FIRST DIVISION
|
SPS. COL.
PEDRO L. LUMBRES and REBECCA ROARING, Petitioners, - versus - SPS. PEDRO B. TABLADA, JR. and ZENAIDA N. TABLADA, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No.
165831 Present: PUNO, CJ., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, *AZCUNA,
and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: |
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C
I S I O N
GARCIA,
J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in
this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the following
issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 82617, to wit:
1. Decision[1] dated August 31,
2004 reversing and setting aside the appealed Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba City,
Branch 37, and reinstating an earlier decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Calamba City,
which dismissed the petitioners' complaint for ejectment against the herein respondents; and
2. Resolution[2] dated
From the facts on record, it
appears that this is a case of double sale of a lot covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
473055 with an area of 105 square meters, more particularly identified as
Reviewed, the records disclose
that on
1.
That the SELLER, for and in consideration of the
payments and other terms and conditions hereinafter to be designated, has
offered to sell and the BUYER has agreed to buy certain parcel of land more
particularly described as follows:
|
Blk
No. P-111 |
Lot
No. |
Area Sq.
Meter |
Price Per
Sq. Meter |
Total
Selling Price |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
3 |
8 |
105 |
P 1,500 |
|
|
|
|
42 |
6,000 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
P 409,500 |
2.
That in consideration of the foregoing agreement,
the BUYER obligates himself to pay to the SELLER the sum of FOUR HUNDRED NINE
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P409,500), Philippine Currency, payable as follows:
a) As downpayment,
the amount of THIRTY NINE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS
(P39,400),
b) The amount of TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P230,000). To be paid on or before upon the release of Pag-Ibig Loan.
c) The SEVENTY THOUSAND
ONE HUNDRED (P70,100) to be paid upon
the
signing of this contract. Balance of SEVENTY THOUSAND (P70,000) by monthly
installments of ELEVEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY SIX & 70 Cents PESOS
(11,666.70) to start on the 30th day of January, 1995 until said balance is fully
paid subject to interest at the rate of ___ percent ( ) per annum on the balance
outstanding or the prevailing bank interest rate whichever is higher.
xxx xxx xxx
On P179,500.00, which the respondents claim to be the full
purchase price of the subject lot, Spring Homes executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[4] in favor
of the respondents. In the deed, P179,500.00
consisted of the following: P39,400.00
by way of downpayment; P70,100.00
paid on signing of the contract; and P70,000.00
paid in monthly installments of P11,666.70
each. All such payments are evidenced by receipts of the corresponding
transactions. Because the anticipated Pag-Ibig loan
failed to materialize, the P230,000.00, which,
under the Contract to Sell, was
supposed to be paid upon release of the loan, was left unpaid.
Respondents later declared the subject
lot for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 019-1342 and paid
the corresponding real property taxes thereon. Using their own funds, they caused
the construction thereon of a residential house, which
they presently occupy, the costs of which amounted to P356,516.50.
On
With the execution of the aforesaid
Deed of Absolute Sale, the respondent
spouses sent a demand letter dated
It appears, however, that after the
filing of Civil Case No. 3117-2001-C, the petitioners
filed a civil case before the RTC of Calamba City, Laguna,
Branch 37, against Spring Homes, docketed as Civil Case No. 2194-95-C. On
On
Meanwhile, due to the
respondents’ alleged failure to pay the P230,000.00
unpaid balance as per the Contract
to Sell earlier adverted to despite demands, the subject lot was sold by
Spring Homes to the petitioners, again by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on December 22, 2000
for and in consideration of the sum of P157,500.00.
The mortgage on the lot was released by Premiere
Development Bank on
The instant case cropped up when,
asserting their ownership of the subject lot on the basis of TCT No. T-473055, the
petitioners demanded of the respondents to vacate said lot and to pay them the rentals
due thereon. Their demands having come to naught, the petitioner spouses then filed in
the MTCC, Calamba City, a complaint for ejectment on October 2, 2001 against respondent Tabladas and all
persons claiming rights under them. The complaint was docketed in the MTCC as Civil Case No. 4335-01.
