FIRST DIVISION
|
PEDRO
GONZALES, ELY GONZALES, BENITO CASIDSID, TANDOY MINDORO, and BADBAD PIANA, in
their respective personal capacities and in behalf of other prior forest land
occupants similarly affected by AFFLA No. 82, Petitioners, -
versus - MADAME PILAR
FARM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Regional Director BERNARDO AGALOOS, Director
EDMUND CORTEZ, Bureau of Forest Development, and Honorable RODOLFO DEL
ROSARIO, Minister of Natural Resources, Respondents. x- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x PEDRO
GONZALES and ELY GONZALES,
Petitioners, - versus
- Honorable INOCENCIO
JAURIGUE, Presiding Judge, MTC of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro,
MADAME PILAR FARM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, District Forester ALFREDO SANCHEZ,
Regional Director BERNARDO AGALOOS, and Director EDMUND CORTEZ, Bureau of Forest
Development, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 115880
Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated: |
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
Before us is this petition* for
review on certiorari to annul and set aside the Decision[1] dated March 24, 1994
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 31159, affirming an
earlier Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, in its Civil
Case Nos. 525 and 542 which directed the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro to proceed with the trial of
Criminal Case No. 7852, a prosecution for Illegal Pasturing thereat filed against the herein petitioners
Pedro Gonzales and Ely Gonzales.
The facts:
The case revolves around the lease of public lands for
agro-forestry farm purposes, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines,
as amended. The standard documentation then for this public land award was a pro forma “Agro‑Forestry Farm
Lease Agreement” (AFFLA) prepared and processed by the Ministry of Natural Resources
(MNR), now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), thru the
then Bureau of Forest Development (BFD).
On
or around October 8, 1982, Pilar Alarcon
Paja, for and in behalf of “Madame Pilar Farm Development Corporation,” applied for an
agro-forest farm lease covering parcels of land situated in Sitio
Tugtugin – Caguray River, Barangay Murtha, Municipality of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro for the
purpose of raising plant crops for the Alcogas
program of the government.
At that time, “Madame Pilar Farm
Development Corporation” (hereinafter “Pilar Farm”)
was still unregistered, its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws having been
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) only on March 1, 1983,
and the corresponding registration certificate - Registration No. 111139 –
being issued over two weeks later on March 18, 1983.
Out of the total 2,400 hectares applied for, which included
an abandoned pasture area of one Fidel del Rosario, the MNR approved only a
slightly smaller area. On
That
sometime in June, 1983 up to the present, at Sitio Panagsangan, [Brgy] Murtha, San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, both the accused without any permit or authority from
the [BFD] director … did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
occupy portion of forest zone for their livestock pasturing and is within [Pilar Farm’s AFFLA
No. 82] … [to] its damage …. (Words in bracket added)
To
the aforesaid complaint, the Gonzaleses filed a Motion and Petition[2] therein praying the MTC to dismiss the complaint, or, in the
alternative, to suspend the criminal action on grounds of erroneous venue,
violation of the equal protection guarantee and prejudicial question, among
others.
On January 21, 1985, the Gonzaleses,
joined by several others also claiming to be prior occupants of certain parcels
covered by AFFLA No. 82, filed with the RTC
of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro a petition for
prohibition and mandamus against the then MNR Minister, certain BFD officials
and Pilar Farm. The petition, basically to challenge
the agro-forest lease award, was docketed as Civil Case No. 525.
Meanwhile,
on
In view of the above denial order, the Gonzaleses
filed a second petition before the RTC, this time a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition against MTC Judge
Inocencio M. Jaurigue who
issued the said order of denial and against the BFD officials earlier impleaded as respondents in Civil Case No. 525. The RTC docketed the second petition as Civil Case No. 542.
On
On
The
Court has not lost sight of the fact that petitioners quoted a declaration of
the B.F.D. District Officer … that the award to respondent [Pilar
Farm] by the B.F.D. Central Office was made “despite the B.F.D. District
Certification that ----the applied area falls within Southern Mindoro Lumber Corporation and District Forest Occupancy
Management Project wherein forest occupants were permanently settled”.
Towards
the close of hearing on
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the above
resolution.
