SECOND DIVISION

HEIRS OF MARINA C. REGALADO AND HEIRS OF ARNULFO C. REGALADO, REPRESENTED BY AMADEO C. REGALADO, Petitioners, - versus - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 168155 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: February 15, 2007

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D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Marina Regalado (Marina) filed on July 14, 1987 an application for registration of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Balubad, Barrio Nangka, Marikina, Metro Manila which was surveyed and recorded as Psu-3907 (the property).[1]

The application, docketed as LRC Case No. 10916 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, was published on November 14, 1988 in the Official Gazette and on November 28, 1988 in Nueva Era, a newspaper of general circulation.[2]

Marina subsequently filed on January 18, 1991 a motion to withdraw the application without prejudice to the refiling of the same, citing as grounds

. . . the discrepancies on the question of the survey and accession number corresponding to the survey plan of the property, the question thereof not being indubitable and to allow the Bureau of Lands time to examine its records; and for another compelling reason was the inevitable absence of applicant from the country to arrange and assist in the intestate estate of her late widowed sister whose children [were] all minors in London.[3]

The motion to withdraw the application was granted on February 28, 1991.

On March 17, 1992, Marina filed a petition to reinstate the earlier application which was withdrawn. The court denied the petition on a technical ground.[4]

On May 6, 1992, Marina filed another application for land registration before the Pasig RTC.

Marina later filed on May 28, 1992 an “Amended Application for Registration”[5] alleging, inter alia, that she had “by herself or through her predecessor-in-interest . . . been in open, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of said land which is alienable and disposable of [sic] the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since 1945 or earlier”;[6] and that she acquired the land “by virtue of a Deed of Assignment dated January 3, 1977 executed by the registered claimant Tomas Antero as Assignor”[7] in her favor.

The application was docketed as LRC Case No. R-4633, but was re-numbered as LRC No. N-11237.[8]

To the Amended Application, the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed an opposition on March 15, 1994, it claiming to be the owner of the property which it referred to as the “Balubad Nangka Project” and which had been declared as an Area for Priority Development under Proclamation No. 1967 dated May 14, 1980.[9]

Acting on the Amended Application, a “Notice of Initial Hearing”[10] scheduled on June 26, 1995 was published in the May 22, 1995 issue of the Official Gazette[11] and in the June 22, 1995 issue of Taliba.[12] Copies of the “Notice of Initial Hearing” were sent to all adjoining owners, the persons named therein with known addresses, and government agencies and offices concerned.[13]

During the pendency of her application or on November 29, 1995, Marina died, hence, her counsel filed on February 21, 1996 a “Motion to Substitute Applicant,” alleging that her surviving heirs designated Arnulfo Regalado, her eldest son, as the applicant to pursue and litigate the land registration case in their behalf.[14] Branch 155 of the Pasig RTC granted the motion on April 30, 1996.[15]

On August 20, 1996, Arnulfo Regalado executed a Waiver of the “area covered by the National Housing Authority [sic] without prejudice to the other land subject of the . . . petition.”[16] In the same Waiver, he ceded, transferred, and waived 30,239 square meters of the property to the NHA.[17]

Finding that “the possession of the substitute-applicant is open, continuous, adverse, against the whole world, in the concept of owner, and under a bona fide claim of ownership”[18] and that “[t]he property is not part of any forest zone nor of any aerial, military or naval reservations of the government and is classified to be alienable and disposable,”[19] Branch 155 of the Pasig RTC, by Decision of August 12, 1997, ordered the registration of the property, except the portion which was waived in favor of the NHA, pro indiviso in the name of the heirs of Marina (Bernardita R. Carino, Amadeo C. Regalado, Ernesto C. Regalado, Elizabeth R. Cabading, Alberto C. Regalado, Milagros R. Escalante, and Arnulfo C. Regalado).[20]

The Republic of the Philippines (the Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Notice of Appeal of the RTC decision.[21]

By Decision[22] of February 10, 2004, the Court of Appeals found for the Republic in this wise:

We sustain the first argument raised by the Republic as to the discrepancy in the lot size and technical description between the original as published vis-à-vis that stated in the petition even after the waiver of 30,239 square meters in favor of the NHA. It is notable too that there are differences among the original technical descriptions made for Tomas Antero [who allegedly assigned the property to Marina] (Exh. “Z”), that duly approved by the Bureau of Lands (Exh. “AA”), and also that published in the Taliba (Exh. “F”), from the final technical description of the subject land in the assailed Decision. This is a serious defect for the technical description sets the extent and boundaries of the land to be registered, and so should be precise for purposes of identification, delineation, and distinction, and notice to the public.[23] (Underscoring supplied)

The appellate court thus dismissed the application for registration.

