FIRST DIVISION
|
THE PEOPLE
OF THE Appellee, - versus - RAFAEL STA. MARIA y INDON, Appellant. |
G.R.
No. 171019
Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, *AZCUNA,
and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: February
23, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O
N
GARCIA, J.:
Under
consideration is this appeal by Rafael Sta. Maria y Indon from the Decision[1]
dated November 22, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00802, denying his earlier appeal from and
affirming the May 5, 2004 decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 20, which found him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 5,[3]
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The
indicting Information,[4]
docketed in the RTC as Criminal Case No. 3364-M-2002, alleges:
That on or about the 29th
day of November, 2002, in the municipality of San Rafael, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without authority of law and legal justification, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade, deliver, give
away, dispatch in transit and transport dangerous drug consisting of one (1)
heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing methylampetamine hydrochloride
weighing 0.041 gram.
Contrary to law.
Duly
arraigned on
The
prosecution’s version of events which led to appellant’s arrest and subsequent prosecution under the
aforementioned Information is as follows:
On November 27, 2002, at around 10:00 o’clock in
the morning, P/Chief Insp. Noli Pacheco, Chief of the Provincial Drug
Enforcement Group of the Bulacan Provincial Office based at Camp Alejo Santos,
Malolos, Bulacan received an intelligence report about the illegal drug
activities in Sitio Gulod, Barangay Pantubig, San Rafael, Bulacan of a certain “Fael,”
who later turned out to be appellant Rafael Sta. Maria. P/Chief Insp. Pacheco formed a surveillance team
to look for a police asset to negotiate a drug deal with appellant. In the morning of P200
worth of shabu from appellant at the latter’s house at No. 123 Sitio Gulod,
Barangay Pantubig, San Rafael, Bulacan between 7:00 and 7:30 in the evening of November 29, 2002. The surveillance
team then prepared for a buy-bust operation, with PO3 Enrique Rullan as team
leader, and PO1 Rhoel Ventura, who was provided
with two (2) marked P100-bills, as poseur-buyer. At the appointed time
and place, PO1 Ventura and the confidential informant proceeded to appellant’s house
and knocked at the door. Appellant opened the
door and the confidential informant introduced
to him PO1 Ventura as a prospective buyer. PO1 Ventura later handed the two (2)
marked P100-bills to appellant who, in turn, gave him a plastic sachet of shabu. Thereupon, PO1 Ventura sparked his cigarette lighter,
which was the pre-arranged signal to the other members of the buy-bust team
that the sale was consummated. Appellant
was arrested and the two marked P100-bills recovered from him. Also arrested on that occasion was one Zedric
dela Cruz who was allegedly sniffing shabu inside appellant’s house and from
whom drug paraphernalia were recovered.
Upon laboratory examination of the item bought from appellant, the same
yielded positive for methylampetamine hydrochloride or shabu weighing 0.041 gram.
The defense gave an entirely different account
of what allegedly transpired prior to and at the time of appellant’s arrest on
that evening of
Appellant testified that on
In
a decision[5]
dated
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1). xxx
2). xxx
3). In Criminal Case No. 3264-M-2002, the
Court finds accused RAFAEL STA. MARIA Y INDON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act 9165. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and is ordered to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00).
The dangerous drug and
drug paraphernalia submitted as evidence in these cases are hereby ordered to
be transmitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
SO ORDERED.
From
the aforesaid decision, appellant went directly to this Court. Pursuant to our
pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[6]
which modified the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court insofar as they
provide for direct appeals from the RTC to the Supreme Court in cases where the
penalty imposed is death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the Court transferred the appeal to the CA
for appropriate action and disposition, whereat it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00802.
On
xxx The Court sees no
reason to disturb the finding of trial court.
The evidence presented by the prosecution proves to a moral certainty
appellant’s guilt of the crime of selling illegal drugs. What is material is proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court
of the substance seized as evidence.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
The
case is again with this Court following its elevation from the CA, together with
the case records.
In
his Brief, appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting him
because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. He maintains that
instigation, not entrapment, preceded his arrest. He also faults the appellate court
in not finding that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was
obtained in violation of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165.
It
is appellant’s submission that what transpired on that fateful evening of
We are not persuaded.
In
entrapment, the entrapper resorts to ways and means to trap and capture a
lawbreaker while executing his criminal plan.
In instigation, the instigator practically induces the
would-be-defendant into committing the offense, and himself becomes a
co-principal. In entrapment, the means
originates from the mind of the criminal.