On
On June 4, 1987, the RTC resolved to reconsider its
dismissal of Civil Case No. 525 in
the light of an alleged supervening execution of an affidavit by San Jose
District Forester Alfredo Sanchez who allegedly instructed petitioner Pedro
Gonzales to transfer his herd to the cancelled pasture area of Fidel del
Rosario, a portion of which had been included in AFFLA No. 82. The pertinent part of the reinstating resolution[3] reads:
It
must be mentioned the petitioners’ Motion For Reconsideration of the dismissal
of Case No. 525 had been pending as of the date the Order for consolidation was
issued; xxx.
The
result of the succession of pleadings is that in the first case (No. 525), the
Court has to act on the Motion For Reconsideration without any pleading nor
comment from any of [the] respondents.
In specifically giving a margin for the officials to interpose the
Bureau's comment, the Court gave way for that Office to manifest whether any
action had been taken by the Bureau on petitioners’ claim after the
Resolution of dismissal had been issued … that the government was “still
locating” an area to be awarded to petitioners, and that the situation depicted
in the District Forester's statement would be verified.
On
the other hand, petitioners now harp on the abuse-of-discretion-angle, which
shifts the jurisdiction to the judiciary.
Definitely
… the Court should not seek to substitute its judgment, its assessment, for
that of the administration body, the [BFD].
All that is believed now open to be inquired into is the subject of
abuse of discretion, the conduct of proceedings which led to that award.
xxx xxx xxx
It is
understood that the decision on Case No. 525 will be decisive of Case No. 542;
hence, no pleading need be filed in Case No. 542 meanwhile. (Underscoring in the original; words in bracket added.)
On April 19, 1988, however, the RTC issued in Civil Case No. 525 a Resolution again dismissing
the said case, predicating its action
basically on the same reason set forth
in its earlier August 20, 1986 ruling. Wrote the court:
The
fundamental issue … encountered in the beginning was want of jurisdiction for
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Dismissal therefore was reconsidered, because petitioners cited a basis
for alleging abuse of discretion. In essence, the “abuse” … was the circumstance
that the area to which petitioners had been previously instructed by the
District Forester to transfer his herd
became a part of the area leased to [Pilar Farm]. The impression given … was that the [BFD]
Central Office, which granted [AFFLA No. 82] …, disregarded the word of the
District Forester, which would have favored petitioners. Giving way to the possibility that the
procedure observed … constituted an abuse of discretion, the Court set the case
for trial solely on that question.
Public
respondents, moving for reconsideration …, state that the sworn statement of
the District Forester (April 3, 1986) to the effect that sometime in 1981, he
instructed Pedro Gonzales to transfer his herd to the cancelled pasture area of
Fidel del Rosario, was a “reversed stand” of that official …. It was deemed a reversal of his letter of
The
actuation of the District Forester was regarded by public respondents as an
encroachment into the power and authority of the Bureau Director.
The
Supplemental Opposition to that Motion reiterated petitioner's reliance on the
District Forester's alleged instruction and cited the disregard thereof as
abusive.
Replying
to that Supplemental Opposition, the public respondents dwelt on the factual,
physical justification for the award to private respondent, that is, the
finding that during the investigation or inspection in July 1981, [the
Gonzaleses] were not occupants of subject area.
Moreover, public respondents state that to petitioners’ [pasture] lease
agreement had expired … and a “Certification” by the Regional Director
(February 19, 1985) states that the processing of the application for renewal
was held in abeyance pending the location of replacement site.
The
determination of whether petitioners’ application for lease of an area … was
accorded the requisite attention or given the proper action by the [BFD] falls
initially on the executive department ….
It may be gleaned from the papers now on file (quite voluminous) that
the internal organization, the delineation of functions according to the
set-up, the detailed instructions and regulations issued, all come into play in
the present dispute, and, at this stage, these are not for the Court to dwell
upon. The questions of confirming
whether the District Forester instructed or authorized Pedro Gonzales to
transfer his herd as claimed, and, in the affirmative, whether that was within
his power or functions, so as to confer a right on Pedro Gonzales, are all
embraced within the administrative aspect - in which, judicial intervention is
not authorized.
xxx xxx xxx
In
resume, since it now appears that the sworn statement relied upon by
petitioners is, after all, for the Bureau to consider, the Court is constrained
to revise its ruling embodied in the Resolution of
Therefrom,
the petitioners went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 15341. On October 18, 1989, the
appellate court, on the premise that the RTC erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 525 without
giving the petitioners the chance to prove that the findings of forestry
officials were not supported by the evidence on record, ordered the remand of the case for trial and decision.
