THIRD
DIVISION
|
AUGUSTO GOMEZ, as Special
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez,
Petitioner, - versus
- MARIA RITA GOMEZ-SAMSON, MARCIAL
SAMSON, JESUS B. GOMEZ, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x AUGUSTO GOMEZ, as Special
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez,
Petitioner, - versus
- ARISTON A. GOMEZ, SR. (who died during
the pendency of the cases below and substituted by his surviving wife, LUZ
BAYSON GOMEZ, and children namely:
ARISTON B. GOMEZ, JR., MA. RITA GOMEZ-SAMSON, JESUS B. GOMEZ, MA.
TERESA G. BLOOM, MARIANO B. GOMEZ, and CARLOS B. GOMEZ) and ARISTON B. GOMEZ,
JR., Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 156284 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ. Promulgated: |
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Which came
first, the chicken or the egg?
This
age-old question has spurned millions of debates in scientific and religious
circles, and has stimulated the imagination of generations of children and
adults. Many profess that they are
certain of the answer, and yet their answers are divergent.
The case at
bar involves a similarly baffling question, but in significantly lesser proportions
of philosophical mystery. Petitioner
claims that, in the two Deeds of Donation he is impugning, the signatures of
the donee were jotted down before the bodies of the Deeds were
typewritten. Respondents maintain that
the bodies of the Deeds were encoded first, and then, a clashing presentation of
expert witnesses and circumstantial evidence ensued. Petitioner’s expert claims she is certain of
the answer: the signature came first.
Respondents’ expert, on the other hand, says that it is impossible to
determine which came first accurately.
As both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
respondents, petitioner is furious how these courts could adopt an opinion that
was “neither here nor there.”
However, as
it is with the chicken and egg riddle, is the person certain of which came
first necessarily the one who is more credible?
This is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari of
the Decision[1]
and Resolution[2]
dated
The facts
of the case, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On February 15, 1980, [petitioner]
instituted these cases, to wit: (1) Civil Case No. 36089, entitled: “Augusto
Gomez, as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez,
Plaintiff, versus Maria Rita Gomez-Samson, Marcial Samson, Jesus B. Gomez, and
the Registers of Deeds of Pasig and Marikina, Rizal, Defendants”; and (2) Civil
Case No. 36090, entitled: “Augusto Gomez, as Special Administrator of the
Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez, Plaintiff, versus Ariston Gomez, Sr., and
Ariston B. Gomez, Jr., Defendants”, both in the Regional Trial Court, Pasig
City.
CONSUELO, ARISTON, SR. and Angel, all
surnamed Gomez, were sister and brothers, respectively. MARIA-RITA Gomez-Samson, JESUS Gomez and
ARISTON Gomez, JR. are the children of ARISTON, SR. while AUGUSTO Gomez is the
child of Angel.
In Civil Case No. 36089, plaintiff AUGUSTO
alleged in his complaint that CONSUELO, who died on
“(a) A parcel of land, with all the improvements
thereon, situated in
“(b) A parcel of land, with all the improvements
thereon, situated in Marikina, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 353818 in her name, x x x,”
“(c) A parcel of land, with all the improvements
thereon, situated in
that after the death of Consuelo, defendants Rita and
Jesus fraudulently prepared and/or caused to be prepared a Deed of Donation Intervivos;
that in the said document, Consuelo donated the above described properties to
defendants Rita and Jesus; that the said defendants forged or caused to be
forged the signature of the donor, Consuelo; that the notarial acknowledgement
on the said document was antedated to April 21, 1979; that on the basis of the
said document defendants sought the cancellation of the certificates of title
in the name of Consuelo and the issuance of new ones in the names of defendants
Rita and Jesus.
On
the basis of the foregoing, plaintiff prayed that the Deed of Donation Intervivos
be declared false, null and void ab initio, and/or be nullified; that
TCT Nos. 340233, 353818, and 268396 be reinstated or be replaced by titles in
the name of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez; and, that defendants be
ordered to pay damages, by way of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation
plus costs.
On
April 24, 1980, private defendants, and nominal defendants Registers of Deeds
of Pasig and Marikina, Rizal, filed their common answer, denying the material
allegations in the complaint and asserting that a copy of the deed of donation
was submitted to the Notarial Section of the CFI of Quezon City as early as
July 2, 1979; that the said document is valid and not a forgery or otherwise
subject to similar infirmity; that the said document being valid, the
properties covered therein passed in ownership to private defendants, as early
as April 20, 1979; that defendants have the perfect and absolute right to cause
the cancellation of TCT Nos. 340233, 353818, and 26839 and request for the
issuance of new certificates of titles in their respective names; that they
have the right to use, enjoy, possess, dispose and own these properties; that
no law was violated by the nominal defendants when the old certificates of
title were cancelled and new certificates were issued in the name of the
private defendants, hence, plaintiff has no cause of action against the nominal
defendants neither has the court jurisdiction over the foregoing issue.
Defendants
thereafter prayed for moral damages of P2,000,000.00; compensatory
damages of P1,000,000.00; exemplary damages of P500,000.00;
attorney’s fees of P200,000.00; and that individual plaintiff be made
jointly and severally liable with the estate of Consuelo Gomez.
In
Civil Case No. 36090, the same plaintiff alleged in his complaint that Consuelo
was also the sole and absolute owner of the following personal properties:
(a)
Seventy-five (75)
common shares of stock of V-Tri Realty, Inc. with a total par value of P75,000.00
and covered by Stock Certificate No. 003;
(b)
Eleven thousand
eight hundred fifty three (11,853) common shares of stock of First Philippine
Holdings Corporation with a total par value of P118,530.00 covered by
Stock Certificates Nos. A-02614 (7,443 shares) and A-02613 (2,040 shares) and
A-09018 (2,370 shares);
(c)
Jewelries and
collector’s items, contained in Consuelo Gomez’s Safe Deposit Box No. 44 at the
PCI Bank, Marikina Branch, which were inventoried on January 9, 1980 per Order
of the Court in Special Proceedings No. 9164;
(d)
A four-door sedan
1978 Mercedes Benz 200 with Motor No. 11593810-050706, Serial/Chassis No.
12302050-069893, Plate No. A6-252 and LTC Registration Certificate No. 0140373
valued at P200,000.00, more or less at the time Consuelo Gomez died;
(e)
A four-door sedan
1979 Toyota Corona with Motor No. 12RM-031643, Serial/Chassis No.
RT-130-901150, Plate No. B-09-373 and LTC Registration Certificate No. 0358757,
valued at P50,000.00, more or less at the time Consuelo Gomez died;
(f)
Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) including accrued interests on money market
placement with the BA Finance Corporation per its promissory note No. BAT-0116
dated
that after the death of Consuelo, defendants
fraudulently prepared and/or caused to be prepared a Deed of Donation Intervivos;
that in the said document Consuelo donated the above described properties to
defendants Ariston, Sr. and Ariston, Jr.; that the said defendants forged or
caused to be forged the signature of the donor, Consuelo; that the notarial
acknowledgment on the said document was antedated to April 21, 1979; that on
the basis of the said document defendant Ariston, Sr., [in] December 1978,
effected or tried to effect a change of the LTC registration of the two (2)
vehicles; that defendant Ariston, Jr., for his part, pre-terminated the money
market placements with BA Finance and received checks in the sums of P187,027.74
and P4,405.56; that with the exception of the jewelries, which are with
the bank, defendant Ariston, Sr., has benefited and will continue to benefit
from the use of the two (2) vehicles and from the dividends earned by the
shares of stocks.
On
the basis of the foregoing, the plaintiff prayed that the Deed of Donation Intervivos
be declared false, null and void ab initio, and/or be nullified; that
defendant Ariston, Sr., be ordered to deliver the stock certificates,
jewelries, collector’s items, and vehicles in his possession plus all the cash
dividends earned by the shares of stock and reasonable compensation for the use
of the two (2) motor vehicles; that defendant Ariston, Jr. be ordered to pay
the amount of P191,533.00 received by him from BA Finance, with interest
from the time he received the amount until he fully pays the plaintiff; and,
damages, by way of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, plus costs.
