THIRD DIVISION
AMELIA S. ROBERTS, G.R. No. 166714
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
MARTIN B. PAPIO, Promulgated:
Respondent.
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D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Assailed in
this petition for review on certiorari
is the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 69034 which reversed and set
aside the Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 150,
The
Antecedents
The spouses
Martin and Lucina Papio were the owners of a 274-square-meter residential lot
located in P59,000.00 loan from the
Amparo Investments Corporation, they executed a real estate mortgage on the property.
Upon Papio’s failure to pay the loan, the corporation filed a petition for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage.
Since the couple
needed money to redeem the property and to prevent the foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage, they executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property on P85,000.00 purchase price, P59,000.00 was paid to the
Amparo Investments Corporation, while the P26,000.00 difference was retained by the spouses.[5] As soon as the spouses had settled their
obligation, the corporation returned the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. S-44980,
which was then delivered to Amelia Roberts.
Thereafter,
the parties (Amelia Roberts as lessor and Martin Papio as lessee) executed a
two-year contract of lease dated P800.00 to be deposited in
the lessor’s account at the Bank of America,
On
Martin Papio
paid the rentals from
In a letter
dated P2,500.00
from P10,000.00 from P410,000.00. She demanded that
Papio vacate the property within 15 days from receipt of the letter in case he
failed to settle the amount.[9] Because he
refused to pay, Papio received another letter from Roberts on
On
Sometime in
1982 she purchased from defendant a 274-sq-m residential house and lot situated
at P800.00. Thereafter,
TCT No. 114478[14]
was issued in her favor and she paid all the realty taxes due on the property.
When the term of the lease expired, she still allowed Papio and his family to
continue leasing the property. However,
he took advantage of her absence and stopped payment beginning January 1986, and
refused to pay despite repeated demands. In June 1998, she sent a demand letter[15]
through counsel requiring Papio to pay rentals from January 1986 up to May 1998
and to vacate the leased property. The
accumulated arrears in rental are as follows: (a) P360,000.00 from P2,500.00
per month; and (b) P50,000.00, from P10,000.00 per month.[16]
She came to the
Roberts appended
to her complaint copies of the
In his
Answer with counterclaim, Papio alleged the following:
He executed
the P59,000.00 to the mortgagor for his account, after
which the mortgagee cancelled the real estate mortgage. However, he was alarmed
when the plaintiff had a deed of absolute sale over the property prepared (for P83,000.00
as consideration) and asked him to sign the same. She also demanded that the
defendant turn over the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. S-44980. The defendant was in a quandary. He then believed that if he signed the deed of
absolute sale, Roberts would acquire ownership over the property. He asked her to allow him to redeem or
reacquire the property at any time for a reasonable amount.[18] When
Roberts agreed, Papio signed the deed of absolute sale.
Pursuant to the right to redeem/repurchase
given him by Roberts, Papio purchased the property for P250,000.00. In July 1985, since Roberts was by then
already in the P150,000.00 as partial
payment for the property.[19] On
P100,000.00, through P39,000.00
out of the P250,000.00 that she had received; Roberts then demanded that
she pay the amount misappropriated before executing the deed of absolute sale.
Thus, the sole reason why Roberts refused to abide by her promise was the
failure of her authorized representative to remit the full amount of P250,000.00.
Despite Papio’s demands, Roberts refused to execute a deed of absolute sale.
Accordingly, defendant posited that plaintiff had no cause of action to demand
payment of rental and eject him from the property.
