THIRD
DIVISION
|
APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO
PLANTATION, INC.,
Petitioners, - versus
- THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LAND BANK OF THE Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 164195 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: |
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo
Plantation, Inc. (HPI) are the registered owners of five parcels of
agricultural lands located in
Apo Fruits
Corporation
|
Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT)[1]
No. |
Area
(Ha.) |
|
T-113359[2] |
115.2179 |
|
|
|
|
T-113366[3] |
525.1304 |
Hijo Plantation,
Inc.[4]
|
TCT No. |
Area
(Ha.) |
|
T-10361 |
155.8408 |
|
|
|
|
T-10362 |
170.7980 |
|
|
|
|
T-10363 |
478.8920[5] |
On
P86,900,925.88 or P165,484.47
per hectare[8] while HPI’s properties were valued at P164,478,178.14.[9] Both AFC and HPI considered the valuations
unreasonably low and inadequate as just compensation for the properties.
On
Owing
to the rejection by both AFC and HPI of LBP’s valuation, the DAR requested LBP
to deposit the amounts equivalent to their valuations in the names and for the
accounts of AFC and HPI.[14] AFC thereafter withdrew the amount of P26,409,549.86,
while HPI withdrew the amount of P45,481,706.76, both in cash from LBP. The DAR PARO then directed the Register of
Deeds of Davao to cancel the TCTs
of AFC and HPI to the said properties and to issue a new one in the name of the
Republic of the
After the issuance of the certificate
of title in the name of the Republic of the
On
Agrarian
Case No. 54-2000[16] filed
by AFC covers two parcels of land in P86,900,925.88.
On the other hand, Agrarian Case No.
55-2000[17]
filed by HPI relates to the other three
parcels of land in Tagum City, with a total area of
814.5308 hectares, likewise, previously assessed by LBP with a valuation
of P164,478,178.14.
Summons
was served on
LBP submitted its Answer on
The
pre-trial order issued by the trial court reads:
This Court will determine the all-embracing concept of Just Compensation, and whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages, and also whether the value of the land and improvements as determined by the Land Valuation of Land Bank for the determination of just compensation, and whether the plaintiff has violated Section 13 of DARAB new rules and procedure.[21]
The commissioners, together with
all the representatives of the parties, conducted an ocular inspection first on
On
On
After hearing, the trial court
rendered a decision[26]
dated
WHEREFORE, consistent with all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by this Special Agrarian Court where it has determined judiciously and now hereby fixed the just compensation for the 1,388.6027 hectares of lands and its improvements owned by the plaintiffs: APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC., as follows:
First – Hereby ordering after having determined and fixed the fair, reasonable and just compensation of the 1,338.6027 hectares of land and standing crops owned by plaintiffs – APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC., based at only P103.33 per sq. meter, ONE BILLION THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,383,179,000.00), Philippine Currency, under the current value of the Philippine Peso, to be paid jointly and severally to the herein PLAINTIFFS by the Defendants-Department of Agrarian Reform and its financial intermediary and co-defendant Land Bank of the Philippines, thru its Land Valuation Office;
Second – Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office, to pay plaintiffs-APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC., interests on the above-fixed amount of fair, reasonable and just compensation equivalent to the market interest rates aligned with 91-day Treasury Bills, from the date of the taking in December 9, 1996, until fully paid, deducting the amount of the previous payment which plaintiffs received as/and from the initial valuation;
Third – Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office, to pay jointly and severally the Commissioners’ fees herein taxed as part of the costs pursuant to Section 12, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, equivalent to, and computed at Two and One-Half (2 ˝) percent of the determined and fixed amount as the fair, reasonable and just compensation of plaintiffs’ land and standing crops plus interest equivalent to the interest of the 91-Day Treasury Bills from date of taking until full payment;
Fourth - Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office, to pay jointly and severally the attorney’s fees to plaintiffs equivalent to, and computed at ten (10%) Percent of the determined and fixed amount as the fair, reasonable and just compensation of plaintiffs’ land and standing crops, plus interest equivalent to the 91-Day Treasury Bills from date of taking until the full amount is fully paid;
Fifth - Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office to deduct from the total amount fixed as fair, reasonable and just compensation of plaintiffs’ properties the initial payment paid to the plaintiffs;
Sixth - Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office, to pay the costs of the suit; and
Seventh - Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office, to pay all the aforementioned amounts thru The Clerk of Court of this Court, in order that said Court Officer could collect for payment any docket fee deficiency, should there be any, from the plaintiffs.[27]
LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration[28]on
In an Order dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following modifications as they are hereby made on the dispositive portion of this Court’s consolidated decision be made and entered in the following manner, to wit:
On the Second Paragraph of the Dispositive Portion which now reads as follows, as modified:
Second - Hereby ordering Defendants –
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru its
Land Valuation Office, to pay plaintiffs-APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO
PLANTATION, INC., interest at the rate of Twelve (12%) Percent per annum on the
above-fixed amount of fair, reasonable and just compensation computed from the
time the complaint was filed until the finality of this decision. After this decision becomes final and
executory, the rate of TWELVE (12%) PERCENT per annum shall be additionally
imposed on the total obligation until payment thereof is satisfied, deducting
the amounts of the previous payments by Defendant-LBP received as initial
valuation;
On the Third Paragraph of the Dispositive Portion which Now Reads As Follows, As Modified:
Third - Hereby ordering Defendants –
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru its Land
Valuation Office, to pay jointly and severally the Commissioners’ fees herein
taxed as part of the costs pursuant to Section 12, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, equivalent to, and computed at Two and One-Half (2 ˝) percent
of the determined and fixed amount as the fair, reasonable and just
compensation of plaintiffs’ land and standing crops and improvements;
On the Fourth Paragraph of the Dispositive Portion which Now Reads As follows, As Modified:
Fourth - Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT
OF AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation
Office, to pay jointly and severally the attorney’s fees to plaintiffs
equivalent to, and computed at ten (10%) Percent of the determined and fixed
amount as the fair, reasonable and just compensation of plaintiffs’ land and
standing crops and improvements.
Except for the above-stated modifications, the consolidated decision stands and shall remain in full force and effect in all other respects thereof.[30]
From
this Order, LBP filed a Notice of Appeal dated
Subsequently, the trial court, citing
this Court’s ruling in the case of “Land
Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon,”[33]
that a petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the proper mode of
appeal from a decision on the determination of just compensation rendered by a
special agrarian court, issued an Order dated 4 November 2002[34]
recalling its Order dated 15 May 2002 and directed LBP to file a Petition for
Review within the reglementary period.
LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration[35]
claiming that the case of Land Bank of
the Philippines v. De Leon was not yet final at that time; hence, it is not
certain whether the decision in that case would have a retroactive effect and
that appeal is the appropriate remedy.
This was denied by the trial court in its Order dated
On
The Court of Appeals found the
petition of LBP meritorious. In a
decision[38] dated
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED and the
assailed orders dated
AFC
and HPI filed a joint Motion for Reconsideration[40]
which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated
Earlier,
on
The importance of stating the material dates cannot be overemphasized. It is only through a statement thereof in the petition can it be determined whether or not the petition was filed on time. For its failure to state the material dates, the petition can and should be outrightly dismissed.
x x x x
The petition is also defective in that it failed to attach material portions of the record as would support the allegations in the petition. More specifically, copies of the alleged motion for reconsideration filed by the DAR, the order denying it, and the notice of appeal were not attached to the petition.
For all the foregoing, the court has no alternative but to dismiss the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.[45]
The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in the Petition filed by the DAR in CA-G.R. SP
No. 74879 became final and executory and entry of judgment was issued by the
appellate court on
On the other hand, from the decision
of the Court of Appeals in the Petition filed by LBP in CA-G.R. SP No. 76222,
AFC and HPI filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE QUESTIONED DECISION AND RESOLUTION ARE IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT?
II.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT LBP IS BOUND BY THE DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 74879 AND IS THEREFORE PRECLUDED FROM FILING CA-G.R. SP NO. 76222?
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE FILING BY RESPONDENT LBP OF CA-G.R. SP NO. 76222 IS ALREADY BARRED BY RES JUDICATA?
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE ARLENE DE LEON CASE, GIVING ONLY PROSPECTIVE EFFECT TO ITS EARLIER RESOLUTION AS TO THE PROPER MODE OF APPEAL FROM DECISIONS OF SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE?
V.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT LBP WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS AND/OR OF ITS RIGHT TO APPEAL?
VI.
WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT PETITION (CA-G.R. SP NO. 76222) WAS MERELY INTERPOSED TO DELAY THE EXECUTION OF SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT’S “DECISION” WHICH IS BASED ON EVIDENCE DULY PRESENTED AND PROVED?[47]
AFC
and HPI pray that the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 76222 be reversed and set aside and that the Decision of the RTC
dated
In
the case of Land Bank of the Philippines
v. De Leon, decided on
A petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the proper procedure in effecting an appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts acting as Special Agrarian Courts in cases involving the determination of just compensation to the landowners concerned. Section 60 of RA 6657 clearly and categorically states that the said mode of appeal should be adopted. There is no room for a contrary interpretation. Where the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for construction, but only application.[49]
LBP
filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In a
Resolution of this Court dated
WHEREFORE, the motion for
reconsideration dated
Essentially
therefore, the rule is that a decision of the RTC acting as a
In
this case, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled when it gave due course to the
appeal of LBP. LBP’s
Notice of Appeal was filed on
Next
we proceed to determine the issue of whether or not the petition of LBP before
the Court of Appeals is barred by the disposition of the Petition for Review
filed by the DAR in CA-G.R. SP No. 74879 on the ground of res judicata.
The
following are the elements of res judicata:
(a) The former judgment must be final;
(b) The court which rendered judgment must have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter;
(c) It must be a judgment on the merits; and
(d) There must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.[51]
In
this case, the third element of res judicata, i.e.,
that the former judgment must be on the merits, is not present. It must be remembered that the dismissal of
CA-G.R. SP No. 74879 was based on technicality, that is, for failure on the
part of the DAR to state material dates required by the rules. Having been dismissed based on a technicality
and not on the merits, the principle of res judicata does not apply. Res judicata applies only where judgment on the merits is
finally rendered on the first.[52]
Having disposed of the procedural
issues involved herein, we shall now proceed to resolve the substantive
questions in this case.
This Court is aware that in the instant
case, since LBP’s appeal before the Court of Appeals
is to be given due course, the normal procedure is for us to remand the case to
the appellate court for further proceedings.
However, when there is enough basis on which a proper evaluation of the
merits of petitioner’s case may be had, the Court may dispense with the
time-consuming procedure in order to prevent further delays in the disposition
of the case.[53] Indeed, remand of the case to the lower court
for further reception of evidence is not conducive to the speedy administration
of justice and it becomes unnecessary where the Court is in a position to
resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public
interest and expeditious administration of justice, has resolved action on the
merits, instead of remanding them for further proceedings, as where the ends of
justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case[54]
or where the trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties.[55] Briefly stated, a remand of the instant case
to the Court of Appeals would serve no purpose save to further delay its
disposition contrary to the spirit of fair play.
It is already an accepted rule of
procedure for us to strive to settle the entire controversy in a single
proceeding,[56]
leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. If, based on the records, the pleadings, and
other evidence, the dispute can be resolved by us, we will do so to serve the
ends of justice instead of remanding the case to the lower court for further
proceedings.[57]
The
complete records of this case have already been elevated to this Court. The pleadings on record will fully
support this adjudication. We have
painstakingly gone over all of LBP’s representations
and arguments, and we found that the material and decisive facts are hardly
disputable. From another perspective, due
consideration should also be given to AFC and HPI for having voluntarily
offered to sell their properties, a clear indication of AFC and HPI’s willingness to participate in the agrarian reform
program of the government. In turn, they
must be given compensation that is just
and timely. Records indicate that the case has been
dragging on for more than ten years now without the landowners having been
fully compensated. We cannot countenance
such a glaring indifference to AFC and HPI’s rights
as land owners – they should be afforded all that is just and due them. To be sure, they deserve nothing less than
full compensation to give effect to their substantive rights.
While
eminent domain lies as one of the inherent powers of the state, there is no
requirement that it undertake a prolonged procedure, or that the payment of the
private owner be protracted as far as practicable.[58]
It is not controverted
that this case started way back on
Verily, these two cases could have been disposed with dispatch
were it not for LBP’s counsel causing unnecessary
delay. At the inception of this case,
DARAB, an agency of the DAR which was commissioned by law to determine just
compensation, sat on the cases for three years, which was the reason that AFC
and HPI filed the cases before the RTC.