On
March 19, 1980, defendants Ariston, Sr. and Ariston Jr., filed their answer,
denying the material allegations in the complaint and asserting that a copy of
the Deed of Donation was submitted to the Notarial Section of the CFI of Quezon
City as early as July 2, 1979; that the said document is valid and not a
forgery or otherwise subject to similar infirmity; that the said document being
valid, the properties covered therein passed in ownership to defendants, as
early as April 20, 1979; and that defendants have the perfect and absolute
right to use, enjoy, possess and own these properties.
Defendants
thereafter prayed for moral damages of P2,000,000.00; compensatory
damages of P1,000,000.00; exemplary damages of P500,000.00;
attorney’s fees of P200,000.00; and that individual plaintiff be made
jointly and severally liable with the estate of Consuelo Gomez.
On
After
appropriate proceedings, the trial court directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda thirty (30) days from their receipt of the transcript of
stenographic notes.
In
its joint decision dated
The
dispositive portion of the RTC Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, it is Ordered:
1. That the instant complaints be
dismissed;
2. That the replevin bonds nos. 2223,
2224, 2225, and 2226 of the Stronghold Insurance Company, Incorporated be
cancelled;
3. That Augusto Gomez and the estate of
the late Consuelo Gomez, jointly and solidarily, should pay to Ariston Gomez,
Jr. the following amounts:
Moral damages of P1,000,000.00;
Exemplary damages of P250,000.00
Attorney’s fees of P200,000.00
And costs of suit; with legal interest on all the
amounts, except on costs and attorney’s fees, commencing from
Petitioner
filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. The latter affirmed the RTC’s Joint Decision
in the
WHEREFORE,
the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto.[5]
Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the Court of
Appeals in the assailed Resolution dated
Petitioner
filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,
bringing forth before us the following issues for our consideration:
1) Whether or not the instant petition
presents several exceptions to the general rule that an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 may only raise
questions of law and that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding
on this Honorable Court;
2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals’
Decision is based on a misapprehension of facts and on inferences that are
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals
seriously erred in its finding of fact that Consuelo Gomez herself paid the
donor’s tax of the properties subject of the donation on
4) Whether or not the Court of Appeals
seriously erred in giving credence to the testimony of former judge Jose
Sebastian, the Notary Public who notarized the assailed Deeds of Donation;
5) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously
erred in dismissing the irregularities apparent on the face of the assailed
Deeds of Donation as mere lapses of a non-lawyer who prepared them;
6) Whether or not the Court of Appeals
seriously erred in totally disregarding the very unusual circumstances relative
to the alleged totally execution and notarization of the assailed Deeds of
Donation;
7) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously
erred and is manifestly mistaken in inferring that respondents were able to
sufficiently and substantially explain the reason for the belated transfer of
the pertinent properties covered by the assailed Deeds of Donation;
8) Whether or not the Court of Appeals
seriously erred and is manifestly mistaken in not giving due weight to the
expert opinion of the NBI representative, which the lower court itself sought;
and
9) Whether or not the Court of Appeals
seriously erred in not finding that the totality of circumstantial evidence
presented by petitioner produced a single network of circumstances establishing
the simulation and falsification of the assailed Deeds of Donation.[6]
As acknowledged by petitioner,
findings of fact of the
trial court, especially when upheld by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the
Supreme Court.[7] Petitioner, however, seeks refuge in the following
established exceptions[8] to
this rule:
1) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible.[9]
2) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts.[10]
3) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts.[11]
4) Where the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion;[12]
and
5) Where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not
disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on absence of evidence but are contradicted by the
evidence of record. [13]
Weight and Credibility of the Expert Witnesses
The core
issue in this Petition, as in that in the lower courts, is whether petitioner
was able to prove that the Deeds of Donation were merely intercalated into two
sheets of paper signed by Consuelo Gomez (Consuelo).
The only
direct evidence presented by petitioner on this matter is the testimony of
Zenaida Torres, Document Examiner[14]
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Respondents, on the other hand, presented their own expert witness,
Francisco Cruz, Chief of Document Examination[15]
of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory. Other
direct evidence presented by respondents includes testimonies positively
stating that the Deeds of Donation were signed by Consuelo in their completed
form in the presence of Notary Public Jose Sebastian. These testimonies are that of Jose Sebastian
himself, and that of several of the respondents including Ariston Gomez, Jr.
(Ariston, Jr.), who allegedly drafted said Deeds of Donation.
As the
testimony of Zenaida Torres is the single most important evidence of petitioner,
it is imperative to examine the lengthy discussion of the trial court analyzing
her testimony, and the contradictory findings of Francisco Cruz.
Zenaida
Torres’s testimony, as noted by the trial court, was that she had examined the
two Deeds of Donation, denominated as Documents No. 401 and No. 402, and her
findings were that the signatures therein were indeed those of Consuelo. However, she opined that Documents No. 401
and No. 402 were not typed or prepared in one continuous sitting because the
horizontal lines had some variances horizontally. Nevertheless, she admitted that the vertical
lines did not show any variance.
Zenaida
Torres also testified that with respect to Document No. 401, the typewritten
words “Consuelo C. Gomez” were typed after the handwritten signature “Consuelo
C. Gomez.” This is based on her analysis
of the letter “o” in the handwritten signature, which touches the letter “n” in
the typewritten name “Consuelo C. Gomez.”
She could not, however, make any similar findings with respect to Document
No. 402, because the typewritten words “Consuelo C. Gomez” and the handwritten
signature “Consuelo C. Gomez” “do not even touch” in the latter document.
Zenaida
Torres failed to convince the trial court that the Deeds of Donation were not
prepared in one sitting:
To start with, it is very significant that
Torres herself admits that the signatures of Consuelo in the Donations 401 and
402 are genuine.
(This is contrary to the allegations of
Augusto in his complaint; wherein he alleged that the signatures of Consuelo
were forged. In fact, as per the
allegations, in Augusto’s complaint, the signatures were forged, after the
death of Consuelo).
(In effect, Augusto is now trying to shift
the thrust of his attack, to a scenario wherein Consuelo allegedly signed two
papers in blank, and thereafter, said Donations 401 and 402 were typed on top.)
Furthermore, Torres fell apart during,
cross-examination. Torres admitted that
she had not taken any specialized studies on the matter of “Questioned Documents,”
except on one or two seminars on “Questioned Documents.” She admitted that she had not passed the
Board Exams, as a Chemist; she further admitted that she has not written any
thesis or similar work on the subject matter at issue.
Regarding non-typing in one continuous
sitting, she admitted that she had never seen the typewriter used to type the
Donations 401 and 402, nor even tried to get hold of it, before she made the
report; that there were no variances insofar as the vertical alignments of the
typewritten documents were concerned; that there were only variances insofar as
the horizontal alignments are concerned; she admitted that if anybody had
wanted to incorporate a document into a blank sheet of paper, on top of a
signature, the normal step to be taken would be to be careful on horizontal alignment,
which can be seen via the naked eye; and not the vertical alignment. Yet, the vertical alignment, as admitted by
her, was perfect.
In fact, she had to admit that it is
possible that if the paper roller is loose, the horizontal alignment will have
a variance; whereas, the vertical alignment would have no variance, and there
would be nothing sinister about this.
She had to admit this, because she was confronted with an authority on
the matter, more particularly the book of Wilson Harrison (vide Exhibit
“17”). She admitted that she had not
used bromide when she took the photographs of the two (2) Donations 401 and
402, which photographs she later on enlarged.
She admitted that when she had taken the photographs of the two (2)
Donations, she had not put the typewritten pitch measure on top. She admitted that when the photographs were
enlarged, the alignment of the typewritten words became distorted; more so when
a typewriter pitch measure is not used, when photographing the documents.