Papio appended
to his Answer the following: (1) the letter dated July 18, 1986 of Perlita Ventura to the
plaintiff wherein the former admitted having used the money of the plaintiff to
defray the plane fares of Perlita’s parents to the USA, and pleaded that she be
allowed to repay the amount within one year; (b) the letter of Eugene Roberts
(plaintiff’s husband) to Perlita Ventura dated July 25, 1986 where he accused
Ventura of stealing the money of plaintiff Amelia (thus preventing the latter
from paying her loan on her house and effect the cancellation of the mortgage),
and demanded that she deposit the balance;[21] and (c) plaintiff’s
letter to defendant Papio dated July
25, 1986 requesting the latter to convince Ventura to remit the balance of P39,000.00 so that the
plaintiff could transfer the title of the property to the defendant.[22]
Papio asserted
that the letters of Roberts and her husband are in themselves admissions or
declarations against interest, hence, admissible to prove that he had reacquired
the property although the title was still in her possession.
In her Affidavit and Position Paper,[23]
Roberts averred that she had paid the
real estate taxes on the property after she had purchased it; Papio’s initial
right to occupy the property was terminated when the original lease period
expired; and his continued possession was only by mere tolerance. She further
alleged that the Deed of Sale states on its face that the conveyance of the
property was absolute and unconditional. She also claimed that any right to
repurchase the property must appear in a public document pursuant to Article
1358, Paragraph 1, of the Civil Code of the Phililppines.[24]
Since no such document exists, defendant’s supposed real interest over the
property could not be enforced without violating the Statute of Frauds.[25]
She stressed that her
Roberts admitted
that she demanded P39,000.00
from the defendant in her letter dated P250,000.00
from Papio in July 1985 and on P670,000.00 inclusive of back
rentals.[28] However, defendant
offered to settle his account with the spouses.[29] Again, the offer came on P250,000.00.
Roberts
insisted that Papio’s claim of the right to repurchase the property, as well as
his claim of payment therefor, is belied by his own letter in which he offered to
settle plaintiff’s claim for back rentals. Even assuming that the purchase
price of the property had been paid through
She further
alleged that defendant’s own inaction belies his claim of ownership over the
property: first, he failed to cause any notice or annotation to be made on the
Register of Deed’s copy of TCT No. 114478 in order to protect his supposed
adverse claim; second, he did not institute any action against Roberts to
compel the execution of the necessary deed of transfer of title in his favor;
and third, the defense of ownership over the property was raised only after Roberts
demanded him to vacate the property.
Based
solely on the parties’ pleadings, the MeTC rendered its
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, finding this case for the plaintiff, the defendant is hereby
ordered to:
1. Vacate the
leased premises known as
2. Pay plaintiff
the reasonable rentals accrual for the period January 1, 1996 to December 13,
1997 at the rate equivalent to Php2,500.00 per month and
thereafter, Php10,000.00 from January 1998 until he actually vacates the
premises;
3. Pay the
plaintiff attorney’s fees as Php20,000.00; and
4. Pay the costs
SO ORDERED.[31]
The MeTC
held that Roberts merely tolerated the stay of Papio in the property after the
expiration of the contract of lease on
The court
further ruled that Papio made no denials as to the existence and authenticity
of Roberts’ title to the property. It declared that “the certificate of title
is indefeasible in favor of the person whose name appears therein and
incontrovertible upon the expiration of the one-year period from the date of
issue,” and that a
presumption of regularity and validity, is generally a conclusive evidence of
ownership of the land referred to therein.”
As to Papio’s
claim that the transfer of the property was one with right of repurchase, the
MeTC held it to be bereft of merit since the Deed of Sale is termed as “absolute
and unconditional.” The court ruled that
the right to repurchase is not a right granted to the seller by the buyer in a
subsequent instrument but rather, a right reserved in the same contract of
sale. Once the deed of absolute sale is
executed, the seller can no longer reserve the right to repurchase; any right
thereafter granted in a separate document cannot be a right of repurchase but
some other right.
As to the
receipts of payment signed by
Papio appealed
the decision to the RTC, alleging the following:
I.
THE
II.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WHICH ESTABLISHED THAT A
REPURCHASE TRANSACTION EXISTED BETWEEN THE PARTIES ONLY THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
WITHHELD THE EXECUTION OF THE ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE AND THE TRANSFER OF TITLE
OF THE SAME IN DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S NAME.
