EN BANC
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PEOPLE OF THE Plaintiff-appellee, - versus - CHRISTOPHER (Popop)
Accused-appellants. |
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G.R. No. 169075 Present: PUNO,
C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, *CARPIO
MORALES, CALLEJO, SR., **AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, GARCIA, VELASCO, JR., and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
For
automatic review is the decision[1]
dated February 21, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00262 which affirmed, with modification, an
earlier decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, in Criminal Case
No. 0055-SPL, finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape With Homicide and sentencing
them to suffer the extreme penalty of death.
Pursuant
to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo[3] which modified the provisions of the
Rules of Court insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this
Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
this case was earlier[4] referred
to the CA for appropriate action and disposition whereat it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00262.
Consistent
with our decision in People v.
Cabalquinto,[5] the real
name of the rape victim in this case is withheld and instead fictitious initials are used to represent
her. Also, the personal circumstances of the victim or any other information
tending to establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her
immediate family or household members, are not disclosed in this decision.
In
the court of origin, appellants Christopher (“Popop”)
That on or about the 21st day of August, 1995 in the City of Muntinlupa, the said accused conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another prompted with lewd designs, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abduct, take and carry away XXX, a 10-year old minor, while walking together with her younger brothers YYY and ZZZ, along a narrow street leading to their house at Purok ABC, Muntinlupa City, by means of force, violence and intimidation to wit: by pulling her and carrying her at the same time covering her mouth and succeeded in forcibly bringing said XXX away to Pacita Complex I, San Vicente, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, where the said accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her against her will, and on the occasion thereof, accused with intent to kill, with the use of superior strength and conveniently armed with a blunt instrument, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, hit and choke by inserting inside the mouth of XXX with the said instrument, thereby inflicting upon the latter several wounds on her body, which had caused her death, to the damage and prejudice of her surviving heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Arraigned
on
For
its part, the defense presented a total of 11 witnesses, including the appellants
themselves.
The
People’s version of the incidents is succinctly summarized by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) in its Appellee’s Brief[7] as
follows:
About
The house of Aling Fely is some
distance away from their house, with several pathways that can be used in going
to and leaving the place. YYY and ZZZ left the place first and waited for their
older sister XXX at the back of the
house of Lalo, one of their neighbors. However, YYY saw XXX take another route
home, going by the house of Kuya Nestor, another neighbor. The place was
illuminated by the lights coming from the nearby Nescafe factory compound.
YYY was about to call his sister
when he saw the three accused approach XXX and snatch her. The illumination
provided by the lights of the Nescafe compound allowed YYY to see appellant
Dullavin cover XXX’s mouth to prevent her from making any sound. YYY also saw
Christopher and Alejandro Padua hold XXX’s hands.
Since YYY was only ten years old and
ZZZ much younger than him, the two were not able to do anything to help their
sister. They saw XXX being dragged towards the house of Alejandro Padua. XXX
was struggling to free herself or “pumapalag” as she was being dragged away.
Fearful that the trio might also
snatch them, the two boys ran home. The two boys, however, did not relate what
they saw to their parents since they feared that if they told their parents
what they saw, the same fate might befall them also.
The next time YYY saw his sister XXX
was inside the morgue of the Veronica Funeral Homes. He noticed that the body
of his sister was still wearing the same clothes she had on the night she was
abducted.
On
After recovering the body, the
police took the cadaver to the Veronica Funeral homes. [The victim’s father]
came to the CIC Office and when taken to the morgue, identified the dead body
as his missing child, XXX.
Pursuant to the Request for
Examination dated
On
the other hand, the defense’ version is hinged mainly on the following
testimonies of the appellants:
Alejandro Padua testified that on
Christopher Padua, grandson of
Alejandro, declared that he was at his parents’ house at Ilaya, Alabang,
Muntinlupa on
Michael Dullavin, brother-in-law of
Christopher, testified that on
The
other witnesses for the defense merely corroborated appellants’ testimonies
that they were home when the incident happened, and that the possible reason
for the filing of the complaint against appellants was the fact that the respective
families of the victim and appellants were not in good terms.
