SPS. GIL
TORRECAMPO and BRENDA TORRECAMPO,
Petitioners, -
versus - DENNIS ALINDOGAN, SR. and HEIDE DE GUZMAN ALINDOGAN, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 156405
Present: PUNO,
C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, AZCUNA,
and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: February 28, 2007 |
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D E C I S I O N
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
J.: |
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For our resolution is the instant
Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated
The facts are:
On
May 24, 1997, spouses Jose and Lina Belmes
executed a deed of sale in favor of spouses Dennis and Heide Alindogan,
respondents, over Lot No. 5524-H and the house constructed thereon located in
Rawis, Legazpi City.
On
Despite
respondents’ repeated demands, petitioners failed and refused to vacate the
property. Thus, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch
10,
In
their Answer to the complaint, petitioners claimed that on P73,000.00 as advance payment for the
sale of the house and lot. On P350,000.00; that upon the signing of the contract,
petitioners shall pay spouses Belmes P220,000.00; and that the balance
of P130,000.00 shall be paid upon the issuance of the certificate of
title in the names of petitioners. To
complete the agreed partial payment of P220,000.00 mentioned in the
contract, petitioners paid spouses Belmes P130,000.00, but the latter
refused to accept the amount. Thus, on
On
rendered a Decision[3] in favor of respondents, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered:
a) declaring
the plaintiffs as the owners and entitled to the possession of the lot in
question more particularly described in par. 2 of the complaint including the
improvements thereon;
b) ordering the defendants or anyone acting
for or with them to vacate the premises; and
c) directing
the defendants and/or their agents to turn over the possession of the property
in question to the plaintiffs.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
The
trial court held that the transaction between petitioners and spouses Belmes is
a mere contract to sell. Thus, the
latter did not transfer ownership of the house and lot to petitioners.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in
its assailed Decision,[4] affirmed in toto the RTC judgment.
In affirming the trial
court’s finding that the transaction between petitioners and spouses Belmes is
a mere contract to sell, the Court of Appeals held:
Thus,
we shall now look into the transaction entered into by the defendants with the
Belmeses, with reference to the intention of the parties. The Contract to Buy
and Sell reads:
“That whereas, the vendor agreed to
sell and the vendee agreed to buy the above-described parcel of land,
together with improvements therein, for the sum of Three Hundred Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P350, 000.00), Philippine currency, under the following terms and
conditions xxx”
The
tenor of the afore-quoted provision of the contract clearly confirms that the
transaction between the transaction
between the defendants and the Belmeses was not a contract of sale, as defined
by Art. 1458 of the Civil Code. The reason for the same was clearly explained
by defendants’ own witness, Lourdes Narito, during her direct examination. She testified that herein defendants
themselves refused to enter into a contract of sale and execute a deed of sale
unless and until the Belmeses will transfer the title to the property. This was
the reason why a mere contract to sell was executed. x x x (Emphasis ours)
In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, we review only errors of law and not
errors of facts. The factual findings of the appellate court are generally
binding on this Court. This applies with greater force when both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals are in complete agreement on their factual
findings, as in this case. Here, the facts
relied upon by the trial and appellate courts are sustained by the record. There is no reason to deviate from their
findings.[5]
Nevertheless, in order
to put rest all doubts on the matter, we hold that the agreement between
petitioners and spouses Belmes is not a contract of sale but only a contract to sell. The
distinction between a contract of sale and a contract to sell is well-settled:
In
a contract of sale, the title to the property passes
to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; in a contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved in the vendor
and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price. Otherwise stated, in a contract of sale, the vendor loses ownership over the property and
cannot recover it until and unless the contract is resolved
or rescinded; whereas, in a contract to sell, title
is retained by the vendor until full payment of the price. In the latter contract, payment
of the price is a positive suspensive condition, failure of which is not a
breach but an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title
from becoming effective. (Underscoring supplied)[6]
Indeed, the true
agreement between petitioners and spouses Belmes is a contract to sell. Not only did the parties denominate their
contract as “Contract to Buy and Sell,” but also specified therein that the
balance of the purchase price in the amount of P130,000.00 is to be paid
by petitioners upon the issuance of a certificate of title. That spouses Belmes have in their possession
the certificate of title indicates that ownership of the subject property did
not pass to petitioners.
In Ursal v. Court of Appeals, et
al.,[7] we
held:
Indeed, in contracts to sell the
obligation of the seller to sell becomes demandable only upon the happening of
the suspensive condition, that is, the full payment of the purchase price by
the buyer. It is only upon the existence of the contract of sale
that the seller becomes obligated to transfer the ownership of the thing sold
to the buyer. Prior to the existence of the contract of sale, the
seller is not obligated to transfer the ownership to the buyer, even if there is a contract to sell between them.
Petitioners further contend
that when respondents bought the property on
The argument is misplaced.
Petitioners invoke Article 1544
of the Civil Code which reads:
Article
1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees,
the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it
who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall
pertain to the person who in good faith was first in possession; and in the absence thereof, to the person who presents
the oldest title, provided there is good faith. (Emphasis ours)
The above
provision does not apply to the instant case considering that the transaction
between petitioners and spouses Belmes is a mere contract to sell, not a
contract of sale.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM
the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
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REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice
Chairperson |
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RENATO C.
CORONA Associate Justice |
(On
official leave) ADOLFO S.
AZCUNA Associate
Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice |
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REYNATO S. PUNO
[1] Filed under Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
[2] Penned
by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. (retired) and concurred in by
Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz and Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña.
[3] Annex “A,” Rollo, pp. 31-37.
[4]
[5] Alfredo v. Borras, G.R. No. 144225,
[6] Salazar v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
118203,
[7] G.R.
No. 142411,