III.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT THE LETTERS OF PLAINTIFF-[APPELLEE]
AND OF HER HUSBAND ADDRESSED TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AND HIS WIFE ARE IN
THEMSELVES ADMISSION AND/OR DECLARATION OF THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT HAD DULY PAID
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE OF THE PURCHASE AMOUNT COVERING THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
IV.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE FOR EJECTMENT OUTRIGHT CONSIDERING THAT
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE WHO IS [AN] AMERICAN CITIZEN AND RESIDENT THEREIN HAD NOT
APPEARED IN COURT ONCE, NEITHER WAS HER ALLEGED ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, MATILDE
AGUILAR NOR [DID] THE LATTER EVER [FURNISH] THE LOWER COURT A SPECIAL POWER OF
ATTORNEY AUTHORIZING HER TO APPEAR IN COURT IN BEHALF OF HER PRINCIPAL.[32]
Papio maintained
that Roberts had no cause of action for eviction because she had already ceded
her right thereto when she allowed him to redeem and reacquire the property
upon payment of P250,000.00 to
On
Meanwhile,
Papio filed a complaint with the RTC of Makati City, for specific performance
with damages against Roberts. Papio, as plaintiff, claimed that he entered into
a contract of sale with pacto de retro with
Roberts, and prayed that the latter be ordered to execute a Deed of Sale over `the
property in his favor and transfer the title over the property to and in his
name. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 01-851.
On
Being in accordance with law
and the circumstances attendant to the instant case, the court finds merit in
plaintiff-appellee’s claim. Wherefore, the challenged decision dated
SO ORDERED.[37]
Both
parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration.[38]
In an Order[39]
dated
Wherefore, the challenged
decision dated January 18, 2001 is hereby affirmed with modification that
defendant pay plaintiff the reasonable rentals accrued for the period January
1, 1986 to December [31, 1997] per month and thereafter and P10,000.00 [per month] from January
1998 to October 28, 2001 when defendant-appellant actually vacated the subject
leased premises.
SO
ORDERED.[40]
On February 28, 2002, Papio filed a
petition for review[41]
in the CA, alleging that the RTC erred in not finding that he had reacquired
the property from Roberts for P250,000.00, but the latter refused to
execute a deed of absolute sale and transfer the title in his favor. He insisted that the MeTC and the RTC erred
in giving credence to petitioner’s claim that she did not authorize
Eugene Roberts to
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a new one entered: (1) rendering an initial determination that the “Deed of
Absolute Sale” dated April 13, 1982 is in fact an equitable mortgage under
Article 1603 of the New Civil Code; and (2) resolving therefore that petitioner
Martin B. Papio is entitled to possession of the property subject of this
action; (3) But such determination of ownership and equitable mortgage are not
clothed with finality and will not constitute a binding and conclusive
adjudication on the merits with respect to the issue of ownership and such
judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to
the land, nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in the
case between the same parties upon a different cause of action not involving
possession. All other counterclaims for damages are hereby dismissed. Cost
against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.[43]
According
to the appellate court, although the MeTC and RTC were correct in holding that
the MeTC had jurisdiction over the complaint for unlawful detainer, they erred
in ignoring Papio’s defense of equitable mortgage, and in not finding that the
transaction covered by the deed of absolute sale by and between the parties was
one of equitable mortgage under Article 1602 of the New Civil Code. The
appellate court ruled that Papio retained the ownership of the property and its
peaceful possession; hence, the MeTC should have dismissed the complaint
without prejudice to the outcome of Civil Case No. 01-851 relative to his claim
of ownership over the property.
Roberts filed
a motion for reconsideration of the decision on the following grounds:
I.
Petitioner did
not allege in his Answer the defense of equitable mortgage; hence, the lower
courts [should] not have discussed the same;
II. Even assuming that Petitioner
alleged the defense of equitable mortgage, the MeTC could not have ruled upon
the said defense,
III. The M[e]TC and the RTC were not
remiss in the exercise of their jurisdiction.[44]
The CA denied the motion.
