SECOND DIVISION
|
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., LAUREANO T. ANGELES,
and JOCELYN P. CELESTINO Petitioners, - versus - HONORABLE VICENTE Q. ROXAS, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 227,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, WESTINGHOUSE
ELECTRIC CORPORATION, WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC S.A., WESTINGHOUSE INTERNATIONAL
PROJECTS COMPANY, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 125509 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated: |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Challenged via petition for certiorari
is the Quezon City Regional Trial Court’s Resolution dated
The antecedent facts, as culled from
the records of the case, are as follows:
On
WESA subsequently executed a deed of
assignment transferring all its rights and responsibilities in the Contract to
its construction arm-agent, respondent Westinghouse International Projects
Company (WIPCO).[2]
In 1986, President Corazon Aquino
issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 55, which was later amended by E.O. No. 98, transferring
ownership of the already constructed power plant, which had become known as the
Bataan Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP), its equipment, materials and facilities,
records and uranium fuel, to the National Government or its duly constituted
agency.[3] Pursuant to E.O. No. 55, as amended, the
National Government assumed all remaining foreign and local obligations
incurred by the NPC in financing the construction of the BNPP.[4]
In 1988, the Aquino administration
instituted a complaint against WESTINGHOUSE in
On
Subsequently or on October 4, 1995,
President Ramos issued E.O. No. 265, which amended E.O. No. 315 dated
E.O. No. 265 provided that the PC-BNPP
Committee[8]
“shall be the coordinating and policy-making body on the BNPP, including policies
arising from negotiations for a fair commercial settlement of all pending legal
claims that will provide a substantial net benefit to the country,” which “shall
submit its recommendations on BNPP-related policies to the President for
approval.”[9]
On October 11, 1995, the PC-BNPP
Committee issued a “Resolution Adopting The
Essential Terms And Conditions Arrived At By The Government Panel And Westinghouse
Representatives During The Exploratory Discussions From September 29, 1995 To October
9, 1995 For A Compromise Settlement Of The BNPP Controversy And Favorably
Recommending Approval Thereof To His Excellency, The President,” the
salient points of which Resolution follow:
x x x x
NOTING that after a
series of talks which started on September 29, 1995, the government panel and
Westinghouse representatives (Mr. Briskman and Mr. Robert Gross) on October
9,1995, eventually agreed in principle on a settlement involving a
package of more than $100 MILLION, consisting of the following:
(1)
$40 Million in cash (transferable by wire to a bank
account specified by the Republic)
(2)
Two (2) newly manufactured 501-F Econopac combustion
turbines, FOB
(3)
Relinquishment by Westinghouse of the right to recover
more than $200,000 in attorney’s fees previously awarded by the
NOTING that in
exchange for the foregoing cash and utilities, the parties would secure a
dismissal with prejudice of the pending lawsuits, appeals and arbitration
between the Republic and National Power Corporation, on one hand, and
Westinghouse, its affiliates and Burns & Roe, on the other hand, involving
the BNPP controversy and that the Republic would direct National Power
Corporation and other government agencies to lift the ban against Westinghouse
equipment and technology;
x x
x x
OBSERVING that the
present offer of Westinghouse of $40 Million in cash plus two (2) 501-F’s worth
$60 Million represents the highest cash offer (since its $10 Million cash offer
in 1992) and the most advantageous in kind offer (no discount/rebate component
or any corresponding obligation on the side of the Republic);
HAVING IN MIND the
uncertainty of the results of the arbitration, the possibility that some of
Westinghouse’s counterclaims may partly offset any recovery, the prospect that
even a favorable arbitration award could be limited to the $40 million cap
under the original BNPP contract and that even if the government eventually
wins the appeal of the New Jersey verdict, substantial costs would have to be
incurred to pursue a new trial, which result is also uncertain;
RECOGNIZING that the
present offer of Westinghouse will result in greater net economic benefits to
the Republic than any previous settlement offer;
x x
x x
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED that PC-BNPP, with the endorsement of the Republic’s lawyers and negotiating panel, adopts the foregoing essential terms of the settlement agreement and respectfully recommends to His Excellency, President Fidel V. Ramos, the acceptance and approval thereof.[10] (Underscoring supplied)
On
On
Herein public respondent, Branch 227