In effect, insofar as the issue of
typewriting in one sitting or not, is concerned, the testimony of Torres was
completely discredited (Vide TSN of May 19, 1986).[16]
On the
other hand, the trial court gave weight to the testimony of Francisco Cruz:
Cruz testified on this point that the
Donations 401 and 402 were both typed in one continuous sitting. He elucidated clearly on how he arrived at
this conclusion.
To start with, he was able to determine
that the typewriter used was the elite typewriter, because as per Cruz, when
his typewriting measuring the instruments were placed over the documents, there
were twelve (12) letters that went inside one inch, which is a characteristic
of an elite typewriter.
Secondly, he noticed that the color tone
of the typewriter ink is the same, thru the entire documents.
As per Cruz, this is another indication
that the Donations 401 and 402 were prepared in one continuous sitting,
because, as per Cruz, if the typewriter is used one time and sometime after
that, the typewriter is used again, the color tone will most probably be
different.
He further concluded that both the
horizontal and vertical alignments are in agreement. He explained how he arrived at this
conclusion.
As per Cruz, by using an instrument which
is a typewriting measuring instrument produced by the Criminal Research Co.,
Inc. in the USA and placing said instrument to test the vertical alignment from
the top down to the bottom, there is a perfect vertical alignment.
In fact, as per Cruz, when he took
photographs of the documents, he had already placed the typewriting measuring instrument
over the document and he showed to the court the enlarged photographs,
indicating clearly that all the vertical alignments are all in order.
He also found out that the horizontal and
vertical alignments are in agreement.
He explained that the slight variances as
to the spacing of the words “Know All Men By These Presents” and the words
“That I Consuelo C. Gomez, single, of legal age, Filipino, and a resident of 24
Pine Street, New Marikina Subdivision, Marikina”, there is a slight
disagreement in the spacing, but not in the alignment.
He explained that the normal reason for
such discrepancy in the spacing is because the typist sometimes tries to push
the variable spacer; the [button] on the left side of the roller, and if you
press that round [button], there will be a variance spacing namely one space,
two spaces, and three spaces; and these are not attached so there is a variable
in the spacing.
In short, this was due to the pushing of
the variable paper by the typist.
Furthermore, he emphasized that the left
margins are aligned and this signifies that there was typing in one continuous
sitting, because if you type on a paper and re-insert it again, there are
differences in the left hand margin. All
of his findings appear in the blow up photographs which were marked as Exhibits
“31” to “34”.
He even pointed out the differences in the
Jurat wherein admittedly, Judge Sebastian inserted the date “21st”
and “1” (page number), “401” (document number), “I” (book number), and “82”
(series); and also his signature “Jose R. Sebastian” and his “PTR Number” (vide
pages 12 to 19, TSN of
All attempts by opposite counsel to
discredit the testimony of Cruz on this issue, proved futile.[17]
As stated
above, petitioner also alleges that the signature “Consuelo C. Gomez” was
written before the typewritten name “Consuelo C. Gomez.” In this second round of analysis of the
respective testimonies of Zenaida Torres and Francisco Cruz, the trial court
arrived at the same conclusion:
[ZENAIDA TORRES’S] FINDINGS ARE BASED
SOLELY ON A SINGLE HANDWRITTEN LETTER “O”, WHICH TOUCHES (DOES NOT EVEN
INTERSECT) THE TYPEWRITTEN LETTER “N”.
BASED ON THIS, WITHOUT MORE, TORRES CONCLUDED THAT THE TYPEWRITTEN NAME
“CONSUELO C. GOMEZ” CAME AFTER THE HANDWRITTEN SIGNATURE “CONSUELO C. GOMEZ”.
We need but cite authorities on the matter
(with which Authorities Torres was confronted and which authorities she had to
admit), which read as follows:
The Intersection of Ink Lines with Typescript. It is often stated that is possible to
determine whether an ink line which intersects typescript was written before or
after the typing. The theory is simple;
most typewriter inks are greasy and an ink line tends to shrink in width as it
passes over a greasy place on the paper.
If, indeed, an ink line is observed to suffer a distinct reduction in
width every time it intersects the typescript it may safely be concluded that
the ink line was written after the typescript.
In practice, however, ink lines written across
typescript are rarely seen to suffer any appreciable shrinkage in width, since
the amount of oily medium transferred from the ribbon to the paper is rarely
sufficient to have any effect. Indeed,
if the ink happens to be alkaline, surplus ink, instead of shrinking, may
spread out into the typescript to increase the width of the inkline at the
intersection. In the case the proof that
the ink followed the typescript would be the presence of a swelling rather than
a shrinkage.
Experience has shown that it is rarely possible for
any definite opinion as to the order of appearance on the paper for
intersecting ink lines and typescript to be justified on the [meager] amount of
evidence which generally available.
A similar state of affairs will be found to hold for
carbon paper and waxer; which have much in common with typewriter ribbons in
the way the mark they make on paper react with intersecting ink lines”.
(Wilson, Suspect Documents; Exhibits “19”; “19-A”; “37”; “37-D”; underscoring
ours).
In fact, the very authority of Torres on
the matter, states as follows:
“Sequence of Writing
Intersecting writing strokes may have distinctive
patterns, depending upon the order of writing the lapse of time between the two
writings, the density of the two strokes and the kind of inks, writing
instruments, and paper used. With a
binocular microscope or a hand-magnifier aided by skillfully controlled light
and photography, the true order of preparation may be revealed and demonstrated
to a lay observer.
What appears to be the obvious solution may not always
be the correct answer. For example, the
line of deepest color usually appears on top even if it was written first. Careful study and testing is necessary before
reaching a conclusion. Some of the more
common criteria for determining sequence are considered in the following
paragraphs.
If we considered the intersection of two writing
strokes or the intersection of writing and typewriting the majority of problems
are covered. Substantial, repeated
intersections of two writings offer a higher probability of success than a
single indifferent intersection, such as a weak stroke crossing another which
only very infrequently can produce a clear indication of the order of writing”.
(Exhibits “V” and “V-1” (underscoring ours).[18]
The trial
court again sided with Francisco Cruz who testified, citing authorities,[19]
that it is impossible to determine accurately which came first, because there
were no intersections at all.[20] The trial court added: “[i]n fact, common
sense, without more, dictates that if there are no intersections (between the
typewritten and the handwritten words), it would be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to determine which came first.”[21] The Court of Appeals found nothing erroneous
in these findings of the trial court.[22]
Petitioner
claims that the testimony of Zenaida Torres, having positively maintained that the
handwritten signatures “Consuelo C. Gomez” in both Deeds of Donation were
affixed before the typewritten name of Consuelo C. Gomez, cannot possibly be
overcome by the opinion of Francisco Cruz that was “neither here not there.”[23]
Petitioner
also puts in issue the fact that Zenaida Torres was a court-appointed expert,
as opposed to Francisco Cruz who was merely designated by respondents. Petitioner also assails the credibility of
Francisco Cruz on the ground that he had once testified in favor of respondent
Ariston, Jr.[24]
Finally,
petitioner stresses that Zenaida Torres conducted her tests on the carbon
originals of both Deeds of Donation that were then in the possession of the
Notarial Register of Quezon City. On the
other hand, Francisco Cruz conducted his tests, with respect to Document No.
401, on the original in the possession of Ariston, Jr.
On the
first point, we agree with petitioner that positive evidence[25]
is, as a general rule, more credible than negative evidence.[26] However, the reason for this rule is that the
witness who testifies to a negative may have forgotten what actually occurred,
while it is impossible to remember what never existed.[27]
Expert
witnesses, though, examine documentary and object evidence precisely to testify
on their findings in court. It is, thus,
highly improbable for an expert witness to forget his examination of said
evidence. Consequently, whereas faulty
memory may be the reason for the negative testimonies delivered by ordinary
witnesses, this is unlikely to be so with respect to expert witnesses. While we, therefore, cannot say that positive
evidence does not carry an inherent advantage over negative evidence when it
comes to expert witnesses,[28]
the process by which the expert witnesses arrived at their conclusions should
be carefully examined and considered.