In this petition
for review, Amelia Salvador-Roberts, as petitioner, avers that:
I.
THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVEOUSLY (SIC) ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE M[e]TC AN(D) THE
RTC WERE REMISS IN THE EXERCISE OF THAT JURISDICTION ACQUIRED BECAUSE IT DID
NOT CONSIDER ALL PETITIONER’S DEFENSE OF EQUITABLE MORTGAGE.
II.
THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVEOUSLY (SIC) ERRED IN REQUIRING THE M[e]TC AND RTC TO
RULE ON A DEFENSE WHICH WAS NEVER AVAILED OF BY RESPONDENT.[45]
Petitioner
argues that respondent is barred from raising the issue of equitable mortgage because
his defense in the MeTC and RTC was that he had repurchased the property from
the petitioner; by such representation, he had impliedly admitted the existence
and validity of the deed of absolute sale whereby ownership of the property was
transferred to petitioner but reverted to him upon the exercise of said right. The
respondent even filed a complaint for specific performance with damages, which
is now pending in the RTC of Makati City, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-851
entitled “Martin B. Papio vs. Amelia Salvador-Roberts.” In that case,
respondent claimed that his transaction with the petitioner was a sale with pacto
de retro. Petitioner posits that
Article 1602 of the Civil Code applies only when the
defendant specifically alleges this defense. Consequently, the appellate court
was proscribed from finding that petitioner and respondent had entered into an
equitable mortgage under the deed of absolute sale.
Petitioner further
avers that respondent was ably represented by counsel and was aware of the difference
between a pacto de retro sale and an
equitable mortgage; thus, he could not have been mistaken in declaring that he
repurchased the property from her.
As to
whether a sale is in fact an equitable mortgage, petitioner claims that the
issue should be properly addressed and resolved by the RTC in an action to
enforce ownership, not in an ejectment case before the MeTC where the main
issue involved is possession de facto. According to her, the obvious
import of the CA Decision is that, in resolving an ejectment case, the lower
court must pass upon the issue of ownership (in this case, by applying the presumptions
under Art. 1602) which, in effect, would use the same yardstick as though it is
the main action. The procedure will not only promote multiplicity of suits but
also place the new owner in the absurd position of having to first seek the
declaration of ownership before filing an ejectment suit.
Respondent
counters that the defense of equitable mortgage need not be particularly stated
to apprise petitioner of the nature and character of the repurchase agreement.
He contends that he had amply discussed in his pleadings before the trial and
appellate courts all the surrounding circumstances of the case, such as the
relative situation of the parties at the time; their attitude, acts, conduct, and
declarations; and the negotiations between them that led to the repurchase
agreement. Thus, he argues that the CA correctly ruled that the contract was
one of equitable mortgage. He insists
that petitioner allowed him to redeem and reacquire the property, and accepted
his full payment of the property through
The
threshold issues are the following: (1) whether the MeTC had jurisdiction in an
action for unlawful detainer to resolve the issue of who between petitioner and
respondent is the owner of the property and entitled to the de facto possession thereof; (2) whether
the transaction entered into between the parties under the Deed of Absolute Sale
and the Contract of Lease is an equitable mortgage over the property; and (3) whether
the petitioner is entitled to the material or de facto possession of the property.
The Ruling of the Court
On the
first issue, the CA ruling (which upheld the jurisdiction of the MeTC to resolve
the issue of who between petitioner or respondent is the lawful owner of the
property, and is thus entitled to the material or de facto possession thereof) is correct. Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
provides that when the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine
the issue of possession. The judgment rendered in an action for unlawful
detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in
no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment would not bar an action between
the same parties respecting title to the land or building.[46]
The summary
nature of the action is not changed by the claim of ownership of the property
of the defendant.[47] The MeTC
is not divested of its jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer action simply
because the defendant asserts ownership over the property.