of the Quezon City RTC, set the hearing of petitioners’ application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order on
On the same scheduled date of hearing,
the Solicitor General, on behalf of
While Atty. Reyes did not deny having
previously filed, in
On
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed [that]:
x x x x
(2) after due hearing, a preliminary mandatory injunction issue upon a bond executed to the party enjoined in an amount to be fixed by the court ordering defendants National Power Corporation and the Republic of the Philippines to stop and/or not to perform further implementation/execution of their obligation/undertaking under the null and void [B]NPP Nuclear Plant Contract between the National Power Corporation and Westinghouse executed on February 9, 1976 in Manila, Philippines; likewise, from further continuing the payments for the contracted loans/interest based thereon unless otherwise securitized; and also from further implementing/executing their undertaking/obligations under the Settlement Agreement between Republic of the Philippines-National Power Corporation and Westinghouse negotiated on October 9, 1995 and allegedly executed on October 13, 1995;
(3) after hearing on the merits, judgment be rendered declaring the [B]NPP Nuclear Plant Contract executed on February 9, 1976 in Manila and all amendments thereto, together with the loan contracts based thereon, as well as the Settlement Agreement executed on October 13, 1995 by defendant Republic of the Philippines/NAPOCOR with Westinghouse, as inexistent and void ab initio;
(4) ordering defendants NAPOCOR and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES to reconvey/turn over the [B]NPP Nuclear Plant equipment and machineries to defendant WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION and/or its corporate agents and to restitute or refund to the former all payments paid for the [B]NPP Nuclear Plant to said Westinghouse, with legal interest from the filing of this complaint;
(5)
making the preliminary mandatory injunction permanent, and ordering defendant
jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to
Article 2208 (2) and (11), Civil Code of the
In essence, the Amended Complaint assailed
the validity of and sought to nullify the following contracts:
(a) The BNPP
Contract;
(b) The loan contracts
entered into by the Republic and NPC to finance the construction of the BNPP;
and
(c) The
Settlement Agreement entered into by the Republic and NPC with Westinghouse on
The Republic filed a Motion to
Dismiss (With Opposition to the Application for Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction)[17] to
petitioners’ Amended Complaint on the following grounds: (a) lis pendens and/or forum-shopping; (b) lack
of legal capacity of petitioners to sue; and (c) lack of cause of action.[18]
For its part, the NPC filed its
Comment/Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint,[19] alleging
that the Amended Complaint failed to state a cause of action against it.
By Order of
On
WIPCO soon filed a Motion to Dismiss[21] petitioners’
Amended Complaint on the following grounds: (a) petitioners have no legal
capacity to sue; (b) the Amended Complaint states no cause of action; and (c) assuming
the existence of a cause of action, the same is nonetheless barred by the
statute of limitations.
By the assailed Resolution of
x x x x
(i) plaintiffs have violated
Supreme Court Administrative Circular 04-94, otherwise known as the Anti-Forum
Shopping Rule, which carries with it, among others, the penalty of
dismissal of the action;
II. that, with respect to the second cause of action,
(i) this
Court has no territorial jurisdiction over foreign and international
bodies situated abroad, more so, if such bodies are foreign and international
courts;
(ii) this Court has no original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of invalidating compromise agreements
entered into in foreign and international courts to settle foreign lawsuits
pending before such foreign and international courts;
(iii) this Court has no jurisdiction to enjoin court proceedings relative to the compromise agreement entered into in foreign and international courts to settle pending foreign lawsuits;
(iv) the application for preliminary mandatory injunction of plaintiffs is denied for lack of merit . . .
(v) the second cause of action did not allege constitutional, public interest, and judicial policy issues so as to qualify plaintiffs under the relaxed rule, as having standing, . . .
(vi) this Court has not acquired jurisdiction over the persons of foreign defendants WELCO and WESA. . . (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
of public respondent’s Resolution dismissing their complaint having been denied
by the other assailed Order of June 18, 1996, they filed the present Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus With Application for A Writ Of Preliminary
Injunction And Prayer For A Temporary Restraining Order directly with this Court
in view of the “transcendental importance” of the issues involved.