On
WHEREFORE, finding accused Alejandro
Padua y Cabalquento @ Andoy Padua, Christopher Padua y Videna @ Popop Padua and
Michael Dullavin y Valencia @ Mike or Meke guilty of the crime of rape with
homicide, the Court hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of
death, to pay the heirs of XXX the following sums: P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P30,000.00 for the wake, burial, coffin of XXX, and P50,000.00 as
moral damages. Costs against the accused. However, pursuant to Article 83 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the death sentence shall not be inflicted
upon accused Alejandro Padua who is over 70 years of age and the same shall be
commuted to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with the accessory penalty provided for in Article 40.
SO ORDERED.
The
records of the case were then transmitted to this Court on automatic review.
While the case was pending review by the Court, the Court received a letter from one Ma. Victoria
Diaz of the Philippine Jesuit Prison Service to the effect, among others, that
appellant, Christopher V. Padua, was allegedly below eighteen (18) years old at
the time of the commission of the crime. Acting thereon, the Court, in its Resolution
of
As
stated at the onset hereof, the Court, in its Resolution[10]
of
In
a decision dated
WHEREFORE,
the Decision dated
(i) The death penalty upon accused-appellant Christopher Padua is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and,
(ii) In addition to the civil indemnity, each
of the accused-appellants is ordered
to pay the heirs of the victim (i) moral damages in the increased amount of
P75,000.00; and (ii) temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00, in lieu of
actual damages of P30,000.00
SO ORDERED.
From
the CA, the case was then elevated to this Court for automatic review. In its
Resolution of
In
a Manifestation (In lieu of
Supplemental Brief) dated December 6, 2005, appellants Alejandro Padua and Christopher
Padua, through the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), informed the Court that they
were no longer filing a supplemental brief and were merely adopting their
appellants’ brief before the CA as their supplemental brief. For his part, appellant
Michael Dullavin filed his Supplemental Brief through his private counsel,
Atty. Leodegario Barayang, Sr.
The
OSG, on the other hand, filed on
In
their common Appellants’ Brief[12] before
the CA, all three appellants assign the following errors:
I
THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME OF RAPE WITH
HOMICIDE MERELY ON THE BASIS OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
II
THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A VERDICT OF CONVICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
On
the other hand, appellant Michael Dullavin, in his Supplemental Brief,
similarly faulted the trial court for
relying solely on circumstantial evidence in convicting him and for giving
credence to the alleged exaggerated and false testimonies of the victim’s
brothers, YYY and ZZZ.
Insisting
that there was no direct evidence to link them to the crime, all three appellants
stood to a man in asking the Court to review the sufficiency of the circumstantial
evidence upon which their conviction was based, and to acquit them on ground of
reasonable doubt.
The
appeal must fail.
Direct
evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial
court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt.[13]
The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to
support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which
proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be
established by inference.[14] At
times, resort to circumstantial evidence is imperative since to insist on
direct testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and deny
proper protection to the community.[15]
Section
4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if the following requisites are complied with:
(1)
there is more than one circumstance;
(2)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
(3)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
All
the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with
the hypothesis that he is innocent.[16] Thus,
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld, provided the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person.[17]
After
a careful scrutiny of the evidence presented in this case in the light of the
standards set forth above, the Court holds that the evidence adduced by the
prosecution adequately proved the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the herein
appellants. The following circumstances, when pieced together, lead to the
ineluctable conclusion that appellants raped and killed the victim:
1.
At around
2.
At around
3. YYY was about to call his sister when he saw appellants Alejandro, Christopher and Michael pull and drag XXX who was then struggling to free herself. Michael even covered XXX’s mouth as she was crying.
4. The place where XXX was forcibly abducted was well-illuminated by the billboard lights of the Nescafe compound in Alabang, Muntinlupa, which made it possible for YYY and ZZZ to recognize appellants as the ones who abducted XXX.
5.
That night of
6.
Two days after or on
7.
The post-mortem examination of the body of XXX revealed
that she sustained hematoma at the back of her head and right ear, and had been
sexually abused as shown by the hymenal laceration at
8.
Dr. Rolando Victoria, the medico-legal officer who
conducted the autopsy, opined that, based on the injuries and lacerations
sustained by XXX, the latter must have died within 48 hours prior to the
autopsy on August 23, 1995, which time is compatible to the time when she was
last seen alive and being dragged by appellants on August 21, 1995.
