SECOND DIVISION
|
TEOTIMO M. REDULLA, Petitioner, - versus - THE
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, and THE
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 167973 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated: February 28, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Pursuant to an audit[1]
conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA) on several reforestation contracts, five
complaints, OMB-MIN 96-0336, 96-0339,
96-0365, 96-0367, and 96-0369,[2]
were filed against petitioner Teotimo M. Redulla (Redulla) and several others with
the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019.
After an investigation conducted by Prosecutor
Florita S. Linco (Prosecutor Linco),[3] the
Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan three Informations for
violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3(e).
In one of the Informations,[4] Redulla,
along with six others, was indicted. The
information reads:
That
on or about the period from March 7, 1991 to March 15, 1991, and for sometime
immediately prior or subsequent thereto, in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused Hilarion Ramos, a high ranking public officer being then
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO); Eusebio Ybanez,
being then Certifying Officer; Cirilo Salamanca, being then Forestry
Specialist; Teotimo Redulla, being then Countersigning Officer; Antonio
Marquez, being then countersigning officer; Laksmi Palomares, being then a
private contractor, while in the performance of their official and
administrative functions as such public officers, taking advantage of their
official positions, acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality,
conspiring and confederating with accused Luis Tan, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits, advantage, and
preference to accused Luis Tan, by facilitating with undue haste, the payment
to said accused, the sum of P518,654.01 for the seedlings production
project, out of P600,000.00 total
contract price, despite the knowledge that there were no “detail of
accomplishments” submitted, as accused Luis Tan failed to account for the total
number of seedlings produced, in violation of the contract and DENR rules and
regulations implementing the seedlings production project (of the government),
to the damage and prejudice of the people/government in the aforementioned sum
of P518,654.01 and detriment to public service.
Contrary
to law.[5]
(Emphasis supplied)
Following the filing of the Information
in Criminal Case No. 26035, Redulla filed before the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP) an Expanded Motion for Reinvestigation[6]
praying that
the Honorable Office
of the Special Prosecutor [OSP] conduct a careful and thorough
review/reinvestigation of the instant case, and that thereafter, the
findings of the Ombudsman Prosecutor I Florita S. Linco
dated 6 March 2000 against the Accused be reversed or set aside and the OSP
recommends for the dismissal/withdrawal of the above-entitled information for
lack of merit.[7] (Underscoring supplied)
Redulla’s motion was granted and a
reinvestigation was conducted.
After reinvestigation, then Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto (Ombudsman Desierto) approved the OSP’s finding that there was
no probable cause to hale Redulla, et al. into court and accordingly approved the
recommendation to withdraw the Information.[8]
A Manifestation with Motion to
Withdraw Information In Criminal Case No. 26035[9] was
thus filed by the Office of the Ombudsman with the Sandiganbayan which was granted
by Order of
In June 2003, then Ombudsman Simeon
V. Marcelo (Ombudsman Marcelo) ordered the review of the original complaints against
petitioner, et al. which the COA
filed with his Office. Acting on the
order, Prosecutor Jovito A. Coresis, Jr. (Prosecutor Coresis) reviewed the
complaints and found sufficient evidence to conclude that a crime for violation
of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3(e), as amended, had been committed and Redulla and
his co-accused are probably guilty thereof.[11]
The Office of the Ombudsman thus filed
an Information[12] with
the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27853, against Redulla, et
al., alleging
That
on or about the period from 20 October 1990 to 15 March 1991 and for sometime
prior or subsequent thereto, in Ipil,
Zamboanga del Sur and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused Teotimo Redulla, Antionio Marques, Laksmi Palomares, Hilarion Ramos,
Cirilo Salamanca and Eusebio Ybanez, all public officers being then
a Regional Technical Director with salary grade 27, a Finance Officer, an
Accountant, an OIC-PENRO, an OIC-CENRO and a Forestry Specialist, respectively,
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region 9, Zamboanga
City (DENR9-Zamboanga City), acting with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality while in the performance of their official administrative functions
and taking advantage of their public positions, mutually aiding, conniving and
conspiring with each other as well as with accused Luis Tan, a private
contractor, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally give
unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to accused Tan by making
payments to the latter the total sum of P518,654.01 for a seedling
production project despite knowledge that accused Tan was obligated, under the
contract to produce 363,637 seedlings, maintain and protect them for a period
of eight (8) months but that said accused Tan had failed to perform his
obligation under the said contract to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the aforementioned sum.