The sole
issue for resolution in an action for unlawful detainer is material or de facto possession of the property. Even if the defendant claims
juridical possession or ownership over the property based on a claim that his
transaction with the plaintiff relative to the property is merely an equitable
mortgage, or that he had repurchased the property from the plaintiff, the MeTC
may still delve into and take cognizance of the case and make an initial or
provisional determination of who between the plaintiff and the defendant is the
owner and, in the process, resolve the issue of who is entitled to the
possession. The MeTC, in unlawful detainer case, decides the question of
ownership only if it is intertwined with and necessary to resolve the issue of
possession.[48] The
resolution of the MeTC on the ownership of the property is merely provisional
or interlocutory. Any question involving
the issue of ownership should be raised and resolved in a separate action
brought specifically to settle the question with finality, in this case, Civil
Case No. 01-851 which respondent filed before the RTC.
The ruling
of the CA, that the contract between petitioner and respondent was an equitable
mortgage, is incorrect. The fact of the matter is that the respondent intransigently
alleged in his answer, and even in his affidavit and position paper, that petitioner
had granted him the right to redeem or repurchase the property at any time and for
a reasonable amount; and that, he had, in fact, repurchased the property in
July 1985 for P250,000.00
which he remitted to petitioner through an authorized representative who signed
receipts therefor; he had reacquired ownership and juridical possession of the
property after his repurchase thereof in 1985; and consequently, petitioner was
obliged to execute a deed of absolute sale over the property in his favor.
Notably,
respondent alleged that, as stated in his letter to petitioner, he was given
the right to reacquire the property in 1982 within two years upon the payment
of P53,000.00,
plus petitioner’s airfare for her trip to the Philippines from the USA and back;
petitioner promised to sign the deed
of absolute sale. He even filed a
complaint against the petitioner in the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-851,
for specific performance with damages to compel petitioner to execute the said
deed of absolute sale over the property presumably on the strength of Articles
1357 and 1358 of the New Civil Code. Certainly then, his claim that petitioner had
given him the right to repurchase the property is antithetical to an equitable
mortgage.
An equitable mortgage is one that, although
lacking in some formality, form or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute,
nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to change a real property as
security for a debt and contain nothing impossible or contrary to law.[49] A contract between the parties is an
equitable mortgage if the following requisites are present: (a) the parties
entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale; and (b) the
intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage.[50] The decisive factor is the intention of the parties.
In an
equitable mortgage, the mortgagor retains ownership over the property but subject
to foreclosure and sale at public auction upon failure of the mortgagor to pay
his obligation.[51] In
contrast, in a pacto de retro sale, ownership of the property sold is
immediately transferred to the vendee a
retro subject only to the right of the vendor a retro to repurchase the property upon compliance with legal
requirements for the repurchase. The failure of the vendor a retro to exercise the right to repurchase within the agreed time
vests upon the vendee a retro, by
operation of law, absolute title over the property.[52]
One
repurchases only what one has previously sold.
The right to repurchase presupposes a valid contract of sale between the
same parties.[53] By insisting that he had repurchased the
property, respondent thereby
admitted that the deed of absolute sale executed by him and petitioner on P39,000.00 retained by
Perlita Ventura. Respondent is thus bound by his admission of petitioner’s
ownership of the property and is barred from claiming otherwise.[55]
Respondent’s
admission that petitioner acquired ownership over the property under the April
13, 1982 deed of absolute sale is buttressed by his admission in the Contract
of Lease dated April 15, 1982 that petitioner was the owner of the property,
and that he had paid the rentals for the duration of the contract of lease and
even until 1985 upon its extension. Respondent
was obliged to prove his defense that petitioner had given him the right to
repurchase, and that petitioner obliged herself to resell the property for P250,000.00
when they executed the April 13, 1982 deed of absolute sale.
We have
carefully reviewed the case and find that respondent failed to adduce competent
and credible evidence to prove his claim.
