THIRD DIVISION
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MA.
CONCEPCION L. REGALADO, Petitioner, - versus - ANTONIO S. GO, Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 167988 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: February
6, 2007 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
This is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Resolution[1] dated
WHEREFORE, Atty. Ma. Concepcion Regalado of De Borja Medialdea Bello Guevarra and Gerodias Law Offices
is declared GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT and is ordered to pay a fine of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000), with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. The imposed fine should be paid to this Court
upon finality hereof.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished
the Bar Confidant (sic), the Integrated Bar of the
The present controversy stemmed from the complaint of illegal
dismissal filed before the Labor Arbiter by herein respondent Antonio S. Go
against Eurotech Hair Systems, Inc. (EHSI), and its
President Lutz Kunack and General Manager Jose E. Barin.
In a Decision[4]
dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring [EHSI, Kunack and Barin] guilty of illegal dismissal;
2. Considering that reinstatement would not be feasible because of strained relations, [EHSI, Kunack and Barin] are ordered to pay [herein respondent Go] backwages in the amount of Php900,000.00 (Php60,000 x 15 months), separation pay of Php180,000.00 (one month pay for every year of service = Php60,000 x 3 years);
3. Ordering [EHSI, Kunack and Barin] to pay [respondent Go] Php500,000.00 as moral damages;
4. Ordering [EHSI, Kunack and Barin] to pay [respondent Go] Php300,000 as exemplary damages;
5. Ordering the payment of ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award as attorney’s fees in the sum of Php188,000.00.
All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
On appeal
to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), EHSI, Kunack
and Barin employed the legal services of De Borja Medialdea Bello Guevarra and Gerodias Law Offices where herein petitioner Atty. Regalado worked as an associate.[5]
On 11 June 2001, the NLRC rendered a
Decision[6]
reversing the Labor Arbiter’s decision and declaring that respondent Go’s
separation from employment was legal for it was attended by a just cause
and was validly effected by EHSI, Kunack and Barin. The dispositive
part of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is set aside. The complaint below is dismissed for being without merit.
For lack of patent or palpable error,
the Motion for Reconsideration interposed by respondent Go was denied by the NLRC in an Order[7]
dated
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the NLRC promulgated on July 30, 2001 and its Order dated December 20, 2001 are SET ASIDE while the decision of Labor Arbiter Waldo Emerson R. Gan dated December 29, 2000 declaring the dismissal of [herein respondent Go] as illegal is hereby REINSTATED with the modification that [EHSI] is hereby Ordered to pay [respondent Go]:
1. His full backwages from the time of his illegal dismissal until the finality of this decision;
2. Separation pay equal to one month pay for every year of service;
3. Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00; and
4. Exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00
The award of attorney’s fees is DELETED.
The
execution of the compromise agreement was attended by the counsel for EHSI,
Kunack and Barin, petitioner Atty. Regalado, and respondent Go, but in the absence and without
the knowledge of respondent Go’s lawyer.[12]
After the
receipt of a copy of the Court of Appeals decision, respondent Go, through
counsel, filed, on
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most
respectfully prayed for the Honorable Court to declare Null and Void the
dismissal of the instant (sic), with prejudice, by Labor (sic) Waldo Emerson Gan, as well as the Release Waiver and Quitclaim dated July
16, 2003 signed by [herein respondent Go] for having been obtained through
mistake, fraud or undue influence committed by [EHSI, Kunack
and Barin] and
their counsels (sic).
It is likewise prayed for [EHSI, Kunack
and Barin’s] counsel, particularly Atty. Ma. Concepcion Regalado, to be
required to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against them
(sic) for their (sic), unethical conduct of directly negotiating with
[respondent Go] without the presence of undersigned counsel, and for submitting
the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim before Labor Arbiter Waldo Emerson Gan knowing fully well that the controversy between
[respondent Go] and [EHSI] is still pending before this Honorable Court.
[Respondent Go] likewise prays for such other relief
[as may be] just and equitable under the premises.[14]
For their part, EHSI, Kunack and Barin submitted a Manifestation and Motion with Leave of Court[15] praying that CA-G.R. SP No. 69909 be considered settled with finality in view of the amicable settlement among the parties which resulted in the dismissal of respondent Go’s complaint with prejudice in the Labor Arbiter’s Order dated 16 July 2003.