Petitioners contend that in
dismissing their Amended Complaint, public respondent abdicated its
constitutional duty to exercise judicial review over the validity of the BNPP
Contract, the loan contracts, and the 1995 Settlement Agreement.
Petitioners further contend that,
contrary to the finding of public respondent, petitioners did not commit forum-shopping
since there is no identity of parties and causes of action in the instant case
and in the complaint filed before the Manila RTC.
Finally, petitioners contend that they
have sufficiently established that the injury caused to them by the contracts
are “actual, direct and immediate” to thus clothe them with standing.
The Solicitor General and WIPCO,
opposing the petition, argue that no grave abuse of discretion attended the
issuance by public respondent of the assailed resolutions considering that,
among other things, petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping; petitioners have
no legal standing; and the propriety of entering into a settlement agreement
involves a political question and is not subject to judicial review.
The issues then are:
(1)
Whether
petitioners have legal standing;
(2)
Whether
petitioners are engaged in forum-shopping;
(3)
Whether
the validity of the Contract and the contracts of loan entered into by the Republic
and NPC with foreign banks to finance the construction of the BNPP, and the
propriety of entering into a Settlement Agreement are subject to judicial
review; and
(4)
Whether
courts may set aside a final judgment rendered by a foreign court.
Legal Standing
In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,[22]
this Court defined legal standing as follows:
“Legal standing” or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term “interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges “such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
In
public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public, asserts a
"public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected
no differently from any other person, and could be suing as a “stranger,” or as
a “citizen” or “taxpayer.” To invest him
with locus standi, the plaintiff has
to adequately show that he is entitled to judicial protection and has a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the asserted public right.[23]
In the
case of taxpayers’ suits, the party suing as a taxpayer must prove that he has
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation. Thus, taxpayers have been allowed
to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that
public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds
are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.[24]
More
particularly, the taxpayer must establish that he has a personal and
substantial interest in the case and that he has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of its enforcement[25] or
that he stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the case, or is
entitled to the avails of the suit.[26]
Petitioners’
allegations in their Amended Complaint that the loan contracts entered into by the
Republic and NPC are serviced or paid through a disbursement of public funds
are not disputed by respondents, hence, they are invested with personality to
institute the same.
Forum-Shopping
Forum shopping exists when, as a
result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion
(other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes
two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble
that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.[27]
As explained by this Court in First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. Thus, there is forum-shopping when, between an action pending before this Court and another one, there exist: "a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful amount to res judicata in the action under consideration; said requisites also constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens." . . . [W]here a litigant sues the same party against whom another action or actions for the alleged violation of the same right and the enforcement of the same relief is/are still pending, the defense of litis pendentia in one case is a bar to the others; and, a final judgment in one would constitute res judicata and thus would cause the dismissal of the rest."[28]
In determining whether forum shopping
exists, it is important to consider the vexation caused the courts and
parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative
agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of
conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same
issues.[29]
In the present case, it is evident
that, vis a vis the above-mentioned complaint
filed in
Thus, the first complaint which was
instituted before the Manila RTC by the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, et
al. as taxpayers’ suit,[30] “Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc.,
et al. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., et al.,” docketed as Civil Case No.
93-66916, sought to declare null and void the Contract, as well as the same loan
contracts entered into by herein respondents Republic and NPC with foreign
banks, and to restrain said respondents from making further payments in compliance
with the loan contracts.[31]
It appears that the first complaint
was dismissed by the Manila RTC upon a motion to dismiss.[32] It further appears that instead of filing an
appeal, the therein petitioners Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. et
al. filed a petition for certiorari with this Court, which was dismissed by Resolution
dated March 1, 1995,[33]
and that thereafter or on July 12, 1995, they filed a petition for mandamus[34]
with the Court of Appeals praying for the following reliefs:
. . . that a temporary restraining order be ISSUED ex-parte enjoining respondent NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES from paying the loans in question they contracted with respondent banks and insurance companies for a period of TWENTY (20) DAYS from date of issuance; that after notice to respondents and within said period, said temporary restraining order be CONVERTED into a preliminary injunction with bond as may be fixed by the Court; that after hearing, judgment be RENDERED making the preliminary injunction permanent and ordering respondent court to reinstate Civil Case No. 93-66916 and to declare respondents WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP. (WELCO) and WESTINGHOUSE INTERNATIONAL PROJECTS CO. (WIPCO), respondents foreign banks and insurances companies IN DEFAULT . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The above-said petition for mandamus
was still pending before the appellate court when herein petitioners filed
their complaint, later amended, before the Quezon City RTC.