As gleaned
from the
The right of repurchase is not a right granted the
vendor by the vendee in a subsequent instrument, but is a right reserved by the
vendor in the same instrument of sale as one of the stipulations of the contract. Once the instrument of absolute sale is
executed, the vendor can no longer reserve the right to repurchase, and any
right thereafter granted the vendor by the vendee in a separate instrument
cannot be a right of repurchase but some other right like the option to buy in
the instant case.[61]
In Ramos v. Icasiano,[62] we also held that an agreement to repurchase becomes a
promise to sell when made after the sale because when the sale is made without
such agreement the purchaser acquires the thing sold absolutely; and, if he
afterwards grants the vendor the right to repurchase, it is a new contract entered
into by the purchaser as absolute owner.
An option to buy or a promise to sell is different and distinct from the
right of repurchase that must be reserved by means of stipulations to that
effect in the contract of sale.[63]
There is no
evidence on record that, on or before July 1985, petitioner agreed to sell her
property to the respondent for P250,000.00. Neither
is there any documentary evidence showing that P250,000.00,
or to receive the said amount from respondent as purchase price of the
property. The rule is that when a sale
of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent, the authority
of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void[64] and cannot
produce any legal effect as to transfer the property from its lawful owner.[65] Being
inexistent and void from the very beginning, said contract cannot be ratified.[66] Any contract entered into by
Respondent
also failed to prove that the negotiations between him and petitioner has
culminated in his offer to buy the property for P250,000.00, and that they
later on agreed to the sale of the property for the same amount. He likewise failed to prove that he purchased
and reacquired the property in July 1985.
The evidence on record shows that petitioner had offered to sell the
property for US$15,000 on a “take it or leave it” basis in May 1984 upon the
expiration of the Contract of Lease[68] —an offer
that was rejected by respondent—which is why on December 30, 1997, petitioner
and her husband offered again to sell the property to respondent for P670,000.00 inclusive of back
rentals and the purchase price of the property under the April 13, 1982 Deed of
absolute Sale.[69] The offer
was again rejected by respondent. The
final offer appears to have been made on
A contract
is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with
respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.[71] Under Article 1318 of the New Civil Code,
there is no contract unless the following requisites concur:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the
contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.
Contracts
are perfected by mere consent manifested by the meeting of the offer and the
acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract.[72] Once perfected, they bind the contracting
parties and the obligations arising therefrom have the form of law between the
parties which must be complied with in good faith. The parties are bound not only to the
fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to the consequences
which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and
law.[73]
There was
no contract of sale entered into by the parties based on the Receipts dated
July 1985 and
By the
contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer
the ownership of and deliver a determinate thing and the other, to pay therefor
a price certain in money or its equivalent.[74] The absence of any of the essential elements
will negate the existence of a perfected contract of sale. As the Court ruled in
A
definite agreement as to the price is an essential element of a binding
agreement to sell personal or real property because it seriously affects the
rights and obligations of the parties.
Price is an essential element in the formation of a binding and
enforceable contract of sale. The fixing
of the price can never be left to the decision of one of the contracting
parties. But a price fixed by one of the
contracting parties, if accepted by the other, gives rise to a perfected sale.[76]
A contract of sale is consensual in nature and is perfected
upon mere meeting of the minds. When
there is merely an offer by one party without acceptance of the other, there is
no contract.[77] When the contract of sale is not perfected,
it cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a binding juridical
relation between the parties.[78]
Respondent’s
reliance on petitioner’s letter to him dated
Dear Martin & Ising,
Enclosed for your information is the letter written by
my husband to Perlita. I hope that you will be able to convince your cousin
that it’s to her best interest to deposit the balance of your payment to me of P39,000.00
in my bank acct. per our agreement and send me my bank book right away so that
we can transfer the title of the property.