Contrary to law.[13] (Emphasis in the original)
Redulla thereafter filed before the
Sandiganbayan a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause,[14]
arguing that
WITH
THE ORDER OF THE HONORABLE COURT DATED
and that
APPLYING THE CASE OF SISTOZA V. DESIERTO, NO PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS AGAINST ACCUSED REDULLA TO BIND HIM OVER FOR TRIAL FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 3(E) OF REP. ACT NO. 3019 UNDER A SWEEPING “CONSPIRACY” THEORY, AS HE HAD ADMITTEDLY MERELY COUNTERSIGNED THE QUESTIONED CHECK PAYMENTS TO ACCUSED LUIS TAN AS DENR REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR AFTER RELYING IN GOOD FAITH ON THE PRIOR APPROVALS, REPORTS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF HIS SUBORDINATES, AND THERE BEING NO OTHER EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER AGAINST HIM OF HIS ACTUAL PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIME CHARGED OR IN ANY SUPPOSED “CONSPIRACY” TO COMMIT THE SAME.[16] (Italics in the original, citation omitted)
The Sandiganbayan, by Resolution[17] of
On Redulla’s claim of good faith in
countersigning the checks which were the subject of the Information, the
Sandiganbayan brushed it aside, holding that it could be better appreciated
during trial on the merits of the case.[19]
His Motion for Reconsideration[20]
having been denied,[21]
Redulla filed on
[t]he respondent Sandiganbayan is guilty of positive evasion of duty enjoined by law in refusing to dismiss the case below on the ground of lack of probable cause, as previously found by respondent OSP and respondent Ombudsman, and as correctly affirmed by respondent Sandiganbayan, [23]
and that
[a]pplying the
doctrine of Sistoza v. Desierto, petitioner as countersigning director,
could not be held criminally liable for relying in good faith upon the actions
of his subordinates, which showed no patent nor palpable irregularities.[24]
In its Comment[25]
to the present petition, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the OSP, maintains
that the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion when it denied
Redulla’s Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause.[26] It adds that since Redulla, et al. in Criminal Case No. 27853 had been arraigned
(on April 15, 2005) and the case had been set for initial presentation of
prosecution evidence on November 15, 17, and 18, 2005, the issues in Redulla’s
petition had been rendered moot.[27]
First, a word on the Office of the
Ombudsman’s contention that the arraignment of Redulla and his co-accused
rendered moot the issues in the present petition.
An accused does not waive the right to a preliminary
investigation if he invokes it before or at the time he enters his plea.[28] In the case at bar, Redulla filed his Motion
for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause on September 23, 2003[29]
which is akin to a motion for the conduct of preliminary investigation, the
purpose of which is to determine the existence of probable cause,[30]
before he was arraigned on April 15, 2005;[31] hence,
the above-said contention does not lie.
The Sandiganbayan’s denial of
petitioner’s Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause is in order. This
is in line with this Court’s policy of non-interference in the exercise of the
Ombudsman’s constitutionally mandated powers.
This
Court has almost always adopted, quite aptly, a policy of non-interference in
the exercise of the Ombudsman’s constitutionally mandated powers. This rule is
based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers
granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon
practicality as well. Otherwise, the
functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions .
. . with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the
courts would be extremely swamped if they were compelled to review the exercise
of discretion on the part of the fiscals, or prosecuting attorneys, each time
they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.[32]
While there are exceptions to this
policy,[33]
the case at bar does not fall among the exceptions. It is settled that as long
as the Ombudsman’s resolution is supported with substantial evidence, it will
not be overturned.[34]
Prosecutor Coresis’ findings, which
were approved by the Ombudsman, of the existence of probable cause, were based
on an examination of the audit report, including the supporting documents
prepared by the COA.[35]
Redulla argues, however, as follows:
. . . First, there is no dispute that respondent Ombudsman and respondent OSP had already found that no probable cause existed against petitioner. As a result of that finding, the respondent Sandiganbayan had, once before, already ordered that the Information for graft in Criminal Case No. 26305 be withdrawn upon the motu proprio motion of Prosecutor Pesquera.
