EN BANC
Puno, C.J.,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio,
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario,
Garcia,
Velasco, Jr., and
Nachura, JJ.
SAMUEL DIUNSAY-JALANDONI,
Appellant. Promulgated:
February
8, 2007
x
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x
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
Before us for review is the June 13,
2006 Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01002, which affirmed with modification
the March 15, 2005 Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86, in Criminal Case No.
Q-00-91317, finding appellant Samuel Diunsay-Jalandoni guilty of qualified
rape; sentencing him to death; and, ordering him to indemnify the victim in the
sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and to pay the costs.
Appellant was charged with Rape in an
Information[3] dated
That
on or about the 31st day of March 2000 in Quezon City, Philippines,
the above-named accused with force and intimidation did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of sexual assault upon the
person of AAA a retardate by then and there dragging said complainant inside
the guard out post located inside xxx Subdivision xxx, this city by removing
her shorts and inserting his penis inside her vagina and thereafter had carnal
knowledge of her against her will and consent.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded
not guilty, after which, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented six (6) witnesses,
namely: (1) AAA, the private complainant, (2) BBB, mother of private
complainant, (3) Wilfredo Aganon, a construction worker, (4) Chris Pastor,
Aganon’s co-worker, (5) Dr. Ma. Cristina Morelos, a psychiatrist, and (6) Nimia
de Guzman, a psychologist.
The evidence for the prosecution
tends to show that on March 31, 2000 at about 10 o’clock in the morning,
Wilfredo Aganon and Chris Pastor, both construction workers, were passing by x
x x Subdivision in x x x, Quezon City on the way to their jobsite. When they came across a guard outpost, they noticed
appellant, an ice cream vendor, pushing AAA on the floor of the outpost and in
the act of unzipping his pants. From a
distance of about 10 meters, Pastor said to appellant, “Hoy, bawal yan, bitay
ang aabutin mo diyan.” However, the two
did not intervene any further and proceeded to walk towards their jobsite.
AAA testified that after appellant
pushed her into the outpost and forcibly laid her on its floor, appellant held her
thighs and punched her stomach. He ordered
her to keep silent, otherwise, he would maul and kill her. Thereafter, he unzipped
his pants and removed his briefs, and undressed her. He then placed himself on top of her, and
succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina.
Meanwhile, Aganon and Pastor had not
traveled far when they heard AAA shout, “Tama na po, tama na po, ayaw ko na.” Upon hearing AAA’s cry, Aganon and Pastor went
back to the guard outpost. Before they
could reach the outpost, they saw appellant immediately stand up and ring his
ice cream bell while AAA pulled up her short pants. Aganon and Pastor then reported the incident
to the subdivision guards and homeowners. They brought appellant to the Barangay Hall
and thereafter turned him over to the x x x Police Station where he was
detained pending the filing of formal charges against him.
After the rape incident, BBB asked
her daughter about the surrounding circumstances leading thereto. She found out that this was not the first time
that appellant had raped her daughter and that appellant had previously threatened
AAA not to reveal to anyone what he had done to her, otherwise, he would harm her.
Dr. Ma. Cristina Morelos, a
psychiatrist, and Nimia C. De Guzman, a psychologist, both from the National
Center for Mental Health (NCMH), testified on the mental capacity of AAA. Psychological tests showed that AAA’s current
mental capacity was at a severe level of mental retardation with the mental age
of a four-year old although at the time of the commission of the rape, AAA was
already 21 years old. She had a very
limited attention span and concentration. She was also easily cajoled and
pleased, and responded with unthinking eagerness to do anything requested of
her as long as her needs were satisfied. During her testimony, De Guzman also noted
that when she interviewed AAA, the latter answered spontaneously and narrated
vividly how she was raped by appellant. She
pointed out that a person with the mental age of a four-year old could not
fabricate a story; and relates events as he or she experiences them. Neither could such a person be coached on the
witness stand because of his or her limited attention span.
The defense presented the testimonies
of Rosauro Gonzales and appellant himself.
Gonzales was presented as a hostile
witness it appearing that he was listed as a prosecution witness but was not
presented by the prosecution. He
testified that on March 31, 2000, he was the officer on duty in the Barangay Hall
located at x x x, Quezon City; that at around one o’clock in the afternoon, a
certain Chris Pastor, together with several others, went to the Barangay Hall
to turnover appellant; that he was told that a crime was committed in the guard
outpost and Pastor was a witness to its commission; that appellant was subsequently
turned over to the x x x Police Station.
Appellant denied the charges against
him. He claimed that he was selling ice
cream at x x x Subdivision in x x x, Quezon City, when AAA approached his ice
cream cart to buy ice cream. He was not
feeling well so he sat down to rest on the guard outpost. He claimed that AAA was “makulit” and kept on
hitting him (“binubunggo bunggo”) while he was sitting on the floor of the outpost.