On this
respect, Prof. Wigmore states that the ordinary expert witness, in perhaps the
larger proportion of the topics upon which he may be questioned, has not a
knowledge derived from personal observation.
He virtually reproduces, literally or in substance, conclusions of
others which he accepts on the authority of the eminent names responsible for
them.[29] In the case at bar, the expert witnesses
cited sources as bases of their observations. Francisco Cruz’s statement that “no finding or
conclusion could be arrived at,”[30]
has basis on the sources presented both by him and by Zenaida Torres. Both sets of authorities speak of
intersecting ink lines. However, the
typewritten words “Consuelo C. Gomez” barely touch and do not intersect the
handwritten signature Consuelo C. Gomez in Document No. 401. In Document No. 402, said typewritten words
and handwritten signature do not even touch.
In the case
at bar, therefore, the expert testimony that “no finding or conclusion can be
arrived at,” was found to be more credible than the expert testimony positively
stating that the signatures were affixed before the typing of the Deeds of
Donation. The former expert testimony
has proven to be more in consonance with the authorities cited by both experts.
As regards
the assertion that Zenaida Torres conducted her tests on the carbon originals
of both Deeds of Donation found in the notarial registrar, whereas Francisco
Cruz merely examined the original in the possession of Ariston, Jr. with
respect to Document No. 401, suffice it to say that this circumstance cannot be
attributed to respondents. After the
examination of the documents by Zenaida Torres, fire razed the
Other than
the above allegations, petitioner’s attack on the entire testimony of Francisco
Cruz (including the part concerning whether the Deeds were typed in one
continuous sitting) rests primarily in the contention that, while Zenaida
Torres was court-appointed, Francisco Cruz’s testimony was solicited by
respondents, one of whom had previously solicited such testimony for another
case.
In United States v. Trono,[31]
we held:
Expert testimony no doubt constitutes
evidence worthy of meriting consideration, although not exclusive on questions
of a professional character. The
courts of justice, however, are not bound to submit their findings necessarily
to such testimony; they are free to weigh them, and they can give or refuse to
give them any value as proof, or they can even counterbalance such evidence
with the other elements of conviction which may have been adduced during the
trial. (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly,
in Espiritu v. Court of Appeals[32]
and Salomon v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,[33] this
Court held:
Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert
testimonies, they may place whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies
in accordance with the facts of the case.
The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly
within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and
character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and
process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible
bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid
witness, the relative opportunities for study or observation of the matters
about which he testifies, and any other matters which serve to illuminate his
statements. The opinion of the
expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in
view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when common knowledge
utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect (20 Am. Jur., 1056-1058). The problem of the credibility of the
expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of
the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an
abuse of that discretion. (Underscoring supplied.)
Thus, while
the expert witness’ possible bias in favor of the side for whom he or she testifies, and the fact that
he or she is a paid witness, may be considered by the trial court, the latter
should weigh the same with all the other evidence adduced during trial, as well
as with the witness’ deportment, actions, ability, and character upon the
witness stand. The trial court is
consequently given the discretion in weighing all these circumstances in its
determination of the expert witness’ credibility, as it is in a better position
than the appellate courts to observe the demeanor of these witnesses. As there is no evidence of abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in such determination, the latter is
not reviewable by this Court.
Alleged patent irregularities on the face of the
assailed Deeds of Donation
As
previously mentioned, the testimony of Zenaida Torres constitutes the only
direct evidence presented by petitioner to prove that the Deeds of Donation
were merely intercalated over the signature of Consuelo. Petitioner, however, also presents the
following circumstantial evidence and arguments to prove the same, claiming
that there are patent irregularities on the face of the assailed Deeds of
Donation:
1)
Both deeds are each one-page documents contained in a
letter size (8” ½” x “11”) paper, instead of the usual legal size (8” ½” x “14”)
paper, and typed single spaced, with barely any margin on its four sides;[34]
2)
In Doc. 401,
three parcels of land located in two different municipalities were purportedly
donated to two donees in the same document;[35]
3)
In Doc. 402, shares of stock in two corporations,
jewelries and collector’s items in a bank deposit box, two registered cars,
cash and money placement in another bank, and a bodega were donated to three
donees in the same document;[36]
4)
The bodega mentioned in Doc. No. 402 was not owned by
Consuelo. If the Deeds were executed by
Consuelo, she would surely have known this fact as she was the treasurer of V-TRI
Realty Corporation;[37]
5)
If Doc. 401 is superimposed on Doc. 402, the signature
of Consuelo on both documents appear almost in the same place;[38]
6)
The whole of both Deeds of Donation, including the
notarial acknowledgement portion and the TAN Numbers and Residence Certificates
of the signatories, were typed with only one typewriter. The only portions that seemed to have been
typed with a different machine are the date (“21st”) below the
acknowledgement and the filled-in numbers of the “Doc. No. ___; Book No. ___;
Page No. ___’” portion, the name “Jose R. Sebastian” above the words NOTARY
PUBLIC and the PTR Number with date and place of issue;[39]
7)
The PTR Number and its date and place of issue appear
in the right hand side of the name and signature of Jose Sebastian, instead of
below it;[40]
8)
The inserted date (which was typed with the same
machine used for typing the name of notary public Jose Sebastian) is different
from the date of the clause “In WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereunto set their
hands in Quezon City, on the 20th day of April/1979” (which was
typed with another machine; the one used in typing the body of the deed and the
body of the acknowledgment);[41]
9)
The TAN Numbers and the Residence Certificate Numbers
of the purported donor and donees have already been typed with the same machine
that was used in typing the body of the deed and the body of the
acknowledgement;[42]
10)
It is highly questionable that a supposedly
well-educated person like Ariston Gomez, Jr. would not have thought of
preparing at least five copies of each document as there were four donees and
one donor.[43]
The Court
of Appeals ruled:
As to the alleged intercalation of the text of the
deeds of donation above the supposedly priorly affixed signature of CONSUELO on
a blank sheet of bond paper, as shown by the one-page document in a letter size
paper, typed single space with barely any room left on the top, bottom and left
and right margins, as well as the lack of copies thereof, it has been explained
that the same was due to the fact that the said documents were prepared by
defendant ARISTON, JR., a non-lawyer inexperienced with the way such documents
should be executed and in how many copies. x x x.
x x x x
Accordingly, it is not surprising that someone as
unfamiliar and inexperienced in preparing a deed of donation, or any deed of
conveyance for that matter, as ARISTON, JR., prepared the documents that are
the subject matter of the case at bar in the manner that he did.[44]
Petitioner
counters that the alleged irregularities “do not relate to the proper
construction or manner of writing the documents as would necessitate the
expertise of a lawyer. Rather, they
relate to matters as basic as observing the proper margins at the top, left,
right and bottom portions of the document, using the appropriate paper size and
number of pages that are necessary and observing appropriate spacing and proper
placement of the words in the document.”
All these
alleged irregularities are more apparent than real. None of these alleged irregularities affects
the validity of the subject Deeds of Donation, nor connotes fraud or foul
play. It is true that the condition and
physical appearance of a questioned document constitute a valuable factor
which, if correctly evaluated in light of surrounding circumstances, may help
in determining whether it is genuine or forged.[45] However, neither the expert witnesses, nor
our personal examination of the exhibits, had revealed such a questionable
physical condition.
Legal
documents contained in 8 ½ x 11 paper are neither unheard of, nor even
uncommon. The same is true with regard
to single-spaced legal documents; in fact, petitioner’s Supplemental Memorandum
was actually single-spaced.