In a
decision[5] dated
Aggrieved, the petitioners
appealed to the RTC. In an Order[6] dated
While conceding that there is a double sale in
this case, the RTC, in its aforementioned Order, refused to apply the
provisions of Article 1544 of the Civil Code in settling the issue of
possession. Instead, it went to the extent of determining the validity and due
execution of the separate Deeds of Absolute Sale executed
by Spring Homes in favor of the herein contending parties.
In holding that the petitioners have
superior right on the subject lot over the respondents, the
RTC declared that there was no valid deed of absolute sale executed in favor of
the respondents for the following reasons:
1.
Even if there was a perfected Contract to Sell
between respondents and Spring Homes, the former failed to pay the full
purchase price in installments that gave Spring Homes the right to cancel the contract; and
2.
The execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of the respondents on
Applying the provisions of Articles
1350, 1352 and 1409 of the Civil Code, the RTC deemed the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of the respondents void ab initio for want of valid consideration. With
their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the RTC in its
subsequent Order of February 12, 2004, the respondent spouses then went to the
CA on a petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 82617.
In the herein assailed decision[7] dated
1.
Whether the CA committed reversible error or grave
abuse of discretion when it found the purchase price of the contested lot to be
P157,500.00 instead of the stipulated price of P409,500.00 in the Contract to Sell dated
January 9, 1995 despite the fact that the existence and validity of said
contract was never put in issue;
2.
Whether the CA committed reversible error or grave
abuse of discretion when it did not find that the sale of the subject lot to the respondents was
void due to lack of consideration since it was merely used by the respondents
to obtain a loan of P230,000.00 from the PAG-IBIG Fund and despite the
fact that said lot was already mortgaged by Spring Homes to the Premiere
Development Bank since
3.
Whether the CA committed reversible error or grave
abuse of discretion when it ruled that the petitioners acquired the lot in
question in bad faith despite the judicial assignment of rights and interests
to them over the lot in question in RTC Civil Case No. 2194-95-C, and their
having had it titled in their names with the Register of Deeds;
4.
Whether the CA committed a reversible error or
grave abuse of discretion when it did not find the respondents to be bad faith builders and
possessors of the property in question; and
5.
Whether the CA committed reversible error or grave
abuse of discretion when it manifestly misapprehended the relevant facts.
We DENY.
Before proceeding with a discussion of
the issues laid out above, it must be stressed that the present case is one for
ejectment. As such, our judgment hereon is
effective only with respect to possession. It does not bind the title or affect the
ownership of the lot in question. Such judgment shall
not bar an action between the same parties respecting the title to
said property.[9] The only issue for resolution is
who, as between the petitioners and the respondents, is
entitled to the physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of their respective claims of
ownership thereof.[10]
When acting as an ejectment court, the
Metropolitan, Municipal and Circuit Trial Courts' jurisdiction is limited to
the determination of the issue on possession de facto and not
possession de jure.[11] By way of
exception, however, if the issue of possession depends on the resolution of the
issue of ownership, which is sufficiently alleged in the complaint, as here, the MTCC may
resolve the issue of ownership although the resulting judgment would be
conclusive only with respect to possession but not to the
ownership of the property.[12]
In claiming their
right of possession over the subject lot, petitioners made much
of the judicially approved Compromise
Agreement in Civil Case No. 2194-95-C, wherein Spring Homes’ rights
and interests over the said lot under its Contract to Sell with the
respondents were effectively assigned to them. Petitioners argue that out
of the whole P409,500.00 purchase price under the respondents
Contract to Sell with Spring Homes, the respondents
were able to pay only P179,500.00, leaving
a balance of P230,000.00.
Upon scrutiny, however, the CA astutely
observed that despite there being no question that the total land area of the
subject lot is 105 square meters, the Contract
to Sell executed and entered into by Spring Homes and the respondent
spouses states:
3.
