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PEOPLE OF THE - versus - |
G.R. No. 159261 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA,
and VELASCO,
JR., JJ. |
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THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTEENTH DIVISION) AND RAMON Respondents. |
Promulgated: |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari assails the
Court of Appeals’ Decision[1]
dated
The informations
against the private respondent as one of the accused in two cases for homicide before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Oriental Mindoro, Branch 43, read:
Criminal Case No. R-725
The undersigned accuses RAMON
GALICIA, ROBERTO [U]RETA, JOJO MANITO, NESTOR VICENTE, JUN BANANG and MERL[I]N
VICENTE of the crime of homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th
day of August, 1995, at 10:00 o’clock in the evening, more or less, in the
Barangay of San Antonio, Municipality of Mansalay,
Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab one THELMO ABENIR thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wounds on the
different parts of his body resultant therewith caused his death shortly
thereafter.
Contrary to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.[2]
Criminal Case No. R-726
The undersigned accuses “JUN” BANANG, JOJO MANITO RAMON GALICIA, [R]OBERTO [U]RETA, NESTOR VICENTE and MERL[I]N VICENTE of the crime of homicide committed as follows:
That
on or about the 16th day of August, 1995, at 10:00 o’clock in the
evening, more or less, in the Barangay of San Antonio, Municipality of
Mansalay, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and
conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab one RAMON ABENIR thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wounds on the
different parts of his body resultant therewith caused his death shortly
thereafter.
Contrary to Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code.[3]
On
arraignment, all accused entered pleas of not guilty and thereafter a joint
trial ensued.
The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) summed up the prosecution’s version[4] of
the incident at bar, as follows:
At about
Another companion of
At about the same time, Audie Abenir, the brother of
Ramon, testified that he was about ten meters away from their parents’
house. He also heard his brother, Ramon,
shouting, “Mga tanod,
Kapitan, lumabas kayo.” Thereafter,
according to Audie, he saw
Thelmo’s son and Ramon’s brother, Felipe,
testified that while attending to his father in the hospital, on
Dr. Moises Serdoncillo, medico-legal officer of the
The medical certificate issued by Dr.
Serdoncillo showed that Ramon sustained a stab wound
which penetrated the middle portion of his abdomen. The cause of Ramon’s death was loss of blood
and infection. Thelmo’s
medical certificate showed that he sustained a stab wound at the left portion
of his abdomen which injured his spleen and traversed the colon up to the posterior
abdominal wall. Thelmo
also had a hematoma at the back, caused by something
that hit him. According to the medical
certificate, Thelmo died of cardiorespiratory
arrest due to myocardial infarction secondary to stab wound.
The defense’s version[15]
of the incident was culled mainly from the testimonies of accused
Accused Jojo
Manito, a barangay tanod
who heard the call, approached the protagonists. Manito even demonstrated during trial the
position of the two protagonists as they grappled for the scythe. He said that as he entered,
Accused Nestor Vicente interposed the
defense of alibi,[22]
saying he was out fishing with Robert Alunsagay and Abelio* Villanueva from
Merlin Vicente testified that he was
in his house which is about forty meters from the house of the Abenirs, at around
Dr. Domingo Asis
corroborated the testimony of
Accused Ureta and Banang
jumped bail during trial and were tried in
absentia. [32]
On
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(a) In Criminal Case No. R-726, accused
Ramon Galicia y Manresa and accused Roberto [U]reta y
Ortega are hereby pronounced GUILTY of the crime of Homicide with the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling which was off-setted (sic) by the
mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation and each of them is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as MINIMUM to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium as MAXIMUM and for them
to pay in solidum the heirs of the victim of Ramon Abenir, the sum of P50,000.00
as compensatory damages and the additional sum of P50,000.00 as moral
damages;
(b) The rest of the accused in Criminal Case
No. R-726 namely Joseph a.k.a. as Jojo Manito y Galicia, Nestor Vicente y
Gervacio, Vicente “Jun” Banang, Jr. y Buncag and Merl[i]n Vicente y Buncag are ACQUITTED for insufficiency of
evidence and the bailbonds posted by them are hereby ordered discharged;
(c) In accordance with Administrative Circular No. 12-94 entitled “Amendments to
Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure more particularly paragraph a,
Section 2 of Rule 114 to the effect that the bail shall be effective upon
approval unless sooner cancelled until the promulgation of judgment by the
Regional Trial Court, the bail bond posted by the accused Ramon Galicia y
Manresa is cancelled and he is ordered committed to the Provincial Jail. Pursuant to the ruling of the Honorable
Supreme Court in Jose T. Obosa vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 114350,
prom. January 16, 1997 that the grant of bail even in non-capital
offenses after conviction of the accused by the Regional Trial Court is now a
matter of discretion and it appearing that none of the circumstances mentioned
in paragraph 3, Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
which could preclude the grant of bail is present, said accused is allowed to
post bail which is hereby fixed at P90,000.00 should he decide to appeal
from the decision for his provisional liberty during the pendency of the
appeal;
(d) Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued
against accused Roberto [U]reta y Ortega who has
jumped bail during the trial of the case.
