SECOND DIVISION
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EMERLITO F. AGUILA and DANILO D. REYES, |
G.R.
No. 163186 |
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Petitioners, |
Present: |
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- versus - CARMEN R. BALDOVIZO, EDGAR R. BALDOVIZO, and CARMELO R.
BALDOVIZO, |
Quisumbing, J., Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio Morales, Tinga, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: February
28, 2007 |
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Respondents. |
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DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks to
reverse the Decision[1]
dated
The
facts are as follows:
On
On
On September 24, 1994, Fausto’s
wife, Carmen R. Baldovizo, and children, Edgar and Carmelo, filed before the
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 225, a separate complaint for damages against Marlun
Lisbos, Danilo D. Reyes, petitioner Emerlito F. Aguila, the actual operator and
possessor of the van, and Times Surety and Insurance Company, the insurer of
the van under a third-party liability insurance contract.
Summons were served on the
defendants except Marlun Lisbos whose whereabouts were unknown according to the
Sheriff’s Report.
In
his Answer, Aguila claimed that Fausto disregarded traffic rules when he crossed
EDSA; that Aguila exercised due diligence in the selection of Lisbos as driver;
and that Aguila provided assistance and support during the hospitalization of
Fausto.
On
the other hand, Reyes denied ownership of the van. Although the van was
registered in his name, Reyes claimed that Aguila was its actual possessor and
operator. Hence, Reyes claimed he could
not be liable for damages.
Meanwhile, Times Surety and Insurance Company was declared
in default for failure to file an Answer.
After
the parties failed to arrive at a settlement, trial ensued. Petitioners were considered to have waived
their right to present their evidence due to their failure to appear on the
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs Carmen, Edgar and Carmelo R.
Baldovizo and against the defendants Emerlito F. Aguila, Danilo Reyes, Marlun
G. Lisbos and Times Surety [a]nd Insurance Co., Inc., ordering the latter to
jointly and severally pay the following amounts:
1.
P43,800.00 for loss of
earning capacity
2.
P110,700.00 for medical
expenses and hospital bills; and P15,800.07 for medicine expenses
incurred after confinement
3.
P50,000.00 as death
indemnity for the victim
4.
P50,000.00 as moral
damages
5.
P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages
6.
COSTS OF SUIT.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On
Meanwhile,
the Baldovizos moved for the issuance of a writ of execution after the judgment
in their favor attained finality. However,
petitioners filed (1) a motion for reconsideration of the
On
On
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Second Motion For Reconsideration on the Resolutions/Orders
denying the petition for relief from judgment is hereby DENIED and the Motion For
Reconsideration To The Resolution Granting The Issuance Of A Writ of Execution
is likewise DENIED for lack of merit.
Further,
the name of defendant Marlun Lisbos is ordered stricken off in the dispositive
portion of the Decision dated
SO
ORDERED.[7]
Accordingly, the trial court issued an
Amended Decision[8]
dated
Petitioners
Aguila and Reyes appealed the Amended Decision before the Court of Appeals. In denying the appeal for being improper, the appellate
court ruled that Aguila and Reyes had lost their right to appeal. Since no appeal of the
In any event, the appellate court sustained
the Amended Decision which deleted the name of Marlun Lisbos among the parties
held liable. The appellate court also denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for review.
The lone issue to be resolved in this case is: Do the petitioners have the right to appeal
the amended decision after the original decision had become final and
executory?
Petitioners contend that while their
right to appeal the
Petitioners invoke substantial justice
for this Court to consider the merits of the case which the appellate court
failed to address. They pray that they
be absolved from liability.
We find petitioners’ contentions
devoid of merit.
Under Section 2,[9]
Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, a judgment or final order becomes final and
executory if no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed
within the period provided by the Rules.
Before a judgment becomes final and executory, that judgment
may be amended. Upon finality of the
judgment, the court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.[10]
Except for correction of clerical errors
or the making of nunc pro tunc
entries which causes no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment is void, the
judgment can neither be amended nor altered after it has become final and
executory.[11] This is
the principle of immutability of final judgment that is subject only to a few
exceptions.[12]
None of the exceptions are present in
this case.
Upon
review of the records of this case, we note that petitioners received the March
7, 2000 Decision on
Unfortunately for the petitioners,
their petition for relief from judgment was not the proper remedy because it is
an extraordinary remedy available only if there are no other remedies. The remedies available to petitioners were the
filing of an appeal, motion for reconsideration, or motion for new trial. Thus, the petition for relief from judgment did
not toll the running of the reglementary period and, accordingly, the March 7,
2000 Decision became final and executory after the lapse thereof.
Nevertheless, while the
Resolution dated August 13, 2001, correcting the March 7, 2000 Decision, stated
that the name of Marlun Lisbos was inadvertently included in the dispositive
portion, hence, said name was ordered stricken off, the ensuing Amended Decision
rendered on August 13, 2001 is null and void because any amendment or
alteration made which substantially affects the final and executory judgment is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction.[13]
Although the rule that a judgment that becomes
final and executory cannot be disturbed admits of exceptions, none of those are
present in this case.
Besides, it is not necessary to
amend the original decision holding the petitioners, Marlun Lisbos, and the
insurance company solidarily liable. In
an action based on quasi-delict, the liability of the employer is direct and
primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee.[14]
Thus, even if the driver was included
albeit not served with summons, petitioners are directly and primarily liable. Thus, petitioners Aguila and Reyes as employer
and registered owner or possessor-operator of the van, respectively, are
solidarily liable in accordance with Article 2180[15]
in relation to Articles 2184[16]
and 2194[17]
of the Civil Code.
In view of the foregoing, there
is no basis for petitioners to appeal the Amended Decision which is void. As for petitioners’ plea for substantial
justice, time and again, we have reminded the litigants that the Rules of Court
are not mere tools that they can readily use or discard to serve their own
purpose, but they are purposively devised for the proper administration of
justice. Litigants should not, after
resorting to a wrong remedy, then cry for liberal construction of these rules.
For utter disregard of the
rules cannot justly be rationalized by merely harking on the policy of liberal
construction.[18]
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. However, the Amended Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo,
pp. 28-34-A. Penned by Associate Justice
Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and
Rosmari D. Carandang concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4] Records,
p. 157.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] SEC.
2. Entry of judgments and final orders.—If no appeal or motion for new
trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the
judgment or final order shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of
entries of judgments. The date of
finality of the judgment or final order shall be deemed to be the date of its
entry….
[10] Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R.
No. 132601,
[11] Aboitiz Shipping Employees Association v. Trajano,
G.R. No. 112955,
[12] Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 126462, November 12, 2002, 391 SCRA 370, 387.
[13] Navarro v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 116464,
March 1, 2000, 327 SCRA 22, 30; SGMC Realty
Corporation v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 126999, August 30, 2000,
339 SCRA 275, 280.
[14] Construction Development Corporation of the
Philippines v. Estrella, G.R. No. 147791,
[15] Art.
2180.
x x x x
Employers
shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
x x x x
[16] Art.
2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the
owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the
vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune.…
If the owner was not in the motor
vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable.
[17] Art.
2194. The responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
[18] Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146559, August 13, 2004, 436 SCRA 478, 483.