That the SELLER, for and in consideration of the
payments and other terms and conditions hereinafter to be designated, has
offered to sell and the BUYER has agreed to buy certain parcel of land more
particularly described as follows:
|
Blk
No. P-111 |
Lot
No. |
Area Sq.
Meter |
Price Per
Sq. Meter |
Total
Selling Price |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
3 |
8 |
105 |
P 1,500 |
|
|
|
|
42 |
6,000 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
P 409,500 |
The two deeds of absolute sale as well
as the respondents’ Tax Declaration No. 019-1342 uniformly show that
the land area of the property covered by TCT No. T-284037 is
105 square meters. The parties never contested its actual land area.
However, while there is only one parcel
of land being sold, which is P1,500” and “P6,000.” As
correctly observed by the CA:
In does not require much imagination
to understand why figures “3,” “8,” “105” and “P1,500” appear in
the paragraph “1” of the Contract to Sell. Certainly “3” stands for “Blk. No.,” “8” stands for
“Lot No.,” “105”
stands for the land area and “P1,500” stands for the price per square meter. However,
this Court is perplexed as regards figures “42” and “6,000” as they are not
accompanied by any “Blk. No.” and/or “Lot No.” In other words, while there is
only one parcel of land being sold, paragraph “1” of the Contract to Sell
contains two land areas and two prices per square meter. There is no reason for
the inclusion of land area in the computation when it was established beyond
cavil that the total area being sold is only 105 square meters. Likewise, there
is no explanation why there is another rate for
the additional 42 square meters, which was pegged at P6,000 per square
meter, while that of 105 square meters was only P1,500.00.
The CA could only think of one
possible explanation: the Contract to Sell refers only to a single lot with a total
land area of 105 square meters. The 42 square meters mentioned
in the same contract and therein computed at the rate of P6,000 per
square meter refer to the cost of the house which would be constructed by the
respondents on the subject lot through a Pag-Ibig loan. The land
area of the house to be constructed was pegged at 42 square meters because of
the following restrictions in the Contract
to Sell:
9.
The lot(s) subject matter of this contract are
subject to the following restrictions:
a) Any building
which may be constructed at anytime in said lot(s) must be strong x x x. Said
building must not be constructed at a distance of less than (2) meters from any
boundaries of the lot(s).
b) The total area to
be voted to buildings or structures shall not exceed eighty percent (80%) of
the total area of the lot(s).
Looking at the above-quoted portion of
the Contract to Sell, the CA
found merit in the respondents' contention that the total selling price of P409,500
includes not only the price of the lot but also the cost of the
house that would be constructed thereon. We are inclined to agree. The CA went
on to say:
It could be argued that the contract to sell never mentions the construction of any
house or building on the subject property. Had it been the intention of the
parties that the total selling price would include the amount of the house that
would be taken from a loan to be obtained from Pag-Ibig, they could have
specified so. However, one should not lose sight of the fact that the contract
to sell is an accomplished form. [Respondents,] trusting Spring
Homes, could not be expected to demand that another contract duly reflective of
their agreements be utilized instead of the accomplished form. The terms and
conditions of the contract may not contemplate the inclusion of the cost of the
house in the total selling price, but the entries typewritten thereon
sufficiently reveal the intentions of the parties.
The position of the [respondents] finds support in the documents and subsequent
actuations of Bertha Pasic, the representative of Spring Homes. [Respondents] undeniably
proved that they spent their own hard-earned money to construct a house thereon
after their Pag-Ibig loan did not materialize. It is highly unjust for the [respondents] to pay for the
amount of the house when the loan did not materialize due to the failure of
Spring Homes to deliver the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-284037.
xxx xxx xxx
If the total selling price was
indeed P409,500.00, as [petitioners] would like to poster, said amount should
have appeared as the consideration in the deed of absolute sale dated
We find the CA's reasoning to be sound.
