally not only
an attribute of ownership but also a direct consequence of ownership. Thus, from BCDA’s ownership of the subject
lots originates the rights of possession, use, and disposition.
Fifth, prescription does not apply if the subject land is
covered by a Torrens Title, as in the case at bar. Moreover, the equitable remedy of laches has
not been proven to have accrued in favor of the members of petitioner for them
to be accorded better right of possession of the subject lots. Laches is evidentiary in nature and cannot be
established by mere allegations in the pleadings.[26] As it is, in the instant case, laches has not
even been alleged, much less proved.
Sixth, of greater import is the basic tenet that neither
prescription nor laches runs against the State.
Thus, even granting arguendo that the subject lands had been
erroneously issued titles in favor of third parties, which is definitely not
the case; neither prescription nor estoppel by laches applies against the
State. In a catena of cases, we have consistently reiterated this hornbook
doctrine. Thus, in East Asia Traders,
Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines,[27]
we reiterated the doctrine citing Reyes v. Court of Appeals:[28]
In so far as the timeliness of the action
of the Government is concerned, it is basic that prescription does not run against the State. x x x
The case law has also been:
‘When the government is the real party in
interest, and is proceeding mainly to assert its own rights and recover its own
property, there can be no defense on the ground of laches or
limitation.’ x x x
‘Public land
fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or
reverted to the State in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Prescription does not
lie against the State in such cases for the Statute of Limitations does not run
against the State. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the
State is not barred by prescription.’[29] (Emphasis supplied.)
This doctrine applies even more in the instant case where the
members of petitioners were not even erroneously granted titles to the subject
lots. As it is, petitioner can neither
invoke prescription nor estoppel by laches.
Seventh,
the issue of lack of technical description and tie-lines is manifestly a
dilatory excuse to muddle the issue of possession of the subject lots occupied
by petitioner’s members. Verily,
petitioner admits that its members do not own the lot where they have erected
their houses—they posit the
Eighth, RA
7279,[31]
otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (UDHA) and
commonly known as the Lina Law, does not accord possession to squatters of
public land. Section 3 (t) of RA 7279
defines “underprivileged and homeless citizens,” who are the beneficiaries of
said law, as:
the beneficiaries of this Act and to individuals or
families residing in urban and urbanizable areas whose income or combined
household income falls within the poverty threshold as defined by the National
Economic and Development Authority and who do not own housing facilities. This shall include those who live in
makeshift dwelling units and do not enjoy security of tenure.
Interestingly,
members of petitioner have not been shown to be “underprivileged and homeless
citizens” to be accorded the benefits of RA 7279. In fact, the photos of the structures that
were demolished reveal that these were built with cement and other strong
materials costing a lot of money and such structures were not mere shanties of
small value. As such, the owners of
these structures, the SMPMI members, have the financial capacity and resources
to build their own housing facilities which take them out of the ambit of
protection under RA 7279. In fact, they
would even be considered as professional squatters under Section 3 (m) of RA
7279 which provides, thus:
‘Professional squatters’ refers to individuals or groups who occupy lands without
the express consent of the landowner and who have sufficient income for
legitimate housing. The term shall also
apply to persons who have previously been awarded homelots or housing units by
the Government but who sold, leased or transferred the same to settle illegally
in the same place or in another urban area, and non-bona fide occupants and
intruders of lands reserved for socialized housing. The term shall not apply to individuals or
groups who simply rent land and housing from professional squatters or
squatting syndicates.
Verily, the pieces of evidence before us
would show that the affected members of petitioner SMPMI are professional
squatters who have sufficient income for legitimate housing but have illegally
occupied the subject lots without the consent of the government or the eventual
owner, the BCDA.
Yet,
despite the non-application of RA 7279, BCDA still offered cash compensation or
relocation to medium-rise buildings, including land-based relocation, and to
persons who built their structures on the subject premises before
Moreover,
it is also undisputed by petitioner that the structures demolished on April 27,
2000 at the Research and Development Center (RDC) Compound were also undergoing
illegal construction, which pursuant to Section 2 (a)[32]
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the UDHA, in relation to Sections
28[33]
and 30[34]
of RA 7279, can be immediately dismantled.
Besides, it is also undisputed that seven (7) structures were left
untouched as their owners were pre-UDHA occupants. Moreover, through a 1997 census conducted by
BCDA and Federation of Military and Civilian Residents (FOMCRES) on the
occupants of Philippine Light Armor Regiment (PALAR), Wildcat, and Sto. Niño
areas contiguous to the RDC Compound, pursuant to an Order issued by the
Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives, the BCDA has clearly
shown that petitioner’s officers could not be found in said areas, which prove
that they are new squatters.[35]
Ninth, RA 7279 does allow extrajudicial summary demolition
and eviction. Section 28 of said Act
pertinently provides, thus:
Section 28. Eviction and Demolition.—Eviction or
demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, may be
allowed under the following situations:
(a) When persons or
entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps,
riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks,
roads, parks, and playgrounds;
(b) When government
infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented; or
(c) When there is a
court order for eviction and demolition.
