THIRD
DIVISION
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GLICERIA
SARMIENTO, Petitioner, - versus - EMERITA
ZARATAN, Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 167471 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: February 5, 2007 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to nullify
the Court of Appeals Decision[1] in CA-G.R. SP No. 79001 entitled, “Emerita
Zaratan v. Hon. Ramon A. Cruz, as Presiding Judge of RTC, Quezon City,
Branch 223, and Gliceria Sarmiento,” dated 17 August 2004, which reversed
and set side the Orders dated 19 June 2003 and 31 July 2003 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-03-49437, dismissing
respondent’s appeal for failure to file the memorandum within the period
provided for by law.
On
On
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that plaintiff has sufficiently established her causes against the defendant and hereby order the defendant and all persons claiming rights under her:
1.
to pay plaintiff the monthly rentals of P3,500.00
for the said premises from
2.
to pay plaintiff
the sum of P20,000.00 plus P1,500.00 per appearance of counsel in
court, as and for attorney’s fees; and
to pay the cost of suit.[3]
Respondent filed her notice of appeal.[4] Thereafter, the case was raffled to the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 223, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-03-49437.
In
the Notice of Appealed Case,[5]
the RTC directed respondent to submit her memorandum in accordance with the
provisions of Section 7(b) of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court and petitioner to
file a reply memorandum within 15 days from receipt.
Respondent’s
counsel having received the notice on
On
Record
shows that defendant-appellant received the Notice of Appealed Case, through
counsel, on
It
should be stressed that while the rules should be liberally construed, the
provisions on reglemenatry periods are strictly applied as they are “deemed
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and necessary to the orderly
and speedy discharge of judicial business” (Legaspi-Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 60577, October 11, 1983) and strict compliance therewith is
mandatory and imperative (FJR Garments Industries vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. L-49329,
Premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. This renders academic defendant-appellant’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction.[7]
On the basis of the above-quoted Order,
petitioner filed a Motion for Immediate Execution,[8]
while respondent moved for the Reconsideration.[9] Both
motions were denied by the RTC on
In
the main, defendant-appellants Motion for Reconsideration is premised on the
argument that she filed a timely “Motion for Extension of Time To File
Memorandum,” dated and filed on
The
argument is without merit. This Court
did not take cognizance of defendant-appellant’s “Motion for Extension of Time
to File Memorandum,” and rightly so, because it did not contain a notice of
hearing as required by Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, an
omission for which it could offer no explanation. As declared in the case of
Gozon, et al. v. court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105781, June 17, 1993);
x x
x
It
is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that a motion does not meet the
requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered
a worthless piece of paper which the clerk has no right to receive, and the
court has no authority to act upon.
x x
x
Moreover,
parties and counsel should not assume that courts are bound to grant the time
they pray for. A motion that is not acted upon in due time is deemed denied (Orosa
vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 376 [1996]). Thus, defendant-appellant’s appeal was
properly dismissed on account of her failure to file an appeal memorandum
within the fifteen (15) day period provided under Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
With
regard to the “Motion for Immediate Execution,” dated
Petitioner moved for reconsideration
of the said Order, while respondent sought clarification on whether the
On
Section
21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that “the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without
prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. Pursuant to this Rule and taking into account
the arguments of the plaintiff in her “Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,” the
Court is inclined to grant the same. As
further correctly argued by the plaintiff, through counsel, during the hearing
on her motion on August 15, 2003, the cases of City of Manila v. Court of
Appeals (204 SCRA 362) and Sy vs. Romero (214 SCRA 187) cited in the July 31,
2003 Order refer to ejectment cases which has (sic) been decided with finality
and hence, inapplicable to this case where a further appeal is still available
to the defendant. It should likewise be noted that while the Supreme Court
ruled in these cases that execution of a judgment in an ejectment case must be
sought with the inferior court which rendered the same, it likewise provided
that for an exception to this rule, that is, in cases where the appellate court
grants an execution pending appeal, as the case herein.