At any rate, the execution of the January 16, 1996 Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of the respondents effectively rendered the previous Contract to Sell
ineffective and canceled. Furthermore, we find no merit in petitioners'
contention that the first sale to the respondents
was void for want of consideration. As the CA pointed out in its assailed
decision:
Other than the [petitioners'] self-serving
assertion that the Deeds of Absolute Sale was executed solely for the purpose
of obtaining a Pag-Ibig loan, no other concrete evidence was tendered to
justify the execution of the deed of absolute sale. They failed to overcome the
clear and convincing evidence of the [respondents] that as early as
Having stated that the Deed of Absolute
Sale executed in favor of the respondent spouses is valid
and with sufficient consideration, the MTCC correctly applied the
provisions of Article 1544 of the Civil Code. Article 1544 reads:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have
been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the
person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should
be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the
ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded
it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the
ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the
possession, and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest
title, provided there is good faith. [Emphasis provided]
Notwithstanding the fact that the
petitioners, as the second buyer, registered their Deed of
Absolute Sale, in contrast to the Deed of Sale of the respondents which
was not registered at all precisely because of Spring Homes’ failure to deliver the owner’s copy of TCT No. T-284037, the respondents’ right
could not be deemed defeated as the petitioners are in
bad faith. Petitioners cannot claim good faith since at the time of the
execution of the Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. 2194-95-C, they
were indisputably and reasonably informed that the subject lot was previously sold to the
respondents. In fact, they were already aware that the respondents had
constructed a house thereon and are presently in possession
of the same.
Knowledge gained by the second buyer of
the first sale defeats his rights even if he is the first to register the
second sale because such knowledge taints his prior registration with
bad faith. For the second buyer to displace the first, he must show that he
acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the
first buyer's rights) from the time of acquisition until the title is transferred
to him by registration.[13]
Consequently, the respondents are the
buyers entitled to the physical possession of the subject lot since
the prevailing doctrine is that as between the buyer who is in possession of a
Torrens title but who has acquired it in bad faith and the first buyer who
failed to have his title recorded in the Registry of Property, the first buyer
must prevail.[14]
Hence, there was nothing to cede
or transfer to the petitioners when the Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. 2194-95-C was entered into on October 28,
1999 insofar as the subject lot is concerned as it was already sold to and fully
paid for by the respondents as early as January 16, 1996 when the
Absolute Deed of Sale was executed in their favor by Spring Homes. More so
that Spring Homes has no more to sell to the petitioners when it executed in the
latter’s favor the second deed of absolute sale on
One last note, regardless of the actual
condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceful, quiet possession
thereof shall
not be ejected therefrom. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can
recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the
character of the defendant's prior possession, whether
it be legal or illegal, since he had in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles
him to remain on the property
until
he
is lawfully ejected therefrom
by a
person having a better right by accion publciana or accion reivindicatoria.[15]
The respondents are the current occupants of the subject lot. They had
constructed their residential house thereon and are living there at present.
The action for ejectment was fashioned to provide a speedy, albeit temporary, remedy to the dispossessed party while the issue of lawful possession or de jure possession is pending or
about to be filed. The remedy of ejectment ought to maintain the
status quo and prevent the party-litigants from further
aggravating the situation and causing further damage.
WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is DENIED and
the assailed decision and resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
Chairperson
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate
Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE)
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On Official Leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Remedios
Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner (ret.) and Rosmari
D. Carandag, concurring; Rollo, pp. 340-350.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Supra note 1.
[8] Supra note 2.
[9] Feliciano v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 123293, March 5, 1998, 287 SCRA 61.
[10] Gener v. De Leon, G.R. No.
130730,
[11] Paz v. Reyes, G.R. No. 127439,
[12] Tala Realty Services Corporation v.
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 129887,
[13] Uraca, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 115158, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 702.
[14] Cruz v. Cabana, 129 SCRA 656,
663,
[15] Reyes v. Sta. Maria, G.R. No. L-33213, June 29, 1979, 91 SCRA 164; Francisco Realty and Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125055, October 30, 1998, 298 SCRA 349.