THIRD
DIVISION
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ERNESTO M. DE CHAVEZ, PORFIRIO C. LIGAYA,
ROLANDO L. LONTOK, SR., ROLANDO M. LONTOK, JR. and GLORIA G. MENDOZA, Petitioners, - versus - OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
and NORA L. MAGNAYE, Respondents. |
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G.R. Nos.
168830-31 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
Before
Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure which seeks the nullification of the Joint Resolution dated 14
February 2005[2] and the
Supplemental Resolution dated 12 July 2005[3] in
cases OMB-1-01-1036-K and OMB-1-01-1083-K, both issued by the public respondent
Office of the Ombudsman. It also prays
for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order commanding the public respondent
to cease and desist from implementing the said Supplemental Resolution dated
Culled from the records are the
following facts:
On 7
November 2001, private respondent Nora L. Magnaye (Magnaye), Professor IV of the Batangas
State University (BSU), filed with the public respondent an administrative complaint
for Grave Misconduct, Oppression, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interests of
the Service, Falsification of Official Documents, Dishonesty, Gross Neglect of Duty
and Violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713 otherwise known as “CODE
OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES” against
petitioners Ernesto M. de Chavez (de Chavez), BSU President; Porfirio C. Ligaya (Ligaya), BSU Vice- President for Extension Campus
Operations; Rolando L. Lontok, Sr. (Lontok, Sr.), BSU Vice-President for Academic Affairs;
Rolando M. Lontok, Jr. (Lontok,
Jr.), BSU Associate Dean of the College of Computer Science and Information
Technology; Gloria G. Mendoza (Mendoza), BSU Dean of the College of Liberal
Arts; and other BSU officials namely, Virginia Baes,
BSU Executive Vice-President; Amador M. Lualhati (Lualhati), BSU University Secretary; Victoria A. Zaraspe (Zaraspe), BSU Vice-President
for Finance and Administration; and Jessie A. Montalbo
(Montalbo), BSU Vice-President and Dean of the
College of Computer Science and Information Technology.[4] The case was docketed as OMB-1-01-1036-K. The generative facts which gave rise to the
filing of the complaint are summarized in the Comment dated
1.
De
Chavez, Lontok, Sr. and Mendoza caused to be
collected, and received the proceeds of, graduation fees from the graduating
class of SY 2000-2001 without issuing an official receipt and without remitting
the same to BSU.
2.
De
Chavez and Lontok, Sr., did not conduct any public
bidding for the rental of caps and gowns which were used during the graduation
for the SY 2000-2001 and gave the contract to rent caps and gowns to their
relatives.
3.
De
Chavez and Lontok, Sr. required and received from the
graduating class of SY 2000-2001 the amount of P200.00 from each student as
payment for said students’ comprehensive examination. Said collection was not
authorized by the BSU Board of Regents.
4.
Lontok, Jr. and Montalbo
collected from BSU students internet fees without issuing an official receipt
and despite the absence of internet facilities in BSU Lipa
City Campus.
5.
Ligaya collected from BSU students the amount P200.00
each as payment for Related Learning Experience Fee (RLEF) without issuing any
official receipt.
6.
De
Chavez and Baes conspired in designating close
relatives of De Chavez to key administrative positions in BSU.
7.
De
Chavez made appointments of faculty members and transmitted said appointments
to the CSC [Civil Service Commission] without the approval of the BSU Board of
Regents.
8.
De
Chavez prevented the elected President of the Federation of Supreme Student
Assembly to sit as a member of the Board of Regents.
9.
De
Chavez issued a Memorandum increasing the rates of fees for records and other
documents issued by BSU without any approval of the governing Board of the BSU.
10.
De
Chavez, Baes and Zaraspe
designated and appointed faculty members to key positions in BSU without any
authority under the law, rule or regulation.
11.
De
Chavez and Lontok, Sr. failed to respond to the
letter of officials of the PTA-BSU Lipa Campus in
violation of R.A. 6713.
12.
De
Chavez collected notarial fees from contractual
employees without issuing official receipts.
13.
De
Chavez and Lontok, Sr. did not renew the contract of
two faculty members.[6]
Subsequently,
on 13 November 2001, based on the above imputed acts plus an additional one,[7] private
respondent also filed with the public respondent another Complaint imputing
criminal liability to the BSU officials above-named for Violation of Section 3(a)
and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the “ANTI-GRAFT AND
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT,” Violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713, Falsification
of Official Documents and Estafa.[8] The criminal complaint was docketed as
OMB-1-01-1083-K.
