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RENE CABARLES, Petitioner, - versus - |
G.R. No. 161330 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA,
and VELASCO,
JR., JJ. |
|
HON. JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA AND
PEOPLE OF THE Respondents. |
Promulgated: February
20, 2007 |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
In an original action filed under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner Rene Cabarles seeks to annul the Order[1] issued by respondent
Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda in Criminal Case No. 99-0878, entitled People of the
The facts of
the case are as follows:
On
The undersigned Prosecutor II accuses RENE “NONOY” CABARLES Y ADIZAS of the
crime of Murder, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 25th day of April, 1999, in the
City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without justifiable motive with intent to kill
and by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and stab with a deadly weapon (fan
knife) one Antonio Callosa, which
directly caused his death.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[2]
Cabarles pleaded not guilty. The trial court scheduled
the case for hearing on the following dates, to wit: pre-trial on
The
prosecution had subpoenas issued to its witnesses: Flocerfina Callosa, the
mother of the deceased; Imelda Pedrosa, the alleged eyewitness; Carlos Callosa,
brother of the deceased; and Dr. Romeo T. Salen, Police
Senior Inspector of the Southern Police District (SPD) Crime Laboratory to
testify on the contents of the death certificate of Antonio Callosa.
Through no
fault of its own, the prosecution was unable to present its evidence on the
first four hearing dates. Instead, trial
on the merits began only on
The second
prosecution witness, Police Inspector Prudencio Parejos, was presented in court
during the
When the
case was called on
… It is however understood whether the
subpoena is actually issued and served or not upon the prosecution witnesses
and service of such subpoena or notice will not relieved (sic) the prosecution
to make a formal offer of evidence should the prosecution failed (sic) to present
any witness in the next scheduled hearing.[14]
With no witness for the
Thereafter,
Cabarles, with leave of court, filed a demurrer to evidence but it was denied
by Judge Maceda.[16] Two witnesses were called for the defense, accused
Cabarles and Luisito Javier, a fisherman.
A day
before the scheduled promulgation of judgment on
… As a consequence[,]
the promulgation set tomorrow, April 2, is canceled. Set the reception of the
testimony of the eye witness and the doctor on
Issue the corresponding subpoena to Imelda
Pedrosa and Dr. Romeo T. Salen directing them to appear on the aforesaid date
and time, to be served by the Branch Sheriff who is required to make a prompt
return thereof.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Judge Maceda
denied Cabarles’s motion for reconsideration in an
Order dated
Finally, on
On
Cabarles was then given
a chance to adduce further evidence on his behalf.
On
In his
petition, Cabarles raises as issues the following:
[1] WHETHER
THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION WHEN HE ISSUED THE
QUESTIONED ORDER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A FINAL JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION.
[2] WHETHER
PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE WAS
VIOLATED.[22]
Did Judge Maceda act with grave abuse of discretion
in issuing motu proprio the April 1,
2003 Order reopening the case, before judgment was rendered, to receive the testimonies
of two prosecution witnesses after both parties had rested their case? Did the said order violate Cabarles’s right to due process and speedy disposition of
his case?
On the first issue, Cabarles insists that Judge Maceda gravely abused his
discretion when he ordered the reopening of the case before promulgation of
judgment although both parties had already rested their case. Cabarles argues that a case may only be
reopened after a judgment of conviction has been made but before its finality,
as provided in Section 24,[23]
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Cabarles insists that the reopening of a case
under Section 24 presupposes that judgment has already been promulgated, which
is not the case here. According to petitioner,
the cases cited by the People are not at all applicable in this case since they
were tried and decided before the introduction of Section 24 under the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
For Judge
Maceda, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that Section 24 is a
new provision which merely formalized the long accepted practice of judges of
reopening a case to avoid a miscarriage of justice. This being the case, jurisprudence providing that a judge
has the discretion to reopen a case even before promulgation of judgment still
holds.
After a
thorough consideration of the submissions by the parties, we find that the
petition is meritorious.
A motion to
reopen a case to receive further proofs was not in the old rules but it was nonetheless
a recognized procedural recourse, deriving validity and acceptance from long,
established usage.[24] This lack of a specific provision covering
motions to reopen was remedied by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on
The April 1, 2003 Order
was issued under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 24, Rule 119 and existing
jurisprudence stress the following requirements for reopening a case: (1) the
reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order
is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is
issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a
miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further
evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the
order.
Generally,
after the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are
allowed to offer rebutting evidence only. However, the court, for good reasons, in the
furtherance of justice, may allow new evidence upon their original case, and
its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of
discretion appears.[25] A motion to reopen may thus properly be
presented only after either or both parties had formally offered and closed their
evidence, but before judgment is rendered,[26]
and even after promulgation but before finality of judgment[27]
and the only controlling guideline governing a motion to reopen is the
paramount interest of justice.[28] This remedy of reopening a case was meant to
prevent a miscarriage of justice.[29]
However, while
Judge Maceda is allowed to reopen the case before judgment is rendered, Section
24 requires that a
hearing must first be conducted. Judge
Maceda issued the April 1, 2003 Order without notice and hearing and without
giving the prosecution and accused an opportunity to manifest their position on
the matter. This failure, to our mind,
constitutes grave abuse of discretion and goes against the due
process clause of the Constitution which requires notice and opportunity to be
heard.[30] The
issuance of the said order, without the benefit of a hearing, is contrary to
the express language of Section 24, Rule 119.
