Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
RODOLFO ABENES y |
|
G.R. No. 156320 |
|
GACUTAN, |
|
|
|
Petitioner, |
|
Present: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., |
|
- versus - |
|
Chairperson, |
|
|
|
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
|
|
|
CALLEJO,
SR., and |
|
THE HON. COURT OF |
|
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. |
|
APPEALS and PEOPLE |
|
|
|
OF THE |
|
Promulgated: |
|
Respondents. |
|
February
14, 2007 |
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
For review before the Court is the Decision[1] dated November 29, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the
Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian City, Branch 19,
dated June 5, 2000, finding Rodolfo Abenes y Gacutan (petitioner) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Possession of High Powered Firearm and
Ammunition under Presidential Decree No. 1866 (P.D. No. 1866) in Criminal Case
No. 4559-98, and of violating Section 261(q) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
(B.P. Blg. 881), otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, vis-à-vis
COMELEC Resolution No. 2958 (Gun Ban) in Criminal Case No. 4563-98.
Petitioner was
charged under the following Informations:
In Criminal Case
No. 4559-98 —
The
undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor hereby accuses RODOLFO ABENES Y GACUTAN
of the offense of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF HIGH POWERED FIREARM & ITS
AMMUNITIONS (Violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294),
committed as follows:
On
May 8, 1998, at about 10:30 a.m., in Danlugan, Pagadian City, Philippines,
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said RODOLFO ABENES Y GACUTAN
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and without any prior authority,
license or permit to possess or carry the firearm hereunder described, have in
his possession and control the following firearm classified as high powered,
with its corresponding ammunitions and accessory, viz:
- one (1) cal. 45 pistol (NORINCO) bearing SN
906347;
- one (1) magazine for pistol cal. 45
- seven (7) rounds live ammunitions for cal. 45,
in gross violation of P.D. No. 1866 as amended by
R.A. No. 8294.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[2]
In Criminal Case No. 4563-98 —
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor hereby
accuses RODOLFO ABENES Y GACUTAN of Election Offense in violation of Sec. 261
(9)[3],
BP 881 (OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE), vis-à-vis COMELEC RESOLUTION # 1958 (GUN BAN),
committed as follows:
On May 8, 1998, at about 10:30 a.m. within the
Election period which is from January 11, 1998 to June 30, 1998, in Danlugan,
Pagadian City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
said RODOLFO ABENES Y GACUTAN did, then and there, willfully, and unlawfully,
carry in his person a cal. .45 (NORINCO) pistol, bearing serial number 906347,
and loaded with seven (7) rounds of live ammunitions, without any prior
authority from the COMELEC in gross violation of Sec. 261 (9) of BP 881 (OMNIBUS
ELECTION CODE) in relation to COMELEC RESOLUTION No. 2958 (GUN BAN).
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Upon arraignment, the
petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial
ensued.
The facts, as
found by the RTC and summarized by the CA, are as follows:
The prosecution showed that three days prior to
the May 11, 1998 national and local elections, the Philippine National Police
(PNP) of Pagadian City, through its Company Commander Major Pedronisto Quano,
created a team composed of seven policemen with a directive to establish and
man a checkpoint in Barangay Danlugan at said city, for the purpose of
enforcing the Gun Ban which was then being implemented by the COMELEC. SPO3 Cipriano Q. Pascua was the designated
team leader.
The team proceeded to Barangay Danlugan, arriving
thereat at
At about
Subsequently SPO3 Pascua, using his privately
owned jeep, brought Abenes to the PNP Headquarters at
A certification dated
After the prosecution presented its evidence,
[the] accused filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Motion to Dismiss (supra, pp.