Petitioners
denied the allegations of private respondent. In their Joint Counter-Affidavit
dated
1.
The
BSU management did not collect graduation fees for the commencement exercises
of SY 2000-2001 like in the previous years. It was claimed that the members of
the graduating class, with the guidance of their advisers, were the ones who
fixed, collected and disbursed the
contributions/fees for the commencement exercises.
2.
No
public bidding was conducted for the rental of the caps and gowns because the
BSU did not enter into contract with any supplier. The graduating students have
the complete freedom to hire their caps and gowns from anyone. The receipts
signed by Lontok, Sr. was merely in acknowledgment of
the receipts of certain amounts from Magnaye which
the latter requested to be given to Mr. Fralundio Sulit from whom the graduating class rented their caps and
gowns.
3.
Whenever
a collection of the internet fee is made, a receipt was issued by the BSU using
Accountable Form No. 51. Further no collection of internet fees was made at BSU
Lipa City Campus.
4.
The
collection of the Related Learning Experience Fee was done by the Cashier’s
Office of the College. What was being collected in the past by the Office of
Dr. Porfirio Ligaya was the
Dual Training Fee for non-degree courses. However, effective the second week of
December 2001, the collection of this fee was already turned over to the
Cashier’s Office of the BSU.
5.
De
Chavez relied on the authority of the Resolution issued by the Office of the
President declaring that the designation of the relatives of De Chavez to
certain positions in the BSU is not violative of the
rule against nepotism. The subject designations were all duly confirmed by the
Board of Regents.
6.
The
Board of Regents recognized the practice of De Chavez of submitting first the
appointments he made to the CSC for attestation before submitting the same for
confirmation of the Board. The appointments of professors/instructors which Magnaye claim is violative of
existing law and rules has already been confirmed by the Board of Regents.
7.
No
one has been elected as President of the Federation of Student Assembly. Said
position is still non-existent in view of the failure of the student to draft
and ratify their constitution and by-laws.
8.
The
increase in miscellaneous fees was duly approved by the Board of Trustees of
PBMIT through Board Resolution No. 6 series of 1997.
9.
The
failure to respond to some letters query was brought about by the
pre-occupation of petitioners to other pressing and more important matters.
10.
The
BSU neither collects nor shares in the notarial fees
charged by the notary public.
11.
The
management can opt to renew or not to renew the contract for employment of some
faculty members. They are not governed by the security of tenure as commonly
enjoyed by the regular employees of the government.[10]
In her
Reply dated 8 March 2002,[11]
private respondent attached therewith a photocopy of the alleged Audit Report
dated 7 February 2001 of State Auditor IV Milagros D. Masangkay,
Office of the Auditor, Pablo Borbon Memorial Institute
of Technology,[12]
containing a finding and recommendation on the graduation fees collected by
BSU, thus:
4. FINDING
Graduation
fees were not yet issued official receipts and were not taken up in the books
of the College despite prior years’ audit recommendations and in violation of
the provisions of Sections 63 and 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445,
and Section 4(d) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8292 resulting to an aggregate
understatement of Cash and Trust Liability accounts by about P3,342,550.00.
Section 63 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445 requires all moneys and property officially
received by a public officer in any capacity or upon any occasion to be
accounted for as government funds and government property, while Section 68 of
the same presidential decree provides that no payment of any nature shall be
received by a collecting officer without immediately issuing an official
receipt in acknowledgment thereof.
Under Section 4(d) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8292, the higher Education Modernization Act of 1997,
state universities and colleges are authorized to deposit in any authorized
government depository bank and treat as Special Trust Fund, income from tuition
fees and other necessary school charges such as matriculation fees, graduation
fees, and laboratory fees.
The existing practice of
not issuing official receipts and not taking up in the books of accounts
graduation fees paid by graduating students has been an audit finding since
1997.
Based on the Annual
Audit Report for calendar year 1999, the graduation fees from 1997-1999 totaled
P2,057,600 with an expenses of P921,529.00.
The graduation fees
collected and the expenses paid out of these fees during the calendar year 2000
could not be determined due to failure of the employee concerned to furnish
this Office with certified statement of collections of graduation fees and the
related disbursements together with the supporting papers despite our request
to the College President in a letter dated January 17, 2001.