Petitioners do not deny that the
first complaint and the petition for mandamus (“first set of cases”) and their
complaint subject of the present petition involve the same causes of action, are
founded upon the same set of facts, and are taxpayers’ suits. Nevertheless, they argue that the first set
of cases and the present case do not have identity of parties since they were
not among the petitioners in the former.
Furthermore, petitioners assert that
a taxpayer’s suit is not a class suit, hence, judgment in one case does not amount
to res judicata in the other.
At all events, petitioners contend
that there is no absolute identity of causes of action since their Amended Complaint
includes the nullification of the Settlement Agreement, which was not raised in
the first set of cases.
Petitioner’s
position does not impress.
A taxpayer’s action has been defined
as follows:
A
taxpayer's bill is essentially a class bill and can be filed only in the common
interest of all the taxpayers of the municipality, to prevent the wrongful
expenditure of the money of the municipality or the wasting of its assets.’ Schlanger v. West Berwick Borough, 261 Pa. 605, 608, 104 A. 764.
‘A class bill, as its name implies, is a bill by several members of a class,
on behalf of themselves and all others in the class, and no relief can be
granted upon it, except upon a ground which is common to all the members of the
class. [Citing cases].’ Ashcom v. Westmont Borough, 298 Pa. 203, 208, 148 A. 112, 114.[35] (Emphasis supplied)
As
to plaintiffs, both suits are brought by
the plaintiff as a citizen and taxpayer, besides as an individual, and
therefore they are taxpayer class actions. x x x,
In Holman
v. Bridges, 165 Ga. 296(2), 140 S.E. 886, this court held: “Where a
taxpayer or property owner brings an action against a county or its officers
upon a matter of public or general interest to all other taxpayers of such
political subdivision, and the action either expressly or by necessary
implication is on their behalf, they are equally bound by the adjudication ,
and a judgment is a bar to any subsequent proceeding by them or any of them
seeking similar relief upon the same facts. x x x”[36]
(Emphasis supplied)
The general principle of class
actions that a judgment in favor of or against the parties representing the
general class is, under the doctrine of res judicata, in favor of or
against all who are thus represented applies to litigations instituted by
taxpayers.
Accordingly, in a suit brought by
citizens and taxpayers to determine a public right or a matter of public
interest, all citizens and taxpayers are regarded as parties to the proceedings
by representation and are bound by the judgment rendered therein.[37]
The
plaintiff there was another taxpayer of the city, suing in the status of
‘citizen and taxpayer,’ and the city itself was a co-defendant. The action was
instituted
x x
x x
Petitioner
first seeks to avoid the effect of the prior judgment on the ground that the
subject matter of the two respective proceedings differs. However, this is
not, properly speaking, a case of different subject matter, but of different
causes of action. Such a difference is immaterial if a postulate of law
essential to the success of the party in the later proceeding has been
distinctly put in issue and adjudicated Contra in the earlier, particularly
where, as here, the subject matter in both proceedings arises out of the
same transaction. See 30A Am.Jur., Judgments, s 360, p. 401; Restatement, Judgments, ss 68, 70, comment pp. 319, 320; N.J. Highway Authority v. Renner, 18 N.J. 485, 493, 494, 114 A.2d 555
(1955); Mazzilli v. Accident, etc., Casualty Ins. Co., etc., 26 N.J. 307, 314,
139 A.2d 741 (1958) (quotation from City of Paterson v. Baker, 51 N.J.Eq. 49, 26 A. 324 (Ch.1893)).
Nor
will it avail petitioner that the taxpayer in the earlier action was one other
than herself. A taxpayer attacking governmental action in which he has no
peculiar personal or special interest is taken to be suing as a representative
of all taxpayers as a class. The general rule is that in the absence of
fraud or collusion a judgment for or against a governmental body in such an
action is binding and conclusive on all residents, citizens and taxpayers with
respect to matters adjudicated which are of general and public interest.