That the subject
Deeds of Donation appear to have conveyed numerous properties in two sheets of
paper does not militate against their authenticity. Not all people equate length with
importance. The simplicity and
practicality of organizing the properties to be donated into real and personal
properties, and using one-page documents to convey each category, are clearly
appealing to people who value brevity.
The same appeal of conciseness had driven petitioner to make a
single-spaced Supplemental Memorandum whose only object was to summarize the
arguments he has laid down in the original twice-as-long Memorandum,[46]
an endeavor that we, in fact, appreciate.
The
allegation concerning the use of one typewriter to encode both Deeds of
Donation, including the notarial acknowledgment portion, TAN, and residence
certificates, is purely paranoia. Being
in the legal profession for many years, we are aware that it is common practice
for the parties to a contract to type the whole document, so that all the
notary public has to do is to input his signature, seal, and the numbers
pertaining to his notarial registry.
The use of
single-paged documents also provides an explanation as to why the PTR number
and the date and place of issue are found in the right-hand side of the name
and signature of Jose Sebastian, instead of below it. We agree with respondents that it is
irrational, impractical, and contrary to human experience to use another page
just to insert those minute but necessary details. Such use of single-paged documents, taken
together with the fact that the Deeds of Donation are of almost the same length,
are also the reasons why it does not baffle us that the signatures of Consuelo
appear at around the same portions of these Deeds. Indeed, we would have been suspicious had these
documents been of varying lengths, but the signatures still appear on the same
portions in both.
The only
observations concerning the physical appearance of the subject Deeds of
Donation that truly give us doubts as to their authenticity are the relatively
small margins on the sides of the same, the lack of copies thereof, and the
alleged inclusion in Document No. 402 of a bodega allegedly not owned by
Consuelo. However, these doubts are not
enough to establish the commission of fraud by respondents and to overturn the
presumption that persons are innocent of crime or wrong.[47] Good faith is always presumed.[48] It is the one who alleges bad faith who has
the burden to prove the same,[49]
who, in this case, is the petitioner.
The small
margins in the said Deeds of Donation, while indicative of sloppiness, were not
necessarily resorted to because there was a need
to intercalate a long document and, thus, prove petitioner’s theory that there
were only two pieces of paper signed by Consuelo. Respondents admit that the use of one sheet
of paper for both Deeds of Donation was intentional, for brevity’s sake. While the ensuing litigation could now have
caused regrets on the part of Ariston, Jr. for his decision to sacrifice the
margins for brevity’s sake, there still appears no indication that he did so maliciously. Indeed, law professors remind bar examinees
every year to leave margins on their booklets.
Despite the importance examinees put into such examinations, however,
examinees seem to constantly forget these reminders.
The
testimonies of Ariston Gomez, Sr. (Ariston, Sr.), Ariston, Jr., Maria Rita
Gomez-Samson (Maria Rita), and Notary Public Jose Sebastian tend to show that
there were one original and two copies each of Documents No. 401 and No. 402. Of these documents, it was the original of Document
No. 402 and a duplicate original of Document No. 401 which were actually
presented by petitioner himself before the trial court, through the
representative of the notarial registrar of
Petitioner
testified that he could not find copies of the two Deeds of Donation with the Bureau
of Records Management. He, however, was
able to find certified true copies of these documents with the Register of
Deeds and the Land Transportation Commission.[50]
According
to the testimony of Ariston, Jr., the original of Document No. 401 was
separated from the brown envelope, containing the other copies of the Deeds of
Donation, which Jose Sebastian left with respondents, as they were trying to
fit the same into a certain red album.
On the other hand, Maria Rita testified that one copy each of the
duplicate originals of Documents No. 401 and No. 402 were lost. Maria Rita explained that when she was about
to leave for Spain to visit her sister in Palma de Mallorica, her father,
Ariston, Sr., gave her the brown envelope, containing duplicate originals of
the Deeds of Donation in question, to show to her sister in Palma de Mallorica.[51] Maria Rita explained in detail how her
handbag was stolen as she was praying in a chapel while waiting for the
connecting flight from
Notary
public Jose Sebastian retained two copies of the Deeds of Donation in his
files. Jose Sebastian explained that he
did so because Consuelo wanted two copies of each document. Since Jose Sebastian had to transmit to the
Notarial Registrar duplicate originals of the document, he had to photocopy the
same to keep as his own copies, and transmit to the Notarial Registrar whatever
duplicate original copies he had. Jose
Sebastian did not notice that, instead of retaining a duplicate original of Document
No. 402, what was left with him was the original.[54]
While it
cannot be denied that the unfortunate incidents and accidents presented by
respondents do arouse some suspicions, the testimonies of Ariston, Jr., Maria
Rita, and Jose Sebastian had been carefully examined by the trial court, which
found them to be credible. Time and again, this Court has ruled
that the findings of the trial court respecting the credibility of witnesses
are accorded great weight and respect since it had the opportunity to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before the court. Unless substantial facts and circumstances
have been overlooked or misunderstood by the latter which, if considered, would
materially affect the result of the case, this Court will undauntedly sustain
the findings of the lower court.[55]
All petitioner has succeeded in
doing, however, is to instill doubts in our minds. While such approach would succeed if carried
out by the accused in criminal cases, plaintiffs in civil cases need to do much
more to overturn findings of fact and credibility by the trial court,
especially when the same had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It must be stressed that although this Court
may overturn a conviction of the lower court based on reasonable doubt,
overturning judgments in civil cases should be based on preponderance of
evidence, and with the further qualification that, when the scales shall stand
upon an equipoise, the court should find for the defendant.[56]
Respondents
also point out that Ariston, Jr., the person they claim to have prepared said
Deeds of Donation, was never confronted during the trial with all these alleged
irregularities on the face of the Deeds of Donation. As such, the trial court
was never given a chance to determine whether Ariston, Jr. would have given a
rational, logical and acceptable explanation for the same.
Respondents
are correct. As the alleged
irregularities do not, on their faces, indicate bad faith on the part of
respondents, it is necessary for petitioner to confront respondents with these
observations. Respondents would not have
thought that the Deeds of Donation would be impugned on the mere basis that
they were written on short bond paper, or that their margins are small. Respondents were thus deprived of a chance to
rebut these observations by testimonies and other evidence, and were forced to
explain the same in memoranda and briefs with the appellate courts, where these
observations started to crop up. It
would have been different if the date of the documents had been after
Consuelo’s death, or if there had been obvious alterations on the
documents. In the latter cases, it would
have been the responsibility of respondents’ counsel to see to it that Ariston,
Jr. explain such inconsistencies.
Payment of donor’s tax before the death of Consuelo
In ruling
that there had been no antedating or falsification of the subject Deeds of
Donation, the Court of Appeals was also persuaded by the following evidence: (1) the finding that it was the
deceased CONSUELO herself who paid the donor’s tax of the properties subject of
the donation, as evidenced by the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB)
check she issued to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on
9 October 1979, in the amount of
P119,283.63, and (2) the testimony and certification dated 22 November
1979 of Jose Sebastian that the said documents were acknowledged before him on 21
April 1979.[57] Respondents had presented evidence to the
effect that Consuelo made an initial payment of P119,283.63 for the
Donor’s Tax on P2,125.82 on
Petitioner
claims that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in its finding of fact that
Consuelo herself paid the donor’s tax of the properties subject of the donation
on 9 October 1979, as the evidence allegedly shows that the Donor’s Tax was
paid on 4 December 1979, or a month after Consuelo’s death.[58] Petitioner thereby calls our attention to his
Exhibit “O,” a certificate dated
LUNGSOD NG QUEZON
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that MS. CONSUELO C.
GOMEZ of P121,409.45 inclusive of surcharge, interest and compromise
penalties as follows:
RTR No. 2814499, PTC Conf. Receipt No.
2896956 – P119,283.63
RTR No. 2814500/PTC Conf. Receipt No.
2896957 – 2,125.82
---------------
T
o t a l P121,409.45
This certification is issued upon request
of Mr. Ariston Gomez, Sr.