Following the
remand of Civil Case No. 525 and the subsequent trial of the
consolidated cases, the
RTC, via an
Order[4] dated December 21, 1992, dismissed Civil Case Nos. 525 and
542, with an express directive for the
MTC of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro “to proceed to try and decide Criminal Case No. 7852 against
Pedro Gonzales for illegal pasturing.”
Again,
the petitioners went on appeal to the CA whereat their appellate recourse was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31159.
For its part, respondent Pilar Farm also interposed
an appeal which the CA dismissed for having been filed out of time.
In
the herein assailed Decision[5]
dated
1. The nature
of the petition filed before the RTC basically required the petitioners to
establish grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent MNR and BFD
officials, but petitioners failed to discharge the burden;
2. But assuming that the cases before the RTC partake
of an appeal from the MNR, the recourse would still fail owing to submitted
evidence showing that:
a. AFFLA No. 82 was regularly issued;
b. all portions of the leased area applied
for under bona fide occupation or
claims were excluded from the coverage of AFFLA No. 82;
c. that the
priority right of Mrs. Pilar Alarcon Paja over the leased area was acquired
ahead of other applicants; and
d. that
during the investigation and inspections on July 1987, the Gonzaleses were
not the occupants of the subject area.
Thereafter,
the petitioners filed a pleading styled “Motion” asking the CA to render a
ruling on whether or not the RTC violated procedural due process in not
resolving their offer of rebuttal evidence which forced them to make a proffer
of proof. In a Resolution[6] dated
Hence,
petitioners’ present recourse submitting for our consideration the following
issues:[7]
1. WHETHER
OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
DECLINED TO RULE ON WHETHER THE
2. WHETHER
OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT “BY THE NATURE OF THIS
PETITION, PETITIONERS TOTALLY FAILED TO ESTABLISH LACK OF JURISDICTION, GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND/OR THE UNLAWFUL NON-PERFORMANCE OF DUTY IMPOSED BY LAW
ON PUBLIC RESPONDENTS,” DESPITE ADMISSIONS OR PROOF TO THE CONTRARY.
3. WHETHER
OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT “THERE NO LONGER EXIST ANY
HINDRANCE TO THE PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 7852 NOR ANY BASIS FOR AN
AWARD OF DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLANTS,” DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF
JURISDICTION BY THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT AND BASIS FOR THE AWARD OF DAMAGES.
As
we see it, all the above three (3) issues or grounds emanate from a single core
argument involving the disinclination of the RTC to consider the petitioners’
offer of rebuttal evidence.
The
petition lacks merit.
To
begin with, the rules of evidence accords trial courts considerable discretion
on the matter of admission of rebuttal evidence,[8]
the rule being that, for an effective and efficient administration of justice,
it is essential that litigation must end sometime and somewhere.[9]
A contrary policy could result to an absurd situation where, after admission of
rebuttal evidence, the trial court, to be fair, must allow: sur-rebuttal of the
rebuttal evidence; refutation of the sur‑rebuttal of the rebuttal
evidence; thereafter, a sur‑refutation of the refutation of the
sur-rebuttal of the rebuttal evidence; and so on ad infinitum.
Anent
the first issue, petitioners claim that during the hearings for the presentation
of their rebuttal evidence, the RTC was unusually lenient whenever respondents’
counsels were absent, but did not exhibit the same behavior when petitioners’ counsel
was absent, as exemplified when the RTC viewed the latter’s absence as waiver
of the right to present rebuttal evidence.
Scoring the CA for not correcting a wrong allegedly dealt them below by
the RTC, petitioners now lament:
And
now comes the decision of respondent [appellate] court which refused to review
the most crucial assigned error raised by petitioners. From pages one to twelve thereof, the
decision never discussed the issue on whether the trial court “committed
obvious errors in its ruling during the trial, showed unusual leniency to
respondents and practically ignored the offer of rebuttal evidences, which
constrained appellants to submit the pending incidents for resolution without
further arguments and to make proffer of proof.” Then on page [13] thereof, respondent court
finally concluded that “[w]ith the foregoing disquisition, the Court sees
little or no reason to go into minute detail in discussing the appellants’
remaining assignments to error”. Hence,
the decision of respondent court also ignored the rebuttal exhibits of herein
petitioners.[10]
(Bracketed words added)
We
find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA for not striking down
the RTC’s refusal to admit petitioners’ rebuttal evidence.