Regards,
Amie [79]
We
have carefully considered the letter of Perlita Ventura, dated P39,000.00 without the latter’s knowledge for
the plane fare of P39,000.00,
inclusive of interests, within one year.[80]
Eugene Roberts berated P250,000.00
which respondent gave to her.
Petitioner
in her letter to respondent did not admit, either expressly or impliedly,
having received P211,000.00 from P39,000.00
and pleaded that she be allowed to refund the amount within one (1) year,
including interests.
Naririto
ang total ng pera mo sa bankbook mo, P55,000.00 pati na yong deposit na
sarili mo at bale ang nagalaw ko diyan ay P39,000.00. Huwag kang
mag-alala ibabalik ko rin sa iyo sa loob ng isang taon pati interest.
Ate
Per[81]
It
is incredible that Ventura was able to remit to petitioner P211,000.00
before July 25, 1986 when only a week earlier, she was pleading to petitioner for
a period of one year within which to refund the P39,000.00 to petitioner.
It would
have bolstered his cause if respondent had submitted an affidavit of P211,000.00 out of the P250,000.00 she received
from respondent in July 1985 and
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 69034 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, affirmed with modification by the Regional Trial Court, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, with Associate Justices Salvador J.
Valdez, Jr. (retired) and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 24-35.
[2]
Penned by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar.
[3]
Penned by Judge Dina P. Teves.
[4]
Records, p. 31.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] Id at 24-25.
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
CA rollo, pp. 99-110.
[24]
Art. 1358 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1358. The following must appear in a
public document:
(1.) Acts and
contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification
or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property; sales of real
property or of an interest therein are governed by Articles 1403, No. 2 and
1405; xxx
[25] Art.
1317 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1317. No one may contract in the
name of another without being authorized by the latter, or unless he has by law
or right to represent him.
A
contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or
legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be
unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on
whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other
contracting party.
[26] CA rollo, p. 110.
[27] Records, p. 176.
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
Records, pp. 339-340.
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
CA rollo, pp. 6-23.
[42]
Rollo, pp. 24-35.
[43]
[44]
CA rollo, p. 277.
[45] Rollo, pp. 15-16.
[46] rules of court, rule 70, Sec. 18.
[47] Ocampo v. Tirona, G.R. No. 147812, April 6,
2005, 455 SCRA 62, 74-75.
[48]
Arambulo v. Gungab, G.R. No. 156581,
[49]
Ceballos v. Intestate Estate of Emigdio
Mercado, G.R. No. 155856, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 323, 335.
[50]
Matanguihan v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 115033,
[51]
Ramos v. Sarao, G.R. No. 149756,
[52]
De Guzman, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 46935, December 21, 1987, 156 SCRA 701, 711
[53]
Nool v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
116635, July 24, 1997, 276 SCRA 149, 159-160.
[54] rules of court, rule 129, Sec. 4.
[55]
Philippine Ports Authority v. City of
[56]
civil code, Art. 1370.
[57]
German Marine Agencies, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 403 Phil. 572, 589 (2001).
[58]
The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850,
[59]
Vicente v. Planters Development Bank, 444
Phil. 309, 318 (2003).
[60] 135 Phil. 166 (1968).
[61]
[62] 51 Phil. 343 (1927).
[63]
[64] civil code, Art. 1874.
[65]
City-Lite Realty Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 382 Phil. 268, 276 (2000).
[66] San Juan Structural & Textile
Fabrication, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129459, September 29, 1998,
296 SCRA 631, 648.
[67]
Abalos v. Macatangay, Jr., G.R. No.
155043,
[68] Records, p. 176.
[69]
[70]
[71]
civil code, Art. 1305.
[72]
Gomez v. Court of Appeals, 395 Phil.
115, 125-126 (2000).
[73]
civil code, Art.
1315.
[74]
civil code, Art. 1458.
[75]
G.R. No. 158149,
[76]
[77]
Palattao v. Court of Appeals, 431
Phil. 438, 450 (2002).
[78]
[79] Records, p. 32.
[80]
[81]