GOVERNMENT
SERVICE A.M. No. RTJ-04-1831
INSURANCE SYSTEM, (Formerly OCA IPI No. 99-796-RTJ)
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO,
C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
CARPIO
MORALES,
CALLEJO,
SR.,
AZCUNA
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
HON. VICENTE A. PACQUING,
Presiding
Judge, Branch 28 and
MARIO
ANACLETO M. BAÑEZ, JR.,
Clerk
of Court, RTC, San Fernando
City,
La Union,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
February 2, 2007
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R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA,
J.
In
1971, Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (Bengson) borrowed P4,250,000
from petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), secured by real
estate and chattel mortgages. When Bengson defaulted in the payment of the
amortizations, petitioner extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged properties
and sold them at public auction where it emerged as the highest bidder.
In 1977, Bengson filed an action in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 26[1] to annul
the extrajudicial foreclosure. The trial court, through Judge Antonio Fineza,
declared the foreclosure void and directed petitioner to restore to Bengson the
foreclosed properties, pay damages and costs of suit.
Petitioner appealed the decision to
the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed with modification the trial court’s
decision and remanded the case for reception of evidence on the costs of suit
and determination of the replacement value of the properties should petitioner
fail to return them. The CA decision became final and executory on February 10,
1988.
When petitioner failed to return the
foreclosed properties, the new presiding judge of Branch 26, respondent Judge
Vicente A. Pacquing, ordered it to pay Bengson the equivalent value of the
foreclosed properties. Thereafter, Bengson moved that it be permitted to
present evidence on the costs of suit. On April 6, 1995, the trial court
directed petitioner to pay Bengson P31 million as costs of suit. This
order became final on April 24, 1995.
Petitioner filed an urgent omnibus
motion with the court a quo stating that its counsel, Atty. Rogelio
Terrado, went on AWOL and never informed it of respondent judge’s order.[2] This
motion, treated as petition for relief from judgment by respondent judge, was
dismissed on January 16, 1997.[3]
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration (MR) but respondent judge denied the same on April 23, 1998.
Petitioner then instituted a special
civil action for certiorari in the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47669[4]
assailing the court a quo’s denial of its petition for relief from
judgment. The CA, however, dismissed
CA-G.R. SP No. 47669 for having been filed out of time as three years had
elapsed since the order awarding Bengson P31 million as costs of suit
became final and executory.[5]
Petitioner filed an MR of the above
decision and, while it was pending resolution at the CA, respondent judge, on
December 16, 1998, issued an alias writ of execution ordering petitioner to pay
Bengson the P31 million.[6] Pursuant
thereto, respondent Atty. Mario Anacleto M. Bañez, acting as sheriff of Branch
26, executed the writ and levied on petitioner’s shares of stock in San Miguel
Corporation (SMC) worth P6.2 million. The garnished shares were later
sold at public auction with Bengson as the only bidder.
Aggrieved, petitioner moved to quash
the writ on the ground that its funds and properties were exempt from
garnishment, levy and execution under Section 39 of RA 8291.[7]
Respondent judge denied the motion stating that only funds and properties that
were necessary to maintain petitioner’s actuarial solvency, like contributions
of GSIS members, were exempt from garnishment, levy and execution under RA
8291.[8]
Petitioner filed its MR of the trial
court’s denial of its motion to quash the writ but this was rejected as well.
Via a special civil action for
certiorari with an urgent motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order (TRO), petitioner came to us questioning
the garnishment and sale on execution of its SMC shares. The petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 136874.[9]
We referred G.R. No. 136874 to the CA
for consideration and adjudication on the merits. In the CA, it was re-docketed
as CA-G.R. SP. No. 51131 and was consolidated with CA-G.R. SP. No. 47669.[10]
Later, the CA dismissed both
petitions.[11]
Petitioner questioned the CA’s
dismissal of CA-G.R. SP. No. 47669 via a petition for review in this Court
docketed as G.R. No. 137448,[12] the
ultimate issue of which was the existence of grounds for relief from the P31
million costs of suit judgment by respondent judge.