For
one, the most appropriate time and forum for the petitioners to present their
evidence, be they evidence-in-chief or rebuttal, is during the trial of Criminal
Case No. 7852 before the MTC.
Petitioners have only themselves to blame for disrupting the proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 7852. They cannot plausibly deny having commenced Civil
Case Nos. 525 and 542 hoping that the outcome in either case would thwart
efforts towards continuing with Criminal Case No. 7852 in the MTC. Else, why attack
as sham the steps and proceedings taken by the BFD leading to the issuance of AFFLA No. 82,
question the regularity of the final lease award and seek its nullification
before the courts when, as correctly held by the CA and the RTC, these are
matters immediately cognizable and better addressed by the MNR?
For
another, even at the RTC level, we can readily observe not only the voluminous
evidence coming from both the petitioners and the respondents, but also the
painstaking evaluation of evidentiary details in the RTC’s single space 20-paged
Order[11]
of December 21, 1992. There is, therefore, no compelling reason for us to
disturb the CA’s findings, in its challenged decision, affirmatory of that of
the RTC, that –
Over
and above the foregoing considerations, the record is replete with documentary
evidence showing the regularity of the award of AFFLA No. 82 in favor of [
Pilar Farm]. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
Absent such stronger countervailing proof as would
disprove the evident showing of the foregoing documents, the [CA] is not
inclined to disturb the lower court’s affirmance of the Ministry of Natural
Resources award of AFFLA No. 82 as well as the findings made in relation
thereto.
Among
the pieces of rebuttal evidence which the petitioners are raising all the way
up to this Court concern alterations and/or intercalation allegedly committed by
the respondents, acts which petitioners insist as being punishable under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, according to the petitioners:
Respondent
court failed to consider that AFFLA No. 82 was purportedly executed on
For
reference¸ we quote paragraph 3, page 19 of the public respondents’ Comment[12]
to this petition:
3. The records of this case also show that
AFFLA No. 82 was originally applied for under the name of “Mrs. Pilar Alarcon
Paja”, and that the same was changed and put under the name of private
respondent corporation after the latter was organized in 1983. Evidently, this explains the discrepancy
between the dates of the Contract of Lease of AFFLA No. 82, and the
incorporation of private respondent corporation in March 1983.
Analyzing
the text of the AFFLA, we find no provision therein requiring that the lessee
must first be a corporation before it may plant and raise crops necessary for
the Alcogas program of the
government. Regardless of whether the
lessee is a single proprietor, a partnership, a corporation or a cooperative,
what matters here is the lessee’s accomplishment of the undertaking to plant
and raise said crops.
This
brings us to the matter of notarial jurisdiction. It must be stressed right off
that Pilar Alarcon Paja signed the
necessary lease contract documents. When she affixed her signature on and acknowledged
executing the AFFLA before a Notary Public for the City of
It
cannot be over emphasized that when Mrs. Paja signed the AFFLA ready-made form on
Article
1319. Consent is manifested by the
meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are
to constitute the contract. The offer
must be certain and the acceptance absolute.
A qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer.
It may be that Pilar Farm was
issued its SEC registration certificate only on
In any event, the MNR, following its rules and exercising
its administrative discretion, did not find the situation thus depicted
sufficient ground to reject the application altogether. To borrow from National Power Corporation v. Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc.,[14]
the exercise of discretion is usually a policy decision that necessitates
inquiry and deliberation on the wisdom and practicalities of a given course of
action, in this case approving or denying the lease application. The role of courts is to ascertain whether a
branch or instrumentality of government has transgressed its constitutional
boundaries. Courts will not interfere with executive or legislative discretion
exercised within those boundaries. Otherwise, they stray into the forbidden
realm of policy decision-making.[15]
And until the MNR or
the DENR cancels AFFLA No. 82, Pilar Farm shall
continue to enjoy the rights accruing therefrom to
the exclusion of petitioners Gonzaleses, et al.
Turning
now to the second issue, petitioners bemoan the fact that the RTC, in refusing
to consider their rebuttal evidence, arrived “at a conclusion based on pure
speculation, surmises and or conjectures, which calls for the judicial
reexamination of this … Court.” Pressing the point, the petitioners state:
This
is where respondent court erred the most.
By refusing to consider the rebuttal exhibits of petitioners, it relied
upon respondents’ documentary evidences …
that were hearsay and self-serving. xxx .
We
are not impressed.
