ERNESTO
V. YU and G.R. No. 130316
ELSIE
O. YU,
Petitioners, Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,*
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
GARCIA, JJ.
BALTAZAR
PACLEB,[1]
Respondent. Promulgated:
January
24, 2007
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D E C I
S I O N
CORONA, J.
The present petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court originated from an action for forcible entry and damages filed by
petitioners Ernesto and Elsie Yu against respondent Baltazar
Pacleb.
The
antecedent facts follow.
Sometime
in September 1992, Ruperto Javier allegedly offered
to sell Lot No. 6853-D to petitioners for P75 per sq.m.
The lot was approximately 18,000 square meters and was located in Barangay Langkaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite.
Javier supposedly purchased the lot from one Rebecca del
Rosario who, in turn, acquired it from respondent and his wife. The title of the property
(Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. T-118375), however, remained in
the names of respondent and his wife.
The instruments in support of the series of alleged sales were not
registered.
On
September 11, 1992, petitioners accepted the offer and gave Javier P200,000 as downpayment for the
lot. Javier then delivered his supposed muniments of title to petitioners. After the execution of a contract to sell, he
formally turned over the property to petiti oners.
At
the time of the turn-over, a portion of the lot was occupied by Ramon C. Pacleb, respondent’s son, and his wife as tenants. On
September 12, 1992, Ramon and his wife allegedly surrendered possession of
their portion to petitioners. Later on,
petitioners appointed Ramon as their trustee over the subject lot.
Aside
from taking possession of the property, petitioners also caused the annotation on
TCT No. T-118375 of a decision rendered in their favor in Civil Case No.
741-93.[2] This
decision attained finality on April 19, 1995.
Petitioners
alleged that they exercised ownership rights as well as enjoyed open, public
and peaceful possession over the property from September 12, 1992 until the
early part of September 1995. During
this time, respondent was in the United States.
Upon
respondent’s return to the Philippines in May 1995, he allegedly entered the
property by means of force, threat, intimidation, strategy and stealth thereby
ousting petitioners and their trustee, Ramon.
Despite repeated demands, respondent,
asserting his rights as registered owner of the property, refused to vacate the
premises and surrender its possession to petitioners.
Petitioners
filed an action for forcible entry[3] in the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Dasmariñas, Cavite on November 23, 1995. Respondent filed an answer
with compulsory counterclaim dated December 8, 1995. After the issues were joined, the MTC
required the submission of the parties’ position papers at a preliminary
conference on March 11, 1996. Respondent failed to comply.
On
June 17, 1996, the MTC ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the [respondent] and other persons claiming right under him are hereby ordered
to surrender physical possession of Lot No. 6853-D in favor of the
[petitioners] and to pay the sum of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P25,000.00) PESOS as
attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On
appeal,[5] the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite rendered a decision affirming the MTC decision in
toto.[6]
Respondent
elevated his case to the Court of Appeals (CA)[7] which
rendered the assailed decision on March 18, 1997:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED;
the Decision dated October 25, 1996 of the [RTC] of Imus,
Cavite in Civil Case No. 052-96 and the Decision of
the [MTC] of Dasmariñas, Cavite
in Civil Case No. 182 are SET ASIDE; and Civil Case No. 182 for Forcible Entry
and Damages is hereby ordered DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[8]
In
a resolution dated August 20, 1997, the CA denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
Before us now come petitioners who
claim that the appellate court erred in finding that respondent had prior
physical possession of the subject property.
“In
an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior
possession of the land or building and that he was deprived thereof by means of
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.”[9] The
plaintiff, however, cannot prevail where it appears that, as between himself
and the defendant, the latter had possession antedating his own.[10] We are
generally precluded in a Rule 45 petition from reviewing factual evidence
tracing the events prior to the first act of spoliation.[11] However,
the conflicting factual findings of the MTC and RTC on one hand, and the CA on
the other, require us to make an exception.
We
overrule petitioners’ contentions.
The
Civil Code states that possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of
a right.[12]
In the grammatical sense, to possess means to have, to actually and physically
occupy a thing, with or without right.[13]
“Possession always includes the idea of occupation x x
x. It is not necessary that the person in possession
should himself be the occupant. The occupancy can be held by another in his
name.”[14] Without
occupancy, there is no possession.[15]
Two
things are paramount in possession.[16] First,
there must be occupancy, apprehension or taking. Second, there must be intent
to possess (animus possidendi).[17]
Here,
petitioners failed to establish that they had prior physical possession to
justify a ruling in their favor in the complaint for forcible entry against
respondent.
In
the decision in Civil Case No. 741-93 (a case for specific performance and
damages against Javier, the alleged vendor of the lot in question) upon which
petitioners based their right to possess in the first place, the trial court
categorically stated:
The
[petitioners were never placed] in possession of the subject property on
which [was] planned to be [site of] a piggery, nor [were they] given a
clearance or certification from the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer.[18] (emphasis ours)
The
claim that the lot was turned over to petitioners in 1992 was self-serving in
the face of this factual finding. On the
other hand, the tax declarations and receipts in the name of respondent in 1994
and 1995 established the possession of respondent.[19] The
payment of real estate tax is one of the most persuasive and positive
indications showing the will of a person to possess in concepto
de dueño or with claim of ownership.[20]
“[P]ossession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man
has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before he is deemed in
possession.”[21]
In this case, Ramon, as respondent’s son, was named caretaker when respondent
left for the United States in 1983.[22] Due to the
eventual loss of trust and confidence in Ramon, however, respondent transferred
the administration of the land to his other son, Oscar, in January 1995 until his
return in May 1995.[23] In other
words, the subject land was in the possession of the respondent’s sons during
the contested period.