In addition, EHSI, Kunack
and Barin also filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[16]
with an ad cautelam that in case of
unfavorable action on their foregoing Manifestation and Motion, the appellate
court should reconsider its decision dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Manifestation with Omnibus Motion is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The order of Labor Arbiter Gan dismissing the case with prejudice is hereby declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. [EHSI, Kunack and Barin’s] counsel, [herein petitioner] Atty. Ma. Concepcion Regalado is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution why she should not be cited for contempt of court for directly negotiating with [herein respondent Go] in violation of Canon 9 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. On the other hand, the Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam is hereby denied for lack of merit.
For her
part, petitioner Atty. Regalado submitted a Compliance[18]
and explained that she never took part in the negotiation for the amicable
settlement of the illegal dismissal case with respondent Go which led to the
execution of a compromise agreement by the parties on
Further, petitioner Atty. Regalado maintained that she never met personally
respondent Go, not until
Considering the circumstances, petitioner Atty. Regalado firmly stood that there was no way that she had directly dealt with respondent Go, to the latter’s damage and prejudice, and misled him to enter into an amicable settlement with her client.
Undaunted,
petitioner Atty. Regalado filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was also denied by the appellate court for lack of merit.[20]
Hence, this instant Petition
for Review on Certiorari,[21]
raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMPLETELY VIOLATED PETITIONER’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS TOTALLY DISREGARDED THE MANDATORY PROVISION OF RULE 71 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A MANIFEST ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS ESTOPPED FROM
CHALLENGING ITS AUTHORITY TO ENTERTAIN THE CONTEMPT CHARGES AGAINST HER.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DISREGARDING THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO EFFECT THAT
PETITIONER DID NOT COMMIT ANY CONTUMACIOUS CONDUCT.
V.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND COMMITTED A GROSS MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS IN FINDING THE PETITIONER GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT ON THE BASIS OF THE CONFLICTING, UNCORROBORATED, AND UNVERIFIED ASSERTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT.
Considering
that the issues raised herein are both questions of law and fact, and
consistent with our policy that this Court is not a trier
of facts, we shall address only the pure questions of law and leave the factual
issues, which are supported by evidence, as found by the appellate court. It is an oft-repeated principle that in the
exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the
re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the
trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals, if supported by evidence, are conclusive and binding upon this Court.[22]
Contempt of
court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such
conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into
disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties
litigant or their witnesses during litigation.[23] It is defined as disobedience to the Court by
acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or
disobedience of the court’s orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the
authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some
manner to impede the due administration of justice.[24]
The
power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due
administration of justice.[25]
Thus, contempt proceedings has a dual
function: (1) vindication of public interest by punishment of contemptuous
conduct; and (2) coercion to compel the contemnor to do what the law requires
him to uphold the power of the Court, and also to secure the rights of the
parties to a suit awarded by the Court.[26]
In
our jurisdiction, the Rules of Court penalizes two types of contempt, namely
direct contempt and indirect contempt. [27]
Direct contempt
is committed in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt
the proceedings before the same, and includes disrespect toward the court,
offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when
lawfully required to do so.[28]
On the other
hand, Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court enumerates particular acts which
constitute indirect contempt, thus:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in
the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings. (Emphasis supplied.)[29]
Section 4, Rule 71 of the same Rules
provides how proceedings for indirect contempt should be commenced, thus:
SEC. 4. How
proceedings commenced. – Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the
court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal
charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect
contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars
and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon
full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil
actions in the court concerned. If the
contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in
the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard
and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the
consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing
and decision. (Emphases supplied.)
As can be
gleaned above, the provisions of the Rules are unequivocal. Indirect contempt
proceedings may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu
proprio by the court; or (2) through a verified
petition and upon compliance with the requirements for initiatory
pleadings. Procedural requirements as
outlined must be complied with.
There is no doubt that the complained acts of Atty. Regalado would fall under paragraphs (a) and (d) of Section
3, Rule 71, as in fact, she was adjudged guilty of indirect contempt. But were the proceedings conducted in
convicting petitioner done in accordance with law?