AAA held him by the shoulders so he
stood up and pushed her. When AAA fell on
the floor of the outpost, she was shocked. He wanted to help her stand up but she
shouted. He was about to leave the place
when Pastor and Aganon approached him and asked, “What did you do with the
girl?” to which he replied, “Wait a moment, how could I do that thing that you
are accusing me at this time and place.” He was then brought to the Barangay Hall and
placed in the detention cell. Thereafter, at around
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Samuel
Diunsay-Jalandoni guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed
against AAA and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of death, and to
indemnify the private complainant the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus costs.[5]
Conformably with our ruling in People v. Mateo,[6] the
records of this case were forwarded to the Court of Appeals for review. On P50,000.00 to P75,000.00:
WHEREFORE,
the appealed DECISION is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant
Samuel Diunsay-Jalandoni is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. He
is also ordered to indemnify AAA the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
In his Brief,[7] appellant
contends that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime because it
was done in broad daylight, along a subdivision street and within the public’s
view. He claims that it is inconceivable
for him to have committed such dastardly acts in the guard outpost and in such
manner and time, and that even a hardened criminal is not indiscriminate in his
actions.
We are not persuaded.
We note that the pictures of the
guard outpost, as shown by the pictures presented in evidence,[8] had
an opening and three side walls which were about waist high. The walls of the outpost were high enough to
conceal the crime taking place on the floor thereof. Thus, there is no merit in appellant’s
contention that he could not have raped AAA inside the guard outpost because
the place was in plain view of passersby.
Besides, during the commission of the crime, no other person was
traversing the street where the rape took place, aside from Aganon and Pastor.
As we have often ruled, lust is not a
respecter of time and place. Rape can be
committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside,
within school premises, inside a house or where there are other occupants, and
even in the same room where there are other members of the family who are
sleeping.[9] Indeed, when the bestial passion of man is
aroused, rape could be committed anywhere. We find, therefore, the commission of the rape
on the floor of the guard outpost to be neither impossible nor inconceivable.
Appellant asserts that the
prosecution failed to establish the fact of commission of the alleged rape
because it failed to present the doctor who conducted the medico-legal examination
of AAA.
The contention lacks merit.
The records show that after the rape
incident, BBB brought AAA to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in
However, this omission is not fatal.
In a long line of cases, we have ruled that a medical examination is not
essential in the prosecution of a rape case because it is merely corroborative
in character.[11] Further, the absence of external signs of
violence does not negate the commission of rape. Nor is the absence of spermatozoa material in
the prosecution of a rape case. A
freshly broken hymen is, likewise, not an essential element of rape, and healed
lacerations do not negate rape because full penetration is not necessary to consummate
rape. Penetration of the penis by entry
into the labia of the pudendum of the vagina, even without rupture or
laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for rape.[12]
What matters greatly is the clear,
unequivocal and credible testimony of the victim.[13] To be sure, an accused may be convicted on the
basis of the lone, uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim, provided that
her testimony is clear, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature. In
the instant case, we find AAA’s unflinching testimony, which related the details
of her traumatic experience, coupled with the corroborating testimonies of
Aganon and Pastor, who saw appellant with AAA under incriminating circumstances
shortly before and soon after the rape incident, to be sufficient for
conviction of rape. Pertinent portions
of AAA’s testimony sufficiently described her horrible ordeal thusly:
Q. Did [appellant] approach you on that
particular day [
A. He approached me, sir, then he undressed
me. My shorts was removed.
Q. Where did this undressing take place?
A. At the guardhouse. He told me to lie
down, then he placed himself on top of me.
Q. When he undressed you, what happened
next?
A. He threatened me that if I will report
to my parents, he will kill me.
Q. Who told you that statement that he will
kill you?
A. That man, Mamang ice cream, Manong
Samuel.
Q. When you were told of this statement,
was he holding you?
A. Yes, he abused me.
Q. When he was holding you, what portion of
your body was he holding you?
A. My both thighs.
Q. When the accused was holding you what
happened next?
A. He said that he will kill me. He also
said he will maul me.
Q. After this was made, what happened next?
A. He said that if I will not keep silent,
he will maul me.
Q. Did the accused maul you?
A. He said, “uupakan kita pag nagsumbong
ka.”
Q. Did the accused hurt you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What portion of your body did the
accused hurt you?
A. He boxed my stomach.
Q. What did you do when he boxed your
stomach?
A. I did not fight back.
Q. What happened next after boxing you?
A. I kicked him and I said it is enough.
Q. Why do you say it is enough?
A. Because he was forcing me to lie down in
the guardhouse.
Q. Were you able to lie down because of
this pressure from the accused?
A. Yes, sir, he forced me to lie down.
Q. When you were lying down, were you
undressed?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. While being undressed, what happened?
A. He removed my shorts, he tore it?
x x x x
Q. Did the accused also undress in your
presence?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What particular clothes were taken off
by the accused?
A. His briefs.
Q. And after undressing his briefs, what
did he do to you?
A. He placed himself on top of me.
Q. Did it hurt when he placed his body on
top of you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In what part of the body did it hurt?
A. He inserted something on my private part
(witness pointing to her private part).
Q. Can you identify the thing that was
inserted on your private part?
A. His private organ.
Q. Can you inform the Court what is the shape
of the private organ?
A. He inserted it on my private part.
Q. After inserting it in your private part,
what did he do next?