72-79), which was denied by the trial court in a Resolution dated
In his defense, accused-appellant tried to
establish that the firearm did not belong to and was not recovered from him;
that the firearm was recovered by the policemen from the floor of the vehicle
inside a clutch bag which was allegedly left by an unidentified person who
hitched a ride somewhere along the national highway of Tawagan Norte Zamboanga
Del Sur and alighted near the Mabuhay Bazaar in Pagadian City (TSN, July 12,
1999 [Noel Rivera], pp. 7-13; September 15, 1999 [Rodolfo Abenes], pp. 11-15;
September 27, 1999 [Manuel Sabado Gengania], pp. 9-16).[5]
On
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing
discussion, this Court hereby finds accused Rodolfo Abenes y Gacutan GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic
Act No. 8294, having been found in possession without license/permit of a
Norinco .45 caliber pistol bearing Serial No. 906347 and 7 rounds of
ammunitions and sentences him to imprisonment ranging from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR
(4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION CORRECCIONAL in its MEDIUM PERIOD, as
MINIMUM, to EIGHT (8) YEARS of PRISION MAYOR in its MINIMUM, as MAXIMUM and a
FINE of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), Philippine currency. Insofar as Criminal Case No. 4559-98 is
concerned. The .45 Caliber Pistol
aforementioned and the seven (7) rounds of ammunitions are hereby forfeited in
favor of the government the same being effects of the Violation of P.D. 1866,
amended.
As regards Criminal Case No. 4563-98, this Court
also finds herein accused Rodolfo Abenes y Gacutan GUILTY of Violation of
Section 264, in relation to Section 261, paragraphs (p) and (q) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code and sentences
him to imprisonment for a period of ONE (1) YEAR, and in addition thereto,
herein accused is disqualified to hold any public office and deprived [of] the
right of suffrage. It shall be
understood that the sentence herein imposed shall be served simultaneously with
the sentence imposed in Criminal Case No. 4559-98.
SO ORDERED.[6]
The
RTC found that, as between the positive and categorical assertions of facts by
the two policemen – the witnesses for the prosecution – and the mere denial of
the accused and his witnesses, the former must prevail over the latter; that
the prosecution successfully proved that the petitioner had no license or
permit to carry the firearm through the officer-in-charge of the firearms and
explosives office who testified that, based on his records, the petitioner had
not been issued a license, and whose testimony had not been impugned by the
defense; and that the testimonies of the accused and his two witnesses to the
effect that while aboard their private vehicle and on their way to attend an
election campaign meeting, they simply stopped and allowed a complete stranger
to hitch a ride who was carrying a clutch bag, left the same in the vehicle
when he alighted, and which later turned out to contain the subject firearm, were
flimsy and unbelievable. The RTC ruled that
the defense of alibi or denial cannot prevail over the positive identification
by eyewitnesses who have no improper motive to falsely testify against the petitioner,
especially where the policemen and the petitioner do not know each other; and,
that the petitioner failed to show any license or any other document to justify
his lawful possession of the firearm.
The petitioner
appealed to the CA claiming that the checkpoint was not shown to have been
legally set up, and/or that the frisking of the petitioner who was ordered to
alight from the Tamaraw FX, along with his companions in the vehicle, violated
his constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure; and, that the
trial court erred in believing the version of the incident as testified to by
the policemen instead of the version presented by the defense’s witness which
is more consistent with truth and human experience.[7]
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Joint Decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that with respect to Criminal
Case No. 4559-98, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 7 years and 4
months of prision mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[8]
With respect to the validity
of the checkpoint, the CA found that not only do the police officers have in
their favor the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed,
but also that the proximity of the day the checkpoint had been set up, to the
day of the May 11, 1998 elections, specifically for the purpose of enforcing
the COMELEC gun ban, gives a strong badge of the legitimacy of the checkpoint;
that after a review of the records, the evidence adduced by the prosecution
prevails over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of the petitioner that
he had been “framed”; and, that with respect to the admissibility of the
firearm as evidence, the prosecution witnesses convincingly established that
the .45 caliber pistol, tucked into the right waist of the petitioner when he
alighted from the vehicle, was readily visible, and, therefore, could be seized
without a search warrant under the “plain view” doctrine.