Later, petitioner filed another case,
a special civil action for certiorari in this Court, this time contesting the
CA’s dismissal of its petition in CA-G.R. No. 51131. Docketed as G.R. No.
141454,[13] the
petition ascribed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA for upholding
the trial court’s issuance of the alias writ of execution and the subsequent
garnishment and sale of its shares in SMC.
Petitioner also filed this
administrative complaint[14] against
respondents for ignorance of the law, bias and partiality, and for violation of
RA 8291. In its complaint, petitioner alleged:
In
fine, [respondent judge] refused to take cognizance of [Section 39, RA 8291].
He refused to await an authoritative and definitive resolution of the issues
[on the exemption of GSIS’s funds and properties] from execution or the issue
of whether GSIS is entitled to a relief from judgment of his [P]31
million peso cost[s] of suit. …[H]e was in a hurry, as Bengson, to execute the P31
million costs of suit…[O]n the other hand, Sheriff Mario Anacleto M. Bañez,
seemed to have the same objective when he refused to take heed of [GSIS’s
request] to hold in abeyance the execution sale on the basis of Section 39 (RA
8291).
The
foregoing only shows [respondent judge’s] deliberate disregard of the express
provisions of [RA 8291], specifically Section 39…and his bias, given his
exorbitant award for cost[s] of suit, bereft, as it is, of any legal basis. It
evidently reveals a malicious scheme that seriously undermines the very
integrity and impartiality of his court.
The
same can be said of the acts of Sheriff Bañez in garnishing and selling [GSIS’s
shares of stock in SMC] to Bengson, characterized by an unusual swiftness and
in clear disregard of the express provision of Section 39, RA 8291…[15]
We referred the complaint to the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for investigation, report and
recommendation. In its report[16] to the
Court, the OCA found nothing in the records to support petitioner’s accusations
against both respondents. According to the OCA, even assuming that respondent
judge erred in interpreting RA 8291, such error did not constitute gross
ignorance of the law. It added that the records also failed to prove malice,
fraud, dishonesty or bad faith on the part of respondent judge in issuing the
assailed alias writ of execution.
On petitioner’s allegations against
respondent Atty. Bañez, the OCA likewise found no reason to hold him liable for
failing to defer the execution of the writ.
The OCA then recommended the
dismissal of petitioner’s complaint against respondents.[17]
On petitioner’s motion, we referred
the case to the CA for further investigation. It was assigned to Associate
Justice Roberto A. Barrios, who acted as investigating officer. Before a
hearing on the case could be conducted, respondent judge died.[18] The
hearing proceeded but we withheld his benefits pending the completion of the
investigation of his case by Justice Barrios.
Subsequently, Justice Barrios
submitted his report[19] to us
agreeing with OCA’s findings that petitioner’s complaint against respondents
was unfounded. According to Justice Barrios:
Assuming
for the nonce that [respondent judge] erred in issuing the Order of 16
December 1998 without awaiting the resolution of [petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration], and in holding that [its] properties are not exempt from
execution, these would not be errors that are gross and patent, or done
maliciously, deliberately or in evident bad faith. [Petitioner] has not
presented proof to the contrary, which with the factual milieu would call for
administrative sanctions against [respondent judge]. As a matter of public
policy, the acts of the judge in his official capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Good faith and
absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient
defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of [the] law can find refuge.[20]
He added that the filing of the
administrative charges against respondents was premature because this Court at
that time had yet to decide G.R. No. 137448 and G.R. No. 141454. He thus
recommended the dismissal of the administrative charges against respondents.
On January 31, 2002,[21] we handed
down our decision in the above cases nullifying the CA’s resolutions dismissing
G.R. Nos. 51131[22]
and 47669.[23]
In the same decision, we set aside respondent judge’s January 16, 1997 order
dismissing petitioner’s petition for relief from judgment and his April 23,
1998 order denying the MR.[24]
Notwithstanding the nullification of respondent judge’s orders, we are
adopting the findings and recommendations of the OCA and Justice Barrios.
