HEIRS OF TEOFILO GAUDIANO, G.R. No. 174247
Namely: HONORIA GAUDIANO,
ERLINDA G. SANDE, PHILIP
GAUDIANO, JAMES GAUDIANO,
EDISON GAUDIANO and TERESITA
GAUDIANO-APORA,
Petitioners, Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Callejo,
Sr.,
Chico-Nazario, and
Nachura, JJ.
CONSTANCIO
BENEMERITO,
MELECIO
LOQUINARIO,
DOMINGO
CORONEL and Promulgated:
MACARIO
ESCULTOR,
Respondents. February 21, 2007
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
assails the April 17, 2006 Order[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 21 in Civil Case No.
CEB-1151 denying petitioners’ Motion for Extension of Time to File a Notice of
Appeal and declaring its
The respondents filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu an action for redemption against the
petitioners. On
Petitioners received a copy of the
Decision on
On
This
treats of the defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time to File a Notice of
Appeal, submitted on
Under Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, said motion is not allowed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Extension prayed for is hereby denied, and defendants having been unable to file their Notice of Appeal within the required reglementary period, in effect, renders the decision final and executory.
SO ORDERED. [7]
Hence, this Petition for Review on
Certiorari raising the following issues: 1) whether the petitioners’ belated
filing of their notice of appeal is justifiable; and 2) whether the court a quo
correctly denied petitioners’ Motion for an Extension of Time to File Notice of
Appeal and in declaring the RTC Decision dated October 7, 2005 final and
executory.[8]
Petitioners claim that their former
counsel suffered a stroke which incapacitated him from filing a notice of
appeal. Thus, while looking for a new
counsel to engage, they decided to file a motion for extension to file a notice
of appeal. They argue that respondents
would not be prejudiced if their notice of appeal is given due course despite
its late filing. They also allege that
under Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the filing of a motion for
extension to file a notice of appeal is not prohibited and that this Court is
vested with power to relax its rules in the interest of justice and equity.
The petition lacks merit.
In
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases
Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court,[9]
the Supreme Court ruled that in ordinary appeals by mere notice of appeal, as
in the instant case, no extension to file a notice of appeal is allowed. It was stated:
In an ordinary appeal
from the final judgment or order of a metropolitan or municipal trial court to
the regional trial court, and from the regional trial court to the Court of
Appeals in actions or proceedings originally filed in the regional trial court,
the fifteen-day period for appeal provided by Section 39 of BP No. 129 and
Section 19(a) of the Interim Rules is interrupted or suspended by a motion for
new trial or reconsideration, unless such motion fails to satisfy the
requirements of Rule 37 (Section 3 of Rule 41). If the motion for new trial or
reconsideration is denied, the moving party has only the remaining period from
notice of denial within which to file a notice of appeal, which is the only
requirement for taking an appeal under the present rules. Obviously, no
extension of time to file such a notice of appeal is needed, much less allowed.[10]
The perfection of an appeal within
the period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and
non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal and has the effect of rendering
the judgment final and executory.[11] The limitation on the period of appeal is not
without reason. They must be strictly followed as they are considered
indispensable to forestall or avoid unreasonable
delays in the administration of justice, to ensure an orderly discharge of
judicial business, and to put an end to controversies.[12] Though as a general rule, rules of procedures
are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner
and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied and are only relaxed in
very exceptional circumstances on equitable considerations,[13]
which are not present in the instant case.
Being a prohibited pleading, a motion
for extension of time to file a notice of appeal is a mere scrap of paper and its
filing does not toll the running of the period to appeal.[14] Petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal
within the period prayed for in their motion for extension but beyond the
period to appeal. Sections 2(a) and 3 of
Rule 41 clearly provide that decisions of Regional Trial Courts may be appealed
by filing a notice of appeal within 15 days from date of receipt of notice of
judgment. The filing of a notice of
appeal within the reglementary period is mandatory; no extension is
allowed. Since the motion for extension
did not toll the running of the period to appeal, it follows that the Notice of
Appeal filed after the lapse of 15 days was filed out of time and the trial
court properly dismissed the appeal pursuant to Section 13, Rule 41, which
reads:
SEC. 13. Dismissal of appeal.— Prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal to the appellate court, the trial court may, motu proprio or on motion, dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time or for non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.
When no timely appeal is taken, the
judgment becomes final and the court loses jurisdiction over the case, and it
has no alternative but to order the execution of the final judgment. The trial court, therefore, commits no error
in denying the motion for extension and declaring that its October 7, 2005
Decision has become final and executory.
Petitioners’ reliance on this Court’s
power to relax and disregard the application of technical rules of procedure in
the interest of substantial justice is misplaced. The liberal application of rules of procedure
for perfecting appeals is still the exception, and not the rule; and it is only
allowed in exceptional circumstances to better serve the interest of
justice. In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[15]
the Court declared:
In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.[16] (Emphasis added)
The circumstances surrounding this
case do not warrant the relaxation of the rules. Petitioners alleged in their motion for extension
of time that their previous counsel suffered a stroke sometime in the middle of
the year 2005 and they still need to engage another counsel who can ably
represent them.[17]
We do not find these circumstances
extraordinary that would warrant a liberal application of the rules. The allegation of stroke was not proven or
supported with a medical certificate.[18] There is likewise no evidence showing that
their counsel was unable to assist them in filing the notice of appeal. Interestingly, on January 10, 2006, or five
days after the period to appeal had lapsed, Atty. Villaflor filed before the
trial court his withdrawal as counsel for petitioners. This only shows the falsity in petitioners’
allegation as to the counsel’s incapacity to file the notice of appeal.
Petitioners likewise allege that
respondents have nothing to lose should their notice of appeal be given due
course.[19] However, it is worthy to note that the action
for redemption filed by respondents dated as far back as
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court provides that no appeal may be taken from an order disallowing or
dismissing an appeal. The denial of
petitioners’ motion for extension and the declaration that the Decision has
become final and executory, is tantamount to a disallowance/dismissal of an
appeal. As such, the remedy of appeal is
not available. Even on the assumption
that an appeal is available, petitioners should not have directly filed the
same before the Supreme Court since only questions of law may be raised in
appeals by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of Regional
Trial Courts.
Even if we treat this petition as one
for a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, it is still dismissible for violation of the hierarchy of courts.
Although the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial
Courts and the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, this should not
to be taken as granting parties seeking any of the writs an absolute and
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which an application will be
directed. It is an established policy
that a direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special, important and
compelling reasons, clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition,[22]
which are not present in this case.
The right to appeal is not a natural
right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to
appeal must strictly comply with the requirements of the rules, and failure to do so leads to the loss
of the right to appeal.[23]
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED. The Order dated
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 4-13.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] 227 Phil. 606 (1986).
[10]
[11] Cabellan v. Court
of Appeals, 363 Phil. 460, 467
(1999).
[12] See Videogram Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 820, 828 (1996).
[13] Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals, 400 Phil. 395, 402-403 (2000).
[14] Cf. Uy v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 1004 (1998) where petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration which is prohibited by several rulings of this Court. In said case, this Court ruled that said motion did not suspend/toll the running of the reglementary period and in effect renders the assailed decision final and beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.
[15]
G.R. No. 141524,
[16]
[17] Rollo, pp. 25-26
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Supra note 12.
[22] David v. Mijares, G.R. No. 158717,
[23] M.A.
Santander Construction, Inc. v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 136477,