A. He inserted it.
Q. After inserting his private part on your
private part, what did the accused do?
A. He inserted his private part on my
private part.[14]
During AAA’s testimony, the trial
court noted that there were instances when she could not immediately comprehend
the questions propounded to her, and that she was sometimes repetitious in her
answers. These were attributed to her mental condition as she was found to be
suffering from severe mental retardation with the mental age of a four-year old
although she was already 21 years old at the time of the commission of the rape.
Despite this, the trial court found AAA’s
testimony to be spontaneous, credible and replete with details of her ordeal at
the hands of appellant. It observed that
given AAA’s low mental age, it is improbable that she could concoct or
fabricate such a serious charge of rape. Neither was it possible that she was coached
into testifying against appellant considering her limited attention span and
concentration. Under such circumstances,
only a very startling event would leave a lasting impression on her which she
would be able to recall when asked about it.
We sustain the above findings of the
trial court under the settled rule that appellate courts will not disturb the
findings of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses considering that
it is in a better position to observe their candor and behavior on the witness
stand. Evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor,
conduct and attitude. Its assessment is
respected unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case.[15] These exceptions are not present in this case.
We
now determine the appropriate penalty.
The trial court, as affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, convicted appellant for qualified rape and sentenced him to death under
Article 266-B(10)[16] of
the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353. It
reasoned that appellant knew of AAA’s mental retardation at the time of the
commission of the rape since, during his testimony, appellant referred to AAA as
the “makulit” and “abnormal” person who kept on annoying him while he rested in
the guard outpost.[17]
Indeed, under Article 266-B(10),
knowledge by the offender of the mental disability of the offended party at the
time of the commission of the rape is a special qualifying circumstance that
sanctions the imposition of the death penalty.[18] However, the long settled rule is that
qualifying circumstances must be sufficiently alleged in the indictment and
proved during trial to be properly appreciated by the trial court. Otherwise, it would be a denial of the right
of the accused to be informed of the charges against him, and, thus, a denial
of due process, if he is charged with simple rape but is convicted of its
qualified form even if the attendant qualifying circumstance is not set forth
in the information.[19] In the instant case, the information merely
states that AAA is a retardate without specifically stating that appellant knew
of her mental disability at the time of the commission of the rape. Thus, appellant can only be convicted of simple
rape under Article 266-A, par. 1[20]
in relation to 266-B[21] of
the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353, and his sentence should be accordingly reduced
to reclusion perpetua.
Anent the award of damages, the Court
of Appeals awarded to the victim P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00
as moral damages. However, with our finding that appellant should be convicted
of simple rape only and not of qualified rape, the civil indemnity must be
reduced to P50,000.00 conformably with prevailing jurisprudence.[22] Nonetheless, AAA is entitled to P25,000.00
as exemplary damages pursuant to our ruling in
People v. Catubig.[23]
In Catubig,
we held that the presence of an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying, entitles the offended party to an award of exemplary damages. Further, we noted in that case that the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, now
requires that aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information in
order to be validly appreciated by the court. However, the retroactive application of these procedural rules cannot
adversely affect the rights of a private offended party that have become vested
where the offense was committed prior to the effectivity of said rules[24]
as is the case here. Consequently,
aggravating circumstances which were not alleged in the information but proved
during the trial may be appreciated for the limited purpose of determining appellant’s
liability for exemplary damages.[25] In the instant case, the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of knowledge by the offender of the offended party’s
mental disability, although not alleged in the information, was proved during
trial, which justifies the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00
in consonance with current rulings.[26]
WHEREFORE, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01002 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellant is found GUILTY of simple rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua; he is ordered to indemnify the victim in the
sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
(On Leave)
RENATO C.
CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
(On Leave)
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-20. Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los
Santos and concurred in by Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Myrna
Dimaranan Vidal.
[2]
Records, pp. 228-239. Penned by
[3]
[4]
Art. 266-B. Penalties. — x x x The
death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any
of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: x x x
10. When
the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical
handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.
[5]
Records, p. 239.
[6]
G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[7] Rollo, pp. 36-49.
[8]
Records, pp. 217-223; Exhibits “I” to “I-F.”
[9] People v. Gabayron, 343 Phil. 593, 608
(1997).
[10]
Records, p. 11.
[11] People v. Iluis, G.R. No. 145995,
[12]
[13]
[14]
TSN,
[15] People v. Yaoto, 421 Phil. 963, 973
(2001).
[16] Supra note 4.
[17]
TSN,
[18] People v. Limio, G.R. Nos. 148804-06,
[19] People v. Bernaldez, 379 Phil. 493, 505
(2000); People v. Limio, supra.
[20]
Art. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed.
– Rape is committed –
1) By
a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through
force, threat or intimidation;
x x x x
d) When the offended party is x x x
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
[21]
Art. 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under
paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
[22] Supra note 18 at 616; Supra note 19 at 506. Cf. People
v. Salome, G.R. No. 169077,
[23]
416 Phil. 102, 120 (2001).
[24]
[25] People v. Calongui, G.R. No. 170566,
[26] Supra note 23 at 121.