With regard to defendant’s Motion for Clarification, contained in her Opposition, the Court notes that the issues raised therein have already been squarely dealt with in the July 31, 2003 Order. The same must, therefore, be denied.[11]
Aggrieved, respondent filed a
Petition for Certiorari in the Court
of Appeals, which was granted in a decision dated
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration[13] on
Hence,
this appeal by petitioner posing the following issues,[16]
thus:
1.
Whether respondent’s petition for certiorari should have been dismissed in the first place;
2.
Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying respondent’s motion for extension;
3.
Whether it is Section 19 of Rule 7 that applies, and
not Section 21; and
4. Whether the Court of Appeals Justices should have inhibited themselves from further proceeding with the subject case.
Stated otherwise, the main issue for
resolution is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law
in granting the Writ of Certiorari. In granting the petition, the Court of Appeals
ruled that the RTC erred in dismissing respondent’s appeal for failure to file
the required Memorandum within the period provided by law and in granting
petitioner’s Motion for Immediate Execution of the MeTC decision.
Before resolving the substantive
issues raised by petitioner, the Court will first address the procedural
infirmities ascribed by petitioner. Petitioner
assails the correctness and propriety of the remedy resorted to by respondent
by filing a Petition for Certiorari in
the Court of Appeals. According to petitioner, certiorari is not appropriate and unavailing as the proper remedy
is an appeal.
It must be noted that respondent’s
appeal in the RTC was dismissed for failure to file the required memorandum
within the period allowed by law, as the Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum
was not acted upon for failure to attach a notice of hearing. From the said dismissal, respondent filed a Petition
for Certiorari in the Court of
Appeals.
Respondent correctly filed said petition pursuant to Section 41 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken:
x x x x
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an
appeal;
x x x x
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate civil action under Rule 65. (Underscoring supplied.)
Petitioner also contends that the
Petition for Certiorari filed in the
Court of Appeals should be dismissed as the certification of non-forum shopping
was defective. The verification in part
reads:
I, EMERITA ZARATAN, of legal age, after having been duly sworn to, according to law, depose and say:
That I, Emerita Zaratan is one of the respondent (sic) in the above entitled case, hereby declare, that I have caused the preparation and filing of the foregoing Comment on the Petition; that I have read all the allegations therein, which are true and correct to the best of my own knowledge.
That as respondent, I further certify that I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the foregoing Petition in the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, or different Divisions thereof, respectively, or any tribunal, or agency; and should it be known that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending in any of the abovementioned Courts or different Divisions thereof, the petitioner shall notify the Honorable Court to which this certification is filed, within five (5) days from such notice. (Underscoring ours.)
Petitioner avers that respondent by
stating in the above-quoted certification that she was the respondent, while in
truth she was the petitioner and by stating that respondent caused the
preparation of the comment on the petition, instead of the petition itself,
indicate that respondent did not understand what she was signing. The defect of the verification all renders the
petition in the Court of Appeals without legal effect and constitutes ground
for its dismissal.
The contention is baseless.
The purpose of requiring a
verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition
have been made in good faith, or are true and correct, not merely speculative. This requirement is simply a condition
affecting the form of pleadings and non-compliance therewith does not
necessarily render it fatally defective.[17] Perusal of the verification in question shows there was sufficient compliance with the
requirements of the Rules and the alleged defects are not so material as to
justify the dismissal of the petition in the Court of Appeals. The defects are mere typographical errors. There appears to be no intention to circumvent
the need for proper verification and certification, which are intended to
assure the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition and
to discourage forum shopping.[18]
Now, the substantial issues.
Corollary to the dismissal of the
appeal by the RTC is the question of whether the lack of notice of hearing in
the Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum on Appeal is fatal, such
that the filing of the motion is a worthless piece of paper.
Petitioner avers that, because of the
failure of respondent to include a Notice of Hearing in her Motion for
Extension of Time to file Memorandum on Appeal in the RTC, the latter’s motion
is a worthless piece of paper with no legal effect.