Although the defense counsel had
cross-examined Pedrosa and had participated in the proceedings after the case
was reopened by Judge Maceda, the same does not amount to a waiver of Cabarles’s objection to the April 1, 2003 Order. To be
effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal.[31] Here,
Cabarles filed the present petition seeking
for a writ of certiorari against Judge Maceda before Pedrosa was
cross-examined. Also, when asked to
comment on the prosecution’s formal
offer of evidence taken after the case was reopened, Cabarles objected to its
admission on the ground that the same was inadmissible having been received by
the court after Judge Maceda issued the questioned order.
On the
second issue, Cabarles maintains that
contrary to Judge Maceda’s observation, the
prosecution was given ample opportunity to present its case as seen by the
issuance of several subpoenas to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen. Cabarles argues that he is presumed innocent until
proven guilty and should not be made to wait indefinitely for prosecution
witnesses to testify. To do so would violate
his constitutional right to due process and a speedy disposition of his case. According to Cabarles, the reopening of the
case is clearly detrimental to him since it meant another day in prison.
The OSG counters
that the reopening of the case was made in accordance with Section 24 since the
prosecution is entitled to the reopening of the case to prevent a miscarriage
of justice. Furthermore, Cabarles’s right to a speedy trial had not been violated
since delays caused by the absence of a prosecution witness are excluded when
computing the time within which trial should start under Section 3,[32]
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Although the matter of reopening a case for
reception of further evidence is largely a matter of discretion on the part of
the trial court judge, this judicial action must not, however, be done whimsically, capriciously and/or unreasonably.[33] In this particular case, the prosecution was
given ample opportunity to present all its witnesses but it failed to do so. The failure of the prosecution to take full
advantage of the opportunities given does not change the fact that it was
accorded such opportunities. Contrary to
the justification stated in the April 1, 2003 Order, the prosecution was not
deprived of its day in court. While it may be true that due to some confusion with
the trial court’s calendar, some of the trial dates assigned to the prosecution
did not push through and some of the subpoenas issued to Pedrosa and/or Dr.
Salen pertained to hearing dates which were different from those assigned for
reception of prosecution’s evidence, still the prosecution had a total of four hearing
dates when it was given the chance to prove its case: May 23, June 20 and 27,
and August 1, 2001. The presence of
prosecution witnesses in court is the responsibility of the public prosecutor
and it is incumbent upon him to take the initiative of ensuring the attendance
of his witnesses at the trial.[34]
Since Judge
Maceda issued the questioned order without complying with the third requirement
of Section 24, that there be a hearing conducted before the order to reopen is
issued, then the assailed order must be annulled and set aside for having been
issued contrary to law and consequently with grave abuse of discretion.[35]
On Cabarles’s
right to a speedy disposition of his case, we agree that under the
Constitution, all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases. Nowhere is this guaranty more
significant and meaningful than in criminal cases where not only the fortune,
but the life and liberty of the accused as well, are at stake.[36]
Although a discussion on the right to
speedy disposition of the case is mooted by our nullification of Judge Maceda’s
With regard
to the OSG’s allegation in its Comment and Memorandum, that Cabarles failed to observe the rule on hierarchy of courts
since the petition for certiorari was filed directly with the Supreme Court,
Cabarles insists that he is a detention prisoner needing immediate resolution
of his case. He also argues that this
case not only involves grave abuse of discretion but also a pure question of
law involving the application of Section 24, which is a new provision.[39]
It is
necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court is highly improper for
it violates the established policy of strict observance of the hierarchy of
courts. This Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the Court of
Appeals and with the regional trial courts in proper cases within their
respective regions. However, this
concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant a party seeking any of the
extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file his petition with the court of
his choice. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if
it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
Constitution and immemorial tradition. The hierarchy of courts determines
the appropriate forum for such petitions. Thus, petitions for the
issuance of such extraordinary writs against a regional trial court should be
filed with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of this Court’s
original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
This is the established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon this Court’s time and attention which are
better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to
prevent further overcrowding of its docket.[40]
Under the present circumstances
however, we are willing to take cognizance of this case as an exception to the
principle of hierarchy of courts. Cabarles invokes the jurisdiction of
this Court in the interest of speedy justice since the information against him was filed way back in June 1999,[41]
and almost eight years thereafter, no judgment has yet been rendered. Any further delay in the resolution of
the instant petition will be prejudicial to Cabarles. Also, the Court has full discretionary power
to take cognizance of the petition filed directly to it for compelling reasons
or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised.[42] Since
Section 24 is a new provision, and
considering the irregularities in the issuance of the
As a final word, we find the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in
the case of People v. Monje instructive:
A proposal has been expressed for the remand of this
case to the trial court for further proceedings, apparently to enable the prosecution
to prove again what it failed to prove in the first instance. We cannot agree
because it will set a dangerous precedent. Aside from its being unprocedural,
it would open the floodgates to endless litigations because whenever an accused
is on the brink of acquittal after trial, and realizing its inadequacy, the
prosecution would insist to be allowed to augment its evidence which should
have been presented much earlier. This is a criminal prosecution, and to order
the remand of this case to the court a quo to enable the prosecution to
present additional evidence would violate the constitutional right of the
accused to due process, and to speedy determination of his case. The lamentable
failure of the prosecution to fill the vital gaps in its evidence, while
prejudicial to the State and the private offended party, should not be treated
by this Court with indulgence, to the extent of affording the prosecution a
fresh opportunity to refurbish its evidence.