We underscore the pronouncement of the RTC that “the delay by DARAB in
the determination of just compensation could only mean the reluctance of the
Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the
To allow the taking of landowners’ properties, and to leave
them empty-handed while government withholds compensation is undoubtedly
oppressive.[61]
It
is in light of the foregoing that this Court will now undertake the final
resolution of the present controversy which, as already elucidated, is within
the power of this Court to do.
The
concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land
within a reasonable time from its taking.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered “just”
inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of
being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or
more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.[62] Just compensation is defined as the full and
fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.[63] It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court
that the measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss.[64] The word “just” is used to intensify the
meaning of the word “compensation” to convey the idea that the equivalent to be
rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and
ample.[65]
The
two main issues, thus, for determination of this Court are the date of the taking
of the property and the amount of just compensation.[66]
First,
it is settled that the property was taken on
Second,
on payment of just compensation, we have previously held:
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that “private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation” and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.[68] (Emphases supplied.)
Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law) provides:
SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.
To implement the provisions of
Republic Act No. 6657, Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure,
provides:
Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. – The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied.)
The next question now crops up, who
shall determine just compensation? It is
now settled that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a
judicial function which is vested with the RTC acting as
We now come to the issue of just
compensation.
LBP
argues that the trial court’s valuation of the subject landholdings has
incorporated irrelevant and/or immaterial factors such as the schedule of market
values given by the City Assessor of Tagum, the
comparative sales of adjacent lands and the commissioners’ report.[71]
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657,
which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the
determination of just compensation, reads, as follows:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.[72]
The RTC
provided the following elucidation in its assailed decision:
The
recommendation of the Commissioners’ Report for a value of P85.00 per sq.m. or P850,000.00 per hectare (sic) is founded on
evidence. The schedule of market values
of the City of P100/sq.m.
for 4th class residential land in 1993. In 1994, it gave the lowest value of P80.00/sq.m.
for barangay residential lot. It appears that certain portions of the land
in question have been classified as Medium Industrial District (Exhibit “J-4”
and “CC-4”). The lowest value as for
industrial land, 3rd class in a barangay
is P130.00 sq.m. The average of these figures, using the
lowest values in Exhibit “6” and “CC-6” yields the figure of P103.33
which is even higher by 22.2% than that recommended by the Commissioners. It is even of judicial notice that
assessments made by local governments are much lower than real market
value. Likewise, the value of the
improvements thereon, not even considered in the average of P103.33. If considered, this will necessarily result
in a higher average value.
In said Appraisal Report, mention has been made on “improvements,” and our Supreme Court in Republic vs. Gonzales, 50 O.G. 2461, decreed the rule, as follows:
If such improvements are permanent in character, consisting of good paved road, playgrounds, water system, sewerage and general leveling of the land suitable for residential lots together with electric installations and buildings, the same are important factors to consider in determining the value of the land. The original cost of such improvements may be considered, with due regard to the corresponding depreciation. (Davao vs. Dacudao, L-3741, May 8, 1952).
Note should be taken that in said Appraisal Report, permanent improvements on plaintiffs’ lands have been introduced and found existing, e.g., all weather-road network, airstrip, pier, irrigation system, packing houses, among others, wherein substantial amount of capital funding have been invested in putting them up.
This Court, however, notes that the
comparative sales (Exhibits “A” to “F”) referred to in the Appraisal Report are
sales made after the taking of the land in 1996. However, in the offer of evidence, the
plaintiff offered additional comparative sales of adjacent land from late 1995
to early 1997, ranging from a high of P580.00/sq.meter in September 1996
(Exhibit “L-4” for plaintiff Apo and “EE-4” for
plaintiff Hijo) to a low of P146.02/sq.meter
in October 1997 (Exhibits “L-2” and “EE-2”).
The other sales in 1996 were in January 1996 for P530.00/sq.meter
( Exhs. “L-3” and “EE-3”) and in December 1996 for P148.64/sq.meter
(Exhs. “L-2” and “EE-1”). On the other hand, the sale in December 1995
(Exhs. “L-5” and “EE-5”) was made for P530.00/sq.meter.” The average selling price based on the
foregoing transaction is P386.93/sq.meter. The same is even higher by around 350% than
the recommended value of P85.00, as per the Commissioners’ Report.
The Cuervo
Appraisal Report, on the other hand, gave a value of P84.53/sq. meter
based on the Capitalized Income Approach.