It is not disputed that respondent
perfected her appeal on
SEC. 4. Hearing
of Motion. - Except for motions which the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set
for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
As may be gleaned above and as held
time and again, the notice requirement in a motion is mandatory. As a rule, a motion without a Notice of Hearing
is considered pro forma and does not
affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite
pleading.[19]
As a general rule, notice of motion
is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion
and principles of natural justice demand that his right be not affected without
an opportunity to be heard.[20]
The three-day notice required by law is intended not for the benefit of the
movant but to avoid surprises upon the adverse party and to give the latter
time to study and meet the arguments of the motion.[21] Principles of natural justice demand that the
right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be
heard.[22]
The test is the presence of the
opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and
meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based.[23] Considering the circumstances of the present
case, we believe that procedural due process was substantially complied with.
There are, indeed, reasons which would
warrant the suspension of the Rules: (a)
the existence of special or compelling circumstances, b) the merits of the
case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.[24] Elements or circumstances (c), (d) and (e) exist
in the present case.
The suspension of the Rules is
warranted in this case. The motion in question does not affect the substantive
rights of petitioner as it merely seeks to extend the period to file Memorandum.
The required extension was due to respondent’s
counsel’s illness, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood,
compounded by the grounding of the computers. There is no claim likewise that said motion
was interposed to delay the appeal.[25] As it appears, respondent sought extension
prior to the expiration of the time to do so and the memorandum was subsequently
filed within the requested extended period. Under the circumstances, substantial justice
requires that we go into the merits of the case to resolve the issue of who is
entitled to the possession of the land
in question.
Further, it has been held that a “motion for extension
of time x x x is not a litigated motion where notice to
the adverse party is necessary to afford the latter an opportunity to resist
the application, but an ex parte motion
made to the court in behalf of one or the other of
the parties to the action, in the absence and usually
without the knowledge
of the other party or parties.” As a general rule, notice of motion is
required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion
and principles of natural justice demand that his rights be not affected
without an opportunity to be heard. It
has been said that “ex parte motions
are frequently permissible in procedural matters, and also in situations and under
circumstances of emergency; and an exception to a rule requiring notice is
sometimes made where notice or the resulting delay might tend to defeat
the objective of the motion.”[26]
It is well to remember that this
Court, in not a few cases, has consistently held that cases shall be determined
on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their
causes and defense, rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections. In so doing, the ends of
justice would be better served.[27] Furthermore, this Court emphasized its policy
that technical rules should accede to the demands of substantial justice
because there is no vested right in technicalities. Litigations, should, as much as possible, be
decided on their merits and not on technicality. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical
grounds is frowned upon, and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in
a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not
override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very aims. As has been the constant rulings of this
Court, every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just disposition of his cause, free from constraints of
technicalities.[28] Indeed, rules of procedure are mere tools
designed to expedite the resolution of cases and other matters pending in
court. A strict and rigid application of
the rules that would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
than promote justice must be avoided.[29]
The visible emerging trend is to
afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from constraints and technicalities.
Parenthetically, it must be noted
also that when the appeal was dismissed on
On the issue of immediate execution of
judgment.
The applicable provision is Section
19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 19. Immediate Execution of judgment; how to stay the same.- If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. x x x.
To stay the immediate execution of
judgment in ejectment proceedings, Section 19 requires that the
defendant-appellant must (a) perfect his appeal, (b) file a supersedeas bond,
and (c) periodically deposit the rentals falling due during the pendency of the
appeal.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, execution pending
appeal was premature as respondent had already filed a supersedeas bond and the
monthly rental for the current month of the premises in question.[30]
The invocation of petitioner of the
provisions of Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which runs:
Sec. 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.- The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.
to justify the issuance of the writ
of execution pending appeal in this case is misplaced.