The idea and the resolve to commit the crime come from him. In instigation, the law enforcer conceives
the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and
carries it into execution. The legal
effects of entrapment do not exempt the criminal from liability. Instigation does.[8]
Here,
the mere fact that the agreement between appellant and the police informant for
the purchase and sale of illegal drugs was made on
It
is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission
were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the
“decoy solicitation” of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that
detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting
its commission. Especially is this true
in that class of cases where the offense is one habitually committed, and the
solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct.[9]
As
here, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant utilized by the
police merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. The police received an intelligence report
that appellant has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs. They duly acted on it by utilizing an
informant to effect a drug transaction with appellant. There was no showing that the informant induced
appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.
It
is a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative
allegation.[10] In this case, apart from appellant’s
self-serving declaration that he was instigated into committing the offense, he
did not present any other evidence to prove the same.
A
perusal of the records readily reveals that the police operatives who took part
in the buy-bust operation, namely, PO1 Alexander Ancheta, PO1 Rhoel Ventura and
PO3 Enrique Rullan, clearly and convincingly testified on the circumstances
that led to appellant’s arrest. In a
credible manner, they narrated in open court the details of the buy-bust
operation they conducted on
PO1 Ancheta, PO1 Ventura
and PO2 Rullan testified on the aforementioned circumstances concerning the
drug buy-bust operation that led to the arrest of accused Sta. Maria, following
the purchase from him of P200 worth of shabu by PO1 Ventura posing as
poseur-buyer. The testimonies of these
officers, as summarized above, are essentially clear credible and
convincing. Notwithstanding minor
inconsistencies, their declarations in Court dovetail and corroborated one
another on material points, and are generally consistent with the narrations
contained in their “Joint Affidavit of Arrest” (Exh. “D”) executed on
The Court also takes
judicial notice of the fact that accused Sta. Maria had other criminal cases
before other branches of this Court for involvement in drug activities. He was charged with and convicted by Branch
21 of this Court of Violation of Section 16, Article III of the Republic Act of
6425, as amended, also known as the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” following a
voluntary plea of guilty in Criminal Case No. 341-M-2001. He was likewise charged with Violation of
Sections 15 and 16 of the same law before Branch 81 under Criminal Cases Nos.
59-M-2000 and 60-M-2000, which were dismissed on mere technicality because of
non-appearance of the arresting officers.
The Court is not
persuaded by the defense of denial interposed by accused Sta. Maria. According to him, the police officers just
barged into his house on
The Court rules that the
version bandied about by accused Sta. Maria is purely self-serving. It cannot prevail over the positive
declarations of the police officers regarding the drug buy-bust operation and
purchase from him of shabu. To reiterate,
there is no showing that said police officers were actuated by any ill or
improper motive or intention in effecting the arrest of the accused Sta. Maria
and in testifying against him in Court.
(See People v. Dela Cruz, 229 SCRA
754; People v. Persiano, 233 SCRA 393). [11]
Appellant
would next argue that the evidence against him was obtained in violation of
Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 because the buy-bust operation was
made without any involvement of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Prescinding
therefrom, he concludes that the prosecution’s evidence, both testimonial and
documentary, was inadmissible having been procured in violation of his constitutional right against illegal arrest.
The
argument is specious.
Section
86 of Republic Act No. 9165 reads:
SEC. 86. Transfer,
Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal Drugs into the
PDEA and Transitory Provisions. – The Narcotics Group of the PNP, the
Narcotics Division of the NBI and the Customs Narcotics Interdiction Unit are
hereby abolished; however they shall continue with the performance of their
task as detail service with the PDEA, subject to screening, until such time
that the organizational structure of the Agency is fully operational and the number
of graduates of the PDEA Academy is sufficient to do the task themselves: Provided, That such personnel who are
affected shall have the option of either being integrated into the PDEA or
remain with their original mother agencies and shall, thereafter, be
immediately reassigned to other units therein by the head of such
agencies. Such personnel who are
transferred, absorbed and integrated in the PDEA shall be extended appointments
to positions similar in rank, salary, and other emoluments and privileges
granted to their respective positions in their original mother agencies.
The transfer, absorption
and integration of the different offices and units provided for in this Section
shall take effect within eighteen (18) months from the effectivity of this Act:
Provided, That personnel absorbed and
on detail service shall be given until five (5) years to finally decide to join
the PDEA.