The said approach considered only the use of the land and the income
generated from such use.
The just compensation for the
parcels of land under consideration, taking into account the Schedule of Market
Values given by the City Assessor of Tagum (Exhs. “J-6” for Apo “CC-6” for Hijo), the comparative sales covering adjacent lands at the
time of taking of subject land, the Cuervo Report,
and the Appraisal Report is hereby fixed at P103.33/sq.meter.
The valuation given by Cuervo and the Appraisal Report of P84.53 and P85.00,
respectively, in this Court’s judgment, is the minimum value of the subject
landholdings and definitely cannot in anyway be the price at which plaintiffs APO
and/or HIJO might be willing to sell, considering that the parcels of land
adjacent thereto were sold at much higher prices, specifically from a low of P146.02/sq.meter
to a high of P580.00. The average
of the lowest value under the 1993 and 1994 Revision of Assessment and Property
Classification (Exhibits “J-6” and “CC-6”) were already at P103.33/sq.meter,
even without considering the improvements introduced on the subject
landholdings.
Moreover, the Commission made the
findings that “portions of the land subject of th(e)
report may x x x increase
to P330.00/sq.meter, specifically th(e) strips
of land surrounding the provincial roads” and made the conclusion that “(c)learly, the value recommended by th(e)
Commission, which is only about P85.00/sq.meter is way below the x x x assessed values, which
effectively was fixed (as early as) 1994 or earlier than the Voluntary Offer to
Sell of the above plaintiffs’ properties.”
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the said assessed values
are presumed to be prevailing [in] December 1996, the time of taking of
plaintiffs’ landholdings. The Commission
further stated that the average of the said “assessed values as submitted by
the City Assessor of Tagum City (is) P265.00/sq.meter.” This Court, therefore, finds it unfair that
the just compensation for the subject landholdings should only be fixed at P85.00/sq.meter.
It is similarly true, however, that the determination of just compensation cannot be made to the prejudice of defendants or the government for that matter.
Thus, the selling price of P580.00/sq.
meter nor the average selling price of P386.93/sq. meter or the average
assessed value of P265.00/sq. meter cannot be said to be the value at
which defendants might be willing to buy the subject landholdings.
This Court, therefore, finds the
price of P103.33/sq. meter for the subject landholdings fair and
reasonable for all the parties. Said
value is even lower than the lowest selling price of P148.64 for sale of
adjacent land at the time of the taking of the subject landholdings [in]
December 1996. It approximates, however,
the average of the lowest values under the 1993 and 1994 Revision of Assessment
and Property Clarification (Exhs. “J-6” and “CC-6”)
of P103.33. The said figure will
further increase, if the Court will further consider the improvements
introduced by plaintiffs, which should be the case. Moreover, the said value of P103.33/sq.
meter is more realistic as it does not depart from the government recognized
values as specified in the 1993 and 1994 Revised Assessment and Property
Classification of Tagum City. This Court finds the evidence of the
plaintiffs sufficient and preponderant to establish the value of P103.33/sq.
meter.[73]
The trial court further rationalized
its award thus:
It may be admitted that plaintiffs’ properties are agricultural; however, it is simply beyond dispute that in going about the task of appraising real properties, as in the instant cases, “all the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, may be shown and considered in estimating its value.” (Manila Railroad Company vs. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 287, 314). It is undeniable that plaintiffs’ agricultural lands as borne out from the records hereof, and remaining unrebutted, shows that all weather-roads network, airstrip, pier, irrigation system, packing houses, and among numerous other improvements are permanently in place and not just a measly, but substantial amounts investments have been infused. To exclude these permanent improvements in rendering its valuation of said properties would certainly be less than fair. x x x.