Secondly, what was further “re-reviewed” by Prosecutor Coresis was not the withdrawal of Criminal Case No. 26035, or the Pesquera Memorandum and Tansiongco Memorandum, it was a re-review of the Linco Memorandum “recommending the filing of criminal Information with the Sandiganbayan.” The basis for this apparently is a mere “verbal order” of Ombudsman Marcelo. Indeed, this “procedure” is not supported by any legal basis. In any case, Prosecutor Coresis obviously failed to take into consideration in his Coresis Memorandum the previous filing of Criminal Case No. 26035, by reason of the Linco Memorandum, and its subsequent withdrawal for lack of probable cause, by reason of the Pesquera Memorandum and Tansiongco Memorandum. Moreover, at any time during the “re-review” of the findings of Prosecutor Linco, petitioner was never apprised of the same, nor, worse, given any opportunity to present his side. He could have, at least, availed of remedies available to him under the law to defeat the very filing of the present Information. Petitioner was thus completely denied [of] his right to due process, which cannot be simply brushed off as a harmless procedural lapse since its consequence may well be petitioner’s unnecessarily undergoing the rigors of trial.[36] (Emphasis in the original)
Petitioner’s
arguments do not mirror the presence of grave abuse of discretion. There was nothing irregular in Ombudsman
Marcelo’s order to re-review Prosecutor Linco’s memorandum,
as R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 places the OSP
under the control and
supervision of the
Ombudsman.[37] Thus this Court declared in Cruz, Jr. v. People:[38]
. . . Verily, it is discretionary upon the Ombudsman if he will rely mainly on the findings of fact of the investigating prosecutor in making a review of the latter’s report and recommendation, as the Ombudsman can very well make his own findings of fact. There is nothing to prevent him from acting one way or the other. As a matter of fact, Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides that “where the investigating assistant fiscal recommends the dismissal of the case but his findings are reversed by the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file the corresponding information against the respondent or direct any other assistant fiscal or state prosecutor to do so, without conducting another preliminary investigation.”
With more reason may the Ombudsman not be faulted in arriving at a conclusion different from that of the investigating prosecutor on the basis of the same set of facts. It cannot be said that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion simply because he opines contrarily to the prosecutor that, under the facts obtaining in the case, there is probable cause to believe that herein petitioner is guilty of the offense charged.[39]
Ombudsman
Desierto’s statement that “[t]he documents adduced in the Expanded Motion for
Reinvestigation in C[riminal] C[ase]
N[o.] 26035 sufficiently overturned the previous findings of probable cause
against the accused therein”[40] did
not preclude Ombudsman Marcelo from ordering a re-review of the said memorandum
because an administrative officer may revoke, repeal or abrogate the acts or
previous rulings of his predecessor in office.[41]
Redulla’s
claim that he was denied due process does not avail him. Due process is satisfied when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of.[42]
The
records of the case show that Redulla filed a Counter-Affidavit to the
complaints that the COA filed before the Office of the Ombudsman.[43]
He also filed an Expanded Motion for Reinvestigation[44]
in relation to the first Information filed, as well as an affidavit[45]
in support of such motion.
As for
Redulla’s claim that he could not be held liable as countersigning director for
relying in good faith upon the actions of his subordinates, the same was
correctly brushed aside by the Sandiganbayan.
As this Court, on a similar claim, held:[46]
Petitioner’s
argument that he could not be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of RA
3019, because he acted in good faith when he approved the disbursement voucher,
purchase order, invitation to bid and signed the checks after the same had been
processed by his subordinates, are evidentiary in nature and are matters of
defense, the truth of which can be best passed upon after a full-blown
trial on the merits. A preliminary
investigation is conducted for the purpose of determining whether a crime has
been committed, and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused
is guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
It is not the occasion for full and exhaustive display of the parties’
evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a
well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof.[47] (Underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
DANTE
O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Sandiganbayan rollo, Vol. I, pp.
80-100.
[2] Rollo, p. 23.
[3] Supra note 1 at 5-9.
[4] Supra note 2 at 104-107.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Supra note 1 at 1-4.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Penned by Associate Justice Diosdado M.
Peralta, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Teresita Leonardo-de Castro
and Roland B. Jurado; Supra note 1 at
378-384.
[18] Supra note 1 at 382-383; Supra note 2 at 44-46.
[19] Supra note 1 at 383.
[20]
[21]
[22] Supra
note 2 at 17-40.
[23]
[24] Ibid.
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28] Go v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101837,
[29] Supra note 1 at 184.
[30] Rules of Court, Rule 112, Section 1; Cruz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 110436,
[31] Sandiganbayan
rollo, Vol. II, pp. 18, 20A-20B.
[32] Nava v. Commission on Audit, 419
Phil. 544, 553 (2001).
[33] Thus, the courts may interfere with the investigatory powers of the Ombudsman ─
a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance.
Vide Cabahug v. People, 426 Phil. 490, 500-501 (2002).
[34] Vide
Tan v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 114332 & 114895,
[35] Vide
supra note 1 at 10-31.
[36] Supra
note 2 at 34-35.
[37] Republic Act No. 6770, Section 11(3).
[38] G.R. No. 110436,
[39]
[40] Supra
note 2 at 142.
[41] Vide
Philippine National Oil Company v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 109976 & 112800,
[42] Vide Roxas v. Hon. Vazquez, 411 Phil. 276, 287 (2001).
[43] Supra note 1 at 101-108.
[44] Supra
note 2 at 108-130.
[45]
[46] Nava v. Commission on Audit, supra note 32.
[47]