The petitioner
is now before this Court, raising the following issues:
I.
Given the circumstances,
and the evidence adduced, was the check-point validly established?
II.
Given the circumstances,
and the evidence adduced, was the petitioner’s constitutional right against
unlawful search and seizure violated?
III.
Given the circumstances,
and the evidence adduced, did not the honorable court of appeals commit a grave
abuse of discretion for adopting the trial court’s unsubstantiated findings of
fact?
IV.
Given the circumstances,
and the evidence adduced, is not the petitioner entitled to an acquittal, if
not on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, on the ground of reasonable doubt itself . . . as to where the gun was
taken: from the floor of the vehicle or from the waist of petitioner?[9]
The appeal is partly meritorious. The Court reverses the CA’s finding of his
conviction in Criminal Case No. 4559-98.
After a thorough review of the records,
this Court is of the view that the courts a
quo – except for a notable exception with respect to the negative
allegation in the Information – are correct in their findings of fact. Indeed, the version of the defense, as found
by the lower courts, is implausible and belies the common experience of
mankind. Evidence to be believed must
not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible
in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve
as probable under the circumstances.[10] In addition, the question of credibility of
witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine.[11]
For this reason, its observations and conclusions are accorded great respect on
appeal.[12]
The trial
court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight.
It is conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or
unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence
has not been considered.[13]
Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result
of the case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the
credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by appellate courts.[14] Thus, the Court finds no cogent reason to
disturb the findings of the lower courts that the police found in plain view a
gun tucked into the waist of the petitioner during the Gun Ban period enforced
by the COMELEC.
So too must this Court uphold the
validity of the checkpoint. The
petitioner insists that the prosecution should have produced the mission order
constituting the checkpoint, and invokes Aniag,
Jr. v. Comelec,[15] where the Court purportedly
held that firearms seized from a motor vehicle without a warrant are
inadmissible because there was no indication that would trigger any suspicion
from the policemen nor any other circumstance showing probable cause.
On both points
the petitioner is wrong. In the present
case, the production of the mission order is not necessary in view of the fact
that the checkpoint was established three days before the
In People v. Escaño,[16]
the Court, through the ponencia
of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., held:
Accused-appellants assail the manner by which the
checkpoint in question was conducted. They contend that the checkpoint manned
by elements of the Makati Police should have been announced. They also complain
of its having been conducted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.
We take
judicial notice of the existence of the COMELEC resolution imposing a gun ban
during the election period issued pursuant to Section 52(c) in relation to
Section 26(q) of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). The
national and local elections in 1995 were held on 8 May, the second Monday of
the month. The incident, which happened on
This
Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted
by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists are allowed. For,
admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists’
right to "free passage without interruption," but it cannot be denied
that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which
the vehicle’s occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as
long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body
search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said
routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right against
unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed
area, are even less intrusive.
The
checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the
COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized
agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the
purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun
during said period would know that they only need a car to be able to easily
perpetrate their malicious designs.
The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a
violation of the constitutional rights of the accused against illegal search
and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed
suspicious, such as those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the
passengers thereof were carrying guns. At best they would merely direct their
flashlights inside the cars they would stop, without opening the car’s doors or
subjecting its passengers to a body search. There is nothing discriminatory in
this as this is what the situation demands.[17] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Court
agrees with the Solicitor General that petitioner’s reliance on Aniag is misplaced.
In Aniag, the police officers manning the
checkpoint near the Batasang Pambansa complex stopped the vehicle driven
by the driver of Congressman Aniag.
After stopping the vehicle, the police opened a package inside the car
which contained a firearm purportedly belonging to Congressman Aniag. In declaring the search illegal, the Supreme
Court stated that the law enforcers who conducted the search had no probable
cause to check the content of the package because the driver did not behave
suspiciously nor was there any previous information that a vehicle hiding a
firearm would pass by the checkpoint.