Their Motion for Reconsideration[24] having been denied,[25] Marina’s heirs filed the instant Petition[26] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, faulting the Court of Appeals to have erred

I. . . . IN ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL OF THE REPUBLIC DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS NOT PARTY IN THE CASE AS IT HAD NOT FILED ANY OPPOSITION OR ANSWER AGAINST THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO;

II. . . . IN FINDING THAT THE COURT A QUO DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE APPLICATION FOR DECREE OF REGISTRATION OVER THE INSTANT CASE

III. . . . IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS FAILED TO SUBSTANTIATE THEIR REGISTERABLE RIGHTS OVER THE SUBJECT LAND IN THE CASE AT BAR.[27] (Underscoring supplied)

In the meantime, the heirs of Marina designated Amadeo Regalado as their attorney-in-fact to pursue the application.[28]

The petition is devoid of merit.

The failure of the Republic to file any opposition or answer to the application for registration, despite receipt of notice thereof,[29] did not deprive its right to appeal the RTC decision.[30]

Relative to the allegation that the Director of Lands or that the government did not oppose the application of herein respondent, as in fact on December 26, 1969 an order of general default was issued by the court against the whole world, suffice it to say that as stated by this Court in Luciano v. Esterella, 34 SCRA 769, “it is a well known and settled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic, or its government, is usually not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.” And, in an earlier case, Republic vs. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., 32 SCRA 211, “there was an enunciation of such a principle in this wise: ‘Thus did the lower court, as pointed out by the then Solicitor General, conclude that the government was bound by the mistaken interpretation arrived at by the national treasurer and the auditor general. It would consider estoppel as applicable. That is not the law. Estoppel does not lie.”[31] (Underscoring supplied)

Respecting the finding of the appellate court on the “discrepancy” in the lot size and technical descriptions mentioned in the earlier-quoted portion of its decision, the heirs contend that “[w]hat appears, after a careful comparison of the approved survey plan (Exh. ‘Z’), and that republished [sic] with Taliba (Exh. ‘F’) and the Official Gazette (Exhibit ‘CC’), were simple clerical errors and minor discrepancies which do not substantially alter the technical description of the subject property as published by the Land Registration Authority in the Official Gazette (Exh. ‘CC’) and that by petitioner with the Taliba (Exh. ‘F’).”[32]

Petitioners conclude that any such discrepancy “was unsubstantial and did not in any way affect the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court.”

Petitioners’ contention fail in light of the following clear pronouncement of this Court in Fewkes v. Vasquez,[33] viz:

Under Section 21 of the Land Registration Act, an application for registration of land is required to contain, among others, a description of the land subject of the proceeding, the name, status and address of the applicant, as well as the names and addresses of all occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known, or if unknown, of the steps taken to locate them. When the application is set by the court for initial hearing, it is then that notice (of the hearing), addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the lot being registered and the adjoining owners, and indicating the location, boundaries and technical description of the land being registered, shall be published in the Official Gazette for two consecutive times. It is this publication of the notice of hearing that is considered one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court in land registration cases, for the proceedings being in rem, it is only when there is constructive seizure of the land, effected by the publication and notice, that jurisdiction over the res is vested on the court. Furthermore, it is such notice and publication of the hearing that would enable all persons concerned, who may have any rights or interests in the property, to come forward and show to the court why the application for registration thereof is not to be granted.

It must be remembered that the application in this case filed in the court below was for registration, not of the big parcel of land (Lot No. 1383, Pls-764-D or Lot no. 21), but of certain portions thereof designated by applicant-appellant as Lots Nos. 21-A and 21-B. It is the technical description of these 2 smaller lots, therefore, that must be published in order that the persons who may be affected by their registration may be notified thereof. For, considering that the adjoining owners of Lot No. 21 would not be the same as the owners of the properties adjoining Lots Nos. 21-A and 21-B, the notification of the adjoining owners of the big lot would not be the notice to the adjoining owners or occupants of the smaller lots required by law. In short, it is the publication of the specific boundaries of Lots Nos. 21-A and 21-B that would actually put the interested parties on notice of the registration proceeding, and would confer authority on the land registration court to pass upon the issue of the registerability of said lots in favor of the applicant.[34] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Marina’s heirs invoke Benin v. Tuason,[35] synthesizing its ruling as follows, quoted verbatim:

“An slight increase in area registered over the area contained in the application is not fatal to the decree of registration.” “Registration Court has no jurisdiction only in so far as areas not covered by original application are added.” Also, “Amendment to application for registration need not be published anew if merely excludes portions covered by the original application.[36] (Underscoring supplied)

It is not the lot or property size alone, however, in which the appellate court found a discrepancy. More importantly, it found discrepancy in the technical descriptions of the property appearing in the different documents material to the resolution of the Amended Application for registration.

IN ANY EVENT, Marina’s heirs as applicants in this land registration case “bear the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.”[37] This they failed to discharge.