x x x x
The
plaintiffs’ agricultural properties are just a stone’s throw from the
residential and/or industrial sections of
Proceedings before the Panel of Commissioners revealed that permanent improvements as mentioned above exist inside the lands subject of this complaints. It was also established during the trial proper upon reception of the evidence of the plaintiffs which clearly revealed the character, use and valuation of the lands surrounding the properties involved in these cases, indicating the strategic location of the properties subject of these cases. The findings being that surrounding properties have been classified as residential, commercial or industrial. And yet defendant-LBP refused to acknowledge the factual basis of the findings of the Panel of Commissioners and insisted on its guideline in determining just compensation. x x x.[74]
In arriving at its valuation of the
subject properties, the RTC conducted a thorough and meticulous examination of
all determining factors. It did not rely merely on the report of Commissioners
nor on the Cuervo appraiser’s report. It took into consideration the schedule of
market values of the City of
Contrary to LBP’s
claim, the above factors are neither irrelevant nor immaterial. When the trial court arrived at the valuation
of a landowner’s property taking into account its nature as irrigated land,
location along the highway, market value, assessor’s value and the volume and
value of its produce, such valuation is considered in accordance with Republic
Act No. 6657.[75]
Even the Commissioners’ report which
the trial court took into consideration may not be dismissed as irrelevant. In the first place the trial court acting as a
special agrarian court is authorized to appoint commissioners to assist in the
determination of just compensation.[76]
In this case the Commissioners’ report
was submitted only after ocular inspections were conducted on the landholdings
to give them a better idea of their real value.[77]
Conspicuously, the trial court did not
merely rely solely on the appraisal report submitted by the Commissioners. The trial court conducted hearings for the
purpose of receiving the parties’ evidence.
Clearly evident from the records of
this case is that in the proceedings before the Commission constituted by the
RTC of Tagum City, Branch 2, to fix the just
compensation for the properties, the LBP and the DAR were given all the
opportunities to justify their stances.
Thus:
[T]he Commission set
another hearing on
Inspite of the lapse of the period, the LBP failed to file its position paper.
x x x x
The plaintiffs have presented
evidence to establish the value of their properties before the Court-appointed
Commissioners, as well as before this Court.
The Commissioners who acted and performed their assigned tasks under their
Oaths of Office are deemed a surrogate or extension of the Court itself. (Secs. 3 and 4,
Rule 32 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
Defendant-DAR and Defendant-LBP failed to present evidence during the
hearings set by the Commissioners on
Given the already exhaustive analysis
made by the RTC, this
Court is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the amount of just
compensation due to AFC and HPI.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. While the Decision, dated 12 February 2004,
and Resolution, dated 21 June 2004, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
76222, giving due course to LBP’s appeal, are hereby AFFIRMED, this Court, nonetheless, RESOLVES, in consideration of public
interest, the speedy administration of justice, and the peculiar circumstances
of the case, to give DUE COURSE to
the present Petition and decide the same on its merits. Thus, the Decision, dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third
Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, Annex C, p. 13; Both land titles (TCTs No. 113359 and No. 113366) were previously covered by TCT No. 50976.
[2]
[3] Id at 6.
[4]
[5] Rollo, p. 259.
[6] Pursuant to Republic Act No.
6657, as amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988, effective
[7] Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) – A scheme wherein landowner/s voluntarily offer their agricultural lands, including improvements thereon, if any, for coverage. (Records, p. 592) DAR Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1998.
[8] Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, p. 13.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Republic
Act No. 6657, Sec. 20.
(a) All notices for voluntary land
transfer must be submitted to the DAR within the first year of the
implementation of the CARP. Negotiations
between the landowners and qualified beneficiaries covering any voluntary land
transfer which remain unresolved after one (1) year shall not be recognized and
such land shall instead be acquired by the government and transferred pursuant
to this Act.
(b) The terms and conditions of such
transfer shall not be less favorable to the transferee than those of the
government’s standing offer to purchase from the landowner and to resell to the
beneficiaries, if such offers have been made and are fully known to both parties.
(c) The voluntary agreement shall include
sanctions for non-compliance by either party and shall be duly recorded and its
implementation monitored by the DAR.
[13] Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, p. 461.
[14]
[15] Agrarian Case No. 54-2000 entitled,
Apo Fruits Corporation v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform and Land Bank of the Philippines, and Agrarian Case No. 55-2000
entitled, Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform and Land Bank of the
[16] Records of Agrarian Case No. 54-2000, Book I, pp. 1-5.
[17] Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, pp. 1-5 .
[18]
Mr. Alfredo H. Silawan, incumbent City Assessor of Tagum
City, Davao del Norte, to act as Member.
Mr. Wilfredo G. dela Cerna, incumbent City Treasurer of Tagum City, Davao del Norte, to act as Member.