For a judge to be administratively
liable for ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must be gross or
patent.[25] To
constitute gross ignorance of the law, such acts must not only be contrary to
existing law and jurisprudence but also motivated by bad faith, fraud, malice
or dishonesty.[26]
That certainly does not appear to be the case here as petitioner’s complaint
was spawned merely by the honest divergence of opinion between petitioner and
respondent judge as to the legal issues and applicable laws involved.[27]
Petitioner also proffered no evidence that respondent judge’s acts were imbued
with malice or bad faith.
In the same vein, we hold that
respondent judge was neither biased nor partial against petitioner when he
issued the alias writ of execution. Petitioner’s assertion that respondent
judge precipitately issued the alias writ is not supported by the records. On
the contrary, the records indicate that the writ was issued more than three
years from the finality of the order directing petitioner to pay Bengson P31
million as costs of suit. Its issuance was not all tainted with undue haste. In
the exercise of his judicial discretion, respondent judge believed that the
issuance of the alias writ had become forthwith a matter of right following the
finality of said order. The rule is that once a judgment becomes final, the
winning party is entitled to a writ of execution and the issuance thereof
becomes a court’s ministerial duty.[28]
Assuming ex gratia argumenti
that respondent judge erred in issuing the alias writ, his act would still not
merit administrative sanction absent malice or bad faith.[29] Bad faith does not simply connote poor or
flawed judgment; it imports a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity or conscious
doing of a wrong.
Furthermore, for allegations of bias
and partiality to stand, petitioner should have demonstrated that respondent
judge’s decisions and orders came from extrajudicial sources or from some bases
other than what he had learned from his study of the case.[30] Decisions formed in the course of judicial
proceedings, although they appear erroneous, are not necessarily partial as
long as they are culled from the arguments and evidence of the parties.[31] The
party who alleges partiality must prove it with clear and convincing evidence.
Petitioner failed in that aspect.
Interestingly, this Court, in our
decision in G.R. Nos. 137448 and 141454, nullified the orders of respondent judge
only to give petitioner another chance to seek redress from the gross
negligence and mistake of its then counsel, Atty. Terrado. We did not at all
declare respondent judge’s orders as erroneous or tainted with malice or bad
faith. In our decision, we said:
It is readily apparent that part of [petitioner’s]
predicament stemmed from the negligence or mistake, to put it mildly, of its
former counsels.
Indeed, it is undisputed that despite ample
opportunity, [petitioner’s] counsel, Atty. Rogelio Terrado, did not rebut
BENGSON’s evidence on the costs of suit or, at the very least, verify the
schedule of costs and cross-examine BENGSON’s witnesses. Much worse, he allowed
the 6 April 1995 Order awarding BENGSON P31 million costs of suit to
attain finality by not filing a motion for reconsideration with the trial court
or a petition with the Court of Appeals. Instead, he went AWOL without
informing petitioner of the said Order. These acts constituted gross
negligence, if not fraud, and resulted in the deprivation of petitioner of an
opportunity to move to reconsider or appeal the adverse order.
…[A]s a general rule, the negligence or mistake of a
counsel binds the client for otherwise there would be never be no end to a suit
so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that the
former counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned. But
if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office as
an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors
must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and prevent miscarriage of justice.
In other words, the court has the power to except a particular case from the
operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.
Moreover, the filing of an
administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for correcting the actions of
a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a
sufficient remedy exists.[32] The
actions against judges should not be considered as complementary or suppletory
to, or substitute for, the judicial remedies which can be availed of by a party
in a case.[33]
Regarding the accusations against
respondent Atty. Bañez, the Court finds no basis to hold him liable for
executing the assailed writ at that time. Undeniably, the most difficult phase
of any proceeding is the execution of judgment.[34] Charged
with this task, he must act with considerable dispatch to administer justice.
Otherwise, a judgment, if not executed at once, would just be an empty victory
on the part of the prevailing party.[35] In
executing the writ, Atty. Bañez merely carried out a ministerial duty. He had
no discretion to implement the writ or not.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for ignorance of the
law, bias and partiality, and violation of RA 8291 against the late Judge
Vicente A. Pacquing and Atty. Mario Anacleto M. Bañez, is hereby DISMISSED.