In another vein, while the heirs claim that Tomas Antero assigned the property to Marina by a Deed of Assignment, no proof was presented that Tomas Antero had possessed the same in the concept of an owner. That the property was surveyed for Tomas Antero[38] does not prove his ownership.[39] Marina’s heirs themselves admit, in their petition filed before this Court, the doubtful nature of Tomas Antero’s title to the property, thus:

It is worth pointing out that the very reason why the previous owner Tomas Antero of the subject lot failed to secure the corresponding Tax Declaration was because of the apparent hesitation of then Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila to issue the same, contending that it considered the same as part of the public domain. That attitude of the Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila could be readily gleaned from the very Tax Declaration No. B-0069187 issued to petitioner Marina C. Regalado, the specific portion thereof is quoted, to wit:

NOTE:

It is believed that the land covered by this declaration form [sic] part of the public domain and was assessed upon the insistence of the declarant and upon compliance with Article 5-E of the Assessment Regulation No. 3-75.[40] (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)

Other than Marina’s uncorroborated testimony given in a previous attempt to have the property registered, there is no proof to sustain the trial court’s finding that Marina, her uncle, aunt, and other relatives have been residing in the property for more than 30 years and that she herself had been residing there for 15 years when Tomas Antero executed the deed of assignment in her favor.[41]

Marina’s admission that she does not know the name of the public road traversing the property[42] belies her claim that she resided therein for 15 years. At most, the evidence indicates that Marina possessed and occupied a small portion of the property, while some 600 other parties possessed and occupied the rest.[43]

As for the tax declaration in the name of Marina,[44] it is not conclusive proof of ownership. While it is a good indication of possession in the concept of owner,[45] delayed declaration of property for tax purposes negates

a claim of continuous, exclusive, and interrupted possession in the concept of an owner.[46]

In the case at bar, Marina claimed that the property was assigned to her as early as 1977, yet she only declared it for tax purposes in 1988,[47] following her first attempt to have the land registered on July 14, 1987.[48]

And, there is no proof that Marina religiously paid taxes on the property. In fact, in her testimony, she twice stated that she intended to pay taxes only if and when ordered to do so by the court.[49] The photocopies of Tax Receipt Nos. 7436713 and 7436714 annexed to the motion for reconsideration filed by Marina’s heirs before the Court of Appeals cannot be appreciated in their favor. On top of being mere photocopies, they were not offered in evidence before the trial court. To consider them at the appeal stage would deny the other parties the right to rebut them.[50]

In fine, the trial court’s finding that Marina had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession in the concept of owner and under a bona fide claim of ownership[51] fails. The reversal by the appellate court of the trial court’s decision must thus be upheld.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

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[1] RTC records, pp. 19, 21.

[2] Id. at 21.

[3] Id. at 20.

[4] Id. at 21.

[5] Id. at 18-24.

[6] Id. at 18.

[7] Ibid.; Folder of exhibits, Volume I, pp. 45-46.

[8] RTC records, p. 333.

[9] Id. at 185.

[10] Id. at 338-33A-A.

[11] Id. at 341, 343.

[12] Folder of exhibits, Vol. I, pp. 1-2.

[13] RTC records, p. 342.

[14] Id. at 357-361.

[15] Id. at 363-364.

[16] Id. at 380.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Id. at 427.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Id. at 428-430.

[21] Rollo, p. 432.

[22] Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Arsenio J. Magpale. CA rollo, pp. 162-175.

[23] Rollo, p. 62.

[24] CA rollo, pp. 179-185.

[25] Id. at 211-212.

[26] Rollo, pp. 13-49.

[27] Id. at 35-36.

[28] Id. at 8-9.

[29] Id. at 36-38, 594.

[30] Republic v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-33983, January 27, 1983, 120 SCRA 186.

[31] Id. at 191-192.

[32] Rollo, p. 40 (emphasis in the original).

[33] 148-A Phil. 448 (1971).

[34] Id. at 452-453.

[35] 156 Phil. 525 (1974); Vide rollo, pp. 603-604.

[36] Rollo, p. 604.

[37] Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50260, July 29, 1992, 211 SCRA 868, 876.

[38] Folder of exhibits, Vol. I, pp. 48, 59-60; Folder of exhibits, Vol. II, pp. 84-91.

[39] Vide Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-56948, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA 476, 486.

[40] Pages 1, 34; Rollo, p. 46.

[41] RTC records, p. 426.

[42] Folder of exhibits, Vol. I, p. 7.

[43] Id. at 8-9.

[44] Id. at 63.

[45] Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108926, July 12, 1996, 258 SCRA 712, 722.

[46] Vide National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 228 Phil. 304, 308 (1986); Director of Lands v. Santiago, G.R. No. L-41278, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 186, 194.

[47] Folder of exhibits, Vol. I, pp. 17, 63.

[48] RTC records, p. 30.

[49] Folder of exhibits, Vol. I, pp. 15, 17.

[50] Spouses Ong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117103, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 387, 399

[51] RTC records, p. 427.