In the instant
case, the firearm was seized from the petitioner when in plain view, the
policemen saw it tucked into his waist uncovered by his shirt.
Under the plain
view doctrine, objects falling in the “plain view” of an officer who has a
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence.[18] The “plain view” doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure.[19]
All the
foregoing requirements are present in the instant case. The law enforcement officers lawfully made an
initial intrusion because of the enforcement of the Gun Ban and were properly
in a position from which they particularly viewed the area. In the course of
such lawful intrusion, the policemen came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the petitioner where they saw the gun tucked into his
waist. The gun was in plain view and discovered inadvertently when the
petitioner alighted from the vehicle.
As accurately found
by the CA:
xxx It must be emphasized that the policemen
discovered the firearm [on] the person of the [petitioner] shortly after he
alighted from the vehicle and before he was frisked. SPO3 Pascua’s testimony[,] corroborated by that
of SPO1 Requejo[,] convincingly established that the holstered .45 caliber
pistol tucked at the right waist of the [petitioner] was readily visible to the
policemen (TSN, August 24, 1998, pp. 18, 37).
Thus, notwithstanding the absence of a Search Warrant, the policemen may
validly seize the firearm and the same is admissible in evidence against the
[petitioner] pursuant to the “plain view doctrine” xxx.[20]
Nor can the Court believe petitioner’s
claim that he could not have freely refused the “police orders” issued by the
police team who were “armed to the teeth” and “in the face of such show of
force.” The courts a quo consistently found that the police team manning the
checkpoint politely requested the passengers to alight from their vehicles, and
the motorists who refused this request were not forced to do so. These findings of fact are fully supported by
the evidence in the record.
However, the
Court must underscore that the prosecution failed to satisfactorily prove the
negative allegation in the Information that the petitioner possessed no license
or permit to bear the subject firearm.
It is a
well-entrenched rule “that in crimes involving illegal possession of firearm,
the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof, viz: the
existence of the subject firearm, and the fact that the accused who owned or
possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to
possess the same.”[21]
Undoubtedly, it
is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon the
prosecution. The absence of such license
and legal authority constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of
illegal possession of firearm, and every ingredient or essential element of an
offense must be shown by the prosecution by proof beyond reasonable doubt.[22]
Witness for the
prosecution SPO4 Gilbert C. Senados admitted that his records were outdated, i.e.,
that his Master List of holders of firearms only covered licenses up to 1994; that
it was possible for the petitioner to acquire a license after 1994; and that he
issued the Certification, dated May 18, 1998, stating that the petitioner
carried no license or permit to possess the guns because he was ordered to do
so by his superiors.[23]
There is no
evidence that between 1994 and
While the prosecution was able to
establish the fact that the subject firearm was seized by the police from the
possession of the petitioner, without the latter being able to present any
license or permit to possess the same, such fact alone is not conclusive proof
that he was not lawfully authorized to carry such firearm. In other words, such fact does not relieve
the prosecution from its duty to establish the lack of a license or permit to
carry the firearm by clear and convincing evidence, like a certification from
the government agency concerned.[24]
Thus, for
failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was
carrying a firearm without prior authority, license or permit, the latter must
be exculpated from criminal liability under P.D. No. 1866, as amended.
With respect to the charge of
violating Section 261(q) of B.P. Blg. 881, as amended, otherwise known
as the Omnibus Election Code, the Court is constrained to affirm the conviction
of the petitioner, since the prosecution successfully discharged its burden of
proof.
Section 261 of B.P.
Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), as originally worded, provides:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. – The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(q) Carrying firearms outside residence or place of business. – Any person who, although possessing a permit to carry firearms, carries any firearms outside his residence or place of business during the election period, unless authorized in writing by the Commission: Provided, That a motor vehicle, water or air craft shall not be considered a residence or place of business or extension hereof.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 32 of
Republic Act No. 7166 (R.A. No. 7166), amending Section 261 of the Omnibus
Election Code, provides:
SEC. 32. Who May Bear Firearms. – During the election period, no person shall bear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including any building, street, park, private vehicle or public conveyance, even if licensed to possess or carry the same, unless authorized in writing by the Commission. The issuance of firearm licenses shall be suspended during the election period. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the
foregoing provisions, while it is well-settled that under P.D. No. 1866, as
amended, the burden to prove the negative allegation that the accused has no
license or permit to carry a firearm lies with the prosecution; under the
Omnibus Election Code, however, the burden to adduce evidence that accused is
exempt from the COMELEC Gun Ban, lies with the accused.
Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166 is clear
and unequivocal[25] that
the prohibited act to which this provision refers is made up of the following
elements: 1) the person is bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms or other
deadly weapons; 2) such possession occurs during the election period; and, 3)
the weapon is carried in a public place.
Under said provision, it is explicit that even if the accused can prove
that he is holding a valid license to possess such firearm, this circumstance
by itself cannot exculpate him from criminal liability. The burden is on the accused to show that he
has a written authority to possess such firearm issued by no less than the COMELEC.
On this point, the petitioner failed
to present any form of such authority, and, therefore, his conviction must be
affirmed.
Section 264 of the Omnibus Election
Code provides:
Sec. 264. Penalties. – Any person found guilty of any election offense under this Code shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years and shall not be subject to probation. In addition, the guilty party shall be sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. If he is a foreigner, he shall be sentenced to deportation which shall be enforced after the prison term has been served.
The CA affirmed
the penalty imposed by the RTC. However,
the RTC failed to apply Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law[26]
which provides:
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for
an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which
shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within
the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which
shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be
less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
Thus, the penalty that should be
meted out to petitioner should have a minimum and a maximum period. The Court deems it reasonable that petitioner
should suffer imprisonment for a period of one (1) year as the minimum and two
(2) years, as the maximum.
Furthermore, under Section 34 of R.A.
No. 7166, the subject firearm shall be disposed of according to existing laws,
which, in this case, must be read in light of Article 45 of the Revised Penal
Code, to wit:
Art. 45.
Confiscation and forfeiture of the
proceeds or instruments of the crime.— Every penalty imposed for the
commission of a felony shall carry with it the forefeiture of the proceeds of
the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall
be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be the
property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which
are not subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is partly GRANTED. The
Decision dated
With respect to Criminal Case No.
4563-98, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS that petitioner is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of
one year of imprisonment as minimum to two years of imprisonment as maximum,
not subject to probation; and he shall suffer DISQUALIFICATION to hold
public office and DEPRIVATION of the right of suffrage. The subject firearm is CONFISCATED and
FORFEITED in favor of the Government.
SO
ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, with Associate Justices Jose L.
Sabio, Jr. and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring.
[2] Rollo,
p. 49.
[3] Should be (q).
[4] Rollo,
p. 50.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Petitioner’s
Memorandum, rollo, pp. 127-128.
[10] People
v. Alba, 326 Phil. 519, 527 (1996).
[11] People
v. Mercado, 400 Phil. 37, 71 (2000), citing People v. Dianos, 357
Phil. 871, 884 (1998).
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] G.R.
No. 104961,
[16] 380
Phil. 719, 733-734 (2000).
[17]
[18] People
v. Go, 457 Phil. 885, 928 (2003), citing People v. Musa, G.R. No.
96177, January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA 597, 610.
[19] People
v. Go., id. at 928.
[20] Rollo,
p. 40.
[21] People v. Lualhati, G.R. Nos.
105289-90,
[22] People
v. Solayao, 330 Phil. 811, 819 (1996), citing People v. Arce, G.R.
Nos. 101833-34, 227 SCRA 406, 421.
[23] TSN,
[24] People
v. Solayao, supra note 22 at 819.
[25] See 1 Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code 17 (2001) & Antonio L. Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review 10 (1997).
[26] Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225.