Likewise, in response to
our Memorandum dated
The continuous refusal
of management to implement prior years’ audit recommendations and the letter of
the Honorable Chairman of the Commission on Audit relative to the handling of
graduation fees was already communicated to the Commission on Audit thrice, the
latest was last November 8, 2000 when the General Counsel of the Commission on
Audit asked for status report.
Since graduation fee is
one of the items to be recorded under Special Trust Fund per R.A. No. 8292,
failure to record the same in the books of accounts of the Institute
understated the cash and trust liability accounts.
Since there were no
records submitted to this Office pertaining to graduation fees collected from
graduating students, understatement of Cash and Trust Liability Accounts
amounting to P1,284,950.00 (Annex G) was based on the number graduating
students and the graduation fee per student last school year 1999-2000. The 1999
Annual Audit Report of the previous COA Auditor reported a total collections
from 1997 to 1999 of P2,057,600.00. These amounts when added will yield
an aggregate understatement of Cash and Trust Liability accounts by about P3,342,550.00.
RECOMMENDATION
Require the accountable
officer to issue official receipts (Accountable Form 51) for graduation fees
collected and deposit the collections in an authorized government depository
bank. Enjoin the Accountant to record in the books of accounts of the College
all collections and disbursements conformably with generally accepted
accounting principles and in accordance with pertinent laws and regulations.
Private respondent Magnaye
also accused the petitioners of grave oppression and harassment for giving her
two unsatisfactory performance ratings corresponding to the periods of June to
After
the conduct of a clarificatory hearing[14]
and upon submission of both parties of their respective position papers, the
public respondent, through Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II Joy
N. Casihan-Dumlao with Director Joaquin F. Salazar
and Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Victor C. Fernandez concurring, issued its Joint
Resolution dated 14 February 2005 in OMB-1-01-1036-K and OMB-1-01-1083-K
recommending the indictment of petitioners De Chavez, Lontok,
Sr., and Mendoza for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019. It, however, proposed the dismissal of the
complaints against petitioners Ligaya and Lontok, Jr., and other officials of BSU namely, Lualhati, Zaraspe, and Montalbo for lack of probable cause.[15] The fallo states:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondents ERNESTO M. DE
CHAVEZ, ROLANDO L. LONTOK, SR., and GLORIA G. MENDOZA, be indicted for
violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019.
With regard to the rest
of respondents, namely: VIRGINIA BAES, AMADOR M. LUALHATI, PORFIRIO C. LIGAYA,
VICTORIA A. ZARASPE, ROLANDO M. LONTOK, JR., and JESSIE A. MONTALBO, it is
recommended that instant complaints against them be dismissed for lack of
probable cause.
Upon
review by Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, he issued a Supplemental Resolution
dated
WHEREFORE, the
a)
Respondents
De Chavez, Lontok,
Sr., and Mendoza are hereby
found liable for violation of Section 3 (e) RA 3019, as amended, for unlawfully
collecting graduation fees. In addition, they are also liable for Estafa under Art. 315 (2) (b) of the Revised Penal Code;
b)
Respondents
De Chavez and respondent Lontok, Sr. are hereby found liable for
violation of Section 3 (e) RA 3019, as amended, in relation to Section 3 (h)
thereof, relative to their engaging in the business of rental of caps and
gowns;
c)
Respondent
De Chavez and respondent Lontok, Jr., are found liable for violation
of Section 3 (e) RA 3019, as amended, for illegally collecting internet fees
from students. In addition, they are also liable for Estafa
under Art. 315 (2) (b) of the Revised Penal Code;
d)
The
Field Investigation Office (FIO) is directed to conduct further fact-finding on
respondent Ligaya for probable Malversation
under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for collecting P200.00 each from BSU
students as payment for Related Learning Experience Fee (RLEF) without issuing
official receipts and misappropriating the same, and to establish with
certainty the total amount collected;
e)
The
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon is hereby directed to refer to the
Civil Service Commission the administrative aspect of the charges relating to
nepotism, appointment, assignment/designation, transfer of personnel, and
performance evaluation ratings;
f)
The
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
g)
The
Field Investigation Office (FIO) is directed to immediately conduct an
investigation to gather evidence relative to the students who rented caps and
gowns for the school year 2000-2001 and prior to said school year; and
h)
Respondents
De Chavez, Lontok,
Sr., Ligaya and Lontok Jr., are hereby found guilty of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct
and are, thus, meted the penalty of Dismissal from the Service, pursuant to
Section 52 (A), Rule IV, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits and
perpetual disqualification from employment in government service pursuant to
Section 58, Rule IV of the same Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service.