Upon
the other hand, in Criminal Case No. R-725, the court pronounced judgment as follows:
(a) Accused Vicente “Jun” Banang, Jr. y
Buncag and Roberto [U]reta y Ortega are hereby found
GUILTY of the crime of Homicide with the aggravating circumstance of dwelling
without any mitigating circumstance and each of them is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum as MAXIMUM and for them to pay in
solidum the heirs of Thelmo Abenir the sum of P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages and the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(b) The rest of the accused in R-725 namely
Ramon Galicia y Manresa, Joseph “Jojo” Manito y Galicia, Nestor Vicente y
Gervacio and Merl[i]n
Vicente y Buncag are ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence and the bail bonds
posted by them are discharged;
(c) Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued
against accused Vicente “Jun” Banang, Jr. y Buncag and
Roberto [U]reta y Ortega.
No
award of actual damages could be made in both cases for failure of the
prosecution to establish the factual bases for entitlement to said damages.
For
the convicted accused to pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[33]
The Court of Appeals acted favorably
on
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED
and judgment is hereby rendered reversing the assailed Decision and ACQUITTING accused-appellant RAMON
GALICIA Y MANRESA of the crime charged. The civil liability pronounced by the
Decision as against him is hereby deleted. The bailbond
posted by accused-appellant is ordered cancelled.
SO ORDERED.[34]
In this
petition, the OSG asserts:
I.
PUBLIC
RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION BY HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING OF CONSPIRACY BETWEEN
PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND ROBERTO [U]RETA HAD NO LEGAL
BASIS IN DISREGARD OF THE PLAIN EVIDENCE EXTANT IN THE RECORD OF THIS CASE THAT
PROVED THE PRESENCE OF CONSPIRACY TO INFLICT PHYSICAL HARM ON RAMON ABENIR,
MAKING THE ACT OF ONE, THE ACT OF ALL.
II.
PUBLIC
RESPONDENT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT BASED ON THE MEDICAL FINDING, THE VICTIM RAMON ABENIR SUFFERED ONLY ONE FATAL
STAB WOUND AS NO AUTOPSY REPORT WAS CONDUCTED.
III.
PUBLIC
RESPONDENT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THELMO ABENIR’S DYING
DECLARATION; ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT
THELMO ABENIR’S STATEMENT IS NOT ADMISSIBLE AS AN ANTE MORTEM DECLARATION, IT MAY NONETHELESS BE CONSIDERED AS PART
OF THE RES GESTAE, AS IT WAS MADE
IMMEDIATELY AFTER A STARTLING OCCURRENCE AND WHEN THE VICTIM DID NOT HAVE TIME
TO CONTRIVE A FALSEHOOD.
IV.