A perusal of the above proviso clearly shows that the
aforementioned law allows not only judicial eviction and demolition through
court action (e.g., court order), but also summary or extrajudicial eviction
and demolition where structures are built on public places, among others, esteros, railroad tracks,
garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, sidewalks, roads, parks and
playground; and when government infrastructure projects with available funding
are about to be implemented. Of the two
instances of extrajudicial summary eviction and demolition, the first partake of
an abatement of public nuisance of illegal structures built on public places,
and the second particularly partakes of a government infrastructure project
with available funding that is about to be implemented. In the instant case, what is applicable is
the second case of an extrajudicial summary eviction and demolition.
Indeed, respondent BCDA has amply shown that the disposition
and use of subject lots are required to raise funds needed for the conversion
of the
Thus, the development and disposition of portions of
“National government projects” shall refer to all current and future national government infrastructure, engineering works and service contracts, including projects undertaken by government-owned and -controlled corporations, all projects covered by Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718, otherwise known as the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law, and other related and necessary activities such as site acquisition, supply and/or installation of equipment and materials, implementation, construction, completion, operation, maintenance, improvement, repair and rehabilitation, regardless of the source of funding. (Emphasis supplied.)
Based on the aforequoted provision, it is clear that the
project for the conversion, development, and disposition of Metro Manila
military camps by the BCDA, a wholly government-owned corporation, partakes of
a national government infrastructure project.
As such, the present controversy has not only delayed and hampered such
development and disposition of subject lots, but also directly affected the
more primordial purpose of the project which is to raise funds for the
conversion of military reservation that has been pushed by the government for
over a decade. Therefore, the BCDA and
the
Eviction and Demolition was done properly
Moreover, Section 27 of RA 7279 also provides a summary
eviction and demolition against professional squatters, thus:
Section 27. Action Against Professional Squatters and Squatting Syndicates.—The
local government units, in cooperation with the Philippine National Police, the
Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP), and the PCUP-accredited
urban poor organization in the area, shall adopt measures to identify and
effectively curtail the nefarious and illegal activities of professional
squatters and squatting syndicates, as herein defined.
Any person or group identified as such shall be summarily evicted and their dwellings or structures demolished, and shall be disqualified to avail of the benefits of the Program. A public official who tolerates or abets the commission of the abovementioned acts shall be dealt with in accordance with existing laws. (Emphasis supplied.)
While concededly there is no finding that petitioner’s
members are professional squatters, yet, as we mentioned above, the evidence
presented before us tend to show that the affected members of petitioner SMPMI
are professional squatters who have sufficient income for legitimate housing
but have illegally occupied the subject lots without the consent of the
government or the eventual owner, the BCDA.
Be that as it may, respondent BCDA convincingly showed that the
structures demolished were new ones, and that Section 44[37]
of RA 7279 on moratorium on eviction and demolition does not apply in the
instant case. Thus, on the grounds of a
much-delayed government infrastructure project about to be implemented, and the
structures demolished were new ones, BCDA and the
Tenth, belying petitioner’s allegation of harassment,
particularly in the alleged shooting incident of five (5) of its members, is
the March 25, 2002 Joint Resolution[38]
of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, which dismissed two (2)
criminal complaints docketed as OMB-MIL-CRIM-01-0028 and OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0870
filed by two members of petitioner, Pacita L. Pecson and Robert L. Mora, Sr.,
petitioner’s representative in this petition.
The Ombudsman, citing separate investigations conducted by the PNP
Southern Police District and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
categorically found that during the
The Ombudsman found evidence on record that the demolition
was met with violent resistance by affected squatters, some of whom were armed
with unlicensed firearms. Thus,
petitioner’s assertion that its members were harassed and no actual gun-battle
happened is without factual support as the records show that its members
resisted and resorted to violence during the demolition. The Ombudsman concluded that there was no
showing that the demolition was conducted in an inhumane manner considering
that the measures taken by the respondents were commensurate reaction to the actual
resistance posed and violence used by the affected occupants.
Prescinding
from this investigation, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military
found that the eviction and demolition were done in accordance with the rules
and were valid exercises of police power by respondent
In the
light of the foregoing considerations, we find that petitioner has not shown
its right in esse to be protected by a restraining order or an
injunctive writ. Without doubt, the
instant petition must fail.
One last
word. Through a Very Urgent
Manifestation and Motion,[39]
petitioner manifested that the Office of the President issued EO No. 70, series
of 2002, which declared some portions of
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED
for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F
I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 4-8.
[2] SECTION
21. Injunction and Restraining Order.—The
implementation of the projects for the conversion into alternative productive
uses of the military reservations are urgent and necessary and shall not be
restrained or enjoined except by an order issued by the Supreme Court of the
[3] “AN ACT ACCELERATING THE CONVERSION OF MILITARY RESERVATIONS INTO OTHER PRODUCTIVE USES, CREATING THE BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY FOR THIS PURPOSE, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.”