Nothing in this Act
shall mean a diminution of the investigative powers of the NBI and the PNP on
all other crimes as provided for in their respective organic laws: Provided, however, That when the
investigation being conducted by the NBI, PNP or any ad hoc anti-drug task force is found to be a violation of any of
the provisions of this Act, the PDEA shall be the lead agency. The NBI, PNP or any of the task force shall
immediately transfer the same to the PDEA: Provided,
further, That the NBI, PNP and the
Bureau of Customs shall maintain close coordination with the PDEA on all drug
related matters.
Cursory
read, the foregoing provision is silent as to the consequences of failure on
the part of the law enforcers to transfer drug-related cases to the PDEA, in
the same way that the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act
No. 9165 is also silent on the matter. But by no stretch of imagination could this silence be interpreted
as a legislative intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA
illegal nor evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible.
It
is a well-established rule of statutory construction that where great
inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great public
interests would be endangered or sacrificed, or great mischief done, such
construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such
construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by
clear and unequivocal words.[12]
As
we see it, Section 86 is explicit only in saying that the PDEA shall be the
“lead agency” in the investigations and prosecutions of drug-related cases. Therefore, other law enforcement bodies still
possess authority to perform similar functions as the PDEA as long as illegal
drugs cases will eventually be transferred to the latter. Additionally, the same provision states that
PDEA, serving as the implementing arm of the Dangerous Drugs Board, “shall be
responsible for the efficient and effective law enforcement of all the
provisions on any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical as provided in the Act.” We
find much logic in the Solicitor General’s interpretation that it is only
appropriate that drugs cases being handled by other law enforcement authorities
be transferred or referred to the PDEA as the “lead agency” in the campaign
against the menace of dangerous drugs. Section 86 is more of an administrative
provision. By having a centralized law
enforcement body, i.e., the PDEA, the
Dangerous Drugs Board can enhance the efficacy of the law against dangerous
drugs. To be sure, Section 86 (a) of the IRR emphasizes this point by providing:
(a) Relationship/Coordination between PDEA
and Other Agencies – The PDEA shall be the lead agency in the enforcement of
the Act, while the PNP, the NBI and other law enforcement agencies shall
continue to conduct anti-drug operations in support of the PDEA xxx. Provided,
finally, that nothing in this IRR shall deprive the PNP, the NBI, other law
enforcement personnel and the personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) from effecting lawful arrests and seizures in consonance with the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
Appellant
next argues that the prosecution failed to show compliance with Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165 regarding the custody and disposition of the evidence
against him.
Appellant
demands absolute compliance with Section 21 and insists that anything short of
the adherence to its letter, renders the evidence against him inadmissible.
Pertinently, Section 21 of the law
provides:
SEC. 21. Custody
and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources
of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Regrettably,
the pertinent implementing rules, Section 21 of the IRR, states:
Section 21.
a. xxx Provided further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
It
is beyond quibbling then that the failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly
with Section 21 was not fatal. It did not render appellant’s arrest illegal nor
the evidence adduced against him inadmissible.
The
law excuses non-compliance under
justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police
officers involved in the buy-bust operation
in this case from complying with Section 21 will
remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the
safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers’ alleged violations of Sections 21
and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not
raised before the
trial court but
were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court
that
there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their
integrity and evidentiary value. Objection
to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires
the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of
objection. Without such objection he
cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.[13]
To
recapitulate, the challenged buy-bust operation, albeit made without the
participation of PDEA, did not violate appellant’s constitutional right to be
protected from illegal arrest. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 which
even remotely indicate the intention of the legislature to make an arrest made
without the participation of the PDEA illegal and evidence obtained pursuant to
such an arrest inadmissible. Moreover, the law did not deprive the PNP of the
power to make arrests.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the appealed decision of the CA,
affirmatorary of that of the trial court, is AFFIRMED.
No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate
Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE)
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate
Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that
the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On Official Leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Jose C. Mendoza, concurring; Rollo, pp. 3-18.
[2] CA Rollo, pp. 16-33.
[3] SEC. 5. P500,000.00) to Ten
million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver,
give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the
quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.
[4] CA Rollo, p. 8.
[5] Supra note 2.
[6] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[7] Supra note 1.
[8] People v. Marcos, G.R. No. 83325,
[9] People v. Lua Chu
and Uy Se Tieng, 56 Phil. 44 (1931).
[10] Jimenez
v. NLRC, G.R. No. 116960,
[11] RTC Decision, pp. 13-14.
[12] Sesbreño v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 106588, 270 SCRA 360 (1997).
[13] People
v. Ramon Chua Uy, G.R. No. 128046,