In the instant case, the indirect contempt proceedings was
initiated by respondent Go through a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion.[30] It was based on the aforesaid Motion that the
appellate court issued a Resolution[31]
dated
Clearly, respondent Go’s Manifestation with Omnibus Motion was the catalyst which set everything in motion and led to the eventual conviction of Atty. Regalado. It was respondent Go who brought to the attention of the appellate court the alleged misbehavior committed by petitioner Atty. Regalado. Without such positive act on the part of respondent Go, no indirect contempt charge could have been initiated at all.
Indeed,
the appellate court itself, in its Resolution dated
In
the present case, [respondent’s Go]
Manifestation With Omnibus Motion which led to our
We cannot, therefore, argue
that the Court of Appeals on its own initiated the indirect contempt charge
without contradicting the factual findings made by the very same court which
rendered the questioned resolution.
It is true in Leonidas v. Judge Supnet,[33] this
Court ruled that the contempt proceedings was considered commenced by the court
motu proprio even
if the show cause order came after the filing of the motions to cite for
contempt filed by the adverse party. The
Decision thus reads:
Thus, independently of the
motions filed by the Tamondong Spouses, it was the Pasay MTC which commenced the contempt proceedings motu proprio. No
verified petition is required if proceedings for indirect contempt are
initiated in this manner, and the absence of a verified petition does not
affect the procedure adopted.
It is true that the
Tamondong Spouses did file a Motion To Cite Plaintiff For Contempt Of Court, dated
This above-cited case,
however, has no application in the case at bar for the factual milieu of the
cases are different from each other. In Leonidas,
there was an order of the court that was utterly violated by Union Bank. Thus, even in the absence of the motion of
spouses Tamondong to cite Union Bank in contempt, the
court a quo on its own can verily
initiate the action. In the present
case, the appellate court could not have acquired knowledge of petitioner Atty.
Regalado’s misbehavior without respondent Go’s Manifestation with Omnibus Motion reiterating the
alleged deceitful conduct committed by the former.
Having painstakingly laid
down that the instant case was not initiated by the court motu proprio necessitates us to look into the
second mode of filing indirect contempt proceedings.
In cases where the court did
not initiate the contempt charge, the Rules prescribe that a verified petition
which has complied with the requirements of initiatory pleadings as outlined in
the heretofore quoted provision of second paragraph, Section 4, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, must be filed.
The manner upon which the case at bar was commenced is clearly in contravention with the categorical mandate of the Rules. Respondent Go filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion, which was unverified and without any supporting particulars and documents. Such procedural flaw notwithstanding, the appellate court granted the motion and directed petitioner Atty. Regalado to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt. Upon petitioner Atty. Regalado’s compliance with the appellate court’s directive, the tribunal proceeded in adjudging her guilty of indirect contempt and imposing a penalty of fine, completely ignoring the procedural infirmities in the commencement of the indirect contempt action.
It bears to stress that the power to punish for contempt is not limitless. It must be used sparingly with caution,
restraint, judiciousness, deliberation, and due regard to the provisions of the
law and the constitutional rights of the individual. [34]
The
limitations in the exercise of the power to punish for indirect contempt are
delineated by the procedural guidelines specified under Section 4, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court. Strict compliance
with such procedural guidelines is mandatory considering that proceedings
against person alleged to be guilty of contempt are commonly treated as
criminal in nature.[35]
As
explained by Justice Florenz Regalado,[36]
the filing of a verified petition that has complied with the requirements for
the filing of initiatory pleading, is mandatory, and thus states:
1.
This new provision clarifies with a regularity norm the proper procedure for
commencing contempt proceedings. While
such proceeding has been classified as special civil action under the former
Rules, the heterogenous practice tolerated by the
courts, has been for any party to file a motion without paying any docket or
lawful fees therefore and without complying with the requirements for
initiatory pleadings, which is now required in the second paragraph of
this amended section.
x x x x
Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu propio by order of or a formal charge by the offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a verified petition with full compliance with the requirements therefore and shall be disposed in accordance with the second paragraph of this section.
Time and
again we rule that the use of the word “shall” underscores the mandatory
character of the Rule. The term “shall”
is a word of command, and one which has always or which must be given a
compulsory meaning, and it is generally imperative or mandatory.[37]
In Enriquez v. Enriquez,[38]
this Court applied the word “shall” by giving it mandatory and imperative
import and ruled that non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of the
Rules goes into the very authority of the court to acquire jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case, thus:
“However, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
which took effect on
x x x x
Time and again, this Court has consistently held that
payment of docket fee within the prescribed period is mandatory for the
perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appellate
court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.[39] (Emphases supplied.)