(SGD)NESTOR M. ESPENILLA
Chief, Financing, Real Estate and Transfer
Taxes Division
TAN E2153-B0723-A-7[59]
Petitioner
highlights the fact that the Revenue Tax Receipts (RTRs) and the Confirmation
Receipts for the payments supposedly made by Consuelo on 9 October 1979 and by
respondent Ariston, Sr. on
Petitioner
presented further the check used to pay the Donor’s Tax, which, petitioner
himself admits, was signed by Consuelo.[60] Petitioner draws our attention to the words
“RECEIVED – BIR, P.T.C. CUBAO BR., NON-NEGOTIABLE, T-10 DEC. 4.” Petitioner concludes that Philippine Trust Company
Bank, Cubao Branch, received the check on
Respondents,
on the other hand, presented the following documents to prove payment of the
Donor’s Tax before the death of Consuelo on
1) The
covering letter to the BIR Commissioner dated
2) Another
letter dated
3) A
schedule of gifts which was also dated
4) The
Donor’s Tax Return covering the properties transferred in the two Deeds of Donation
filed, received, and receipted by the BIR Commissioner on
5) The 9
October 1979 PCIB Personal Check No. A144-73211 issued by Consuelo in favor of
the BIR Commissioner in the amount of P119,283.63.[65]
6) An
“Authority to Issue Tax Receipt” issued by the BIR Commissioner on P119,283.63.[66]
Before
proceeding further, it is well to note that the factum probandum[67]
petitioner is trying to establish here is still the alleged intercalation of
the Deeds of Donation on blank pieces of paper containing the signatures of
Consuelo. The factum probans[68]
this time around is the alleged payment of the Donor’s Tax after the death of
Consuelo.
Firstly, it
is apparent at once that there is a failure of the factum probans, even if successfully proven, to prove in turn the factum probandum. As intimated by respondents, payment of the
Donor’s Tax after the death of Consuelo does not necessarily prove the alleged
intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on blank pieces of paper containing the
signatures of Consuelo.
Secondly,
petitioner failed to prove this factum
probandum.
Ariston,
Jr. never testified that Consuelo herself physically and personally delivered PCIB
Check No. A144-73211 to the BIR. He
instead testified that the check was prepared and issued by Consuelo during her
lifetime, but that he, Ariston, Jr., physically and personally delivered the
same to the BIR.[69] On the query, however, as to whether it was
delivered to the BIR before or after the death of Consuelo, petitioner and
respondents presented all the conflicting evidence we enumerated above.
The party
asserting a fact has the burden of proving it.
Petitioner, however, merely formulated conjectures based on the evidence
he presented, and did not bother to present Nestor Espenilla to explain the
consecutive numbers of the RTRs or what he meant with the words “on even date”
in his certification. Neither did
petitioner present any evidence that the records of the BIR Commissioner were falsified
or antedated, thus, letting the presumption that a public official had
regularly performed his duties stand.
This is in contrast to respondents’ direct evidence attesting to the
payment of said tax during the lifetime of Consuelo. With respect to respondents’ evidence, all that
petitioner could offer in rebuttal is another speculation totally unsupported
by evidence: the alleged fabrication thereof.
Credibility of Jose Sebastian
Petitioner
claims that no credence should have been given to the testimony of the notary
public, Jose Sebastian, as said Jose Sebastian is the same judge whom this
Court had dismissed from the service in Garciano
v. Sebastian.[70] Petitioner posits that the dismissal of Judge
Jose Sebastian from the service casts a grave pall on his credibility as a
witness, especially given how, in the course of the administrative proceedings
against him, he had lied to mislead the investigator, as well as employed
others to distort the truth.
Petitioner
further claims that the reliance by the Court of Appeals on the
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO
Executive Judge
CFI –
Sir:
In
connection with the discrepancies noted by the Acting Clerk of Court in my
notarial report pertaining to another document submitted to the Notarial
Section last July 2, 1979 I have the honor to certify that documents Nos. 401
and 402 referring to Donations Inter Vivos executed by Donor Consuelo C. Gomez
in favor of Donees Ma. Rita Gomez-Samson et. al. were signed in my presence by
all the parties and their instrumental witnesses on
In
view of the above, it is respectfully requested that the certified true copies
of the said two documents officially requested by one of the Donees be issued.
Very
respectfully,
(Sgd.)
JOSE R. SEBASTIAN
Notary
Public[71]
Petitioner
points out that the Certification was made after the death of Consuelo, and
claims that the same appears to be a scheme by Jose Sebastian to concoct an
opportunity for him to make mention of the subject Deeds of Donation intervivos, “despite the plain fact that
the latter had utterly no relation to the matter referred to by Jose Sebastian
in the opening phrase of the letter.”[72]
It is well
to note that, as stated by the Court of Appeals, Jose Sebastian was originally
a witness for petitioner Augusto. As
such, Rule 132, Section 12, of the Rules of Court prohibits petitioner from
impeaching him:
SEC. 12.
Party may not impeach his own
witness. – Except with respect to witnesses referred to in paragraphs (d)
and (e) of section 10, the party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach
his credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling
or hostile only if so declared by the court upon adequate showing of his
adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled the
party into calling him to the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so
declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may be impeached by the party
presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party,
except by evidence of his bad character.
He may also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse party, but
such cross-examination must only be on the subject matter of his
examination-in-chief.
This rule
is based on the theory that a person who produces a witness vouches for him as
being worthy of credit, and that a direct attack upon the veracity of the
witness “would enable the party to destroy the witness, if he spoke against
him, and to make him a good witness, if he spoke for him, with the means in his
hands of destroying his credit, if he spoke against him.”[73]
Neither had
there been declaration by the court that Jose Sebastian was an unwilling or
hostile witness. Jose Sebastian is also
neither an adverse party, nor an officer, director nor a managing agent of a
public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an
adverse party.[74]
Be that as
it may, even if Jose Sebastian had been declared by the court as an unwilling
or hostile witness, the third paragraph of Section 12 as quoted above, in
relation to Section 11[75]
of the same Rule, only allows the party calling the witness to impeach such
witness by contradictory evidence or by prior inconsistent statements, and never by evidence of his bad character. Thus, Jose Sebastian’s subsequent dismissal
as a judge would not suffice to discredit him as a witness in this case.
We have also
ruled in People v. Dominguez,[76]
which, in turn cited Cordial v. People,[77]
that:
(E)ven convicted criminals are not excluded from
testifying in court so long as, having organs of sense, they “can perceive and
perceiving can make known their perceptions to others.”
The fact of prior criminal conviction alone
does not suffice to discredit a witness; the testimony of such a witness must
be assayed and scrutinized in exactly the same way the testimony of other
witnesses must be examined for its relevance and credibility. x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The effect
of this pronouncement is even more significant in this case, as Jose Sebastian has never been convicted of a crime before
his testimony, but was instead administratively
sanctioned eleven years after such testimony. Scrutinizing the testimony of Jose Sebastian,
we find, as the trial court and the Court of Appeals did, no evidence of bias
on the part of Jose Sebastian. On top of
this, Jose Sebastian’s testimony is supported by the records of the notarial
registry, which shows that the documents in question were received by the
Notarial Registrar on
Alleged unusual circumstances relative to the
execution and notarization of the subject Deeds of Donation
The last
set of circumstantial evidence presented by petitioner to prove the alleged
intercalation of the subject Deeds of Donation on two blank papers signed by
Consuelo are the following allegedly unusual circumstances relative to the execution
and notarization of the said deeds.
According to petitioner:
1.
The signing and
acknowledgement of the Deeds of Donation on 21 April 1979 is highly improbable
and implausible, considering the fact that Consuelo left the same day for the
United States on a pleasure trip;[78]
2.
The flight time
of Consuelo on
3.