All
the aforementioned circumstances have been duly proven and established.
Circumstantial evidence is considered sufficient when the facts from which the
inferences are derived are themselves duly proved. Clearly then, the
prosecution has established appellants’ culpability through these established
facts which constitute an unbroken chain of events leading to the conclusion of
guilt on the part of the appellants. There is thus moral certainty that they
authored the crime charged.
Appellants
also contend that the prosecution’s principal witnesses, YYY and ZZZ, are not
credible as they did not actually witness the commission of the crime.
We
are not persuaded.
In
previous decisions, the Court has had occasions to discuss the intrinsic nature
of a rape case as one which involves only two parties, the rapist and the
victim. Thus, conviction or acquittal in rape cases depends entirely on the
credibility of the victim’s testimony because only the participants to the
crime can testify as to its occurrence.[18]
Unfortunately in the instant case, the Court does not have the facility of
hearing the victim’s testimony as she did not survive the brutality of her
assailants. Hence, the prosecution had to rely on the testimonies of its
principal witnesses, YYY and ZZZ, younger siblings of victim XXX.
We
have carefully gone over the testimonies of YYY and ZZZ and we agree with the
trial court’s finding that despite rigorous cross-examination by no less than
three defense counsels, their testimonies remained unshaken. The brothers were
consistent and unwavering in their declaration that they saw appellants drag
their sister XXX on the night of
Appellants
argue that the failure of YYY and ZZZ to come to the rescue of their sister and
to inform their parents of the incident are contrary to human experience. On
this score, we agree with the Solicitor General’s rationale to wit:
YYY and ZZZ are children. As such,
they cannot be expected to deliberate and act as adults do. While an adult
would normally come to the rescue of a child in distress, a minor cannot be
expected to do the same. Children, under ordinary circumstances, would first
think of their own safety, and not of rescuing another child in trouble. As
explained by the brothers, they did not dare help their sister, or even tell
their parents about the abduction, since they feared that appellants, who are
definitely stronger than they are, would take them away like they did their
sister. This fear was heightened by the fact that appellants were neighbors who
lived thereby.[20]
Indeed,
behavioral responses of witnesses are diverse when they are confronted with
startling occurrences. In fact, there is no uniform reaction or standard
behavioral response to grisly events. The sealed lips of witnesses are but a
natural and spontaneous reaction. They may opt to remain silent rather than to
imperil their own lives and those of their own families.[21] As
we see it, the imputed reaction of YYY and ZZZ is thus understandable and does
not at all diminish their credibility.
Appellants
then resort to pointing inconsistencies/inadequacies in the testimonies of YYY
and ZZZ, such as the title of the movie they watched on television in the house
of Aling Fely; the exact time they arrived at the house of Aling Fely; and
whether ZZZ shouted at the appellants upon seeing their sister XXX being
dragged by them. To the mind of the Court, the inconsistencies/deficiencies alluded to are too trivial to merit
consideration, referring as they do to minor and irrelevant matters. For sure,
it is of little or no significance at all as to what time the siblings arrived
at the house of Aling Fely. It is too petty, as well, to quibble over the title
of the movie they watched on Aling Fely’s television. What is important is that
YYY and ZZZ saw the three appellants perform the acts preparatory to their
commission of the crime. The Court is thus consistent in ruling
that minor incongruences
even serve to strengthen,
rather than weaken, the credibility
of witnesses[22] as
they dispel the testimonies as
rehearsed. Too, ample margin of error and understanding must be accorded to
young witnesses like YYY, 10 years old, and ZZZ, 7 years old, who, much more
than adults, would be gripped with tension due to the novelty of the experience
of testifying before a court.[23]
Appellants
claim that the charge against them was triggered by the long-standing feud between
them and the victim’s parents, claiming that the parents were merely impelled
by anger and revenge in implicating them. The Court finds such claim flimsy and
inconceivable. For, it is highly unnatural for parents to impute such a serious
crime as rape with homicide if their motive were other than a fervent desire to
seek justice for their daughter.