PUBLIC
RESPONDENT GRAVELY ERRED IN ACQUITTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT BECAUSE THE
PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT RAMON
In sum, the main
issues for our resolution are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals
commit grave abuse of its discretion when it declared there was no conspiracy
to kill Ramon? (2) Did the appellate court err in its appreciation of the
medico-legal report and ante mortem declaration as res
gestae, and then in concluding that the
guilt of
Let us now
focus on the matter of conspiracy. The OSG contends that conspiracy on the part
of
(1) Before the incident, Ramon and
(2) Before breaking into the house,
(3)
(4) When
The OSG argues that even if it was
not
Further, the OSG challenges the
reliance of the appellate court on the medical certificate showing that Ramon
sustained only one stab wound contrary to Dolores’s testimony that her son was
stabbed twice. The OSG points out that
the medical certificate was issued only for identifying the cause of Ramon’s
death and not to identify all the injuries. The OSG stresses that Dr. Serdoncillo
admitted he did not conduct an autopsy on Ramon because while operating on the
victim, he already knew the cause of death.
In
addition, the OSG points out that the appellate court overlooked the dying
declaration of Thelmo identifying his assailants. According to the OSG, at the very least, Thelmo’s statement should have been considered by the
appellate court as a dying declaration.
Lastly,
the OSG concludes that after the prosecution had shown the acts and conduct of
ART. 4. Criminal
liability. – Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1.
By any person
committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
In his
Comment, Galicia contends that there was no grave abuse on the part of the
Court of Appeals, and adds that any mistake or error in the appreciation of
facts, evidence or law is merely an error of judgment and not an error of
jurisdiction, and hence, not a subject of a petition for certiorari.
Most significantly, the defense for private
respondent points out that to give due course to the instant petition and review
the acquittal by the appellate court of Galicia would constitute double
jeopardy.
Thus, before tackling the
two-pronged issues raised by petitioner, we must address first the threshold
issue raised by private respondent: Would
a review of the acquittal of
Section
21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
Section
7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 7.–Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.—
When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the
accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused
or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof,
or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information.
However,
the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an
offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint
or information under any of the following instances:
(a) the
graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or
omission constituting the former charge;
(b) the
facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after
a plea was entered in the former complaint or information; or
(c) the plea of guilty
to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the
offended party except as provided in section 1 (f) of Rule 116.
In
any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or
in part the judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the event of
conviction for the graver offense.
As we
have previously held in People v. Serrano, Sr.:[36] A verdict of acquittal is immediately final
and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate
courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several
avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents
the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to
wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the
additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from
successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it
prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in
the hope of securing a greater penalty.[37] In People v. Velasco,[38] we stressed that an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a
direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. Hence, it cannot be disputed that the verdict
of the Court of Appeals acquitting Ramon Galicia is now final and irreviewable.[39]
This is not to say that the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy is
without exceptions. For there are two recognized
exceptions: (1) Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there
is a finding of a mistrial,[40]
or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional
circumstances.[41] However, in this case, we find that the
exceptions do not exist.
Firstly, was there a deprivation
of due process, or a mistrial? The
records show that during the trial, both parties had more than sufficient
occasions to be heard and to present their evidence. The same is true during the appeal. The State represented by the prosecution had
not been deprived of a fair opportunity to prove its case.
Second, has there been a grave
abuse of discretion by the Court of Appeals?