In
The objection in this case is not, strictly
speaking, to the sufficiency of the complaint, but goes directly to the
jurisdiction of the court over the crime with which the accused was charged.
x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Even if the
contempt proceedings stemmed from the main case over which the court already
acquired jurisdiction, the Rules direct that the petition for contempt be
treated independently of the principal action.
Consequently, the necessary prerequisites for the filing of initiatory
pleadings, such as the filing of a verified petition, attachment of a
certification on non-forum shopping, and the payment of the necessary docket
fees, must be faithfully observed.[41]
We now proceed to the issue of estoppel raised by the Court of Appeals. When petitioner Atty. Regalado brought to the attention of the appellate court through a Motion for Reconsideration the remedial defect attendant to her conviction, the Court of Appeals, instead of rectifying the palpable and patent procedural error it earlier committed, altogether disregarded the glaring mistake by interposing the doctrine of estoppel. The appellate court ruled that having actively participated in the contempt proceedings, petitioner Atty. Regalado is now barred from impugning the Court of Appeals jurisdiction over her contempt case citing the case of People v. Regalario.[42]
We do not agree.
Laches is defined as the “failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.”[43]
The ruling in People v. Regalario[44] that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy[45] on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.[46]
In Sibonghanoy,[47]
the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a
motion to dismiss filed by the Surety[48]
almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered.[49] At several stages of the proceedings, in the
court a quo as well as in the Court
of Appeals, the Surety invoked the
jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its
case for final adjudication on the merits.
It was only when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of
Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.[50]
Clearly, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said court’s jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate court’s directive to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could not be considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to take the case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to comply.
The provisions of the Rules are worded in very clear and categorical language. In case where the indirect contempt charge is not initiated by the courts, the filing of a verified petition which fulfills the requirements on initiatory pleadings is a prerequisite. Beyond question now is the mandatory requirement of a verified petition in initiating an indirect contempt proceeding. Truly, prior to the amendment of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, mere motion without complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings was tolerated by the courts.[51] At the onset of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, such practice can no longer be countenanced.
Evidently, the proceedings attendant to the
conviction of petitioner Atty. Regalado for indirect
contempt suffered a serious procedural defect to which this Court cannot close
its eyes without offending the fundamental principles enunciated in the Rules
that we, ourselves, had promulgated.
The other
issues raised on the merits of the contempt case have become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The indirect contempt proceedings
before the Court of Appeals is DECLARED null and void.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria-Tirona with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez,
Jr. and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring, rollo, pp. 69-76.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, 28 April 2004, 428 SCRA 79, 85-86.
[23] 12 Am. Jur. 389, as cited in Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 220 Phil. 507, 526 (1985).
[24] 17 C.J.S. 4, as cited in Heirs of
[25] Ruiz v. Judge How, 459 Phil. 728, 738 (2003).
[26] Penfield
Company of
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33] 446 Phil. 53, 69-70 (2003).
[34] Ruiz v. Judge How, supra note 25 at 739.
[35] Atty. Cañas v. Judge Castigador, 401 Phil. 618, 630 (2000).
[36] Remedial Law Compedium (Seventh Revised Edition), p. 808 as cited in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Listaña, Sr., 455 Phil. 750 (2003).
[37] Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson, 133 Phil. 884, 895 (1968), as cited in Enriquez v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 139303, 25 August 2005, 468 SCRA 77, 84.
[38]
[39]
[40] 9 Phil. 22, 26 (1907).
[41] Nedia v. Laviña,
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1957,
[42] People v. Regalario,
G.R. No. 101451,
[43] Oca v. Court of Appeals, 428 Phil. 696, 702 (2002).
[44]
[45] Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 22 Phil. 29 (1968).
[46] Francel
Realty Corporation v. Sycip, G.R. No. 154684,
[47] Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, supra note no. 45.
[48] Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. (Surety), the bonding company of defendants Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy (id.).
[49] Calimlim v. Ramirez, 204. Phil. 25 (1982).
[50] Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, supra note no. 45.
[51]