[4] SECTION 8. Funding Scheme. –– The capital of the Conversion Authority shall come from the sales proceeds and/or transfers of certain Metro Manila military camps, including all lands covered by Proclamation No. 423, series of 1957, commonly known as Fort Bonifacio and Villamor (Nichols) Air Base x x x
[5] Sec. 2.
[6]
[7]
Issued on
[8]
Dated
[10] SECTION 7. Transfer of Properties. –– Pursuant to paragraph (a), Section 4 hereof, the President shall transfer forthwith to the Conversion Authority:
(a) Station x x x
(b) Such other properties including, but not limited to, portions of Metro Manila military camps, pursuant to Section 8 of this Act: Provided, however, That the areas which shall remain as military reservations shall be delineated and proclaimed as such by the President.
[12] Supra note 9.
[13] Rollo,
pp. 92-107, at 99.
[14]
[15] Tayag v. Lacson, et al., G.R. No. 134971, March 25, 2004, 426 SCRA 282, 299, citing Crystal v. Cebu International School, G.R. No. 135433, April 4, 2001, 356 SCRA 296, 305 and Verzosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 119511-13, November 24, 1998, 299 SCRA 100, 108.
[16] Id., citing Arcegas v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 122206, July 7, 1997, 275 SCRA 176, 180; see also Idolor v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 141853, February 7, 2001, 351 SCRA 399, 405.
[17] Supra note 9.
[18] Rollo, pp. 108-111.
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation v. Heirs of Baba, G.R. No. 138945, August 19, 2003, 409 SCRA 306, 315, citing Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 133895, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 395, 405–406.
[27] G.R.
No. 152947,
[28]
G.R. No. 94524,
[29] Supra note 27, at 726.
[30]
G.R. No. 163751,
[31] “AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR A COMPREHENSIVE AND CONTINUING URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING PROGRAM, ESTABLISH THE MECHANISM FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.”
[32] Section 2. SCOPE OF APPLICATION. – These Rules and Regulations shall apply to demolitions allowed under Sec. 28 of the Act, to wit:
(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas
such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines,
waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and
playgrounds.
[33] Section
28. Eviction and
Demolition.—Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be
discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the
following situations:
(a) When persons or entities occupy danger
areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines,
waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and
playgrounds;
(b) When government infrastructure
projects with available funding are about to be implemented (emphasis supplied); or
(c) When there is a court order for eviction
and demolition.
In the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving
underprivileged and homeless citizens, the following shall be mandatory:
(1) Notice upon the effected persons or entities at
least thirty (30) days prior to the date of eviction
or demolition;
(2) Adequate consultations on the matter of
resettlement with the duly designated representatives
of the families to be resettled and the affected communities in the areas where
they are to be relocated;
(3) Presence of Local government officials or their
representatives during eviction or demolition;
(4) Proper identification of all persons taking part
in the demolition;
(5) Execution of eviction or demolition only during
regular office hours from Mondays to Fridays
and during good weather, unless the affected families consent otherwise;
(6) No use of heavy equipment for demolition except
for structures that are permanent and
other of concrete materials;
(7) Proper uniforms for members of the Philippine
National Police who shall occupy the first
line of law enforcement and observe proper disturbance control procedures; and
(8) Adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent:
provided, however, That in cases of
eviction and demolition pursuant to a court order involving underprivileged and
homeless citizens, relocation
shall be undertaken by the local government unit concerned and the National Housing Authority with the
assistance of other government agencies within forty-five (45) days from service of notice of final judgment by
the court, after which period the said order shall be executed: provided, further, That should relocation not be possible
within the said period, financial
assistance in the amount equivalent to the prevailing minimum daily wage
multiplied by sixty (60) days
shall be extended to the affected families by the local government unit
concerned.
The Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Housing an Urban Development Coordinating Council shall jointly promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the above provision.
[34] Section
30. Prohibition
Against New Illegal Structures.—It shall be unlawful for
any person to construct any structure in areas mentioned in the preceding
section.
After the effectivity of this Act, the barangay, municipal or city government units shall prevent the construction of any kind or illegal dwelling units or structures within their respective localities.
[35] See
Data Validation List of FOMCRES members at
[36] “AN ACT TO ENSURE THE EXPEDITIOUS IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLETION OF GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS BY PROHIBITING LOWER COURTS FROM ISSUING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS OR PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTIONS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.”
[37] Section 44. Moratorium on Eviction and Demolition.—There shall be a moratorium on the eviction of all program beneficiaries and on the demolition of their houses or dwelling units for a period of three (3) years from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the moratorium shall not apply to those persons who have constructed their structures after the effectivity of this Act and for cases enumerated in Section 28 hereof (emphasis supplied).
[38] See separate folder, last four (4) pages.
[39] Rollo, pp. 270-305.