A closer examination of the above-quoted
provision reveals that said provision applies to decision of the RTC rendered
in its appellate jurisdiction, affirming the decision of the MeTC. In the case at bar, the RTC order was an order
dismissing respondent’s appeal based on technicality. It did not resolve substantive matters delving
on the merits of the parties’ claim in the ejectment case. Thus, the case brought to the Court of Appeals
was the dismissal of the appeal for failure to file the required memorandum
within the period provided by law, and not on the merits of the ejectment case.
Lastly, petitioner posited the view
that the Court of Appeals’ justices should have inhibited themselves because of
bias and partiality for deciding the case within eight months and for being very
selective in discussing the issues.
We reject the proposition.
Inhibition must be for just and valid
causes. The mere imputation of bias and
partiality is not enough ground for judges to inhibit, especially when the
charge is without basis. This Court has
to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice
before it can brand them with the stigma of bias and partiality.[31] This Court has invariably held that for bias
and prejudice to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of
judges, mere suspicion is not enough. Bare
allegations of their partiality will not suffice “in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake
his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without
fear and favor.”[32]
There is no factual support to
petitioner’s charge of bias and partiality. A perusal of the records of the
case fails to reveal that any bias or prejudice motivated the Court of Appeals
in granting respondent’s petition. Neither
did this Court find any questionable or suspicious circumstances leading to the
issuance of the questioned decision, as suggested by petitioner.
The fact alone that the Court of Appeals decided the case within eight
months does not in any way indicate bias and partiality against petitioner. It is within the constitutional mandate to
decide the case within 12 months.[33]
As to petitioner’s allegation that the
Court of Appeals was selective in choosing what issues to resolve, it bears to
stress again that “a judge’s appreciation or misappreciation of the sufficiency
of evidence x x x adduced by the parties, x x x, without proof of malice on the
part of respondent judge, is not sufficient to show bias and partiality.”[34] We also emphasized that “repeated rulings
against a litigant, no matter how erroneously, vigorously and consistently
expressed, do not amount to bias and prejudice which can be bases for the
disqualification of a judge.”[35]
IN ALL, petitioner utterly failed to show that the appellate court erred in issuing the assailed decision. On the contrary, it acted prudently in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit. The Decision dated
SO
ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZAssociate Justice |
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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Consuelo Ynares-Santiago Associate Justice Chairperson, Third
Division |
Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice |
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Rebecca De Guia-
[2] Records, Vol. I, pp. 2-4.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Rollo, pp. 108-115.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, G.R. No. 149634, 6 July 2004, 433 SCRA 455, 463-464.
[18] Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum v. John Boardman Ltd. of Iloilo, Inc., G.R. No. 159831,
[19] Tan v. Court of Appeals, 356 Phil. 1058, 1067-1068 (1998).
[20] Commercial Union Assurance Company Limited v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, G.R. No. L-43342, 30 October 1978, 86 SCRA 79, 96; citing Amante v. Judge Suñga, 159-A Phil. 476 (1975); Pimentel v. Court of Appeals, 159-A Phil. 728 (1975).
[21] J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Magdangal, G.R. No. L-15539,
[22] Gonzales v. Balikatan Kilusang Bayan sa Pananalapi, Inc., G.R. No. 150859, 28 March 2005, 454 SCRA 111, 117.
[23] Jehan
Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, G.R. No. 159750,
[24] Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 452 Phil. 665, 674 (2003).
[25] Records, Vol. 1, p. 321.
[26] Amante v. Judge Suñga, supra note 20 at 477.
[27] Durban
Apartments Corporation v. Catacutan, G.R. No. 167136,
[28] Fonseca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
L-36035,
[29]
[30] CA Decision, p. 7; rollo, p. 114.
[31] Gochan v. Gochan, 446 Phil. 433, 447 (2003).
[32] People v. Kho, G.R. No. 139381,
[33] Section 15, Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution. All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within x x x twelve months for all lower collegiate courts x x x.
[34] Republic
v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 156015,
[35]