Petitioners cite an alleged document (Kusangloob
na Pagsasauli
ng Lupang Sakahan at Pagpapahayag ng Pagtalikod sa
Karapatan) dated March 10, 1995 executed by them
and Ramon to prove a turn over of possession.
They also seek to prove their exercise of rights over the land through
alleged frequent visits and the designation of Ramon as their own trustee as
declared in a joint affidavit attached to their position paper filed with the
MTC. These instruments, however, fail to
convince us of petitioners’ actual occupancy of the subject land. First,
petitioners themselves acknowledged that Ramon and his wife occupied part of
the land as tenants of respondent.
Second, Ramon, a mere tenant, had no authority to sign such document
dated March 10, 1995 waiving all rights to the land. Third, there was no clear
proof in the records of the appointment of Ramon as petitioners’ trustee save
their self-serving statements to this effect. Finally, at the time the Kusangloob na
Pagsasauli document was executed, the caretaker of
the land was no longer Ramon but Oscar.[24]
Most important, the title of the land in question (TCT No.
T-118375) remained in the name of respondent.[25] “As the registered owner, petitioner had a
right to the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of
ownership.”[26] The Civil Code states:
Art. 538.
Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different
personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise
regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if
there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the dates of the
possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if all these
conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending
determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings.
In
view of the evidence establishing respondent’s continuing possession of the
subject property, petitioners’ allegation that respondent deprived them of
actual possession by means of force, intimidation and threat was clearly untenable. In Gaza v. Lim, we held that:
Where a dispute over
possession arises between two persons, the person first having actual
possession is the one who is entitled to maintain the action granted by law;
otherwise, a mere usurper without any right whatever, might enter upon the
property of another and, by allowing himself to be ordered off, could acquire
the right to maintain the action of forcible entry and detainer,
however momentary his intrusion might have been.[27]
WHEREFORE,
the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated March 18, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42604 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
* No Part.
[1] Baltazar Pacleb passed away during the pendency of this petition. He was substituted by his surviving spouse, Antonieta S. Pacleb, and by his children with his first wife, Angelita Chan Pacleb: Lorna Pacleb-Guerrero, Florencio C. Pacleb and Myrla C. Pacleb.
[2] On April 20, 1993, petitioner Ernesto Yu filed an action for specific performance and damages against Javier, vendor of the lot, because of Javier’s failure to comply with certain conditions of their “Contract to Sell” dated September 11, 1992. In a decision dated September 8, 1994, RTC Branch 22 of Imus, Cavite held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for [petitioner Ernesto] and against [Javier] based on the sale of subject parcel of land to the former who is entitled thereby to the ownership and possession thereof from [Javier] x x x . (Annex “J,” rollo, p. 88)
The finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 741-93 was annotated at the back of TCT No. T-118375. (Annex “K,” rollo, at the back of p. 90)
[3] The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 182.
[4] Penned by Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas of MTC Dasmariñas, Cavite; Annex “A,” rollo, pp. 34-35.
[5] The appealed case was docketed as Appealed Civil Case No. 052-96.
[6] Penned by Judge Cesar A. Mangrobang of Branch 22 of RTC Imus, Cavite; Annex “B,” rollo, pp. 36-37.
[7] The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 42604.
[8] Penned by Associate Justice Fidel P. Purisima (a retired Associate Justice of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez (now Associate Justice of this Court) and Conrado M. Vasquez Jr. of the Second Division of the Court of Appeals; Annex “C,” rollo, pp. 40-43.
[9] Gaza v. Lim, G.R. No. 126863, 16 January 2003, 395 SCRA 261, 269. Citation omitted.
[10] Id. Citation omitted.
[11] Id. Citation omitted.
[12] Civil Code, Art. 523.
[13] Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 238 (Central Professional Books, Inc., Quezon City, Philippines) (1992).
[14] Id.
[15] Id. Citation omitted.
[16] Id., at 238. Paras provided a third element of possession. According to him, “possession must be by virtue of one’s own right,” as an owner or by virtue of a right derived from the owner such as that of a tenant. (Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated 412 [Rex Book Store, Manila, Philippines] [1999])
[17] “The animus possidendi
may be contradicted and rebutted by evidence which tends to prove that the
person under whose power or control the thing in question appears to be, does not in fact exercise the power or control and does
not intend to do so.” (Tolentino,
supra note 13, at 239)
[18] Annex
“J,” rollo, p. 88.
[19] Annex
“C,” rollo, p. 40.
[20] Paras, supra note 16, at 474. Citations omitted.
[21] Dela Rosa v. Carlos, G.R. No. 147549, 23 October 2003, 414 SCRA 226, 235, citing Roales v. Director of Lands, 51 Phil. 302 (1927).
[22] Annex
“C,” rollo, p. 40.
[23] Id.
[24] Annex “C,” rollo, p. 40.
[25] Annex “K,” rollo, p. 90.
[26] Co v. Militar, G.R. No. 149912, 29 January 2004, 421 SCRA 455, 460.
[27] Supra note 9, at 271.