It is contrary to
human experience for Consuelo and respondents not to make a prior arrangement
with the notary public Jose Sebastian and instead take a gamble on his being in
his office;[80]
4.
It is illogical
for Consuelo to rush the execution of the donations when she was in fact
planning to come back from her pleasure trip shortly, as she did;[81]
5.
The choice of a
notary public from
6.
It is improbable
that Consuelo paid Jose Sebastian in cash, for there is no reason for her to
carry much cash in peso when she was about to leave for the
7.
Maria Rita’s
residence certificate was obtained from
8.
If Consuelo was
really frugal, she could have also made a will;[86]
9.
All the
instrumental witnesses of the Deeds of Donation are biased, being themselves
either donees of the other Deed of Donation, or a relative of a donee;[87]
and
10.
Respondents were
not able to sufficiently and substantially explain the belated transfer of the
properties covered by the assailed Deeds of Donation. Petitioner points to
Maria Rita’s testimony that the real properties were transferred after the
death of Consuelo. While respondents
assert that the personal properties were transferred to them prior to
Consuelo’s death, evidence shows otherwise.[88]
This Court
does not find anything suspicious in a person wanting to transfer her
properties by donation to her loved ones before leaving for abroad via an airplane. While many believe these days that taking the
plane is the “safest way to travel,” this has not always been the case. The fear that planes sometimes crash, now
believed to be irrational, has always been at the back of the minds of air
travelers. Respondents maintain in their
testimonies before the RTC that the Deeds were completed to the satisfaction of
Consuelo only on
The claim
that the flight time of Consuelo was at
As regards
petitioner’s claim that respondents’ alleged time frame in the morning of
Respondents
and Consuelo’s decision not to make a prior arrangement with notary public Jose
Sebastian does not surprise us either.
Respondents explain that, since the telephone lines of
With
respect to the choice of a notary public from
Moreover, ARISTON, JR. disclosed that they could not
have gone to the notary public whom his aunt, CONSUELO, knew because she did
not want to go to said notary public since our cousins whom she didn’t like had
access to him and she wanted to keep the execution of the deeds
confidential. Thus:
Q: And
also you know for a fact that your auntie had a regular Notary Public for the
preparation and notarization of legal documents in the name of Atty. Angeles,
now Congressman Angeles of
A: It
depends on the frame of time. Yes and
No. He was a regular Notary Public, but
way before that date. But after that, he
fall out of graces of my auntie. He was
not anymore that regular.
Q: How
long before April 30 did he fall out of graces of your auntie, year before
that?
A: I
don’t specifically remember but what I do know is such confidential document
like this, we would not really go to Angeles.
Q: Even
for notarization purposes?
x x x x
A: Even
for notarization purposes, no sir. This
confidential nature, no.
ATTY. FERRY:
Are
you saying that your auntie trusted more Sebastian than Angeles?
A: No. He is trusting her own experience about Atty.
Angeles.
Q: Are you
saying that she had sad experience with Atty. Angeles in connection with the
latter’s performance of his duty as Notary Public, as a lawyer?
A: That
is what she told me.
Q: When
was that?
A: She
will tell me that regularly.
x x x x
ATTY. FERRY:
Q: Mr. Gomez,
you testified last April 6, 1989 that after the execution of the two documents
in question dated April 20, 1979, Atty. Angeles fell out of the graces of your auntie and you added that as a
consequence, your auntie did not avail of the notarial services of Atty.
Angeles when it comes to confidential matters, is that correct?
A: Yes. After that particular execution of the Deed
of Donation Inter Vivos, Atty. Angeles especially if the documents are
confidential in nature.
Q: You used confidential matters, did your
aunt spell out what these confidential matters are?
A: This
particular document, Deed of Donation was under the category “confidential”.
Q: But did
you discuss this, the matter of notarizing this document by Atty. Angeles with
your auntie such that she made known to you this falls under confidential
matters?
A: Yes we
did.
Q: So in
other words, you intimated to your auntie that Atty. Angeles would possibly
notarized these documents?
A: No.
Q: How did
it come about that your auntie gave that idea or information that these
documents should be notarized by other notary public other than Angeles,
because it is confidential?
A: It
came from her.
Q: Yes,
did she tell you that?
ATTY. GUEVARRA:
That’s
what he said. “It came from her”.
ATTY. FERRY:
My question is, how did it come about your auntie told
you that these two documents are of confidential matters?
A: Well,
no problem. I said that it has to be
notarized, she said more or less, “ayaw
ko kay Atty. Angeles”.
Q: She
said that?
A: That’s
correct.
Q: And you
were curious to know why she told you that?
A: No. I knew why she told me that. She said that Atty. Angeles….well, my cousins
whom she didn’t like have access to Atty. Angeles.[92]
The Court
of Appeals had fully explained that the belated transfer of the properties does
not affect the validity or effects of the donations at all, nor dent the
credibility of respondents’ factual assertions:
Per our perusal of the records, we find that the
defendants were able to sufficiently and substantially explain the reason for
the belated transfer of the pertinent properties, i.e., after the death of
CONSUELO. Thus, the testimony of MA.
RITA revealed, insofar as the real properties are concerned, the following:
“Q: Since
you were already aware as you claim that as early as when you went to the
States in the company of your auntie, Consuelo Gomez, these 2 parcels of land
together with the improvements consisting of a house were transferred to you,
you did not exert efforts after your arrival from the States to effect the
transfer of these properties?
“A: No, I
did not.
“Q: Why?
“A: Well,
for delicadeza. My auntie was still alive.
I am not that aggressive. Tita
Elo told me “akin na iyon” but I did
not transfer it in my name. “Siempre nakakahiya.”
“Q: That
was your reason for not effecting the transfer of the properties in your name?
“A: Yes,
that was my reason.
“Q: Did you
not know that the deed supposedly executed by Consuelo Gomez was a donation
inter vivos, meaning, it takes effect during her lifetime?
“A: I do
not know the legal term donation inter vivos.
I have also my sentiment. Tita
Elo was very close to us but I did not want to tell her: “Tita
Elo, ibigay mo Na iyan SA akin.
Itransfer mo na sa pangalan ko.”
It is not my character to be very aggressive.”
In addition, Article 712 of the Civil Code provides:
“ART. 712.
Ownership is acquired by occupation and by intellectual creation.
“Ownership and other real rights over property are
acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by testate and intestate
succession, and in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition.
“They may also be acquired by means of prescription.”
Clearly, the issuance of the titles in the names of
the defendants is not the mode by which they acquired ownership of the
properties, but rather the fact that the same were donated to them. The circumstance that aforesaid properties
were actually transferred in the names of the donees only after the death of the
donor, although the deeds of donation were dated April 21, 1979, does not by
itself indicate that the said documents were antedated.[93]
Petitioner
seems to unduly foreclose the possibility – one which experience tells us is
not a rare occurrence at all – that donations are often resorted to in place of
testamentary dispositions, often for the purpose of tax avoidance. Such properties usually remain in the donor’s
possession during his or her lifetime, despite the fact that the donations have
already taken effect. Nevertheless, the
purpose of utilizing donation as a mode to transfer property is not in issue
here.
Finally,
the allegations concerning the payment of Jose Sebastian in cash, the
suggestion that Consuelo should have also made a will, and the claim that all
the instrumental witnesses of the will are biased, are purely speculative.
In sum, all
these circumstantial evidence presented by petitioner had failed to comply with
the strict requirements in using circumstantial evidence, for which Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court provides:
SEC. 4.
Circumstantial evidence, when
sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There
is more than one circumstance;
(b) The
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
While
the above provision seems to refer only to criminal cases, it has been pointed
out that in some jurisdictions, no distinction is made between civil and
criminal actions as to the quality of the burden of establishing a proposition
by circumstantial evidence. In such
jurisdictions the rule is generally stated to be that the circumstances
established must not only be consistent with the proposition asserted but also
inconsistent with any other rational theory.[94]
In all, what
petitioner has succeeded
in doing is to raise doubts in our minds.