Grave abuse of
discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law.[42] Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion
is an extraordinary remedy. Its use is
confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior court is
wholly void.[43] Its
aim is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or
to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.[44] No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed
to the court simply because of its alleged misappreciation
of facts and evidence.[45] While
certiorari may be used to correct an abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such
extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly
abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice.[46]
In its decision,
the Court of Appeals, said that it overturned
The Court of Appeals also observed
that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses lacked credibility and were filled
with inconsistencies.[48] Among them, (1) Dolores and Audie both
claimed that Galicia was armed with a gun and fired two consecutive shots, but
surprisingly, the latter did not use his gun when he fought with Ramon. (2) Ureta stabbed Ramon,
yet,
The Court
of Appeals concluded that the RTC based its decision on the weakness of the
defense evidence, rather than on the strength of the prosecution’s. It went on to say,
… there is no evidence to show unity of purpose and design
between appellant and accused [U]reta. The fact that the fight between appellant and
Ramon commenced prior to the actual stabbing of the latter by [U]reta does not of itself demonstrate concurrence of wills or
unity of purpose and action, in the same manner that the fact that the assault
on Ramon was carried out by accused [U]reta while
appellant was grappling with Ramon does not conclusively show that appellant
knew that [U]reta intended to stab, much less kill
the victim. Simultaneity, it has been
held, would not itself demonstrate the concurrence of will or the unity of
action and purpose that could be a basis for collective responsibility of two or
more individuals. Thus, contrary to the
findings of the trial court, appellant and accused [U]reta
acted independently of, not in conspiracy with each other. Appellant fought with Ramon in response to
the latter’s challenge to a fight. And
while the two were fighting and grappling for the possession of a scythe,
accused [U]reta stabbed Ramon.[51]
Finally,
the Court of Appeals rejected the trial court’s finding that the conspiracy
between Ureta and Galicia was strengthened by the former’s
decision to jump bail and go into hiding, for being contrary to the doctrine of
res inter alios acta. According
to the Court of Appeals, this conclusion of the court a quo partakes
more of wild conjectures and speculations which have no probative value
whatsoever since there was no evidence that the escape of Ureta was with the
knowledge, much less consent of Galicia.[52]
In our considered view, the
conclusions arrived at by the Court of Appeals cannot by any measure be characterized
as capricious, whimsical nor arbitrary, to constitute grave abuse of discretion
under Rule 65. While it may be argued that there have been instances where the appreciation
of facts might have resulted from possible lapses in evaluation of the evidence,
nothing therein detracts from the fact that relevant and material evidence was scrutinized,
considered and evaluated.
We note that while the OSG alleges grave abuse of discretion as
the core of its petition, the issues it raises concern errors of judgment, not
errors of jurisdiction, which is tantamount to converting the petition for
certiorari into an appeal, contrary to the express injunction of the
Constitution, the Rules of Court, and prevailing jurisprudence.[53] Conformably then, we need not embark upon review of the
factual and evidentiary issues raised by the OSG, as these are not within the realm
of the present petition.
WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The acquittal of herein private respondent by
the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 9-24.
[2] CA rollo, p. 23.
[3] Records, p. 1.
[4] Rollo, pp. 11-12.
[5] TSN,
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] TSN,
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Records, p. 206; TSN,
[14]
[15] Rollo, pp. 12-15.
[16] Records, p. 206; TSN,
[17] TSN,
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] TSN,
[22] TSN,
* Abello in some parts of the records.
[23] TSN,
[24]
[25] TSN,
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29] TSN,
[30]
[31]
[32] Records, p. 209.
[33]
[34] Rollo, p. 24.
[35]
[36] G.R. No. 135451,
[37] People
v. Dela Torre, G.R. Nos.
137953-58,
[38] G.R. No. 127444,
[39] See People v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 142051,
[40] People v. Tria-Tirona, G.R. No. 130106,
[41] People v. Serrano, Sr., supra at 690.
[42] People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
128986, June 21, 1999, 308 SCRA 687, 698, citing Commissioner [of] Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 119322, June 4, 1996, 257 SCRA 200,
209.
[43] Herrera v. Barreto and Joaquin, 25 Phil. 245, 271 (1913).
[44] People v. Court of Appeals, supra note 39, at 612.
[45] People v. Court of Appeals, supra note 42, at 699, citing Teknika Skills and Trade Services, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 97896, June 2, 1997, 273 SCRA 10, 20.
[46] People v. Dela Torre, supra note 37, at 607, citing People v. Court of Appeals, supra note 42, at 704.
[47] Rollo, pp. 19-20.
[48]
[49]
[50]
[51]
[52]
[53] Supra
note 46.