Corollary thereto, the
Civil Service Commission is hereby requested to implement this Order in
accordance with law and to advice this Office of compliance thereon. Let a copy
of this decision be furnished the Honorable Chairman, Civil Service Commission,
Constitution Hills, Diliman,
Aggrieved,
the petitioners filed this petition. Petitioner
I.
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN FINDING PETITIONERS
ALREADY LIABLE FOR CRIMINAL OFFENSES.
II.
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE TWO SEPARATE BUT
IDENTICAL CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT.[19]
Apropos
the first issue, the petitioners alleged that the public respondent’s
Supplemental Resolution dated 12 July 2005 categorically stated that
petitioners are liable for the criminal acts complained of; that the public
respondent did not even discuss the matter of probable cause but instead immediately
ruled on their guilt; that the said resolution did not state or instruct the
filing of the appropriate criminal informations
against them before the courts of justice. Hence, the public respondent’s instantaneous finding
of criminal liability on their part renders any trial against them an “exercise
in futility” which “inevitably clashes with Section 14(2) of the 1987
Constitution which grants to the accused, inter
alia, the right to have a speedy, impartial and public
trial.” Therefore, the public respondent
had exceeded its jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the
“Ombudsman Act of 1989,” since there is nothing in the said statute which
grants to it the power to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.[20]
Further,
they argued that “the public respondent’s directive to the Field Investigation
Office (FIO) to conduct further fact-finding on x x x [petitioner] Ligaya for
probable Malversation under Art. 217 of the Revised
Penal Code, is questionable as it had already arbitrarily decreed the guilt of
petitioner Ligaya when it pilloried him for
collecting P200.00 each from BSU Students as payment for Related
Experience Fee (RLEF) without issuing official receipts and misappropriating
the same x x x.”[21]
We
reject the foregoing asseverations.
Petitioners
make mountain on the use of the words “liable for violation x x x” employed by the Ombudsman. A review of the specific powers of the
Ombudsman under the Constitution, the laws and jurisprudential pronouncements
is in order. Both the 1987 Constitution
and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6770) empower the public
respondent to investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public official or employee, office or
agency when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient.[22] By virtue of this power,[23] it
may conduct a preliminary investigation for the mere purpose of determining
whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should
be held for trial.[24]
A
preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only
means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to
enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits
and has no objective except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the respondent is
guilty thereof.[25] In the conduct of preliminary investigation,
the prosecutor does not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable
doubt of the guilt of respondent. A
prosecutor merely determines the existence of probable cause, and to file the
corresponding information if he finds it to be so.[26]
At the
threshold, we must accentuate that in the exercise of the powers and in the
discharge of his functions and responsibilities, the Ombudsman, as in that of
the other officials, enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions. Rule 131, Section 3(m) of the Revised Rules of Evidence
provides:
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
x x
x x
(m) That official duty
has been regularly performed; x x x.
This
presumption of regularity includes the public officer’s official actuations in
all the phases of his work.[27]
With
particular reference to the Ombudsman, it is well to state that his office is,
indeed, one of the more powerful agencies of the government and wields vast
powers, though limited to a certain extent. Concomitant to this stature, our laws have
required more stringent qualifications, most especially to the intellectual
quality and capacity, for the person who will run for the office.
In
light of this observation, the presumption that the Ombudsman knows whereof he
speaks forcefully applies. We must then
presume that he is well aware of the extent and limitations of his powers. Thus, when Ombudsman Marcelo used the words
“liable for” in his Supplemental Resolution of
Further,
the word “liable” is described as to mean “subject or exposed to some usually
adverse contingency or action.”[28] The word is now rather wide in its use and is
considered synonymous to the words “susceptible,” “prone,” and “exposed,” all
indicating temporary or fluctuating situations.[29]
We,
likewise, call special attention to the fact that nowhere in the challenged resolution
is it stated that petitioners are found “guilty” beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, in stark contrast to the disposition of the administrative case[30]
wherein petitioners “De (sic) Chavez, Lontok, Sr., Ligaya and Lontok, Jr., are
hereby found guilty of x x x”
and were meted the corresponding penalty.