Again, while such approach would succeed if carried out by the accused
in criminal cases, plaintiffs in civil cases need to do much more to overturn
findings of fact and credibility by the trial court, especially when the same
had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Leniency in
the weighing of petitioner’s evidence could only produce a mere equipoise:
When
the scales shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence
which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the
defendant.
Under
this principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not
on the weaknesses of the defendant’s claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the
defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his side if such
evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action.”[95] (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner’s liability for damages
The last
part of the trial court’s decision, which was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, involves the award of damages in
favor of Ariston, Jr. The trial court
held Augusto Gomez and the estate of the late Consuelo “jointly and solidarily
liable” for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
The trial
court held:
The records are clear, that plaintiff was
so desperate for evidence to support his charges, that he repeatedly subpoenaed
the defendants themselves; at the risk of presenting evidence contradictory to
his legal position and which actually happened, when plaintiff subpoenaed Ariston
Gomez Jr., Ariston Gomez Sr., and Maria Rita Gomez-Samson, as his witnesses.
All told, the court finds plaintiff was
motivated not by a sincere desire to insure the totality of the estate of
Consuelo, but rather by his desire to cause injury to defendants, and to
appropriate for himself and the rest of the Gomez brothers and nephews, other
than the donees, properties which were clearly validly disposed of by Consuelo,
via Donations Inter Vivos.[96]
Our own
examination of the records of the case, however, convinces us of the
contrary. Respondents never assailed the
authenticity of petitioner’s evidence, and merely presented their own evidence
to support their assertions. As
previously stated, petitioner’s evidence had successfully given us doubts as to
the authenticity of the subject Deeds of Donation. While such doubts are not enough to discharge
petitioner’s burden of proof, they are enough to convince us that petitioner’s
institution of the present case was carried out with good faith. The subpoenas directed against respondents
merely demonstrate the zealous efforts of petitioner’s counsel to represent its
client, which can neither be taken against the counsel, nor against its clients.
While, as
regards the alleged intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on two blank sheets
of paper signed by Consuelo, the burden of proof lies with petitioner, the
opposite is true as regards the damages suffered by the respondents. Having failed to discharge this burden to
prove bad faith on the part of petitioner in instituting the case, petitioner
cannot be responsible therefor, and thus cannot be held liable for moral damages.
This Court
has also held that, in the absence of moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages, no exemplary damages can be granted, for exemplary
damages are allowed only in addition to any of the four kinds of damages
mentioned.[97]
The attorney’s
fees should also be deleted, as it was supposed to be the consequence of a
clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding by the plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, subject to the modification of
the assailed Decision, the Petition is DENIED. The Joint Decision of the
3. That Augusto Gomez and the estate of
the late Consuelo Gomez, jointly and solidarily should pay to Ariston Gomez,
Jr. the following amounts:
Moral damages of P1,000,000.00;
Exemplary damages of P250,000.00
Attorney’s fees of P200,000.00
And costs of suit; with legal interest on all the
amounts, except on costs and attorney’s fees, commencing from
SO
ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. with Associate Justices Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and
Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; rollo,
pp. 61-79.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Rollo, pp. 306-307.
[7] Sps. Lagandaon v. Court of Appeals, 352 Phil. 928, 941 (1998); Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1163, 1168 (1997).
[8] These are just five of the many exceptions to the rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive to the Supreme Court. According to this Court in The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 126850, 28 April 2004, 428 SCRA 79, 86), the exceptions to the foregoing rule are the following: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
[9] De Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 (1942).
[10] Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453, 461 (1954).
[11] De
la Cruz v. Sosing, 94 Phil. 26, 28 (1953).
[12] Uytiepo v. Aggabao, 146 Phil.
194, 203 (1970); Carolina Industries, Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc.,
G.R. No. L-46908,
[13] Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-49542, 12 September 1980, 100 SCRA 73, 80; Ducusin v. Court of Appeals, 207 Phil. 248, 261 (1983); Cesar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 54719-50, 17 January 1985, 134 SCRA 105, 121; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 226 Phil. 496, 512 (1986); Manlapaz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56589, 12 January 1987, 147 SCRA 236, 239.
[14] TSN,
[15] TSN,
[16] Rollo, pp. 489-490.
[17]
[18]
[19] Exhibits “19”; “19-a”; “20”; “21”;
“21-a”; “21-b”; “36”; “36-a”; “37”; “37-b to d”; “38”; “38-a to c”.
[20] Rollo, p. 495.
[21]
[22] CA Decision, p. 17;
[23] Supplemental Memorandum, p. 13;
[24]
[25] Evidence is positive when a witness
affirms that a fact did or did not occur. (V Herrera, Remedial Law [1999 Ed.], p. 15, citing 2
[26] Evidence is negative when a witness
states that he did not see or know the occurrence of a fact. (
[27] VI Herrera, Remedial Law (1999 Ed.), p. 357, citing 4 Jones, Sec. 29:4 (Sixth Ed.); People v. Tan, Jr., 332 Phil. 465, 481 (1996).
[28] See
Beaver v. Morson-Knudsen Co., 55
[29] V Herrera, Remedial Law (1999 Ed.), p. 764, citing VI Wigmore, p. 5.
[30] TSN,
[31] 3 Phil. 213, 219-220 (1904).
[32] 312 Phil. 431, 443 (1995).
[33] G.R. No. 70263,
[34] Rollo, p. 334.
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44]
[45] Junquera v. Borromeo, 125 Phil. 1059, 1068 (1967).
[46] Rollo, pp. 533-599.
[47] Rule 131, Section 3(a).
[48] See Civil Code, Article 527.
[49] Mama,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86517, 30 April 1991, 196 SCRA 489, 496.
[50] Exhibits “F”, “F-1”, “G”, and “G-1” of Petitioner.
[51] TSN,
[52] Exhibits “12” and “12-a.”
[53] Exhibit “13.”
[54] Rollo,
p. 97; TSN,
[55] People v. Lua, 326 Phil. 556, 563-564 (1996).
[56] Sapu-an
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91869,
[57] Rollo, pp. 77-78.
[58]
[59] Records, Civil Case No. 36090, p. 488.
[60] Rollo, p. 314.
[61] Exhibit “2.”
[62] Exhibit “2-a.”
[63] Exhibit “2-b.”
[64] Exhibit “2-c” of Respondents; Exhibit “M” of Petitioner.
[65] Exhibit “2-e.”
[66] Exhibit “2-d.”
[67] The ultimate fact to be established.
[68] Evidentiary fact by which the factum probandum is established.
[69] Rollo, p. 401.
[70] A.M. No. MTJ-89-4-371,
[71] Records, Civil Case No. 36090, p. 489.
[72] Rollo, p. 332.
[73] 4 Jones, p. 193, as quoted by VI Herrera, Remedial Law (1999 Ed.), p. 223.
[74] Section 12 gives as exception paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 10, which refers to:
(d) x x x [A]n unwilling or hostile witnesses; or
(e) x x x [A] witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party.
[75] SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse party’s witness. – A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense.
[76] G.R. No. 100199,
[77] G.R. No. L-75880,
[78] Rollo, pp. 338-339.
[79]
[80]
[81]
[82]
[83]
[84]
[85]
[86]
[87]
[88]
[89] TSN,
[90] TSN,
[91] Rollo, p. 73.
[92]
[93]
[94] VI Herrera, REMEDIAL LAW (1999 ed.), p. 402, citing 4 Jones on Evidence (6th Ed.), pp. 301-304.
[95] Sapu-an v. Court of Appeals, supra note 56 at 705-706.
[96] Rollo, p. 499.
[97] Ventanilla v. Centeno, 110 Phil. 811, 816 (1961); Fores v. Miranda, 105 Phil. 266, 273 (1959); Francisco v. Government Service Insurance System, 117 Phil. 586, 597 (1963).