Let a copy of this resolution be
forwarded to the Office of the Court Administrator so that the benefits due the
late respondent judge can be promptly released to his heirs, unless there
exists some other lawful cause to withhold the same.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
|
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice |
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice |
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO Associate
Justice |
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice |
|
ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate
Justice |
ADOLFO S.
AZCUNA Associate
Justice |
|
DANTE O.
TINGA Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
[1] Docketed as Civil Case No. 2794.
[2] Atty. Terrado was later on charged
with gross misconduct for his alleged willful and deliberate act of not filing
the appropriate motion or appeal from the trial court’s order directing GSIS to
pay Bengson P31 million as cots of suit.
[3] The trial court denied the
petition for relief from judgment on the following grounds: 1) GSIS was bound
by the negligence of its counsel; 2) to grant the petition would be to revive
GSIS’s right to appeal which it irretrievably lost through gross inaction; 3)
equity or fairness could not be invoked as valid grounds for petition for
relief from judgment; 4) res judicata had already set in; 5) no
extrinsic or collateral fraud was adduced by GSIS, and; 6) the order for GSIS
to pay Bengson P31 million costs of suit already attained finality.
“Annex F,” Records.
[4] Government Service Insurance System v. Bengson Commercial Buildings, Inc. and the Hon. Judge Vicente A. Pacquing.
[5] The petition was also denied for lack of proper verification and certification against forum-shopping and for failure to attach a certified copy of the assailed decision of the RTC dated January 16, 1997.
[6] Rollo, pp. 127-128.
[7] The GSIS Act of 1997.
Sec. 39. Exemption from
Tax, Legal Process and Lien.-
x x x
The funds and/or properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies including Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of the members, including pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or work except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the GSIS.
[8] Rollo, pp. 30-31.
[9] Government Service Insurance System v. Honorable Judge Vicente A. Pacquing et al.
[10] Supra, at 3.
[11] The CA dismissed the petitions for forum-shopping. CA-G.R. No. 47669 was also dismissed because it was not accompanied with a clear legible copy or certified copy of the assailed judgment.
[12] Government Service Insurance System v. Bengson Commercial Buildings, Inc.
[13] Government Service Insurance System Incorporated v. Court of Appeals et al.
[14] The SC ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 137448 and G.R. No. 141454. GSIS had these two pending petitions before this Court when the administrative case was filed against respondents.
[15] Complaint, rollo, pp. 1-9.
[16] Id., pp. 75-85.
[17] Id., p. 85.
[18] Judge Pacquing died on August 17, 2000 of coronary thrombosis per certificate of death submitted by his heirs to the SC. Rollo, p. 91.
[19] The report was undated.
[20] Records, p. 9.
[21] 426 Phil. 111 (2002).
[22] Petition for review contesting the trial court’s dismissal of petitioner’s petition for relief from judgment. Supra.
[23] Special civil action for certiorari questioning the trial court’s dismissal of its motion to quash the alias writ of execution. Supra.
[24] The
dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, the petitions at bar are GRANTED… the 16 January 1997 Decision and 23 April 1998 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The cases are hereby ordered remanded to the trial court, which shall then proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration has been granted by it. Since the issues raised in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 51131 are irretrievably linked with, or are but a consequence of the 6 April 1995 Order of the trial court, the case shall be suspended or held in abeyance until after the aforementioned proceedings in the trial court shall have been finally resolved...
[25] Urgent Appeal/Petition for Immediate Suspension and Dismissal of Judge Emilio B. Legaspi, RTC, Iloilo City, Branch 22,453 Phil. 459 (2003).
[26] De Guzman v. Judge Amalia F. Dy, 453 Phil. 214 (2003).
[27] See Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106087, 7 April 1993, 221 SCRA 397.
[28] Garcia v. Echavarri, 217 Phil. 599 (1984).
[29] Guillermo v. Reyes, 310 Phil. 176 (1995).
[30] Webb v. People, 342 Phil. 206 (1997).
[31] Id.
[32] Id.
[33] Balayo v. Buban, Jr., 372 Phil. 688 (1999).
[34] Tan v. Herras, A.M. No. P-90-404, 11 March 1991, 195 SCRA 1.
[35] Id.