We,
then, conclude that the words “liable for” employed by the Ombudsman in the
challenged resolution really alluded only to the probability of guilt. They
simply imply that the Ombudsman had found probable cause to hold petitioners
liable for the crimes imputed and, thus, should be held liable for trial in the
courts of law. It is not a declaration
of guilt.
Probable
cause, as used in preliminary investigations, has been defined as the existence
of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable
mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.[31]
We reiterate this in the case of Pimentel
Jr. v. COMELEC,[32]
thus:
[a] finding of probable cause needs only to rest
on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and
was by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar
vs. United States, while probable cause demands more than “bare suspicion,” it
requires “less than evidence which would justify x x x conviction.” A finding of probable cause merely binds
over the suspects to stand trial. It is
not a pronouncement of guilt. (Emphasis
ours.)
The
public respondent’s finding of probable cause to indict petitioners for the
crime charged is based on and supported by the complaints under oath of the
private respondent, sworn statements and notarized affidavits of her witnesses,
and official and public documents submitted by the private respondent.[33] A clarificatory
hearing[34]
attended by private respondent and almost all of the petitioners was conducted
by the public respondent on
The 24-paged
Supplemental Resolution dated 12 July 2005, as well as the 24-paged Joint
Resolution dated 14 February 2005, of the public respondent contains lengthy
and substantial discussions on the bases of its finding of probable cause to
indict the petitioners for the criminal offenses. The Resolutions took pains to
determine the appropriate crimes to be imputed to petitioners and to analyze
each charge vis-a-vis
the elements of the crime. The evidences
submitted by the private respondent for each charge were subjected to careful
scrutiny.
As to
petitioner Ligaya, it is asserted that “the public
respondent’s directive to the Field Investigation Office (FIO) to conduct
further fact-finding on x x x
[petitioner] Ligaya for probable Malversation
under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code, is questionable as it had already
arbitrarily decreed the guilt of petitioner Ligaya
when it pilloried him for collecting P200.00 each from BSU Students as
payment for Related Experience Fee (RLEF) without issuing official receipts and
misappropriating the same x x x.”
The subject directive reads:
d)
The Field Investigation Office (FIO) is directed to conduct further
fact-finding on respondent Ligaya for probable Malversation under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for
collecting P200.00 each from BSU students as payment for related Learning
Experience Fee (RLEF) without issuing official receipts and misappropriating
the same, and to establish with certainty the total amount collected;
As it
is, the public respondent merely directed the FIO to conduct further
investigation and gather more evidence on the liability of petitioner Ligaya for “probable” malversation.
It did not in any way conclude that petitioner Ligaya
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation. In fact, it saw the need to first gather more
information and evidence before deciding on whether petitioner Ligaya may be indicted for malversation.
Coming
now to the second issue, petitioners argued that the public respondent should
have dismissed the “two separate but identical complaints” filed by private
respondent on the ground of forum shopping.
The
test in determining the presence of forum shopping is whether in the two or
more cases pending, there is identity of (1) parties, (2) rights or causes of
action, and (3) relief(s) sought.[35] In the instant case, although the parties,
facts and circumstances are essentially the same, the rights or causes of
action, as well as the relief(s) sought are different. The complaint filed on
Relative
to petitioners’ rantings in the probative value of
the affidavits presented during the preliminary investigation and on the
conclusions of fact reached by the public respondent, suffice it to say that the
technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the conduct of preliminary
investigation by the public respondent strictly. This is clear in the Administrative Order No.
08 entitled “CLARIFYING AND MODIFYING CERTAIN RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN”[36] The validity and the merits of a party’s
defense or accusations as well as the admissibility of testimonies and
evidences are better ventilated during the trial stage than in the preliminary
stage.
The
factual and evidentiary issues can best be passed upon and threshed out during
a full-blown court trial since it is the court’s task to determine guilt beyond
reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented by the parties at a trial on
the merits.[37]
We have
consistently refrained from interfering with the constitutionally-mandated
investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the public respondent absent any
compelling reason.[38] In the case of Quiambao v. Desierto,[39] citing
The Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto,[40]
we ruled:
The prosecution of
offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of the Ombudsman.
To insulate the Office from outside pressure
and improper influence, the Constitution as well as R.A. 6770 has endowed it
with wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory
powers virtually free from legislative, executive, or judicial intervention.