In fine, we are not unmindful of the gravity of the
crime charged; but justice must be dispensed with an even hand. Regardless of how much we want to punish the
perpetrators of this ghastly crime and give justice to the victim and her
family, the protection provided by the Bill of Rights is bestowed upon
all individuals, without exception, regardless of race, color, creed, gender or
political persuasion - whether privileged or less privileged - to be invoked
without fear or favor. Hence, the accused deserves no less than an acquittal;
ergo, he is not called upon to disprove what the prosecution has not proved.[43]
WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is GRANTED. We hold that the assailed Order dated
SO ORDERED.
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|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
|
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo,
pp. 14-15.
[2]
[3] Records, p. 37.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Supra note 5.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Supra note 10.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Rollo, p. 15.
[18] Records, pp. 133-134.
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] Rollo, p. 85.
[23] SEC. 24. Reopening. — At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge may, motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The proceedings shall be terminated within thirty (30) days from the order granting it.
[24] Alegre v. Reyes, No. L-56923,
[25] Gacayan v. Pamintuan, A.M. No.
RTJ-99-1483 (OCA-IPI No. 98-578-RTJ),
[26] Alegre v. Reyes, supra
note 24; II F. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 551 (10th ed., 2004), citing People v. Concepcion, 84 Phil. 787, 788
(1949).
[27] Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 119, Sec. 24; II F. Regalado, Remedial
Law Compendium, supra.
[28] People
v. Tee, G.R. Nos. 140546-47,
[29] II F. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, supra.
[30] See
Lam v. Chua, G.R. No. 131286,
[31] Larranaga
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130644, March 13, 1998, 287 SCRA 581, 591.
[32] SEC. 3. Exclusions.
– The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within
which trial must commence:
(a) Any period of delay resulting from other
proceedings concerning the accused, including but not limited to the following:
(1) Delay resulting from an examination of the
physical and mental condition of the accused;
(2) Delay resulting from proceedings with respect
to other criminal charges against the accused;
(3) Delay resulting from extraordinary remedies
against interlocutory orders;
(4) Delay resulting from pre-trial proceedings;
provided, that the delay does not exceed thirty (30) days;
(5) Delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or
proceedings relating to change of venue of cases or transfer from other courts;
(6) Delay resulting from a finding of the
existence of a prejudicial question; and
(7) Delay reasonably attributable to any period,
not to exceed thirty (30) days, during which any proceeding concerning the
accused is actually under advisement.
(b) Any period of delay resulting from the
absence or unavailability of an essential witness.
For purposes of
this subparagraph, an essential witness shall be considered absent when his
whereabouts are unknown or his whereabouts cannot be determined by due
diligence. He shall be considered
unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known but his presence for trial
cannot be obtained by due diligence.
(c) Any period of delay resulting from the mental incompetence or
physical inability of the accused to stand trial.
(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and
thereafter a charge is filed against the accused for the same offense, any
period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time
limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no
previous charge.
(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial
with a co-accused over whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or, as to
whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for separate trial has been
granted.
(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any
court motu proprio, or on motion of either the accused or his counsel,
or the prosecution, if the court granted the continuance on the basis of its
findings set forth in the order that the ends of justice served by taking such
action outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused in a speedy
trial.
[33] Gacayan v. Pamintuan, supra note 25, at
695.
[34] People v. Monje, G.R. No.
146689,
[35] See Information Technology Foundation of the
[36] Clave
v. Sandiganbayan,
et al., G.R. No. 102502 and Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,
et al., G.R. No. 103143,
[37] Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 144542,
[38] Dela
Rosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116945, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 499,
504, citing Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 94750, July 16,
1991, 199 SCRA 298, 307.
[39] Rollo, pp. 51-52, 100-102.
[40] Page-Tenorio v. Tenorio, G.R. No. 138490, November 24, 2004, 443 SCRA 560,
567-568.
[41] Records, p. 1; Rollo, p. 13.
[42]
Ark Travel Express, Inc v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 137010,
[43] Supra note 34, at 179-180.