Doubtless, the second issue thus raised
pivots on the factual findings of the CA respecting the right of respondent Pilar Farm to its leased area and the petitioners’ lack of
right to enter and occupy a portion thereof. Needless to stress, such issue is
beyond the province of the Court to review, just as it is improper to raise the
same in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[16]
The Court is not a trier of facts; it is not its
function to examine, analyze, winnow or weigh anew the evidence or premises
supportive of such factual determination. This rule all the more assumes an imperative
dimension where, as here, the CA affirms the findings of the lower court. Stated
differently, substantiated findings of the CA are binding on the Court and they
carry even more weight when the said court affirms the factual findings of the
trial court.[17] As it were, the RTC’s
Order [18]
of
The
last issue in the petitioners’ memorandum involves three (3) sub‑issues. In the first, the petitioners argue that the
MTC may not proceed with Criminal Case No. 7852 since the issue, particularly
in Civil Case No. 525, respecting their entitlement to those parcels of Pilar Farm’s leased area occupied by them, constitutes a
prejudicial question, such that there would no longer be any basis for their
prosecution for illegal pasturing if they are adjudged as so entitled. The
second would question a Forest Officer’s authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation for violation of the Forestry Code, as amended. In the third, petitioners call for a
“clinical analysis” of the criminal complaint in question.
The
prejudicial question angle is now moot and academic owing to the RTC’s Order [19]
of December 21, 1992, as affirmed
in
toto by
the CA, making short shrift
of petitioners’ challenge against the validity and the regularity of the
issuance of AFFLA No. 82 and their outlandish claim of having a vested right on
a portion of respondent Pilar Farm’s leased area. In
net effect, the issues in Civil Case Nos. 525 and 542, without more, no longer
pose as impediment to the continuance of Criminal Case No. 7852.
The
sub-issue about “whether or not a Forest Officer has authority to conduct preliminary investigation” is misleading,
assuming as it does that District Forester Alfredo
Sanchez conducted a preliminary investigation. What is more,
this sub-issue is really a non-issue because District
Forester Alfredo Sanchez did not conduct a “preliminary investigation.” With the view we take of this matter because
the record is unclear, the investigation
Mr. Sanchez conducted was not a “preliminary investigation” under the rules on
criminal procedure, but rather an administrative investigation authorized
under Section 89 of the Forestry Code,
as amended, which reads:
Section
89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions.
– A forest officer or employee of the Bureau or
any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest
even without warrant any person who has
committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this
Chapter. He shall also seize and
confiscate, in favor of the Government,
the tools and equipment used in committing the offense xxx. The arresting
forest officer or employee shall thereafter deliver within six (6) hours from
the time of arrest and seizure, the offender and the
confiscated forest products,
tools and equipment
to, and file the proper
complaint with, the appropriate official
designated by law to conduct preliminary investigation and file information in
court.
Lastly,
the sub-issue that calls for a clinical analysis of the criminal complaint, or,
to a specific point, a determination of whether or not the scene of the crime
is situated in the barangay mentioned in the
complaint, need not detain us any longer.
For, at bottom, this sub-issue involves factual matters that should properly be
addressed by the MTC, pursuant to the principle of hierarchy of courts.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
RENATO
C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO
S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* As filed, the petition impleads the Court of Appeals as additional respondent,
which need not be under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Nathaniel P. De Pano, Jr., with
Associate Justices Asaaali S. Isnani
and Corona Ibay-Somera (all ret.), concurring; Rollo, pp. 29-42.
[2] RTC
Records, Vol. IV, pp. 18-21.
[3] RTC
Records, Vol. 1, pp. 347-350.
[4] RTC
Records, Volume III, pp. 1166-1185.
[5] Supra
note 1.
[6] Rollo, pp. 43-44.
[7]
Petitioners’
Memorandum, p. 6;
[8] Paña v. Buyser,
G.R. No. 130502-03,
[9] Siy v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 158971,
[10] Petitioners’
Memorandum, p. 8; Rollo, p. 145.
[11] RTC
Records, Volume III, pp. 1166-1185.
[12] Rollo, pp. 80-101.
[13] AFFLA
No. 82, front page;
[14]
G.R. No. 126204,
[15]
Ibid.
[16]
Tinio v. Manzano, G.R. No.132201,
[17]
Borromeo v. Sun, G.R. No. 75908,
[18] RTC
Records, Volume III, pp. 1166-1185.
[19] Supra
note 20.