50 C.J.S. Judgments s 796, p. 337; cf. Edelstein v. Asbury Park, 51 N.J.Super. 368, 389, 143 A.2d 860
(App.Div.1958); see also 18 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d
ed. 1950), s 52.50, pp. 124, 125; 52 Am.Jur., Taxpayers' Actions, s 38, p. 26.[38] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, it is to no avail that
petitioners invoke lack of identity of parties.
For petitioners in the first set of cases and in the instant case are
suing under a common or general interest on a subject matter in a representative
capacity, for the benefit of all taxpayers as a class. As this Court has repeatedly ruled, identity
of parties needed to satisfy the requirement in lis pendens or res
judicata requires only an identity of interest, not a literal identity of
parties.[39]
As
regards identity of causes of action, petitioners do not deny that the first
set of cases – the complaint filed in Manila and the petition for mandamus
filed before the Court of Appeals – involves the same causes of action grounded
on the same set of facts as that of the Amended Complaint filed by them. Indeed, the petition for mandamus essentially
sought to review the Manila RTC order dismissing the first complaint. Petitioners’ incorporation of an additional
cause of action in their Amended Complaint filed before the Quezon City RTC, occasioned
merely by subsequent events, does not absolve petitioners from forum shopping.
Additionally,
petitioners violated the requirement to report to the courts the fact that a
similar action had been filed or is already pending before the courts,
regardless of who initiated such similar action. For Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court
requires:
SEC.
5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party
shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action
or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such pending action or claim, a
complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter
learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he
shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein
his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Granted
that petitioners were initially unaware of the existence of the first set of cases,
albeit their counsel was one of the petitioners therein, such fact was already
brought to their attention during the hearing of their application for a
temporary restraining order[40] conducted
after the filing of their Complaint. When
petitioners subsequently filed their Amended Complaint, however, they failed to
report the pendency of the petition for mandamus before the appellate court
bearing on the dismissal by the Manila RTC of the complaint filed by the Anti-Graft
League of the Philippines, Inc. Public respondent’s
dismissal of the Amended Complaint on the ground of forum shopping is thus in
order.
This
leaves it unnecessary to pass on the rest of the issues.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate
Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate
Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 128, 160.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
[7] Rollo, p. 146.
[8] The BNPP Committee shall be composed of
the Secretary of Energy as Chairman, the Secretary of Finance as Vice-Chairman,
and as members, the Secretary of Budget and Management, Secretary of Trade and
Industry, Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, Governor
of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Solicitor General,
President of the NPC and President of the Philippine National Oil Company (Sec. 2, E.O. No. 265, x. or 1995).
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] “Anti-Graft
League of the Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., et
al.,” Civil Case No. 93-66916, Regional Trial Court,
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] G.R. No. 141284,
[23] Vide:
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,
G.R. No. 171396,
[24] Del Mar v.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 400 Phil. 307 (2000) citing Kilosbayan,
Inc., et al. v. Morato, et al., 320 Phil. 171 (1995);
Dumlao v. Comelec, G.R. No.
L-52245,
[25] Gonzales v. Narvasa, 392 Phil. 518 (2000) citing People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 50 (1937).
[26] Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra, citing Section 2, Rule 3, Rules of Court and Board of Optometry v. Colet, 328 Phil. 1187 (1996).
[27] Municipality of Taguig v. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142619, September 13, 2005, 469 SCRA 588 citing Rudecon v. Singson, G.R. No. 150798, March 31, 2005; Chemphil Export and Import Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 619 (1995).
[28] Prubankers Association
v. Prudential Bank & Trust Company, 361 Phil. 744 (1999).
[29] Municipality of Taguig
s. Hon. Court of Appeals, supra, citing First Philippine International
Bank v. Court of Appeals, 322
Phil. 280 (1996).
[30] Rollo, p. 172.
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35] Gericke v. City of
[36] Housing
Authority of the City of
[37] 74 Am Jur 2d, Taxpayer’s Actions, sec. 62.
[38] Petition of Gardiner, 67 N.J. Super 435, 170 A 2d 820 (1961).
[39] Vide: First Philippine International Bank, et al.
v. Court of Appeals, supra; Luzon Development Bank v. Benedicto C. Conquilla, G.R.
No. 163338, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 533.
[40] Rollo, p. 38.