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
a) The
amount of ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-ONE MILLION SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P1,131,600,000.00) under the current value of the Philippine Peso,
computed as the JUST COMPENSATION for the properties covered by these cases, to
be paid jointly and severally by the Department of Agrarian Reform and/or the
Land Bank of the Philippines and deposited in an authorized bank;
b) Interest
on the abovementioned amount equivalent to the market interest rates aligned
with 91-day treasury bills, from the date of taking in 1996, until fully paid,
to be paid jointly and severally by the Department of Agrarian Reform and/or
the Land Bank of the Philippines and deposited in an authorized bank;
c) Defendants
DAR/LBP jointly and severally pay all the fees payable to the Commissioners
herein named, taxed, as part of all the costs per Section 12, Rule 67 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
WHEREFORE,
the Commission respectfully submits this Appraisal Report to this Honorable
Special Agrarian Court, with a firm belief that the amount arrived at is JUST.
The
Panel of Commissioners pray for such other reliefs as
may be just and equitable under the premises.
At
(Sgd.)CESAR V. ARAŃAS (Sgd.)ALFREDO M. SILAWAN
Chairman
Member
[25] Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, p. 707.
[26]
[27] CA rollo, pp. 131-133.
[28] Records of Agrarian Case No.
55-2000, Book I, p. 792; DAR also filed its Motion for Reconsideration on the
same date, i.e.,
[29] CA rollo, pp. 141-160.
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33] 437 Phil. 347 (2002).
[34] CA rollo, pp. 47-48.
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44] SEC. 2. Form and contents. – The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies x x x; (b) indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed on time; x x x.
[45] CA rollo, pp. 633-636.
[46]
[47] Rollo, p. 262.
[48]
[49] Land
Bank of the
[50] Land
Bank of the
[51] TF
Ventures, Inc. v. Matsuura, G.R. No 154177,
[52] David
v. Navarro, G.R. No. 145284,
[53] Somoso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78050,
[54] Real v. Belo, G.R. No. 146224, 17 January 2007; Golangco v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 771, 778 (1997); Heirs of Crisanta Y. Gabriel-Almoradie v. Court Appeals, G.R. No. 91385, 4 January 1994, 229 SCRA 15, 29; Republic v. Central Surety & Insurance Co., 134 Phil. 631 (1968).
[55] Samal v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil 230, 233 (1956).
[56] Bunao v. Social Security System, G.R. No. 159606,
[57] Vallejo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156413, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 658, 668; San Luis v. Court of Appeals, 417 Phil. 598, 605 (2001); Chua v. Court of Appeals, 338 Phil. 262, 273 (1997); Golangco v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 771, 778 (1997).
[58] Republic
v. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429,
[59] Rocamora v. Regional Trial Court-Cebu (Branch VIII),
G.R. No. L-65037,
[60] RTC Decision, p. 40; CA rollo, p. 124.
[61] Land
Bank of the
[62] Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone, G.R. No. 137285, 16 January 2001, 349 SCRA 240, 264; Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, id. at 1054, quoting Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 89898-99, 1 October 1990, 190 SCRA 207, 213.
[63] Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286, 313 (1915).
[64]
[65] City
of
[66] Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, pp. 332, 344.
[67]
[68] Association
of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
G.R. No. 78742, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343, 376.
[69] Land
Bank of the
[70] Association
of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
supra note 68 at 380.
[71] Rollo, p. 351.
[72] Otherwise stated, the determination
of just compensation involves the examination of the following factors
specified in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 as amended.
1. the
cost of the acquisition of the land;
2. the
current value of like properties;
3. its
nature, actual use and income;
4. the
sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations;
5. the
assessment made by government assessors;
6. the
social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the government to the property; and
7. the
non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution
on the said land, if any.
These factors as provided under
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 have been translated in a basic formula in
DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, issued pursuant to the DAR’s rule-making power to carry out the object and
purposes of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended.
The formula stated in DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, as amended, is as follows:
CNI
= Capitalized Net Income
CS
= Comparable Sales
MV
= Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all the three
factors are present, relevant and applicable.
A.1 When
the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula shall
be:
A.2
When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula
shall be:
A.2 When
both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the formula
shall be:
[73] CA rollo, pp. 125-128.
[74]
[75] Belen
v. Court of Appeals, supra note 69 at 295; Land Bank of
[76] Rule 67, Section 5, Revised Rules of Court.
[77] B.H Berkenkotter and Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89980, 14 December 1992, 216 SCRA 584, 589.
[78] CA rollo, pp. 112-121.