At bottom, all that appellants could proffer by way of defense are denial and alibi, which, unfortunately for them, are inherently weak and cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. A denial, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative, self-serving and merits no weight in law.[24] On the other hand, for alibi to prosper, the hornbook rule requires a showing that the accused was at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.[25] The accused must not only prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also convincingly demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident.
A
thorough examination of the evidence would show that appellants failed to meet
the requirements of alibi. All three of them claim that they were in their
respective houses when the crime happened. However, considering that their
houses are located at
From
the evidence on record, it is beyond doubt that the three appellants conspired
in the commission of the crime charged. Their concerted actions point to their
joint purpose and community of interest. We, thus, hold all appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape With Homicide.
The
courts below imposed the death penalty upon appellants pursuant to R.A. No. 7659[26]
which imposes the penalty of death whenever the victim is raped and at the same
time killed on the occasion or by reason of the rape.
In
view, however, of the passage of R.A. No.
9346,[27]
otherwise known as the Anti-Death Penalty Law, which prohibits the imposition
of death penalty, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole should instead be imposed.[28] Accordingly,
appellants shall thus be sentenced with reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole in lieu of the penalty of death.
With
regard to the civil indemnity, we rule that the heirs of XXX are entitled to
the amount of P100,000.00 in keeping with the current jurisprudence
authorizing the mandatory award of P50,000.00 in case of death, and P50,000.00
upon the finding of the fact of rape.[29]
As
to moral damages, the Court deems it just and reasonable that in cases of rape
with homicide, the heirs of the victim should be awarded the amount of P75,000.00.[30]
As
regards the actual damages, inasmuch as the actual amount of loss had not been
proven, we grant the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu
of actual damages on the ground that it was reasonable to expect that the
family of the victim incurred expenses for the coffin, burial and food during
the wake.[31]
Finally,
exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00 are likewise imposed on
appellants to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings and as a vindication
of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of a victim.[32]
WHEREFORE, the decision dated
(1)
Appellants
Christopher Padua, Alejandro Padua and Michael Dullavin are each sentenced to reclusion perpetua, conformably with R.A. No. 9346, without eligibility for
parole; and
(2)
They
are ordered to indemnify the heirs of XXX, the following: (a) P100,000.00
as civil indemnity; (b) P75,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P25,000.00 as
temperate damages; and (d) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
|
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice
|
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
|
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
|
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Associate Justice
|
|
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice
|
RENATO C.
CORONA Associate Justice
|
|
(ON LEAVE) CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
ROMEO
J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice |
|
(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE) ADOLFO S.
AZCUNA Associate Justice
|
DANTE O.
TINGA Associate Justice
|
|
MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On Leave.
** On Official Leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, with Presiding Justice Ruben T. Reyes and Associate Justice Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, concurring; Rollo, pp. 3-17.
[2] Penned by Judge Stella Cabuco Andres; CA Rollo, pp. 82-100.
[3] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[4] In our Resolution of
[5] G.R. No. 167693,
[6] CA Rollo, pp. 14-15.
[7] CA Rollo, pp. 288-309.
[8] CA Rollo, pp. 82-100.
[9] Administrative Matter No. 03-03-22-SC.
[10] Rollo, p. 2.
[11] Supra note 3.
[12] CA Rollo, pp. 330-358.
[13] People
v. Lopez, G.R. No. 131151,
[14] People
v. Ayola, G.R. No. 138923,
[15] People
v. Ramos, G.R. No. 104497,
[16] People
v. Pabiona, G.R. No. 145803,
[17] People v. Lopez, supra note 11.
[18] People
v. Tacipit, G.R. No. 109140,
[19] People
v. Abatayo, G.R. No. 139456,
[20] Rollo, p. 47.
[21] People
v. Jamiro, G.R. No. 117576,
[22] People
v. De Leon, G.R. No. 115367,
[23] People
v. Abaño, G.R. No. 142728,
[24] People
v. Alviz, G.R. Nos. 144551-55,
[25] People
v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 141599,
[26] Otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law.
[27] Approved on
[28] Supra note 5.
[29] People
v. Tablon, G.R. No. 137280,
[30] People
v. Magallanes, G.R. No. 136299,
[31] People
v. Abrazaldo, G.R. No. 124392,
[32] People
v. Larrañaga, G.R. Nos. 138874-75,