This Court consistently refrains from interfering with the exercise of its
powers, and respect the initiative and independence inherit in the Ombudsman
who, “beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver
of the integrity of the public service.”
In Maturan v. People,[41]
we held:
A policy of
non-interference by the courts in the exercise of the Ombudsman’s constitutionally
mandated powers is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions
of the Court will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman
with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts
would be extremely swamped if they were compelled to review the exercise of
discretion on the part of the fiscals, or prosecuting attorneys, each time they
decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by private
complainant.”
One
final and significant observation. This
Court noted that the present petition seeks the annulment of public
respondent’s Supplemental Resolution dated
This
Court, however, cannot and will not pass judgment on the administrative
liability of petitioners. In the leading case of Fabian v. Desierto,[43]
we ruled that appeals from decisions of the public respondent in administrative
liability cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Consequently, the administrative aspect of the
present petition should be referred to the Court of Appeals for proper
disposition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition
as regards criminal case OMB-1-01-1083-K is hereby DISMISSED. Petitioners’ appeal of the public respondent’s
Supplemental Resolution dated
SO
ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice |
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson, Third
Division |
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-33.
[2] Penned
by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II Joy N. Casihan-Dumlao
with Director Joaquin F. Salazar and Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Victor C.
Fernandez concurring; id. at 34-58.
[3] Penned
by Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo; id. at 59-82.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Alleged
violation of Section 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against respondents
DE CHAVEZ, BAES, LUALHATI, and LIGAYA for conspiring with each other in
designating LIGAYA as Campus Administrator for Lipa
despite the competent performance of herein complainant as such; for narrowing
the assignment of herein complainant to the Deanship of Liberal Arts and her
transfer to the Balayan campus and then to Calaca campus.
[8] Rollo, pp. 256-297.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Office
of the Ombudsman records, Folder 2, pp. 00691-00711.
[15] Rollo, pp. 56-57.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] Article
XI, Section 13(1) of the 1987 Constitution; Sections 11(4)(a) and 15(1) of Republic
Act No. 6770.
[23] Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio, G.R. No. 118141, 5 September 1997, 278 SCRA
769, 776; Section 11, (4)(a) of Republic Act No. 6770; Rule II, Section 3,
Administrative Order No. 07, Re: Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
[24] Diamante v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 147911,
[25] Cruz, Jr. v. People of the
[26] Supra
note 25.
[27] 31
Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 31, pp. 802-803; American
Jurisprudence 2d, Volume 29, p. 224; Philippine
Consumers Foundation, Inc. v. Secreatary of
Education, Culture and Sports, G.R. No. L-78385,
[28] Webster,
Third New Int’l. Dictionary, 1993, p. 1302; Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth
Edition, 2004, p. 934.
[29]
[30] Paragraph
(h) of the dispositive portion.
[31] Supra
note 26 at 459.
[32] G.R.
No. 126394,
[33] Rollo, pp.
84-414.
[34] Supra
note 16.
[35] Employees’ Compensation Commission v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 115858, 28 June 1996, 257 SCRA 717, 723.
[36] 5. Procedure
in preliminary investigation of Ombudsman cases. – The preliminary
investigation of an Ombudsman case does
not have to be conducted strictly in accordance with Section 3, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court. Said rule shall be
applied as modified by Rule II of Administrative Order No. 07 of the Office of
the Ombudsman. Particular attention is directed to the provisions thereof which
are not exactly in conformity with Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
such as those on the (1) issuance of an order in lieu of subpoena for the
filing of counter-affidavits; (2) prohibition against a motion to dismiss,
motion for bill of particulars, and second motion for reconsideration or
reinvestigation; (3) manner of conducting clarificatory
questioning; and the (4) form of
affidavits and counter-affidavits. It is to be understand, however that the
preliminary investigation of Ombudsman case in accordance with Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court is perfectly valid. The changes in such procedure effected by
Administrative Order No. 07 are designed merely to expedite the process of
preliminary investigation and to conform with the provisions of Republic Act
No. 6770. (Emphasis ours.)
[37] Cabrera v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 157835,
[38] Nava v. National Bureau of Investigation,
Regional Office No. XI,
[39] G.R.
No. 149069,
[40] 418
Phil. 715, 721 (2001).
[41] G.R.
Nos. 150353-54,
[42] Acuna v. Deputy Ombudsman for
[43] G.R.
No. 129742,